Global Terrorism and Social Media: A Study of ISIS

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ABBREBEATION

AK-47- Alashvikova Kalashnikov 1947

AQI-Al-Qaeda in Iraq

BCE- Before Common Era

CD- Compact Disc

CEP -Counter Extremism Project

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency

CTED-Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

CTITF -United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force

CTED -Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

DPI-Department of Public Information

ICT-Information and communication technologies

IM-Indian Mujahidin

INTERPOL -International Criminal Police Organization

ISAF-International Security Assistance Force

ISI- Islamic State of Iraq

ISIS-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ITU-International Telecommunication Union

JKH-Junoodul Khalifafil Hind

JTJ- Jama'at al-Tawhidwal-Jihad

LTTE- Sir Lanka Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIA- National Intelligence Agency

OHCHR -Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PFLP- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

RSF- Reporters sans Frontiers

SIMI-Students' Islamic Movement of India

UNESCO -United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UGC- User Generated-Content

UNHQ- United Nation Headquarter

UNICRI -United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

UK- United Kingdom

UNODC -United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US- United States

VNSA-Violent Non-State Actor

WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABSTRACT

Globalization in the present era is primarily understood as a product of the technological and communication revolution that facilitates free flow of ideas and thoughts through internet and social media content. Global terrorism is the term related to the era of globalization as it serves the interest of radicalization where terrorist groups can easily access information and can radicalize, train and execute violent action without even meeting the recruits who are mostly younger generation. The global broadcast of radio and television on the one hand and the spread of internet, satellite and digital technologies on the other hand have made communication much more sophisticated. It cannot be denied that due to the technological advancement, global terrorism has also undergone a drastic change particularly in the recruitment methods and radicalization of youths with the use of social media and the internet facilities. The terrorist groups such as ISIS have not only made online presence felt but also spread throughout the world. This is evident that the behavioural pattern of the terrorist groups have now undergone a change its functioning and operating style, as compared to how it used to function and operate earlier. ISIS is a terrorist group which has been design to defend and expand the state control. While the group retains a significant regional apparatus, it has been successfully in setting up a self-sustaining financial model which poses a daunting challenge to traditional counterterrorism tactics that aimed at cutting off jihadist financing, propaganda, and recruitment methods. Social media plays a vital role in the age of globalization in which most of the users are young people and are easy target for jihadist groups to radicalize.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **"Global Terrorism and Social Media: A Study of ISIS"** submitted to Sikkim University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Philosophy** in Political Science is the result of bonafide research work carried out by **Deependra Chhetri** under my guidance and supervision. No part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree, diploma, associateship and fellowship.

All the assistance and help received during the course of the investigation have been duly acknowledged by her.

Date: **Dr. Amit Kumar Gupta**

Place: Gangtok   **Supervisor**

PLAGIARISM CHECK CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that plagiarism check has been carried out for the following M.Phil dissertation with the help of URKUND software and the result is within the permissible limit decided by University.

"Global Terrorism and Social Media: A Study of ISIS"

Submitted by **Deependra Chhetri** under the supervision of **Dr. Amit Kumar Gupta** of the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University, Gangtok, India.

Signature of the Candidate

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<u>PREFACE</u>

Globalization in the present era is primarily understood as a product of the technological and communication revolution that facilitates free flow of ideas and thoughts through internet and social media content. Global terrorism is the term related to the era of globalization as it serves the interest of radicalization where terrorist groups can easily access information and can radicalize, train and execute violent action without even meeting the recruits who are mostly younger generation. The global broadcast of radio and television on the one hand and the spread of internet, satellite and digital technologies on the other hand have made communication much more sophisticated. It cannot be denied that due to the technological advancement, global terrorism has also undergone a drastic change particularly in the recruitment methods and radicalization of youths with the use of social media and the internet facilities. The terrorist groups such as ISIS have not only made online presence felt but also spread throughout the world. This is evident that the behavioural pattern of the terrorist groups have now undergone a change its functioning and operating style, as compared to how it used to function and operate earlier. ISIS is a terrorist group which has been design to defend and expand the state control. While the group retains a significant regional apparatus, it has been successfully in setting up a self-sustaining financial model which poses a daunting challenge to traditional counterterrorism tactics that aimed at cutting off jihadist financing, propaganda, and recruitment methods. Social media plays a vital role in the age of globalization in which most of the users are young people and are easy target for jihadist groups to radicalize. Hence, it becomes necessary to counter the narrative that terrorist uses to radicalize the youth in the name of religion, and propagate the real essence of Islamic philosophy in a correct sense of valuing the human lives and the world.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Global terrorism has been one of the primary issues of concern in the globalised world. In the age of globalization and technological advancement with scientific innovation and new inventions, there has been a considerable change in the scenario of the world, which now offers possibilities of unthinkable actions that was unimaginable in the past history. In the trajectory of these developments, the concept of terrorism has also undergone a change in its dimension and behaving pattern with the establishment of its own governing authority (Cockburn P. , 2015). Further, the dynamics of global terrorism has also been in its functioning and mobilising methods with the use of social media for recruiting youths from all over the world (Weimann G. , 2014).

In the era of globalisation, where every nation are interconnected and interdependent and if a single country is effected by the menace of terrorism then it is likely that the other country may also have an impact due to the interconnectedness and interdependence (Cronin, 2007). As the current generations of terrorists possess a distinct advantage that their older predecessors lacked: access to computers, the worldwide Internet, and cyberspace's myriad technological benefits is enabling them to bypass a country's physical borders to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train operatives in warfare, direct operations, and then broadcast such incidents on their supporting websites which mobilizes youths to join their so called, 'cause'. The act of global terrorism and the current terrorist outbreak now constitute first order national security threat, as is being faced by the international community. This was evident in the case of 9/11 attack, when Al Qaida[1] demonstrated that it had world class ambitions to inflict catastrophic damages on its adversaries (Khosrokhavar, 2009).

The term such as global violence and human security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular sub-state units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists (Cha, 2007). The most likely targets are local groups and innocent citizens rather than the opposing force structures or the cities (Cha, 2007). This fact unveils that the illegitimate use of force and

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[1]Al-Qaeda was formed in August 11, 1988 at a meeting attended by Bin Laden, Zawahiri and Fadl in Peshawar, Pakistan. The creation of the group brought together extraordinary Saudi wealth, the expertise of a lifetime Egyptian militant, and a philosophical foundation for jihad from a Cairo intellectual. In Arabic translation Al-Qaeda stands for 'the base', 'the foundation' or 'the fundament' (Tan, 2009).

violence against the people in an area to intimidate a sovereign state and achieve their socio-political goal has become a common terror tactics in modern age. Global terrorism in the age of globalization where technology have enabled terrorist groups to conduct operations that are deadlier, more distributed and more difficult to combat than they were in the past(Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, September/2012).

Since the use of the Internet by a terrorist groups is a transnational problem which requires an integrated response across borders and among national criminal justice systems. Therefore, an international organization such as the United Nations plays a pivotal role in this regard, facilitating discussion and the sharing of good practices among Member States, as well as the building of consensus on common approaches to combating the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, representing a milestone in the domain of multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, September/2012). Several Security Council resolutions that have been adopted in recent years required more States to cooperate fully in the fighting against global terrorism in all its forms.

Theoretical Framework

Defining terrorism can be difficult as groups often espouse multiple grievances and compete with one another for resources and support, in addition the relative emphasis of these grievances within groups can change over time. Those targeted by terrorists are less inclined to see any justification, much less legitimacy, behind attacks that are designed to spread fear by killing and maiming civilians (Kiras, 2008). Thus, the term 'terrorists' has a derogative value that is useful in delegitimizing those who commit such acts and reaching consensus on what constitutes terrorism is difficult. The legitimacy of terrorist means and methods is the foremost reason for disagreement and some view terrorist acts as legitimate only if they meet the criteria associated with the 'just war' tradition. These criteria, which apply to all applications of force, have been expanded to include a just cause, proportional use of violence, and the use of force as a last resort (Kiras, 2008).

Realists suggest that the political violence used by terrorist groups is illegitimate on the basis that states alone have a monopoly on the legitimacy use of physical force. But they also keep the notion of power struggle, for which it means that any agency can challenge the power of a state if it loses the legitimate power to rule. For instance, civil war in Syria and the instability of the government to rule the State has funnel in the extremist groups like ISIS[2] in

the region to establish its own governing area known as 'caliphate'[3] and they project themselves as the legitimate ruler and the religious warriors to defend and expand Islam worldwide. It is astounding that how ISIS is regarded as a terrorist because it is not wretched to fight in the name of religion or neither it is wrong to establish its own governing authority nor it is immoral to defend and expand Islam. But it wrong to have an extremist thought to fulfill its goal, kill innocent civilians, challenge the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people. ISIS is wretched in its method of operating and functioning that uses violence in extreme manner to intimidate a population of government which is a regarded a dark feature of human behavior (Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009). Additionally, ISIS' ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals are similar to Al Qaida's and it represents the post–Al Qaida jihadist threat. This is because Al Qaida remains dangerous—especially its affiliates in North Africa and Yemen— ISIS is its successor (Cronin, March/April 2015).

According to Martha Crenshaw's subjective approach to determine the legitimacy of terrorist act of violence suggest that:

> The value of the normative approach (to terrorism) is that it confronts squarely a critical problem in the analysis of terrorism, and indeed any form of political violence: the issue of legitimacy. Terrorists of the left deny the legitimacy of the state and claim that the use of violence against it is morally justified. Terrorists of the right deny the legitimacy of the opposition and hold that the violence in the service of order is sanctioned by the values of the status quo…the need for scholarly objectivity and abstraction does not excuse use form the obligation to judge the morality of the use of force, whether by the state or against (Crenshaw, 1984: 2-4).

Further she adds that morality can be judged in two ways which are morality of the ends and the morality of the means. First, the goals of the terrorists are democratic or nondemocratic which means whether their aim is to create or perpetuate a regime of privilege and inequality, to deny liberty to other people, or to further the ends of justice, freedom and equality. Terrorism must not, as the terrorists can foresee, result in worse injustice than the condition the terrorist oppose. Second, the morality of the means of terrorism is morally significant that witness the difference between material objects and human casualties (Crenshaw, 1984).

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[2]ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (al-Sham) is described as a quasi-state with its own 'capital city', 'currency', 'official language', etc. It has an element of terrorism with a concentrated force which has expand its territory and started behaving geopolitically in the Middle-East (Cronin, 2015).

[3]Caliphate- the idea of the caliphate evokes many Muslims for the idea of a glorious and unified Islamic civilization(Hoyland, 2006).

Another IR theory, constructivism believes that the claim that significant aspects of International Relations are historically and socially contingent, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristic of world politics(Barnett, 2008). Constructivism most concern itself with the role of ideas in shaping international system by ideas constructivist refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities and other elements that influences states and non-state actor within the international system. Therefore, according to this theory, terrorism in the globalized world may be an idea constructed by the powerful states to retain the hegemonic control over the world by exhibiting its coercion through counter measures.

However, scholar like Audrey Kurth Cronin has outlined different types of terrorist groups and their historical importance in the following ways:

There are four types of terrorist organizations currently operating around the world, categorized mainly by their source of motivation: left-wing terrorists, right-wing terrorists, ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorists, and religious or 'sacred' terrorists. All four types have enjoyed periods of relative prominence in the modern era, with left-wing terrorism intertwined with the Communist movement, right-wing terrorism drawing its inspiration from Fascism, and the bulk of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism accompanying the waves of decolonization especially in the immediate post-World War II years.

Moreover, she adds that "sacred" terrorism is becoming more significant because other categories are not perfect as many groups have a mix of motivating ideologies some ethno-nationalist group, for example, have religious characteristics or agendas but usually one ideology or motivation dominates (Cronin, 2002).

A religious terrorist organization such as Al Qaida, its affiliates and their allies around the world has started the so called 'holy war' against their opponents in the west. One of the issue is that not only they have succeeded in embedding themselves with terrorist networks that are spearheading internal conflicts in weak and failed states, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. Additionally, an ideological movement they have been able to radicalize new generations of adherents around the world using cyberspace, including social media and internet facilities (Weimann G. , 2014).

Social media is a two-way form of communication that allows users to interact with the information being transmitted. Social media encompasses a wide variety of online content, from social networking sites like Facebook to interactive encyclopaedias like Wikipedia (Christensson, 2013; Obar& Wildman, 2015).Conventional media, such as

television or newspapers, essentially transmits information in one direction. Users can consume the information the media offers, but they have little or no ability to share their own views on the subject. Social media, however, gives users the ability to interact with the content that is being distributed. This communication may be as simple as allowing users to comment on articles or news stories, but it can also be more complex, such as on Wikipedia, where users can dictate and revise the content contained in encyclopaedia articles (Obar& Wildman, 2015). Other social media sites may offer recommendations to users based on the interests of other users. Other examples of social media include social news sites such as Reddit, Propeller and Digg. These sites allow users to interact with one another by sharing content and voting on its quality, which determines the articles that rise to the top of the site. Social video sites like YouTube allow users to share video content and interact through video comments.

Social media are computer-mediated technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, career interests and other forms of expression via virtual communities and networks. The variety of evolving stand-alone and built-in social media services introduces a challenge of definition (Obar & Wildman, 2015).The idea that social media are defined by their ability to bring people together has been seen as too broad a definition, as this would suggest that the telegraph and telephone were also social media but scholars are not intending to describe the technologies (Schejter & Tirosh, 2015). Therefore, the terminology is unclear, with some referring to social media as social networks (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). However, some scholars like Obar, Wildman, Schejter and Tirosh reviewed the prominent literature in the area and identified four commonalities unique to then-current social media services which are as follows:

1. social media are Web 2.0 Internet-based applications.
2. user-generated content (UGC) is the lifeblood of the social media organism.
3. users create service-specific profiles for the site or app that are designed and maintained by the social media organization.
4. social media facilitate the development of online social networks by connecting a user's profile with those of other individuals or groups (Obar & Wildman, 2015; Schejter & Tirosh, 2015).

Merriam-Webster defines social media as, "Forms of electronic communication (such as Web sites) through which people create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)", and first known use of social media was from 2004

(Merriam-Webster dictionary, 2017).Social media use web-based technologies, desktop computers and mobile technologies (e.g., smartphones and tablet computers) to create highly interactive platforms through which individuals, communities and organizations can share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content or pre-made content posted online. They introduce substantial and pervasive changes to communication between businesses, organizations, communities and individuals. Social media changes the way individuals and large organizations communicate (Christensson, 2013; Obar & Wildman, 2015; Schejter & Tirosh, 2015).

Islamic militant groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and Taliban have begun to see social media as a major organizing and recruiting tool all because of the increased connectivity of the world through the power of internet. They used social media to promote their cause. For instance, ISIS have produced online magazine to recruit more fighters (Ajbaili, 2014). Not only this, on Twitter they have created an app called the 'Dawn of Glad Tidings' that users can download and keep up to date on news about ISIS and many users around the world have signed up to support them (Ajbaili, 2014). This online support has become one of the major factors in the radicalization of youth.

The term radicalization is the action or a process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political and social issues (Coolsaet R., 2008). However each of the world's major religions includes a tiny minority of militant elements that engage in terrorism (Al-Shishani, 2005; Hegghammer, 2010), most of the literature on radicalization and recruitment into terrorism focuses on militant Islam because terrorist groups that have 'hijacked' Islam represent the major threats against their own societies and the Western world(Aboul-Enein, 2010; Al-Shishani, 2005; Bar, 2008). Like the root causes that drive terrorism in general, militant Islamic terrorism has not emerged in a vacuum, but is the product of the confluence of historical and contemporary drivers and 'real world' factors (Aboul-Enein, 2010; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 2004; Kiras, 2008). To comprehend the narrative that is central to Muslim belief, it is essential to read, understand and interpret the Quran in a right manner to extract the real essence of its philosophy (Al-Shishani, 2005; Aboul-Enein, 2010). Such understanding will provide an overview of radicalization and lessen recruitment into militant Islam, within the context of the larger Muslim world.

Statement of Problem

The terrorists group such as ISIS presently controls a roughly defined region. This has made evident that the behavioural pattern of the terrorist groups have now changed its functioning and operating style, as compared to how it used to function and operate earlier. ISIS is a terrorist group which is designed to defend and expand the state control (Cockburn P. , 2015). While the group retains a significant regional apparatus, it has been successfully in setting up a self-sustaining financial model which poses a daunting challenge to traditional counterterrorism tactics that aimed at cutting off jihadist financing, propaganda, and recruitment methods. The group has changed the notion of terrorist group becoming traditional security threat from non-traditional one.

It cannot be denied that due to the technological advancement, global terrorism has also undergone a drastic change particularly in the recruitment methods and radicalization of youths with the use of social media and the internet facilities (Ajbail, 2014). In a popular discourse, the Internet and the social media are playing a significant role in radicalizing youth, rather than acting as a source of positive change (Weimann G. , 2014). This has further led to the loss of life, insecurity and other major social disruptions that have occurred when such radicalization escalate into extremist behaviours.

Additionally, counterterrorism campaigns now span the spectrum of latest trends in warfare technology, from deploying specially equipped special operations forces to launching aerial drones that can remotely target terrorist operatives in far-away locations. The technology was well suited to the task of going after targets hiding in rural areas, where the risk of accidentally killing civilians was less. But such tactics do not hold much promise for combating ISIS because the group's fighters and leaders cluster in urban areas, where they are well integrated into civilian populations and usually surrounded by buildings, making drone strikes and raids much harder to carry out. And simply killing ISIS' leaders would not cripple the organization because they govern a functioning pseudo-state with a complex administrative structure.

This study makes an attempt to understand the factor that is escalating radicalization of youths which is turning to be an important public policy concern. Further, the study also analyses the counter measures being taken by various national and international agencies against terrorist who are using social media extensively.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Cole Bunzel's work 'Form paper State to Caliphate: the ideology of the Islamic State' has complete notes on the history of the origins of the State and its idea developing since 2002. Basically it is divided into two parts, Part I deals with the doctrines of Islamic world and talks about how these States became brand of Jihadi-Salafism where as Part II deal with the development of these idea since 2002 under Zaraqawi leadership, Arab Spring and the State of disunity. Cole Bunzel is PhD candidates in near Eastern studies at Princeton University, where he focuses on the history of the Wahhabi Movements in Saudi Arabia. He has written extensively on Jihadist ideology, Islamic State, and Al Qaida. The work is helpful for the study but some of the aspects for the study are not fulfilled in this book for instance the use of social media and the internet facilities to radicalized youths all over the world.

Gabriel Weizmann's work 'New Terrorism and New Media' is considered very unique and an instant classic as the first comprehensive study of this issue. Still highly relevant, it discusses how terrorist groups and their extremist affiliates have established a sophisticated and dynamic presence on the Internet, which has transformed the way they communicate, obtain information, conduct propaganda and issue threats against their adversaries. Terrorists also use the Internet to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train followers in tactics and weaponry, organize and carry out warfare, and then broadcast such incidents on their own websites. The author's discussion is illustrated with numerous examples from terrorist websites. But still it lack required knowledge about the success of ISIS as the terrorist group and how it is expanding its terrorist network all over the world by promising youths with its success story and recruiting them to join the group.

Boaz Ganor's edited volume 'Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting' is an important collection of papers by an eclectic group of international experts on terrorism and terrorists' use of the Internet, advertising, and graphic design, who gathered at a NATO advanced Workshop to formulate a comprehensive campaign to counter terrorists' appeal on the Internet. The volume's chapters examine the "seductive" appeal of radical Islamist websites for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, the use of symbolism in Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad, and how to uncover a terrorist group's rebellion's root causes by examining its Internet presence. The author provides practical ways to counter the "seductive" terrorist web by monitoring their cyberspace activities. But this literature also lacks the information and data about ISIS and how it use social media as propaganda tool.

Victoroff and Kruglanski in their edited work 'Psychology of terrorism: Classic and Contemporary Insights' is being divided into eight sections each posing a question like first section having a question what is Terrorism and How can psychology Explain it? Second why would one wants to become a terrorist? Why would terrorists enjoy wide popular support? Is terrorism rational or is terrorism evil? And how terrorism can be overcome? However it has 28 different articles contributed by various scholars in pursuit of seeking to answers of those questions. But this work has not been much useful for the study of ISIS and its use of social media in the twenty-first century because this work only discusses about the various psychological explanations in the aspect of individual terrorism. However in the aspect of collective action in unity or in the form of religious militant harden by its distorted ideological sphere.

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein's work 'Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat' is highly informative and important account, the author defines the threats posed by militant Islamists who, he writes, cloak themselves in Islam but are not representative of its mainstream religion and practices. In an innovative typology, he distinguishes between "Islam," "Islamist" and "Militant Islamist," with the latter presenting the "true threat." Using this framework, Cmdr. Aboul-Enein then proceeds to discuss how militant Islamists abuse Quranic verses. He shows how they embrace violence (jihad) against those who disagree with their extremist views rather than seeking ways to improve their situation. He explains the ideas of the ideological founders of Islamism and militant Islamism, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. Also valuable is his prescription for using al Qaida's rhetoric and actions to marginalize and counter it, including exposing Osama bin Laden as a malignant force. He concludes with a penetrating analysis of what he terms "mindsets that hamper America's capabilities." But the trend that ISIS is using to radicalize youths through social media which has not been highlighted in through insight of the issue. However, the work was useful for knowing some valuable information about historical events relating al Qaida's core value of mobilization and recruiting for Global Jihad.

Rik Coolsaet's edited work, 'Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge: European and American Experiences' is an important compilation of papers by leading experts on radicalization. Utilizing empirically-generated case studies, the contributors find that since 9/11 jihadi terrorism in the form of al Qaida 'Central' has been greatly weakened, now resembling a patchwork of self-radicalizing local cells with international contacts but without any central al Qaida organizational direction and control, which is compared to the radical left-wing terrorism of the 1970s. Another finding is that "self-starter" type

radicalization processes are at work in Western Europe and the United States. A separate section in the book examines the components of effective government strategies to de-radicalize extremists. But still it is limited in knowing the facts about its ideological sphere of misinterpreted religious sentiments or the darker side of Islam that radicalizes people into it.

Marc Sageman's work 'Understanding Terror Networks' is considered as a pioneering study on the global Salafi jihad – the interlocking radical Islamist terrorist networks led and shaped by Osama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization. Compiling biographies of 172 Islamist terrorist operatives gathered from open sources, the author employs social network analysis to unravel al Qaida's operations since 1998. He identifies four large clusters of terrorist operatives: the first, consisting of the central staff of al Qaida and of the global Salafist jihad movement, which formed the movement's overall leadership (many of whom were hiding in the Pakistan-Afghan border regions); the second, including operatives from core Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait); the third, also known as the Maghreb Arabs (the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), who resided in France and England; and the fourth belonging to al Qaida's ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, which was centered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Such unraveling of al Qaida's origins, evolution, organizational and demographic characteristics are the prerequisites for effective counteraction. But the most important successor of Qaida's origin is ISIS and this group has taken its goal to another level by using the technology of internet facilities and such information has not been mentioned.

Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, 'Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation' is a comprehensive account of how terrorist groups use the Internet's new media by examining the content of their websites, including their extremist television programs. Based on the authors' content analysis of the discussion in such extremist forums and chat-rooms, they discuss how terrorism 1.0 has migrated to 2.0 where the interactive nature of new media is used to build virtual organizations and communities that transcend physical boundaries. Terrorist groups' media efforts are also directed at women and children, which are part of their long term strategies to radicalize whole communities. Of particular interest is the authors' examination of the relationship between terrorists' media presence and their actual terrorist activity on the ground. They conclude that, although the use of social networking tools such as Face book and YouTube may advance terrorist groups' broadcast reach, the full impact of their use of such new media remains uncertain. They also discussed the future of cyber terrorism and lessons learned from government counterterrorism strategies

against terrorists' use of the Internet. But it lacked much needed information about ISIS and its origins.

Yaakov Lappin work 'Virtual Caliphate: Exposing the Islamist State on the Internet' is a compelling account which covers terrorism, of how Al Qaeda, which sees itself as a government in exile, along with its myriad affiliate organizations, while failing to achieve its goal of re-establishing the Islamic caliphate on the ground, has succeeded in establishing a virtual caliphate in cyberspace. As an Islamist state that exists on computer servers around the world, the virtual caliphate is used by such Islamists to carry out functions typically reserved for a physical state, such as creating training camps, mapping out a state's constitution, and drafting tax laws. In such a way, he explains, these groups hope to upload the virtual caliphate into the physical world. Also noteworthy is the author's discussion of the components of effective countermeasures. But in the case of ISIS is different as the counter measures used is not much effective as per mentioned in this work because this group has different strategy to radicalized youths. Further, the work limits itself only to design for dedicated analysis throughout cyber space and not focus on establishing actual caliphate.

Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger book, 'ISIS: The State of Terror' traces the ideological innovations that the group deploys to recruit unprecedented numbers of Westerners, the composition of its infamous snuff videos, and the technological tools it exploits on social media to broadcast its atrocities, and its recruiting pitch to the world, including its success at attracting thousands of Western adherents. The authors examine ISIS's predatory abuse of women and children and its use of horror to manipulate world leaders and its own adherents as it builds its twisted society. In their book, the authors claim that the "projection of strength" has lead to the rapid expansion of the self-declared Islamic State. The authors offer a much-needed perspective on how world leaders should prioritize and respond to ISIS's deliberate and insidious provocations.

'Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore', by Jay Sekulow closely examines the rise of the terrorist groups ISIS and Hamas, explains their objectives and capabilities and how, if left undefeated, their existence could unleash a genocide of historic proportions. The book gives a better understanding of the modern face of terror, and provides an overview of the laws of war and war crimes. These laws differentiate between the guilty and innocent, and explain why the US military and the Israeli Defence Forces are often limited in their defensive measures. The authors' firsthand experience, including multiple appearances before the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court at The Hague, along with direct contact battling jihadists during operation Iraqi Freedom lends insight into this important

geopolitical issue. The work is helpful for better understanding of the conflict that exists in the Middle East and this work is invaluable in revealing how this new brand of terrorism poses a very real threat to Americans and the world at large. It also serves as a guide to what we as individuals—and as a nation—can do to stop this escalating violence, prevent jihad, and protect Israel and America from this imminent threat. In this expanded edition, Jay tracks the most recent events in the war against ISIS, exposes new dangers, and provides a detailed plan to defeat ISIS and prevent genocide against Christians in the Middle East. ISIS is still growing, and its reach—as Jay predicted in the first edition—is extending across the globe.

After reviewing these literatures regarding the changing dimension of global terrorism, it has given a greater insight about how the terrorist groups have been using the internet facilities to radicalized and mobilized youth around the world. Further, the literatures on ISIS are more comprehensive in knowing the changing behavioural pattern of the terrorist group which is now acting as a regional state. But more analysis and study is important to have broader understanding between the relationship of ISIS and social media because this has also become one of major dynamics of global terrorism in a modern era.

SCOPE

The study is confined to understand the case for the emergence of ISIS as jihadist threat that has changed the notion of global terrorism with the dynamics of behaving pattern which has been a national security threats among the international community. The era of technological advancement and the innovative ideas of science in the globalised world with the use of internet and social media, offers possibilities for advancing all human abilities. But these progresses and advancement makes realization that such development may also lead to undesired progress of global terrorist groups to use internet facilities for its own desired motives. Therefore, the study makes an effort to analyze the fact behind terrorist's use of social media in mobilizing and radicalization of the youths and find a solution so as to mitigate adverse outcomes and amplify the widest dissemination for counter-measures. In this process, the study involves exploring internet-related issues and its solutions, understanding their evolution in different regions, their application and impact across various user groups and societies. Thus, the primary focus of the study is on the issue of the ISIS as a terrorist group that changed the dimension of global terrorism in its methods of operation and functioning through social media for recruiting and mobilizing youths around the globe. Basically the time frame of the study begins from when the idea of ISIS emerged, that is

precisely from the Second Gulf War of 2003. ISIS has become a focal point to the study of global terrorism because the group has initiated a different form of terrorist strategies which has never been witness by the international community.

The study has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one, is introduction which includes the introductory section which deals with the theoretical framework of the study. The chapter also includes the statement of problems, survey of literature, scope, objectives, research questions and methodology. Chapter two, Changing dimensions of global terrorism highlights the historical events that became responsible for the changing and emerging pattern of global terrorism along with the rise of ISIS and other terrorists organizations. The chapter also looks into the changing methods of its operation and functioning of the terrorist groups worldwide in the era of globalization. Chapter three, ISIS and its use of social media examines how ISIS is making use of the different modes of social media such as YouTube, Face book, Twitter, etc., in order to radicalize the youths around the globe. The chapter's, further discusses how social media is being used as a propaganda tools that serve their interests. Chapter four, Counter-measures against ISIS examines the various counter-measure that have been undertaken at the global and national level against ISIS and how major countries are making an effort to check the use of social media content that seems to be contributing towards radicalization of youths**.**

OBJECTIVES

The study focuses on three areas and the primary objectives of the study are:

- To determine the dimension of global terrorism and it's changing behavioural pattern with primary reference to the emergence and functioning style of ISIS.
- To examine the role played by social media in the radicalization processes, as the methods of recruiting, mobilizing and training of youths by ISIS is changing.
- To assess the counter-measures being taken by various national and international agencies against ISIS and their methods of recruiting and radicalization.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

➢ How global terrorism has changed its dimension with the emergence of ISIS and became traditional security threats from non-traditional one?

➢ What is the role of social media in radicalization processes and with its use how terrorists group have changed its methods of recruiting, mobilizing and training youths around the world?

➢ Are the counter-measures taken by various agencies at the global and national level effective against ISIS and its use of social media?

METHODOLOGY

As the objective of this study is to assess and understand the dynamics of global terrorism by studying the case of ISIS and its use of social media, and to comprehend the effect of radicalization, mobilization and recruiting methods among younger generations, it is exploratory and descriptive. Thus, the nature of the study requires using both quantitative as well as qualitative data collection techniques making it mixed methods approach. Both qualitative and quantitative data has been collected from primary and secondary sources. Secondary data has been collected from various published books, articles, journals etc, and the sources of primary data has been collected from various sources of transnational and international governmental reports such as the official documents from the United Nation (under the wing of UNODC-United Nations Office on Drug and Crime in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force) and data from Global terrorism index published by the Institute for Economics and Peace. Further, the study has also taken the help of content analysis from various news reports and media broadcasting to have a clearer picture and broader concept of the entire problem.

CHAPTER TWO

CHANGING DIMENSION OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

Global terrorism has not been a definite term that every scholar can easily define, but the word global can be understood as involving the entire world, wherein the impact of the terrorism has not been confine to a single nation but rather has become a threat to the nations worldwide. Terrorism can be understood as a systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion (Mahan & Griset, 2013; Zulaika, 2009; Martin, 2013). But in broader sense and commonly accepted definition of terrorism is the systematic use or threatened use of violence to intimidate a population of government and thereby effect political, religious or ideological change (Martin, 2013; Baudrillard, 2003; Kiras, 2008; Mahan & Griset, 2013).

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behaviour and has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people (Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009). The basic understanding of terrorism for a common person maybe as criminal, unfair or otherwise illegitimate use of force, but defining terrorism is not such a simple process. The definition of terrorism has become much more complex and one must have broader conception to define it in the era of globalization and technological development.

The act of terrorism exists in the trajectory of history leaving its existence and since then it has been changing its form and definition. Terrorism is not a new concept, history of terror existed since from the first-century, when Jewish Zealots also known as the 'sicarii', a murderous sect helped to incite an uprising against the Roman occupation that resulted, inter alia, in the destruction of the second temple in 70 C.E. and the Diaspora (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The 'Sicarii' were a first-century Jewish group who murdered enemies and collaborators in their campaign to oust their Roman rulers from Judea. Another act of terrorism in the past was the Hashhashin, whose name gave us the English word 'assassins', were a secretive Islamic sect active in the Middle East countries from the 1090 to the 1272 century (Chaliand & Blin, 2007).

For two centuries, between eleventh and thirteenth century, it made the political assassination of Muslim dignitaries by the blade its trademark. Their dramatically executed assassinations of Abbasid and Seljuk political figures terrified during those era (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Burman, 1987). Terrorism is best thought of as a modern phenomenon. However, Zealots and assassins were not really terrorists in the modern sense. Modern terrorism characteristics flow from the international system of nation-states, and its success depends on

the existence of a mass media to create an aura of terror among many people(Mahan & Griset, 2013; Martin, 2013). And these aspects were lacking in the history of terrorism during that period.

The Origins of Modern Terrorism

Modern terrorism originated as a method used by the state to terrorise its people and subdue its authority. Force and violent means began to flow in the system of state, such as totalitarianism or dictatorship regimes were established and terrorising its people by giving a severe punishment of death. However, the evolution of modern terrorism dates back to the eighteenth century as instigated by Maxmilien Robespierre. The concept of modern terrorism comes from the 'Reign of Terror' and originated with the French revolution (Cronin, 2002). Robespierre was one of twelve heads of the new state who had enemies of the revolution killed, and installed a dictatorship to stabilize the country (McPhee, 2015).

To justify his methods as necessary means in the transformation of the monarchy to a liberal democracy, he said: 'Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic' (McPhee, 2015). Therefore, his sentiments build the foundations for modern terrorists, who believe violence will usher in a better system. For example, the 19th century Narodnaya Volya hoped to end Tsarist rule in Russia and most people in the West consider this to have been a progressive event even though tens of thousands died under the guillotine (McPhee, 2015). But modern terrorism is a dynamic concept that dependent on to some degree on the political and historical context within which it has been employed (Cronin, 2002). Thus, the characterization of terrorism as a state action faded, while the idea of terrorism as an attack against an existing political order became more prominent. Further, Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin add up that:

> Historians of terrorism may point out that the word "terror" applies to the state terror of the French Revolution, but they often neglect to add that, to varying degrees, the phenomenon was a constant of earlier eras and has also been prevalent ever since. Indeed, terrorism, the principal aim of which is to terrorize, is a historically far broader phenomenon than suggested by the term's current usage, which essentially boils it down to the description or analysis of the illegitimate use of violence in terrorist-type activities (Chaliand & Blin, 2007: vii-viii).

However, the French Revolution marked a turning point in the history of terrorism because it was believed that it gave birth to the term 'terror' or what might equally be called 'state terrorism' because it was prefiguring a practice that was to evolve considerably in the

twentieth century with the advent of totalitarianism and large scale violence (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; McPhee, 2015).

Among the one major feature of modern terrorism has been in the connections between the ideological and political concepts that increased levels of terrorist activity internationally. The broad political aim has been against the empires, colonial powers and the U.S led international system marked by globalization (Cronin, 2002). Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the general history of modern terrorism and understand the international context where the current threat lies upon. David Rapoport has described 'four waves of modern terrorism' and argues that terrorism occurs in consecutive if somewhat overlapping waves (Rapoport, 2002). According to Rapoport, the first three waves were based on the historical phases in which terrorism was used as an attack against the empires, decolonization and leftist anti-West, but the fourth wave of modern terrorism has been religiously inspired (Rapoport, 2002). Or in other words, he argues that modern terrorism has been a power struggle along a continuum: central power versus local power, big power versus small power, modern power versus traditional power (Cronin, 2002).

The first wave of modern terrorism was the nineteenth century in which the goal of terrorists was to engage in attacks to get an attention of the common people and provoke a popular response that would ultimately overturn the prevailing political order. The terrorists of the nineteenth century were influenced by the romantic tradition as it was the period that swept by several waves of revolution (McPhee, 2015). It was a violent century, when war became a mass phenomenon, involving not only heads of state and armies, but entire societies. The era of technology and industrialization unleashed phenomenally destructive forms of violence with the invention of machine guns, aircrafts and chemical weapons.

The second waves of modern terrorism associated with the concept of national self-determination developed its greatest predominance after World War I. The demand for greater autonomy and political independence became the factor responsible for terrorism tactics used in the struggle for power. The third wave of modern terrorism came as the relationship between the Vietnam conflict and other decolonization movements inspired from national liberation ideals. The last wave which is still prevailing in present era is the religiously inspired and motivated groups of modern terrorism such as Al-Qaeda (Rapoport, 2002).

The concept of terrorising global population with the horrifying atomic explosions in Japan had indeed ended the World War II, but the fear of another World War persisted, as it would mean an inevitable destruction of the globe, because this was would not be a normal

conflict but rather would be nuclear war(Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015). In the name of national security countries engaged themselves in global technological advancements and innovative ideas which surpassed each country's defensive strategy to another level from traditional combats to rocket launchers and drones strikes lowering the cost of lives (Mahan & Griset, 2013; Kiras, 2008).

In the same phase, the era of globalisation has made nations inter-connected with the use of cyber space and communication enhancement by reaching many spectators as possible in the entire globe (Schori Liang C. , 2016). The advantage of the latest inventions and technology in the world has also changed the form of terrorist network as how they used to operate and communicate. The modern terrorism in the present phase changed in an organised form of groups and network to spread violence with help of technology and therein leaving a political impact. This phase involves two levels of non-state actors, first is the religious motivation of organised and armed groups of terrorists and second is the environment of bad governance, nonexistent social services, and poverty which resulted in the collapse of political order

The Rise of Non-State Terrorism and International Terrorism

The rise of non-state terrorism[4] began from early 1950s with the introduction of guerrilla tactics so as to achieve their goals (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The modern terrorist groups evolved into non-state actors in the latter half of the twentieth century and the changes came due to several factors (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011). These included the rise of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Irish, Basque, and Zionist), anti-colonial sentiments in the vast British, French and other empires. Further, the emergence of new ideologies such as communism also became another important factor to use violent means for achieving their political goals.

Terrorist groups with a nationalist agenda have been formed in every part of the world such as various separatist groups in North-East India and in Kashmir Valley operating for its political agendas. The Kashmir issue has been contested between India and Pakistan since their partition in which, India believes that Pakistan supporting cross-border terrorism and should be declare as terrorist state (Noor, 2007). Another example, the Kurds, a distinct ethnic and linguistic group in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, have sought national autonomy

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[4]Non-State Terrorism- In international relations, violent non-state actors (VNSA) (also known as non-state armed actors or non-state terrorism) are individuals and groups, which are wholly or partly independent of state governments, and which threaten or use violence to achieve their goals. VNSAs vary widely in their goals, size, and methods. For example, VNSAs may include narcotics cartels, popular liberation movements, religious and ideological organizations (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011).

since the beginning of the 20th Century. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), formed in the 1970s, uses terrorist tactics to announce its goal of a Kurdish state (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011). Similarly, the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were the members of ethnic Tamil minority that used suicide bombing and other lethal tactics to wage a battle for independence against the Sinhalese majority government (Armstrong, 2014).

International terrorism became a prominent issue in the late 1960s, when hijacking became a favoured tactic. In 1960s and 1970s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine[5] (PFLP) used a tactic of hijacking passenger aircraft. According to Politburo member and former aircraft hijacker Leila Khaled, the PFLP does not see suicide bombing as a form of resistance to occupation or a strategic action or policy and no longer carries out such attacks (Ibrahim, 2015). The era also gave the contemporary sense of terrorism as highly theatrical, symbolic acts of violence by organized groups with specific political grievances. The terrorist groups became much more organised in using the technique of spreading violence and terrorising the people and its government. The bloody events in 1972 at the Munich Olympics[6] were politically motivated that became a historical event of international terrorism (Sanchez J. , 2007). This event took place when a Palestinian group kidnapped and killed Israeli athletes who were preparing to compete. Black September's[7] political goal was negotiating the release of Palestinian prisoners for which they used spectacular tactics to bring international attention to their national cause (Raab, 2007)

Munich radically changed the United States' handling of terrorism and according to counterterrorism expert Timothy Naftali: "The terms counterterrorism and international terrorism formally entered the Washington political lexicon," and the UN took a serious note on growing terrorism menace (Tan, 2009). Terrorists also took advantage of the black market

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[5]The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a secular Palestinian Marxist–Leninist and revolutionary socialist organization founded in 1967 by George Habash. It has consistently been the second-largest of the groups forming the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the largest being Fatah. The PFLP gained notoriety in the late 1960s and early 1970s for a series of armed attacks and aircraft hijackings, including on non-Israeli targets. PFLP is described as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European Union(Ibrahim, 2015).

[6]The Munich massacre was an attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany, at which eleven Israeli Olympic team members were taken hostage and eventually killed, along with a German police officer, by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September(Sanchez J. , 2007).

[7]Black September was the conflict fought in Jordan between the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), under the leadership of King Hussein, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, primarily between 16 and 27 September 1970, with certain actions continuing until 17 July 1971. The Black September Organization was founded during the conflict to carry out reprisals. The organization claimed responsibility for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Al-Tal in 1971, and the highly publicized 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes (Raab, 2007).

in Soviet-produced light weaponry, such as AK-47 assault rifles created in the wake of the Soviet Union's 1989 collapse(Aboul-Enein, 2010). Most terrorist groups justified violence with a deep belief in the necessity and justice of their cause (Mockaitis, 2007). Terrorist groups also emerged in the United States. Groups such as the 'Weathermen' grew out of the non-violent group, 'Students for a Democratic Society'. They turned to violent tactics, from rioting to setting off bombs, to protest the Vietnam War (Tan, 2009).

The Global Rise of Religious Terrorism

Religiously motivated terrorism is considered the most alarming terrorist threat today (Aboul-Enein, 2010; Khosrokhavar, 2009). Groups that justify their violence on Islamic grounds are Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, ISIS, etc, which come to mind first. But Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and other religions have given rise to their own forms of militant extremism. The world's great religions all have both peaceful and violent messages from which believers can choose (Armstrong, 2014; Juergensmeyer, 2004). Religious terrorists and violent extremists share the decision to interpret religion to justify violence, whether they are Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, or Sikh.

Christianity is a monotheistic religion centred on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, whose resurrection, as understood by Christians, provided salvation for all mankind. Christianity's teachings, like those of other religions, contain messages of love and peace, and those that can be used to justify violence. The 15th-century Spanish inquisition is sometimes considered an early form of state terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2004). These Church-sanctioned tribunals aimed to root out Jews and Muslims who had not converted to Catholicism, often through severe torture (Armstrong, 2014). Today in the United States, reconstruction theology and the Christian Identity movement have provided justification for attacks on abortion providers (Rogers & al., Jun 2007).

Buddhism is a religion or approach to an enlightened life based on the teachings of the Buddha Siddhartha Gautama about centuries ago in northern India. The edict not to kill or inflict pain on others is integral to Buddhist thought. Periodically, however, Buddhist monks have encouraged violence or initiated it. The primary example in the 20th and 21st century is in Sri Lanka, where Sinhala Buddhist groups have committed and encouraged violence against local Christians and Tamils (Armstrong, 2014). The leader of Aum Shinrinkyo, a Japanese cult that committed a lethal sarin gas attack in the mid-1990s, drew on Buddhist as well as Hindu ideas to justify his beliefs (Juergensmeyer, 2004).

Judaism began around 2000 BCE when, according to Jews, God established a special covenant with Abraham. The monotheistic religion focuses on the importance of action as an expression of belief. Judaism's central tenets involve a respect for life's sanctity, but like other religions, its texts can be used to justify violence (Armstrong, 2014). Some consider the 'Sicarii', who used murder by dagger to protest Roman rule in first century Judea, to be the first Jewish terrorists. In the 1940s, Zionist militants such as Lehi (known also as the Stern Gang) carried out terrorist attacks against the British in Palestine (Nardin, May 2001; Hoffman, 1999).

In the late 20th century, militant messianic Zionists use religious claims to the historical land of Israel to justify acts of violence (Nardin, May 2001; Juergensmeyer, 2004).Hinduism, the world's third largest religion after Christianity and Islam, and the oldest, takes many forms in practice among its adherents. Hinduism valorizes non-violence as a virtue, but advocates war when it is necessary in the face of injustice (Armstrong, 2014) However, the role of nationalism is inextricable from Hindu violence in this context.

Adherents of Islam describe themselves as believing in the same Abrahamic God as Jews and Christians, whose instructions to humankind were perfected when delivered to the last prophet, Muhammad (Al-Shishani, 2005). Like those of Judaisim and Christianity, Islam's texts offer both peaceful and warring messages. Many consider the 11th-century 'hashishiyin'[8], to be Islam's first terrorists (Burman, 1987; Daftary, 1998). These members of a Shiite sect assassinated their Seljuk[9] enemies (Daftary, 1998). In the late 20th century, groups motivated by religious and nationalist goals committed attacks, such as the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and suicide bombings in Israel (Armstrong, 2014). In the early 21st century, Al-Qaeda 'internationalized' jihad to attack targets in Europe and the United States (Burke, 2007; Coolsaet R. , 2008).

Religious terrorism is terrorism carried out based on motivations and goals that have a predominantly religious character or influence. In the modern age, after the decline of ideas such as the divine right of kings and with the rise of nationalism, terrorism has more often been based on anarchism, and revolutionary politics (Nardin, May 2001). Since 1980,

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[8]Hashishin or "users of hashish", (which can be used as a derogatory term in Arabic and it is the equivalent of "drug addict", in this case, "hashish addict") was originally applied to the Nizari Ismaelis by the rival Mustali Ismailis during the fall of the Ismaili Fatimid Empire and the separation of the two Ismaili streams, there is little evidence hashish was used to motivate the assassins, contrary to the beliefs of their medieval enemies. It is possible that the term hashishiyya or hashishi in Arabic sources was used metaphorically in its abusive sense relating to use of hashish, which due to its effects on the mind state, is outlawed in Islam (Burman, 1987)

[9]Seljuk- The Seljuk dynasty or Seljuqs was an Oghuz Turk Sunni Muslim dynasty that gradually became a Persianate society and contributed to the Turko-Persian tradition in the medieval West and Central Asia(Daftary, 1998).

however, there has been an increase in terrorist activity motivated by religion (Hoffman, 1999). Former United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said that terrorist acts in the name of religion and ethnic identity have become "one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of the Cold War." (Juergensmeyer, 2004). However, the political scientists Robert Pape and Terry Nardin, the social psychologists M. Brooke Rogers and colleagues, and the sociologist and religious studies scholar Mark Juergensmeyer have all argued that religion should be considered only one incidental factor and that such terrorism is primarily geopolitical (Rogers & al., Jun 2007; Nardin, May 2001; Juergensmeyer, 2004).

According to Juergensmeyer, religion and violence have had a symbiotic relationship since before the Crusades and even since before the Bible (Juergensmeyer, 2004). He defines religious terrorism as consisting of acts that terrify. The definition of which is provided by the witnesses – the ones terrified – and not by the party committing the act; accompanied by either a religious motivation, justification, organization, or world view (Juergensmeyer, 2004). Religion is sometimes used in combination with other factors, and sometimes as the primary motivation and religious terrorism is intimately connected to current forces of geopolitics (Rogers & al., Jun 2007).

Bruce Hoffman has characterized modern religious terrorism as having three traits: (Hoffman, 1999: 60-62)

- The perpetrators must use religious scriptures to justify or explain their violent acts or to gain recruits.
- Clerical figures must be involved in leadership roles.
- Perpetrators use apocalyptic images of destruction to justify the acts.

Researchers in the United States began to distinguish different types of terrorism in the 1970s, following a decade in which both domestic and international groups flourished (Tan, 2009). By that point, modern groups had began to use techniques such as hijacking, bombing, diplomatic kidnapping and assassination to assert their demands and, for the first time, they appeared as real threats to Western democracies, in the view of politicians, law makers, law enforcement and researchers. They began to distinguish different types of terrorism as part of the larger effort to understand how to counter and deter it (Cronin, 2002).

Rise of Militancy in Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda is one of the important links to examine the rise of Islamic State because the root for the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria lies with this organization. Islamic State ideology and objectives with its justification for violence actions are quiet similar with that of Al-Qaeda's ideology and objectives though it may varied from its methods(Bunzel, March 2015). Therefore, before going into the depth into the problems and issues of Islamic State it becomes essential to mention the organization from where it began its movement.

The first known terrorist organization to use media was Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden (Deffenbaugh & Mastors, 2007; Burke, 2007; Gunaratna, 2002; Hamed, 2015; Chaliand & Blin, 2007). Various sources of threats to wage global jihad was documented in CD, and send to various new channels for increasing the spectators around the world (Hamed, 2015; Weimann G. , 2014). It was indeed in September 11[10], the catastrophic damage of human lives and properties became the worldwide phenomena of worst and biggest terrorist attack in American History (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Tan, 2009). Al-Qaeda claimed that attack on the US soil, and it was done justifying its own cause of waging global jihad (Burke, 2007; Moghaddam, 2008).

Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian and military targets in various countries, including the 1998 US embassy bombings[11], the September 11 attacks, and the 2002 Bali bombings[12] (Tan, 2009). The US government responded to the September 11 attacks by launching the "War on Terror". Among the beliefs ascribed to Al-Qaeda members is the conviction that a Christian-Jewish alliance is conspiring to destroy Islam (Zulaika, 2009). As Salafist[13] jihadists, they believe that the killing of non-combatants is religiously sanctioned,

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[10]The most destructive act ascribed to al-Qaeda was the series of attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 also known as 9/11 attack. Four commercial airliners were hijacked. Two of these were crashed into the Twin Towers which later collapsed, destroying the rest of the World Trade Center building complex. The third was crashed into the Pentagon and the fourth in a field during a struggle between passengers and hijackers to control the airplane. Nearly 3,000 people were killed in the attacks, making them the deadliest act of terrorism to occur in the United States, and more than 6,000 others were injured(Tan, 2009; Baudrillard, 2003; Martin, 2013).

[11]In August 1998, Al-Qaeda operatives carried out the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring more than 5,000 others (Lough, August 19, 2008).

[12]The 2002 Bali bombings occurred on 12 October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali. The attack killed 202 people, that including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, and people from more than 20 other nationalities (BBC News, 19 February, 2003).

[13]Salafist -a primarily theological movement in Sunni Islam concerned with purifying the faith. Salafism focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirk) and affirming God's Oneness (tawhid). Salafis view themselves as the only true Muslims, considering those who practice so-called 'major idolatry' to be outside the bounds of the Islamic faith. Those worshiping—or perceived to be worshiping—stones, saints, tombs, etc are considered apostates, desertersof the religion. These include the Shia and, for many Salafis, democrats, or those participating in a democratic system (Daftary, 1998).

but they ignore any aspect of religious scripture which might be interpreted as forbidding the murder of non-combatants and internecine fighting (Moghaddam, 2008). Al-Qaeda also opposes what it regards as man-made laws, and wants to replace them with a strict form of sharia law (Coolsaet R. , 2008).

Al-Qaeda has carried out many attacks on targets it considers kafir[14] and it is also responsible for instigating sectarian violence among Muslims. Al-Qaeda leaders regard liberal Muslims, Shiite, Sufis and other sects as heretics[15] and have attacked their mosques and gatherings (Moghaddam, 2008). Examples of sectarian attacks include the Yazidi community bombings[16], the Sadr City bombings[17], the Ashura massacre of 2004[18] and the April 2007 Baghdad bombings[19].

With the loss of key leaders, culminating in the death of Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's operations have devolved from actions that controlled from the top down, to actions by franchise associated groups and lone-wolf operators (Griffin, 2009). Characteristic techniques employed by Al-Qaeda include suicide attack and the simultaneous bombing of different targets. Activities ascribed to it may involve members of the movement, who have made a pledge of loyalty to Bin laden, or the much more numerous 'Al-Qaeda-linked' individuals who have undergone training in one of its camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq or Sudan (Zulaika, 2009). Al-Qaeda ideologues envision a complete break from all foreign

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[14]kafir- a word used by Muslims to refer to a person who is not a Muslim, that can be considered offensive (Daftary, 1998).

[15]heretics- a person who is guilty of heresy, that is a belief or an opinion that is against the principles of a particular religion; or the fact of holding such beliefs. It can also be understood as a belief or an opinion that disagrees strongly with what most people believe (Daftary, 1998).

[16]The 2007Yazidicommunities bombings occurred on August 14, 2007, when four co-ordinated suicide bomb attacks detonated in the Yazidi towns of Qahtaniyah (TilEzer) and Jazeera (Siba Sheikh Khidir), near Mosul in Iraq. The Iraqi Red Crescent estimated that the bombs killed at least 500 and wounded 1,500 people, making this the Iraq War's most deadly car bomb attack. It was also the second deadliest act of terrorism in history, following only behind the September 11 attacks in the United States (DeYoung & Pincus, 18 March 2007).

[17]The 2006 Sadr City bombings were a series of car bombs and mortar attacks in Iraq that occurred on 23 November at 15:10 Baghdad time and ended at 15:55. Six car bombs and two mortar rounds were used in the attack on the Shia slum in Sadr City. The attacks killed at least 215 people and injured 257 others, making it the second deadliest sectarian attack since the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 (BBC News, 31 November 2006).

[18]The Ashura massacre of March 2, 2004 in Iraq was a series of planned terrorist explosions that killed at least 178 and injured at least 500 Iraqi Shi'a Muslims commemorating the Day of Ashura. Nine explosions were detonated in Karbala, accompanied by mortar, grenade, and rocket fire, killing over 100 people, while three explosions near the Kadhimiya Shrine in Baghdad killed 78 more. Al-Qaeda, which considers Shia Islam to be heretical, was immediately held responsible for the attack, and it was believed their intent was to cause much more destruction than actually occurred (New York Times, 2 March 2004)

[19]The 18 April 2007 Baghdad bombings were a series of attacks that occurred when five car bombs exploded across Baghdad, the capital city of Iraq, on 18 April 2007, killing nearly 200 people. The attacks targeted mainly Shia locations and civilians (DeYoung & Pincus, 18 March 2007).

influences in Muslim countries, and the creation of a new caliphate ruling over the entire Muslim world (Bunzel, March 2015).

As an organization Al-Qaeda management philosophy has been described as "centralization of decision and decentralization of execution"(Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, 2007). It is thought that Al-Qaeda's leadership, following the War on Terror, has "become geographically isolated," leading to the "emergence of decentralized leadership" of regional groups using the Al-Qaeda brand (Burke, 2007). Many terrorism experts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by Al-Qaeda's leadership (Aboul-Enein, 2010; Burke, 2007; Chaliand & Blin, 2007). Although bin Laden still held considerable ideological sway over some Muslim extremists before his death, experts argue that Al-Qaeda has fragmented over the years into a variety of regional movements that have little connection with one another (Gunaratna, 2002). Therefore, it can be said that Al-Qaeda is not only an organization but it is a way of working and has the hallmark of that approach. Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training, to provide expertise and that is, what it has been occurring in the world at the present context.

The origins of Al-Qaeda as a network inspiring terrorism around the world and training operatives can be traced to the Soviet War in Afghanistan during the cold war (Tan, 2009). The US viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as a blatant case of Soviet expansionism and aggression (Burke, 2007). A CIA program called 'Operation Cyclone' channelled funds through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency to Afghan Mujahedeen who were fighting the Soviet occupation (Tan, 2009). Thus, US government financial support for the Afghan Islamic militants was substantial. The point here to be noted is that the experts debate whether or not the Al-Qaeda attacks were an indirect result from the American CIA's "Operation Cyclone" program to help the Afghan mujahedeen.

Robert Cook, British Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001, has written that Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden was "a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies" (Cook, 2005), and that Al-Qaeda was originally the computer file of thousands of mujahedeen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russia (Cook, 2005). Ultimately in order to draw a conclusion for the birth of Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization, the responsible party for its emergence is clearly reflected from the influence of the US and other nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, directly or indirectly. So, if one is to analyse a terrorist organization from its historical up coming, they should keep in mind that

its birth won't be accidental or in a vacuum but rather it came for some long term purpose and interest of other party as well, with proper planning to instigate an affect.

However, after the September 11 attack US invaded Afghanistan and started its search operation for bin Laden, in which US air strike targeted many Al-Qaeda training camps and destroyed it completely (Griffin, 2009). Although Al-Qaeda initially denied involvement, it claimed responsibility in a videotape aired on the Arab broadcaster, Al Jazeera, a year later in September 2002, in which Osama bin Laden praised the 9/11 attackers as- Great men who deepened the roots of faith in the hearts of the faithful, reaffirmed allegiance to God and torpedoed the schemes of the crusaders and their stooges, the rulers of the region.... (The Guardian, September 10, 2002). This statement given by bin Laden proved and accused to be responsible for September 11 attack. However, bin Laden, as well as the Taliban leader, Mohammed Omar, escaped capture and were believed to have fled across the Afghan-Pakistan border, where sympathetic Pashtun tribes in the lawless northwest provinces of Pakistan have provided sanctuary (Tan, 2009).

Taliban is a religious militancy based on Islam which was established in 1994 and ruled by having its own government from 1996 (Rashid, 2000). Taliban changed from militant group to the occupied territories groups and the area they govern was known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. During their reign, the Afghan capital was transferred from Kabul to Kandahar. But in 2001, they were removed from power by a unified effort of United Islamic Front[20] (Northern Alliance) ground forces, small U.S. Special Operations teams and U.S. air support. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban held power in Afghanistan and enforced a strict interpretation of sharia, or Islamic law, of which the international community and leading Muslims has been highly critical (Kaplan, 2010).

The Taliban emerged as one of the prominent factions in the Afghan Civil War and largely consisted of students because the word 'Taliban' essentially resembles 'two students' or group of students. The groups of students follow the leadership of Mohammed Omar, the movement spread throughout the region and held control of most of the region in the country (Rashid, 2000). But the pseudo-state could not last long as it was overthrown by the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001 following the 9/11 attacks.

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[20]The Afghan Northern Alliance, officially known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan a united military front that came to formation in late 1996 after the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) took over Kabul. The Northern Alliance fought a defensive war against the Taliban government. By 2001 the Northern Alliance controlled less than 10% of the country, cornered in the north-east and based in Badakhshan province. The US invaded Afghanistan providing support to Northern Alliance troops on the ground in a two-month war against the Taliban, which they won in December 2001. With the end of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance was dissolved as members and parties joined the new establishment of the Karzai administration.

However, the group later regrouped as an insurgency movement to fight the American-backed Karzai administration and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Thus, this group emerged as a militant group, established its own governing authority and ultimately evolve into insurgency group. The Taliban have been condemned internationally for the harsh enforcement of their interpretation of Islamic sharia law, which has resulted in the brutal treatment of many Afghans, especially to women.

The US attack on Afghanistan, which had the broad support of the international community, was followed by the controversial US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, an action that the rest of the world opposed (Allawi, 2007). Although the United States achieved a swift victory in Iraq but it dissipated much of the international goodwill and sympathy that it gained in the immediate aftermath of September 11 attacks. Later after the War, it became obvious that Saddam Hussein had neither weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) nor links with Al-Qaeda, as the Bush administration had claimed (Tan, 2009). Indeed, the decision made by the US administration invading Iraq was a strategic mistake that led to the failing competently to govern the country resulting in sectarian conflict and insurgency (Martin, 2013; Tan, 2009; Martin, 2013). Furthermore this created an opportunity and condition for terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda to regain its momentum and recruits more fighter in their group.

In the mean time, a Jordanian man named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi emerged as one of the important leader for jihadist movement in Iraq and formed terrorist group to fight against the US invader (Al-Shishani, 2005), he joined forces with Al-Qaeda which stated its goal to create a radical Islamist State governed under strict Sharia law, which encompasses the areas of Syria and Iraq (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). Al-Zarqawi was one of the jihadist members of Al-Qaeda who fought against Soviet occupation during cold war and in 2003 he established terrorist organization named 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' (AQI) which later would become the Islamic State.

Rise of Militancy in Iraq

The arrival of Paul Bremmer as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to replace Jay Garner in May 2003 marked a crucial turning point because Bremmer immediately implemented decisions which had serious strategic implication (Hashim, 2006; Tan, 2009). He ordered a program under which members of the Ba'ath party which was under Saddam Hussein would be dismissed from government, their pensions were denied,

and if necessary investigated for crimes (Tan, 2009). This not only created alienation among those who had lost power, but also resulted in the collapse of basic services as the machinery of government ground to be stop. The decision to dissolve the Iraqi armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior which commanded the police and security services, left hundreds of thousands of security personnel without jobs and pay (Ricks, 2007). This created a vast pool of alienation among people who became susceptible to join insurgent groups because there was no means of livelihood.

The resulting security vacuum in Iraq was quickly filled by militias belonging to different groups where there was also a rise of anti-US insurgents consisting of Al-Qaeda linked jihadists, Iraqi Sunni nationalists, ex-Ba'ath Party loyalists, and Shiite militias belonging to radical factions (Al-Shishani, 2005). The borders was also left open, as the United States did not have sufficient troops to seal them which enabled insurgent jihadists to move freely from Syria, and also enabled Iran to supply Shiite factions in the south with arms (Tan, 2009).

Throughout 2003, the anti-US insurgency began to take shape and by 2004, the insurgency was in full swing as the scholars claimed (Hashim, 2006). This was a mostly Sunni Arab uprising, as they had dominated the country under Saddam Hussein despite being a minority comprising about 20% of the total population of 27 million, and were now the biggest losers under a US-occupied Iraq (Allawi, 2007). Indeed, the United States backed not just the Kurds, who strongly supported the United States in the war in order to secure their eventual goal of independence, but also the Shiites, who comprise around 60% of the population (Tan, 2009).

The alienation and suffering led to a number of Iraqis responding to the call to jihad by radical Islamist groups, the largest and best organized of which is the Jama'at al-Tawhidwal-Jihad (JTJ) or Monotheism and Holy Struggle Movement (Al-Shishani, 2005). It subsequently pledged its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and became known as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI). The JTJ was initially established in Germany in the 1990s as an anti-Jewish militant cell by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who fought the Soviets as a mujahedeen volunteer in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Tan, 2009). After the US-led attack on Afghanistan in late 2001, he went to Iraq, where he reportedly established links with the radical Ansar al-Islam in Kurdish-held northern Iraq (Burke, 2007). Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, he developed his organization into a network of local and foreign mujahedeen fighters resisting US and coalition forces (Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, 2007).

As the invasion sent Iraq tumbling into chaos, religious extremists rushed in, first to fight the American invaders and then also to wage a sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni minority and Shiite majority where the jihadists were mostly Sunni Muslims. The US disbanded Iraq's Sunni-dominated army which was one of the greatest mistakes that led insurgents to flourish extensively (Al-Shishani, 2005). Soldiers and officers, unemployed and aggrieved joined the insurgents in large numbers. Zarqawi and his group, which had slipped into Iraq shortly after the US invasion, distinguished itself as more violent, and more willing to slaughter civilians, than all other (Fisher, 2015). Later, Al-Qaeda would also defect from his group because it was too vicious and violent that the group won't spare its fellow Muslims as well and were damaging Al-Qaeda's brand (Burke, 2007).

In 2004, Zarqawi formally pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden and JTJ now became known as TanzimQaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn[21] or simply as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI). TanzimQaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn – literally refer as, "the Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers" the two rivers naturally mentioning to Euphrates and Tigris (Bunzel, 2015; Al-Shishani, 2005). From 2004 to 2006, AQI launched a number of attacks including multiple beheadings of American citizens. Thereafter, it became the focal point of radical Islamist violence in Iraq and it established a strong presence in cities such as Fallujah and Samarra (Tan, 2009).

But, Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda's leaders clashed frequently-often because the former was too preoccupied with killing fellow Muslims and too vicious even for Al-Qaeda (Burke, 2007). This division remain even in present context, and would years later lead to open war between Zarqawi's group and Al-Qaeda. Eventually, many of Iraq's Sunnis turned against AQI, and the US government placed a $25 million bounty on Zarqawi as same sum for Osama bin Laden (Tan, 2009). The financial incentive appeared to have worked, as Zarqawi was apparently betrayed and killed in US airstrike in 2006 (BBC news, June 8 2006).

By the end of 2008, it looked like Iraq might have a real chance at recovering from the US-launched War. But then Iraq's own Prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki committed a series of terrible errors, as he allowed corruption, and authoritarianism to deepen, persecuting political opponents. He reorganized the government to privilege Shiite and marginalize Sunni and when Sunni communities rose up in protest, he put them down brutally (Fisher, 2015). Maliki also gutted the Iraqi army, removing many experienced senior officers and replacing them with the personnel who delay to take decision.

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[21]Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn – literally refer as, "the Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in the Land of Two Rivers" the two rivers naturally mentioning to Euphrates and Tigris (Bunzel, 2015).

In the mean time, following Zarqawi's death in 2006, second-in-command Abu Ayyub al-Masri assumed leadership of the group and announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to politicize AQI's activities, according to the National Counterterrorism Centre. Although ISI (also known as AQI) was largely degraded by US counterterrorism campaign from 2006 to 2011, the Sunni group managed to carry out various acts of sectarian violence and continue to carry out numerous attacks and bombings in Iraq(Cockburn, 2015). Now AQI has merged with other jihadist groups into the Islamic State of Iraq which would further trained mujahedeen with the most technologically advanced forces that have honed superb urban terrorist skills (Tan, 2009). Recognizing an opportunity for further recruitment and mobilization amid the Syrian uprising, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who replaced al-Masri after his death, joined forces with Syrian Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013 (Fisher, 2015) and ISIS ultimately came into the international scene under the leadership of al-Baghdadi.

ISIS declared all lands under its control to be a caliphate, subject to the authority of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who dubbed himself as Caliph Ibrahim and he announced the establishment of the 'Islamic State' (Bunzel, 2015; Cockburn, 2015). The Islamic State made its first significant territorial gain in Iraq when militants captured the city of Fallujah in January 2014, signalling its increasing capability (Nance, 2016). In June 2014, ISIS took control of Mosul, Tikrit, and oil refinery in Baiji, among other towns in Iraq and Syria (Friedman, 2014).That is how, in the summer of 2014, this group came to rule so much of Iraq and Syria under a de-facto state and it has since been at War on every front.

ISIS has not just become a jihadist organization but rather, by occupying much of the territories in Iraq and Syria; it evolved into self-proclaimed caliphate and with its own governing authority (Bunzel, 2015).ISIS goal is more audacious than anything imagine by Al-Qaeda to revive the ancient caliphate and expand it to encompasses all Muslims around the world (Cockburn, 2015).It earnestly beliefs that its holy war will than bring about the apocalypse as fore told in scripture and thousands of Muslims, mostly from Middle East and from Europe came to join the group (Nance, 2016).Some of them join for religious reasons but many of them are just disillusion and angry that ISIS offers them answers and a purpose, that the ISIS quickly over reaches (Varfolomeev, 2015).

CHAPTER THREE

ISIS AND ITS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The long term objectives of ISIS is to establish its presence around the world by the strategy of regional expansion for which the group uses the word hijrah[22], and global expansion through exporting terrorism either by social media trained recruits or else sending trained candidates from Iraq and Syria (Blaker, 2015; Smith, 2017). Social media has proven to be an extremely valuable tool for the terrorist organization and has been perfectly suited for the very audience it's intending to target (Nance, 2016; Kderner, 2016). Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, YouTube, and other messenger like Telegraph, allow ISIS propaganda to reach across the globe in no time. Increasingly, ISIS' posts to Internet sites include sophisticated, production-quality video and images that incorporate visual effects (Berger, 2014).

Social media is mostly known activity on the world wide web of internet which account for over 22 percent of all time spent on-line in the United States alone. For instance, Twitter averages about 200 million tweets per day and Facebook boasts about 800 million active users throughout the world (Mathur, 2012). The internet was designed to ease communication, and social media has proven to be remarkable in terms of spreading messages to many users at one time that showcase the effectiveness of communication.

When it comes to showcase the power of social media, one must look into the events of Arab Spring[23]. As the Arab Spring ensued, social media spread messages to which the world subscribed, followed, tweeted and retweeted. For instance, the week before Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's resignation, the total rate of tweets about political change in Egypt ballooned ten-fold and the top 23 videos featuring protests and political commentary had nearly 5 1⁄2 million views (Blaker, 2015).More than 75 percent of people that clicked on embedded Twitter links about the Arab Spring were from outside the Arab world (Stepanova, 2011; Schillinger, 2011). The users of social media in the Middle East caused the world to take notice and to witness the revolution (Stepanova, 2011). Social media enabled these revolutionaries, change agents in their own right, to spread their messages beyond national borders to all corners of the world (Schillinger, 2011).

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[22]Hijrah-is the migration or journey of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Yathrib, later renamed by him to Medina, in the year 622. In June 622, after being warned of a plot to assassinate him, Muhammad secretly left his home in Mecca to emigrate to Yathrib. But ISIS, use this term to call western or other recruits to join their groups (Varfolomeev, 2015).

[23]The term "Arab Spring" refers to a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that have been taking place in the Middle East and North Africa since 18 December 2010(Schillinger, 2011).

Knowing the power of social media and its reach, it is quite natural that terrorists groups themselves would try to use social media for their own advantage. For example, former Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader, Anwar al-Awlaki, was known to be as the bin Laden of the internet (Seib & Janbek, 2011). The late al-Awlaki used various social media such as Facebook, blogs, and YouTube videos to try and recruit and develop a cadre of terrorists in the United States (Weimann, 2014; Gilsinan, 2015). According to the sources, he used on-line videos to praise those who not only perpetrated violent acts against people in the United States such as Major Nidal Hasan but also those who waged unsuccessful attacks such as the attempted Christmas Day Bomber (Seib & Janbek, 2011). It was also know that the attempted Times Square Bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was in contact with al-Awlaki via e-mail(Blaker, 2015).What is not known is that, how many people have actually been radicalized by viewing blogs, news feeds, and tweets by al-Awlaki and others like him that espouse violent ideology (Berger, 2014).

The use of social media is crucial in helping terrorist groups to endure and to sustain themselves by reaching various publics and to create a virtual image that protects their operations (Sanchez, 2015). This allows terrorist groups to become regional and even global players, which led to the increase of their weight in propaganda terms and building support from among those who might otherwise not even know of their existence. Dissemination of videos over the internet enabled terrorists to rely less on traditional news media to deliver their messages to widespread audiences around the world (Weimann G. , 2014).

Skilful use of social media has also created misperceptions about how terrorism really works. Clever and persistent reliance on such media allowed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was a leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, to become a terrorist celebrity, eclipsing even Osama bin Laden during the height of Zarqawi's operations in Iraq (Seib & Janbek, 2011). When he was killed by American drone air strike in 2006, his death led many news organisations and political figures to greatly overrate the positive results of his being removed from the conflict (Seib & Janbek, 2011). Even the leaders of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have seen their importance magnified to inaccurate degree by their online presence.

The Islamic State or ISIS was founded in 2003 as Al Qaeda in Iraq with a mission of defeating the U.S. coalition forces that had invaded Iraq and, imposing Islamist governance (Nance, 2016). In 2006 it became The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and, while still affiliated with Al Qaeda, incorporated a number of additional insurgent groups into a coalition and strengthen the organisation into powerful force. Following the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, ISI forces began fighting along with other rebel forces there as well (Nance, 2016). In

2012, the group renamed itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham or Syria (ISIS), reflecting its new regional ambitions which follows an intensively orthopraxis subset of Sunni Islam ideology known as Salafi-jihadism (Bunzel, 2015). While fighting in Syria, it acquired strength and greater numbers of foreign recruits, drawn specifically to that conflict through social media campaign (Berger, 2014).

ISIS calls for action and believes that action is the only way to reach and fulfill their objectives. Its long term objective is to wage the holy war and established its own governing authority. According to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, there are two ways of action, which calls for doing hijrah, emigration to the caliphate in order to help and expand territorial holding, and the latter is for waging jihad at home (Bunzel, 2015). ISIS is making use of different modes of social media such as YouTube, Face book, Twitter, etc. extremely well in order to radicalize youths around the globe (Blaker, 2015). Social media is not very old as it came in use as a propaganda tool very recently. To radicalized and grooming innocent mind has been much easier with low cost of internet based chat rooms. The technology of internet has enable terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and their leader al-Zarqawi used social media sites effectively by uploading numerous videos of blowing the US Army convoy and myriad of suicide bomber attacks that killed many Americans and civilians (Nance, 2016).

The Islamic State recognized the power of digital media when Jordanian jihadist al-Zarqawi discovered the utility of uploading grainy videos of his atrocities to the Internet. As the group evolved, its propaganda campaign surpassed its parent successor Al- Qaeda by placing a premium on innovation in enhancing of videos quality (Seib & Janbek, 2011). The Islamic State maximized its reach by exploiting a variety of internet platforms: social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook, peer-to-peer messaging apps like Telegram and Surespot, and content sharing systems like 'justpast.it' (Nance, 2016; Berger, 2014). More important, it decentralized its media operations, keeping its feeds flush with content made by autonomous production units from West Africa to the Caucasus—a geographical range that illustrates why it is no longer accurate to refer to the group merely as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), rather calling as the Islamic State (Johnson, 2015).

According to Global Terrorism Index 2016, ISIL claimed responsibility for a number of high-profile terrorist attacks outside Iraq and Syria, including a mass shooting at a Tunisian tourist resort (38 European tourists killed) the Suruç bombing in Turkey (33 leftist and pro-Kurdish activists killed), the Tunisian National Museum attack (24 foreign tourists and Tunisians killed), the Sana'a mosque bombings (142 Shia civilians killed), the crash of Metro jet Flight 9268 (224 killed, mostly Russian tourists), the bombings in Ankara (102

pro-Kurdish and leftist activists killed), the bombings in Beirut (43 Shia civilians killed), the November 2015 Paris attacks (130 civilians killed), the killing of Jaafar Mohammed Saad, the governor of Aden, the January 2016 Istanbul bombing (11 foreign tourists killed), the 2016 Brussels bombings (over 30 civilians killed), the 2016 Nice attack (84 civilians killed), the July 2016 Kabul bombing (at least 80 civilians killed, mostly Shias), the 2016 Berlin attack (12 civilians killed) and the 2017 Istanbul nightclub shooting (39 foreigners and Turks killed)(Schori Liang, 2016).

Three main strategies of ISIS campaign

Cyber terrorists use information technology to attack civilians and draw attention to their cause. This may mean that they use information technology, such as computer systems or telecommunications, as a tool to orchestrate a traditional attack (Weimann G. , 2014). More often, cyber terrorism refers to an attack on information technology itself in a way that would radically disrupt networked services (Mockaitis, 2007). For example, cyber terrorists could disable networked emergency systems or hack into networks housing critical financial information (Schori Liang, 2016). But global terrorism is different from cyber terrorists as latter focuses on hacking or disrupting networked services, whereas global terrorism focuses on growing its network through the use of cyber space technology.

Internet allows ISIS and other extremist groups to flood uncensored and easily access messages and videos to their targeted viewers. The technological advancement of internet has made terrorist groups not so worried about the media censorship and visualizes the content from social media sites as viewers wants (Weimann G. , 2014)

The first strategy of ISIS is the beheading videos and gruesome death by killing of civilians liked, Paris, London and the US attacked and posting as hastags in tweeter or else main stream media works to cover the story of gruesome act of killing peoples. The first known beheading of American Jewish journalist was kidnap by Al-Qaeda members, who was covering the story in Pakistan, was executed in 2004 (Seib & Janbek, 2011; Nance, 2016). The similar strategy was adapted by ISIS and kidnapped an American journalists James W Foley and Steven Joe Sottoff, who was covering the story in Syrian Civil War and was executed by a terrorist called jihad John (as shown in figure: 3:1). On August 19 2014, ISIS acted on those threats, releasing a video depicting the beheading of American journalist James Wright Foley and threatening to behead a second American journalist. The video cited American airstrikes as the reason for the murder (Blaker, 2015; Berger, Jun 16, 2014).

Figure: 3:1.Beheading videos of American Journalists and prisoners by ISIS posted in 2014.

Source (Nance, 2016)

In the above mention videos it is noted that during decoding such content reveals the similarity of costume between the executioner and a prisoner, which gave the psychological effect of control to viewers. It makes an attempt to depict that the group as sovereign state complete with legitimate prisoner and authority to execute.

Second strategy is the leader speaks like previously Osama bin Laden did as the propaganda video posted in 2001 through news media Aljazeera, similarly ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his first appearance in 2014 with its own media center called Al-Hayat (as shown in figure: 2).

Figure: 3:2. Bin Laden and al-Baghdadi making public appearance.


Source: (Nance, 2016)

In above figure, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi presents as the successor of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by growing beard and dressing himself. The speech of the leader is very important

to the caliphate and al-Baghdadi closely resemble as former AQI leader by coloring his beard white.

Third strategy adapted by ISIS is the extensive use of social media campaign and exploit its usage through the advantages of internet. ISIS leader al-Baghdadi and its most senior Syrian operative, spokesman and propaganda chief Abu Mohammad al-Adnani have made several twitter account (Gilsinan, 2015). They have figure out the way to avoid being banned on twitter account by creating application that can be easily downloaded in smart phones. One of these techniques is a Twitter application called "Fajr al-Bashaer," or "Dawn of Good Tidings" (Berger, 2014; Kderner, 2016). The application flagged by Twitter as "potentially harmful" - requests user data and personal information. After downloading it, the app sends news and updates on ISIS fighting in Syria and Iraq. A recent report estimates that hundreds of users have subscribed to the application on the internet or their Android smart phones using the Google Play store (Brooking, 2015; Gilsinan, 2015).

Another is the use of organized hashtag campaigns, in which the group enlists hundreds and sometimes thousands of activists to repetitively tweet hashtags at certain times of day so that they trend on the social network (Blaker, 2015; Kderner, 2016; Berger, 2014). This approach also skews the results of a popular Arabic Twitter account called @ActiveHashtags that tweets each day's top trending tags (as shown in figure: 3:3). When ISIS gets its hashtag into the @ActiveHashtags stream, it results in an average of 72 retweets per tweet, which only makes the hashtag trend more (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). As it gains traction, more users are exposed to ISIS's messaging. The group's supporters also run accounts similar to @ActiveHashtags that exclusively feature jihadi content and can produce hundreds of retweets per tweet.

Figure: 3:3. ISIS tweeter account

Source: (Smith, 2017)

As a result of these strategies, and others, ISIS is able to project strength and promote engagement online. For instance, the ISIS hashtag consistently outperforms that of the group's main competitor in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, even though the two groups have a similar number of supporters online (Berger, 2014). ISIS also uses hashtags to focus-group messaging and branding concepts, much like a Western corporation might (Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015; Nance, 2016). Earlier this year, ISIS hinted, without being specific, that it was planning to change the name of its organization (Johnson, 2015). Activists then carefully promoted a hashtag crafted to look like a grassroots initiative, demanding that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declare not an Islamic state in Syria and Iraq, but the rebirth of an Islamic caliphate (Gilsinan, 2015). The question of when and how to declare a new caliphate is highly controversial in jihadi circles, and the hashtag produced a great deal of angry and divisive discussion, which ISIS very likely tracked and measured.

Still, the Islamic State has clearly taken risks by opting for openness. Because its supporters are so visible on social media networks, they often attract law-enforcement scrutiny: one example here is the case of Heather Coffman, a Virginia woman whom the FBI zeroed in on after she made statements like "I love ISIS!" on Facebook (Blaker, 2015). Coffman, who tried to arrange for a male acquaintance to travel to Syria so he could become an Islamic State martyr, is currently serving a 54-month federal prison sentence (Kderner, 2016). But the drawbacks to the Islamic State's online strategy have been outweighed by the advantages. On the most pragmatic level, social media has lowered the bar of entry for recruits—the curious have no problem finding the Islamic State's propaganda in numerous languages, and they can easily connect with intermediaries who will facilitate their travel to the caliphate (Varfolomeev, 2015). A clear example of this is that who was teenager, a Mississippi college student accused of trying to join the Islamic State, allegedly planned her thwarted trip to Syria by using her @1_modest_woman Twitter account to form one-on-one relationships with fighters' widows (Smith, 2017).

The Islamic State's aggressive approach to social media may be most valuable to the organization as a tool to stoke a particular kind of paranoia in the West. Because people are already so anxiety-ridden over how Twitter and its cohorts are altering people lives in the age of globalization (Blaker, 2015).

Cyber Jihad: YouTube and Twitter

YouTube was established in February 2005 as an online repository for sharing video content. According to YouTube, on average, more than 1 billion users watch about 6 billion hours of videos every month. One hundred new hours of video are uploaded every minute. Overall, YouTube passed 1 trillion watched videos in 2011(Mathur, 2012). Statistically speaking, that means 140 views for every human being on the planet. YouTube has localized sites in 61 countries and across 61 languages, and 70 percent of YouTube traffic comes from outside the United States (Seib & Janbek, 2011).The gigantic video-sharing service has become a significant platform for jihadist groups and supporters, fostering a thriving subculture which uses it to communicate, share propaganda, and recruit new individuals. YouTube's massive global audience ensures that jihadists can simultaneously aim at both potential recruits and targets for terrorism (Weimann G. , 2014).

As important as the videos themselves is YouTube's usefulness in facilitating social networking among jihadists. The ability to exchange comments about videos and to send private messages to other users help jihadists identify each other rapidly, resulting in a vibrant jihadist virtual community(Weimann G. , 2014).Terrorist groups have realized the potential of this easily accessed platform to disseminate their propaganda and radicalization videos. Convicted Moroccan-born terrorist Younis Tsouli (under the account name "Irhabi007") observed, "A lot of the funding that the brothers are getting is coming because of the videos. Imagine how many have gone after seeing the videos. Imagine how many have become shahid [martyrs]" (US Govt, 2015). In 2008, a jihadist website suggested a "YouTube Invasion" to support jihadist media and the administrators of al Fajr-affiliated forums, which are associated with al-Qaeda (Weimann G. , 2014).

The post outlining the concept provides a synopsis of the YouTube site and its founding and notes its use by US president-elect Barack Obama during his campaign. The message suggests YouTube as an alternative to television and a medium that allows jihadists to reach massive, global audiences (Johnson, June 08, 2015). It even instructs jihadists in how to cut mujahedeen videos into ten-minute chunks (to comply with YouTube's video length requirements) and upload them sequentially to the site (Weimann G. , 2014). "I ask you, by Allah, as soon as you read this subject, to start recording on YouTube, and to start cutting and uploading and posting clips on the jihadist, Islamic, and general forums," said the posting on the jihadist website (Weimann G. , 2014).

Some jihadists have shown a particular affinity for YouTube as a medium for terrorists messaging. Colleen LaRose, known as "Jihad Jane," is among the more widely known jihadist distributors on YouTube (Weimann G. , 2014). In March 2009, she was charged in a federal court in Pennsylvania with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. LaRose maintained several YouTube channels replete with jihadist content (Weimann G. , 2014). According to her indictment, LaRose posted on YouTube that she was "desperate to do something somehow to help the plight of Muslims."Even more influential on YouTube was the late Anwar al-Awlaki, the mastermind of jihadist online propaganda.

A 2009 British government analysis of YouTube found 1,910 videos of al-Awlaki, one of which had been viewed 164,420 times (Seib & Janbek, 2011). Al-Awlaki, the American born radical cleric who was killed in Yemen in 2011, told jihadists in an Arabic-language Roshanara Choudhry, a Muslim student jailed for attempting to murder British MP Stephen Timms in May 2010, was inspired by al-Awlaki's online videos (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). Choudhry claimed that she was radicalized after being directed inadvertently by YouTube to a stream of al-Awlaki's videos. Despite demands to YouTube to remove his videos, a January 1, 2014, simple keyword search for "Al Awlaki lectures" brought up over 300 YouTube video clips (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). Many YouTube pages have posted terrorist clips, some correlated with major terrorist events around the world. On April 30, 2010, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan group created its official YouTube Page (Weimann G. , 2014).

The Islamic State has fuelled the growth of its social media freelancers by various means of exploitation of information in a strategic manner. The group permits select (and presumably trusted) people within the caliphate to form relationships with Western supporters, usually through the messaging apps Telegram or Surespot (Berger, 2014). The chosen emissaries, in turn, become celebrities in their online circles because they have the inside scoop on the supposed day-to-day realities of life in Raqqa or Mosul (Berger, 2014; Nance, 2016). "There are a few supporters who, over time, have demonstrated a kind of access to those inside the Islamic State," Amarasingam says. "Those are the people who tend to become authoritative and influential, the people who have that kind of access." These elite users, or "nodes," as they were termed in the ISIS in America report, suffuse their social media networks with exclusive content, thereby creating buzz—and allowing the Islamic State to maintain a modicum of influence over its crowd sourced partners(Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015).

Using social media as well as encrypted online communications beyond the reach of law enforcement surveillance, the terror organization is increasingly reaching new sympathizers and encouraging attacks such as the one foiled in Boston, officials said. An estimated 3,400 Westerners have travelled to join ISIS in its quest to establish an Islamist state in Iraq and Syria, according to counterterrorism officials (Kderner, 2016). At least 200 Americans have gone or attempted to travel to Syria. But even a rough estimate of the number of sympathizers on U.S. soil is hard to discern. ISIS has the most sophisticated propaganda machine of any terrorist organization, a global communications strategy that has stumped counterterrorism officials while making significant inroads among U.S. sympathizers (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015).

ISIS has disseminated various other statements attacking the U.S. via social media like the hacker known as Junaid Hussian hacked down Tony Blair private address book on the web and committed computer offense in 2012 (as shown in figure: 3:4). He was then 18 year old boy from Birmingham UK, who also accused with hacker collective called "Team Poison" crashed UK anti-terror phone lines and later joined ISIS group. Hussain became third on the Pentagon's Most Wanted List after hacking US Central Command and posting a "Kill List" with the home addresses of the US military personnel (Schori Liang C. , 2016). Eventually, he was killed in August 2015 near Raqqa Syria by a US drone.

Figure: 3:4. ISIS hacking Tony Blair private address book

Source: (NATGEO, Breakthrough Cyber Terror, 2017)

ISIS has maintained Twitter accounts for several of its official media outlets, including al-Hayat media, which mostly distributes polished propaganda pieces in Arabic, although it also maintains Twitter feeds in various other languages, including English; Al-Medrar, which publishes in a variety of languages; Platform Media, which primarily tweets

news updates in Arabic; and Al-Battar media, which has English and Arabic feeds that tweet news, graphics, official statements, and videos (Nance, 2016). In addition, multiple ISIS regional groups maintain Twitter feeds posting news, images, and video of their activities.

Junaid Hussian continued to recruits member in the group with 1800 followers in twitter (as shown in figure: 3:5). There is a separate hacking division called, the Islamic State hacking Division of ISIS (Smith, 2017). The app that can be easily downloaded for daily news feeds and thousands of twitts, is just one way ISIS games Twitter to magnify its message (Schori Liang, 2016).

Figure: 3:5. Junaid Hussian Tweeter account with thousands of followers.

Source: (NATGEO, Breakthrough Cyber Terror, 2017)

"Muja tweets" are Twitter message that are archived and complied for the benefit of prospective jihadis. Muja tweets are generally hidden from the news media and casual observers by dumping them into hidden folders (Nance, 2016). Though, al-Qaeda and ISIS are believed to have issued over ninety thousand Twitter message a day, the best and most representative for their media are kept from public view. Most Muja tweets are completely pastoral presentations of how wonderful life is in the self-named ISIS caliphate and how brave the ISIS knights are to battle the entire world (Berger, Jun 16, 2014).

ISIS official Twitter accounts are augmented by supporters, some of whom seem to have quasi-official status. The Markaz al Islam Twitter feed, for example, has not only promoted ISIS propaganda (primarily in English), but has also directed supporters to his English-language Facebook pages (continuously replacing pages as they are removed by Facebook for content violation) that do the same (Blaker, 2015; Kderner, 2016). Several other feeds appear to serve similar roles. Such supporters are often active in a variety of languages and on a variety of platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and the question and answer service Ask.FM (Blaker, 2015; Kderner, 2016).

ISIS Media Production Center

Media attention has focused, not unreasonably, on ISIS's use of social media to spread pictures of graphic violence, attract new fighters, and incite lone wolves. But it's important to recognize that these activities are supported by sophisticated online machinery. Al-Qaeda organized the first widespread use of professional centralized media groups around as- Sahab media in the mid 1990s (Seib & Janbek, 2011). Though it is still active and remains Al-Qaeda Central Command's (AQC) official media wing and speaks with the voice of bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri said it has dramatically lost media share to ISIS after the 2014 declaration of the Caliphate. The heart and soul of the ISIS communications team is al-Furqan Media and operates the currently popular al-Hayat Media Center for non-Arabic communications and propaganda (Nance, 2016). The various provinces have their own highly compartmentalized production teams directed by a media emir, who gives videos assignments with instructions bearing the official IS logo and seal of the media emir (as shown in figure).

Figure: 3:6. The Islamic State Media networks and its branches.

Source: (Nance, 2016)

ISIS and its Media producing center al-Hayat and the group's media wing, al-Furqan, documented every aspect of its offensives, paying special attention to the grisly fates of members of the Syrian and Iraqi regimes (Blaker, 2015). The fourth installment of the 'Clanging of the Swords 'video series, for example, released in May 2014, plays like a satanic episode of Cops: Videographers with handheld equipment ride along with ISIS death squads as they pursue and assassinate Iraqi security personnel, some of whom are shown begging for their lives (Sanchez R. , June 5, 2015; Kderner, 2016). These videos helped persuade police and soldiers in other cities to melt away rather than resist when they heard that ISIS forces were on the march. To persuade foreigners to emigrate to the caliphate, the Islamic State produces—in addition to martyrdom videos—literature and videos that emphasize its alleged utopian aspects, particularly the freedom from any trace of religious persecution.

The dozens of Americans who've been arrested for allegedly plotting to commit violence for the Islamic State, meanwhile, have often seemed obsessed not only with viewing the organization's well-made content but also with contributing their own videos to the cause (Blaker, 2015). A Kansan named John T. Booker Jr., for example, who stands accused of planning to open fire on an Army base, was radicalized by the al-Hayat Media Center film 'Flames of War', prior to his arrest, he recorded a video of his own in which he warned Americans to "get your loved ones out of the military." And a Florida man named Harlem Suarez is accused of having concocted a script for his pro-Islamic State video, one in which he theatrically vowed to help "raise our black flag on top of your White House." (Brooking, December 11, 2015)

In one 21-minute video entitled 'Honor Is in Jihad: A Message to the People of the Balkans', a smiling Albanian fighter is shown holding his pigtailed daughter's hand at an outdoor market that abounds with fruit. He assures his fellow Albanian Muslims that if they come to the caliphate, they will never again have to worry about police "finding your wives uncovered" during midnight raids. The Islamic State's media strategy has also taken a cue from the tech world's affinity for transparency. "In the past, jihadist groups tended to prefer using password-protected Arabic-language forums to share and exchange ideas," notes Documenting the Virtual Caliphate, the Quilliam Foundation report. The Islamic State, by contrast, encourages adherents to operate on the Internet's most public networks, having determined that it's worth sacrificing secrecy in exchange for publicity (Kderner, 2016).

The official ISIS translation of an April 2014 speech from the group's main spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, states,

"Yes, verily the plot of Shaytan [Satan] is weak. America came to Iraq leading a frenzied crusade….The Crusaders thought that no one would be able to overcome them; however Allah the Mighty and Majestic disgraced them and showed us the weakness of their plot" (Berger, 2014; Schori Liang, 2016 ; Smith, 2017).

Mohammad al-Adnani also claims credit in the speech for ISIS expelling the U.S. from Iraq (Smith, 2017).Some of these posts target Westerners or non-Muslims more generally. The video "YaJunod Al-HaqqHayya" ('Soldiers of the just cause, let's go!') video, released in June 2014, features a song with the lyric: "Break the crosses and destroy the lineage of the grandsons of monkeys," apparent references to Christians and Jews and, therefore, indicating that Christians and Jews are the enemy (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015).The same video also included more direct anti-Jewish statements: "Wherever our war goes, Jewish rabbis are humiliated." Such Messages highlighting a 'Jewish enemy' to recruit followers is commonly employed by terrorist organizations.   Another video, released in August 2014, featured individuals allegedly from the U.S., Great Britain, Finland, Tunisia, Indonesia, Belgium, Morocco and South Africa praising ISIS and encouraging Muslims from around the world to join the organization and to establish themselves in the territory it holds (Kderner, 2016).

The official media services of ISIS serve to project the constitution and viability of the organization on the world stage: "we are a force to deal with" (Nance, 2016). A video then will be broadcast to the viewer with a desire message of gains and glory, especially of future rewards (Kderner, 2016). The narrative is laden with more than simply apocalyptic messages meant to signify what these propagandists believe; they are telling you what they want you to believe. To prove their viability, the regional offices to the jihadist news services often applaud each other or themselves for hard-fought campaigns against enemies of the group against the Western idea of globalization and its culture (Schori Liang, 2016).

ISIS's Online magazine and Daily Reports

To promote its propaganda, ISIS is also relying on advanced media production techniques, as shown in some of its high-quality videos. Western Muslims are an important target of ISIS's social media propaganda. The group ensures most of its media productions are translated into as many Western languages as possible. This is done through sophisticated media arms such as Al-Furqan Media, Fursan Al-Balagh Media, Asawirti Media, Al-Ghuraba Media, which appears to be operated in Germany (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015). The Al-Hayat

media Center provides the translation of a recent speech by ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani al-Shami into English, Turkish, Dutch, French, German, Indonesian and Russian.

T-shirts and hoodies branded with the "ISIS" (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) emblem are available to buy online for supporters of the extremist group for only $7, according to the Huffington Post, prompting concerns from social media networks (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). The products are being sold by the Indonesia-based Zira Moslem Merch on their various Facebook pages and even on their website. The online merchandise website labels itself as an "Islamic style movement" and also offers shirts with slogans such as "Muslim Brotherhood," "Pray for Gaza" and "Mujahedeen around the World United We Stand" (Kderner, 2016). A page on Facebook named "Kaos Islamic State of Iraq and Sham," which was launched in the past 24 hours, also sells ISIS embedded products. According to Fox News, many Facebook pages selling the items were closed down after the news organization made queries as to why they are not certified (Sanchez R. , June 5, 2015). However, new ones began to spring up (Kderner, 2016; Schori Liang, 2016).

The image ISIS seeks to portray is reminiscent of Inspire magazine, published by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The magazine's earlier issues attempted to encourage Americans to join terrorist training camps abroad by depicting an almost summer-camp like atmosphere. ISIS has created its own English-language magazines that are distributed on Twitter as well. Its first attempt, the Islamic State Report, primarily featured images with headlines and quotes from the Qu'ran, along with occasional short essays praising ISIS (Sanchez R. , June 5, 2015). Various news items in the report included brags about killing sorcerers and information about grain distribution and implementation of Islamic law in relation to giving charity and tax (Berger, Jun 16, 2014).

ISIS has also launched an online magazine to recruit more fighters. The 10-page magazine named "The Islamic State Report" explains how life within its envisioned Islamic state would look like. The first issue of the magazine features an interview with someone called Shaikh Abul-Hawraa' Al-Jazaa'iri, presented as the organizer of a seminar to graduate Imams in the Syrian city of Raqqa (as shown in figure: 3:7). The magazine says:

Caring for the residents of Wilayat Ar-Raqqah [Province of Ar-Raqqah] is a goal of the Islamic State, and because of this, the Islamic State sought to open service all over the wilayah through an Islamic services committee comprised of multiple departments, among which is the Consumer Protection Office (The Islamic State Report, 2014).

Abu Salih Al-Ansari, the head of the Consumer Protection Office, tells the magazine.

>Our teams go out every day, split up on the streets of the city and examine the restaurants, wholesale outlets and shopping centres. We also conduct direct medical supervision of the slaughterhouses in order to ensure that they are free of any harmful substances. We will soon be holding a seminar [God willing] to teach the proper Islamic method of slaughter. We hold surprise inspections on a daily basis at varying times (The Islamic State Report, 2014).

Figure: 3:7.The Islamic State Report, Issue 1

Source: (Berger, Jun 16, 2014)

Another monthly published online magazine by ISIS is 'Dabiq' which is also used for spreading group's propaganda around the world. "Dabiq" is an area located near Aleppo, Syria, where an apocalyptic battle between Islam and "an Army from Rome" is supposed to take place before the return of the Mahdi and the second coming of the Prophet Jesus(Nance, 2016). The monthly magazine of ISIS, debuted the first edition in July 2014. In July 2014, ISIS issued a second English-language magazine called Dabiq (Kderner, 2016). In its first issue, Dabiq was more similar to other terrorist magazines like Inspire, featuring 50 pages of graphics and articles on ideology, theology and praise of the organization, as well as quotes from American military and political figures describing ISIS's strength (Blaker, 2015). The

first edition of the magazine announced of "the return of the Khilafah", followed by new editions monthly (Kderner, 2016; Nance, 2016).

Each edition contains articles on how the Caliphate is challenging the unbelievers of the world, building infrastructure, and normalizing itself into statehood; stories of brave suicide bomber "martyrs" and great adventurous military campaigns; announcements of the most popular videos no fan boy should miss; and even advertising pages for hostages for sale (Kderner, 2016). The second issue of Dabiq, released in July 2014, included philosophical justifications for ISIS and its ideology and urged readers to move to ISIS territory or at least pledge allegiance to the organization (Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015).

The magazine has become the official mouthpiece to take credit for terrorist attacks. Apparently working under deadline, they managed to complete a very fast five-day turn around for the rapid release of the edition twelve, "Just Terror", featuring the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks and the destruction of the Russian airbus over the Sinai(Nance, 2016; Kderner, 2016). The publication featured a photo of the explosive device that allegedly blew up the airliner- a soda can filled with explosives- along with the claim that ISIS Sinai was behind the attack (Nance, 2016; Kderner, 2016).

The vast majority of non-Arabic propaganda distributed by ISIS is designed to get attention (often tweeting information at members of the media and government), enhance the group's image and encourage Westerners to support and join the organization (Johnson, June 08, 2015).Much of the social media campaign centers on depicting ISIS as a goodwill organization. Several Twitter feeds maintained by ISIS (as well as accounts on Facebook and other social media outlets belonging to ISIS or supporters) regularly distribute images of militants engaging with children, distributing food and performing other social services (Johnson, June 08, 2015). In April 2014, ISIS released a video featuring former German rapper-turned-ISIS-militant Denis Cuspert engaged in a snowball fight with fellow extremists, stating in German, "Now you see…here in Syria, we also can have fun!...That's jihad, jihad makes fun…and we have fun here with the children…Come on, we invite you to jihad!" (Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015).

In June 2014, ISIS began posting a series of short videos called 'Mujatweets' (named ostensibly for their brevity) to YouTube (Nance, 2016; Berger, Jun 16, 2014; Kderner, 2016). The videos are designed to depict ISIS as a charitable organization, beloved by civilians and establishing a better society. The first episode depicts an apparent European recruit singing a song in German praising ISIS (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015). The second episode shows clips of children having fun with ISIS militants. The third episode features an apparent Syrian chef –

an everyday civilian – who explains how good life is now that ISIS controls his region. The fourth, released in July 2014, takes a slightly different tack, following an apparently German ISIS member who visits supposed wounded militants in a hospital, telling viewers, "Come to the land of honour and search for shahada (martyrdom)." The fourth episode is in German with English subtitles. By August 2014, ISIS had released 8 Mujatweets episodes in total(Brooking, December 11, 2015).

Some ISIS propaganda also focuses on the work the organization is doing to establish a supposedly model Islamic state. Along with multiple short Tweets and messages by the organization and its supporters praising a coming caliphate, the organization has released highly popularized videos such as 'Khairah Ummah', a fifteen minute film released in June 2014 and promoted on multiple Twitter feeds and on Facebook that shows an ISIS member "reminding" shopkeepers to go to the mosque on Friday and not to display manikins with women's clothing, among other things. This, he explains, creates, 'the best Ummah[community] produced for mankind' (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015).

The video later shows how ISIS found and executed someone they claimed to be a sorcerer – a scene meant to show the extent to which it is working to eradicate evil and implement Islamic law and values. The Khairah Ummah video was released in multiple versions for western audiences, with subtitles in several languages, including English, French, Russian and Turkish (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). Other social media efforts tout ISIS's military strength, calling on followers to join in fighting. The 'Ya Junod Al-Haqq Hayya' video, released early in June 2014, featured prominently displayed English subtitles of a song bragging about ISIS's military conquests and its ability to instil fear in its enemies (Johnson, June 08, 2015 ; Kderner, 2016). Later in the same month, a video called 'Hayaalal-Jihad' or 'Let's go for Jihad!' featured a song in German, with prominent English subtitles, with the lyrics: 'Brothers join us/we slaughter until the Day of Judgment', and proclaims that ISIS members 'love to die' (Schori Liang, 2016). The song was accompanied by images of explosions, casualties and fighting ISIS members (Brooking, December 11, 2015).

Like that of other terrorist organizations, ISIS propaganda does not shy away from graphic military imagery. It regularly posts images of shootings, crucifixions, beheadings and mass executions it claims to perpetrate, as well as images of individuals it claims as martyrs. These can be seen on organizational Twitter accounts as well as on the accounts of its regional affiliates (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). Throughout the winter of 2013-2014, ISIS also released a number of propaganda posters explaining the 'virtues of swords', 'virtues of

seeking martyrdom', and the benefit of 'racing towards jihad' (Sanchez R. , June 5, 2015; Kderner, 2016).

Although all terrorist groups use the internet, ISIS is the first to fully exploit the internet and the social media (Berger, Jun 16, 2014; Kderner, 2016; Brooking, 2015). This reflects some unique characteristics of ISIS itself. It regards itself as a global movement that therefore requires a global network of communications to support it. It sees its mission as not simply one of creating terror but one of awakening the Muslim community (Schori Liang, 2016). Its leaders regard communications as 90 percent of their struggle and therefore, despite the security risks, these leaders communicate regularly with video and audio messages (Smith, 2017).These are distributed on the official websites, and then they are redistributed in a vast number of additional websites, but beneath this there is a tier of forums that allow for direct participation by on-line jihadists so they can become part of the movement themselves.

ISIS leans on these cyber tactics out of necessity. U.S. counterterrorist operations plus unprecedented international cooperation among the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations of the world have degraded ISIS's operational capability (Schori Liang C. , 2016). As a consequence, ISIS today is more decentralized, more dependent on its field commands, its affiliates, its allies and above all on its ability to inspire home-grown terrorists(Brooking, December 11, 2015). In this connection, ISIS has embraced individual jihadism and has emphasized do-it-yourself terrorism. That is a fundamental shift in strategy.

Many would-be jihadists begin their journey on the internet seeking solutions to their personal crises, validation of their anger, and the thrill of clandestine activity (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). Of these, a few move beyond the internet to seek terrorist training abroad or to plot terrorist attacks here, but overall the response in America to ISIS's intense marketing campaign thus far has not amounted to very much. Indeed, between 9/11 and the end of 2010, a total of 176 persons, Americans, were identified as jihadists (Schori Liang, 2016); that is, accused of providing material support to one of the jihadist groups or plotting terrorists attacks. In fact, despite years of on-line jihadist exhortation and instruction, the level of terrorist violence in the United States since 9/11 has been far below the terrorist bombing campaigns of the pre-internet 1970s(Blaker, 2015; Kderner, 2016; Nance, 2016; Schori Liang C. , 2016; Smith, 2017).

CHAPTER FOUR
COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST ISIS

At the national level US Homeland Security and Intelligence, and House of Representative had two important hearing on terrorist groups using social media and internet facilities to radicalize, which was held in 2011 and 2015 respectively. In 2011, the hearing titled was "Jihadist Use of Social Media—How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve Innovation" in which, several statements and speeches were given by various dignitaries in the US department, and issues of radicalization through the internet were discussed before the subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence (US Govt, 2012). Another hearing titled, "Radicalization: Social Media and The Rise of Terrorism" which was held in 2015 that also gave a greater insight into the issue of radicalization and role of social media (US Govt, 2015).

The Internet has enabled the collection of extremist ideas and materials that may lead a vulnerable individual to recruit himself, sometimes unaided by any intermediary (Schori Liang C. , 2016). Such self-recruited extremists can join a community of like-minded individuals which then develops its own ideology. These networks are resilient and adaptive, despite growing law enforcement efforts to take them down. Online extremist forums can play a key role in the radicalization process of an individual or a group (Schori Liang, 2016). Often identified with religious symbolism and rituals, and a rejection of western cultures, these forums provide individuals that feel emotional outrage with a sense of identity and purpose which may lead them to consider it a personal duty to take action as soldiers in a war to protect their community (Seib & Janbek, 2011).

The problem of radicalization however is not limited to ISIS-related terrorism. Extremism can grow out of the domestic conditions of any country, and the Internet can play a facilitating role in radicalizing any set of vulnerable individuals in the same way that it does for ISIS-related extremists (US Govt, 2015).In this respect, participants cautioned against using misleading terminology, in particular as relates to deviations from Islam and the actions of violent Muslims; terms such as jihad, the struggle from what might confuse the youths.

South Asia is critical in the fight against ISIS and India has the potential to play a large role in the United States' regional strategy (Tecimer, 2017). To better collaborate with the United States on countering ISIS, India has consider conducting joint counterterrorism operations with the United States; sharing more inclusive intelligence, including updated terrorists watch lists; and taking a firm stance against Bangladesh's weak response to

terrorism. As India has not been involved in the fight against ISIS on a global scale, there have been few opportunities for U.S.-India joint counter-ISIS operations (Tecimer, 2017).

ISIS poses a significant threat to India, but India has not been engaged in the global fight against the group. Virtual self-radicalization is a growing problem and it might quickly escalate, possibly into kinetic attacks. If India becomes more involved in the global fight against the Islamic State by working closely with the United States in the region, sharing terrorist watch lists, and taking a stronger stance against Bangladesh, it can have a stronger partner to fight the growing domestic threat of ISIS while making a global contribution that Trump will likely value(Tecimer, 2017).

The challenge for governments and all stakeholders is to understand the range of factors in which social media may play a role in this, so that responses are not misplaced or based on unsupported assumptions(Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). On this basis, it may be possible to identify appropriate steps to counter radicalization activity online and to ensure appropriate legal, institutional, administrative and educational frameworks to respond to the threat, in full compliance with the international human rights law (Schori Liang C. , 2016). Steps should ensure that freedom of expression and privacy are free from arbitrary, unlawful or disproportionate interference, and are able to preserve the characteristics of the Internet being open, inclusive and contributing to sustainable development and prosperity of modern society (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012).

In radicalisation there was often a degree of accidental contact in an hour of need rather than a deliberate path (Coolsaet R., 2008). While there was no agreement as to the specifics of what "causes" terrorism, discussants agreed that effective counter-narratives had to focus in particular on vulnerable and marginalized communities, with an aim to empowering young people (Blaker, 2015). Research from across different regions - including the Middle East, Europe, and South America - seemed to indicate that radical movements were often most successful in recruiting new followers when offering some form of identity/sense of belonging. In this context, one of the similarities in the recruitment approach of terrorist groups and criminal gangs, pointing out that a common factor was the focus on young people. Therefore, fostering positive guidance and correct education, be it in religion or sense of belongingness to the younger generation is essential component in countering radicalization (Schori Liang C. , 2016).

Global Responses in Countering ISIS in social media

The Secretary General of UN, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, in his remarks on 29 May 2015 expressed the UN's concern on increase of foreign fighters joining terrorist groups and confirmed that there has been an estimated 70 percent increase in foreign terrorist fighters worldwide between the middle of 2014 and March 2015(Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). According to the UN estimates, over 25,000 foreign citizens from more than 100 countries have joined self-proclaimed ISIS and other groups. The UN and its counter-terrorist members has suggested in the Plan of Action to Prevent Extremism (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, September/2012). That is to encourage more research on the relationship between the misuse of the Internet and social media by violent extremists and the factors that drive individuals towards violent extremism (Harmon, 2014). Terrorist groups have led a global social media campaign to take their cause to every computer and mobile phone. They are increasingly adept in using the Internet and social media to propagate their hateful messages and support their recruitment and terrorism activities (US Govt, 2015).

According to a recent report "Jihad Against Journalist" by RSF (Reporters Sans Frontiers), the self-proclaimed ISIS (Islamic State) central media command supervises seven media divisions with separate specialties (video, text, photo, radio and translation) and collects the information from 38 "media offices" worldwide, mainly in Iraq and Syria but also Afghanistan, West Africa, the Caucasus, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). Some 50,000-70,000 Twitter accounts support self-proclaimed ISIS today, each with an average of one thousand followers (Smith, 2017). And according to a study by the Centre for Middle East Policy published in March 2015, the success of the terrorist group on social networks is dominated by a hyperactive 500-2000 accounts that tweet intensively (Hamed, 2015). Though reprehensible it is not clear however, how effective these media efforts are in engendering sympathy for their cause or recruiting followers.

The Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (henceforth, 1267 Monitoring Team) and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force office, the working group has undertaken a series of initiatives towards these objectives (Seib & Janbek, 2011). In November 2008, the group engaged with stakeholders (representatives of the internet sector, civil society, policymakers, etc.) at a meeting to discuss the nature of the threat and international action to combat it (Schori Liang, 2016).In addition, the group has assembled data on existing measures for countering terrorism on the internet based on responses to a

letter of inquiry sent to UN member states and a number of other, open sources. This information formed the basis for the working group's February 2009 report, which provides an overview of the approaches taken by member states to counter terrorist activities on the internet (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012).

The report provides an analytical framework to categorize different aspects of the issue, and recommends actions for the United Nations. In 2010, the working group organized two expert meetings to discuss countering terrorist activities on the internet, the first hosted by the German Foreign Office and the second in collaboration with Microsoft (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). These discussions have expanded in 2011 to consider countering the appeal to terrorism on the internet through counter-narratives, with a conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia bringing this to the forefront (Schori Liang C. , 2016).

The working group's Leads have also undertaken efforts to fulfil the objectives of the working group in their respective mandates. The 1267 Monitoring team, for instance, has been working with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) to produce documentaries on repentant terrorists (Nance, 2016). The first film, entitled 'The Terrorist Who Came Home', is based on an Algerian fighter who chose to renounce violence and rejoin mainstream society; the second film, 'Second Chance for Saudi Terrorist', focuses on the Saudi government's effort to rehabilitate terrorists. An additional film is planned for release in 2012 (Schori Liang C. , 2016).

Supporting members of the working group have also undertaken measures to address the challenges of countering terrorism on the internet. For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has taken steps to address the challenges of cybercrime in the context of terrorism, by providing states with training and assistance to improve related national legislation and state capacities. To this end, UNODC organized an open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Group on Cybercrime conference in January 2011 (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012).

A two day conference held in Riyadh on 24 - 26 January 2011, by the United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), theme on the use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes focused on identifying good practices in using the Internet to undermine the appeal of terrorism, to expose its lack of legitimacy and its negative impact, and to undermine the credibility of its messengers. Key themes included the importance of identifying the target audience, crafting effective messages, identifying credible messengers, and using appropriate media to reach vulnerable communities. The Conference agreed that Governments might not always be best placed to lead this work and needed the cooperation

of civil society, the private sector, academia, the media and victims of terrorism. Given the global nature of terrorist narratives and the need to counter them in the same space, there was a special role for the United Nations in facilitating discussion and action.

At the global scale on 22 October 2012, UNDOC launched a publication to provide practical guidance to Member States for more effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the use of the Internet (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012). The publication, entitled The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, is the first of its kind and was produced in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, September/2012). Terrorist groups and their supporters use the Internet to recruit, finance, train and incite followers to commit acts of terrorism, as well as to spread propaganda and gather and disseminate information for terrorist purposes. The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes disregards national borders, amplifying the potential impact on victims.

UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov said, "Potential terrorists use advanced communications technology, often involving the Internet, to reach a worldwide audience with relative anonymity and at a low cost. Just as Internet use among regular, lawful citizens has increased in the past few years, terrorist organizations also make extensive use of this indispensable global network for many different purposes." Mr. Fedotov said that with the new tool, UNODC aimed to provide practical guidance for the investigation and prosecution of cases where the Internet is used for terrorism (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, September/2012). Through real examples of legal cases, the publication explores Member States' legislation dealing with the terrorist use of the Internet and demonstrates the difficulties faced by Member States in criminalizing and prosecuting such acts. It further provides guidance on current legal frameworks and practice at the national and international levels relating to the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the Internet (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012).

The publication emphasizes the need for enhancement of cooperation between criminal justice systems and the private sector, as well as international cooperation, particularly where the preservation and retention of Internet-related data take place in several jurisdictions Produced with financial support from the Government of the United Kingdom, the publication is intended for use both as a stand-alone resource for criminal justice practitioners, and in support of the capacity-building initiatives of UNODC. As a key United Nations entity for delivering counter-terrorism legal and related technical assistance, UNODC works to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice systems to implement

the provisions of the international legal instruments against terrorism. UNODC actively participates in the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, ensuring that the UNODC counter-terrorism work is carried out in the broader context of, and coordinated with, United Nations system-wide efforts through the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. "The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes" was launched at a conference held at the Austrian Ministry of Interior in Vienna. The conference was attended by, among, others Johanna Mikl-Leitner, Austrian Interior Minister; UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov; Sandor Pinter, Hungarian Interior Minister; James Brokenshire, Security Minister, British Home Office; and Georg Maassen, President of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

At the global level various international organizations are collaborating in countering the use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes and its members are:

- Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (1267 Monitoring Team)
- Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office (lead)
- Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
- Department of Public Information (DPI)
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
  Additional Partners:
- International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

UNESCO is the UN agency with a mandate to defend freedom of expression, instructed by its Constitution to promote "the free flow of ideas by word and image". In 2013, UNESCO's General Conference of 195 Member States adopted Resolution 52, which recalled Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/20/8, "The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet", affirming that the same rights that people have off-line must also be protected online (Fedotov, Barrett, Shercliff, & Hemming, 2012).

Such rights are relevant across UNESCO's areas of competence and are critical for sustainable development, peace and dialogue. UNESCO holds that the negative dimensions should not overshadow the advantages of the Internet and social media, especially their potential contribution to building inclusive Knowledge Societies and achieving the 2030 Development Agenda, as well as advancing all human rights including freedom of expression and privacy online and offline. UNESCO's Director General, Irina Bokova, said in a recent article on the Huffington post: "We need to disarm the process of radicalization, to undo the mechanisms of influence that can place young people on the path to violent extremism. We must teach peace" (Schori Liang C. , 2016).

Following the international Conference, "Youth and the internet: Fighting Radicalization and Extremism", held at UNESCO's Paris Headquarters from 16 to 17 June, 2015 and within the framework of UNESCO's intergovernmental Information for All Programme (IFAP), UNESCO has launched its integrated Framework for Action − Empowering Youth to Build Peace: Youth 2.0 Building skills, Bolstering Peace. Drawing on the Organization's trans-disciplinary competencies, this initiative seeks to empower youth to leverage the influential role of information and communication technologies (ICT) and networks to promote processes harmonious, inclusive and equitable participation on-line and off-line in pluralistic societies (Smith, 2017). The Framework reaffirms the decisive role of values, knowledge and skills that strengthen respect for human rights, social justice, mutual understanding and contribute to sustainable development and peace.

Subsequent events point to the continued relevance and need to the address Internet-related dimensions of youth radicalization and extremism. At the UN General Assembly High-Level Forum on a Culture of Peace, held in New York, on 9 September 2015, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon drew the attention of global leaders to the UNESCO Conference and Framework for its contribution to preventing violent extremism (Nance, 2016). Following its 38th General Conference' adoption of the Connecting the Dots conference Outcome Document, UNESCO's concept of internet universality, inclusive knowledge societies , media and information literacy, and IFAP's six strategic priorities are of particular relevance (Smith, 2017). They provide an overarching conceptual frame for exploring the comprehensive empowerment of citizenship in digital age.

UNESCO attended the special meeting of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee and technical sessions of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), entitled "Prevent terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media to recruit terrorists and incite terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,"

at UNHQ in New York in December 2015 (Schori Liang, 2016). UNESCO moderated the session on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, and shared UNESCO position that combating terrorism should be made compatible with protecting human rights and respecting international standards on freedom of expression and privacy. UNESCO also presented its publications on intermediaries and hates speech, and share its projects related to Media and Information Literacy, empowering youth for peace, and global citizen education as key social response to fighting youth radicalisation.

In 2015, UNESCO Director for Freedom of Expression and Media Development addressed European Parliament's expert hearing on the role of media and Internet in countering hate speech and promoting intercultural dialogue. UNESCO advocated free flow on the basis that pluralistic information enables people to identify propaganda for violence and war, and choose peaceful alternatives. Any mechanism for protecting vulnerable persons from clearly insightful information must meet international standards for legitimate limits on speech and be complemented by a preparedness paradigm (Schori Liang, 2016).

On the same occasion, the Director highlighted the intersections of news media as an original source of credible information, and social media as a site of secondary information that plays in a context of interpersonal communications that are particularly resonant at an emotional level. The question this prompts is the extent to which news may impact on social media, or be absorbed into social media processes, as relevant to radicalization and counter-radicalization processes which may include online dimensions (Schori Liang, 2016).

The Internet offers significant possibilities for supporting the realization of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and advancing all human rights including access to information, freedom of expression and on-line privacy (Smith, 2017). UNESCO also recognizes that unchecked certain forms of Internet use and internet-related effects may lead to undesirable outcomes. The Organization therefore seeks to promote awareness amongst all stakeholders, promote debate, reflection and solution finding so as to mitigate adverse outcomes and amplify the widest disseminate and uptake of benefits (Schori Liang, 2016). Part of these efforts involves exploring Internet-related phenomena, understanding their evolution in different regions, their application and impact across various user groups and societies. Such an understanding grounded in an empirical basis can support more effective policy responses and enhance the efforts towards attainment of the international targets (Schori Liang, 2016; Smith, 2017).

United States and its Counter-measures

In 2011, the U.S. has established the Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at the State Department, which for the past couple years, has focused on countering ISIS's propaganda (US Govt, 2015). However, as noted by one of the witnesses in the hearing in 2015,Ambassador Fernandez, the Centre's budget over 3 years totalled the cost of a single Reaper drone, $15 million, and has remained the same since 2012(US Govt, 2015). The team of operators and editors working in Arabic and English has not exceeded 15 people at any one time. The Centre has also been operating amidst congressional budget constraints and hiring freezes that result at Federal agencies when Congress continues to enact short-term funding resolutions instead of traditional appropriations bills (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015).

Young people in the United States are not beyond the reach of ISIS either. In January 2015, a 19 year old American girl from Colorado, Shannon Maureen Conley, was sentenced to four years in prison for conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (Kderner, 2016). According to her family, Shannon had learned everything she knew about Islam from the Internet (Kderner, 2016). While her family was aware that Shannon had converted to Islam, they were taken completely by surprise when they learned she was involved with jihadists.

Similarly a local woman from Pennsylvania by the name of Colleen LaRose was arrested on her return to the United States as part of a terror plot that targeted a Swedish cartoonist. LaRose would later become known to the world as Jihad Jane(Weimann G. , 2014).However, what is less well-known to the world was she received that moniker because it was the name that she employed on-line, where she became a committed jihadist. She enthusiastically posted and commented on YouTube videos of supporting Al-Qaeda and their allies, but her enthusiasm for jihad went beyond watching videos and offered moral support as well. She made contacts on-line with other jihadist, solicited funding, and orchestrated an actual terror plot (Weimann G. , 2014). Her case is an example of how easy it can be to find jihadist content on-line and make operational connections with others who speak aspirationally about violent acts of terror against the homeland. These examples highlight the emerging challenge posed by terrorists engaging on-line.

The statement given by William F. Mccants in the hearing was that, he suggested the U.S. Government should focus on putting out the fire of criminal activity rather than removing the incendiary material and follow the smoke trail of ISIS propaganda, looking for those who celebrate its content and distribute it intensively for the purpose of recruitment.

Chances are that some of them will do something criminal (US Govt, 2012).The FBI and local law enforcement in the United States have done a considerable job in finding ISIS supporters on-line and arresting them before they hurt anyone. They have gotten very good at following the smoke trails and putting out the fire of criminal activity (US Govt, 2012).

The U.S. intelligence community is already making very effective use of the internet to identify and investigate extremists. Some additional actions can contribute to undermining the processes that enable extremists to engage in violence. Producing and distributing media for Foreign Terrorist Organizations constitutes material support for terrorism. But the statement given by Andrew Aaron Weisburd argued that a service provider who knowingly assists in the distribution of terrorist media is also culpable.

> While it is in no one's interests to prosecute internet service providers, they must be made to realize that they can neither turn a blind eye to the use of their services by terrorist organizations, nor can they continue to put the onus of identifying and removing terrorist media on private citizens (U.S Govt, 2012).

Further, he personally don't believe that Google, operator of YouTube, has an interest in promoting violent extremism, and they have already made some effort to address this issue, but they can and should do more (U.S Govt, 2012).Branding in terrorist media is a sign of authenticity, and terrorist media is readily identifiable as such due to the presence of trademarks known to be associated with particular organizations. The objective should be not to drive all terrorist media off-line, but to drive it to the margins and deprive it of the power of branding, as well as to leave home grown extremists unable to verify the authenticity of any given product (Schori Liang C. , 2016).

The impact of ISIS's extensive social media presence has already been witnessed in the unprecedented flood of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria (Brooking, December 11, 2015). As the Congressional Research Service has found, these terrorists use Islamist and ideological and/or religious justification for the belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph via violent means(US Govt, 2015). As the ideology of militant Islam spreads, the threat to the U.S. and allies, such as Israel, persists. Terrorist networks like Al Qaeda affiliates and ISIS, as well as extremists, clerics, and others, seek to spread this ideology in order to recruit, engage sympathizers, and criticize the West (US Govt, 2015).

ISIS' use of platforms like Twitter is highly effective (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). YouTube videos depicting violent acts against Westerners are used to incite others to take up arms and wage jihad (Weimann G. , 2014). While foreign fighters travel overseas for training

and to make other terrorist connections, it's becoming apparent that Islamic recruits in the United States and other parts of the world who are unable to travel to these battlegrounds do not necessarily need to do so in order to receive training and inspiration (Kderner, 2016). They can engage real time with jihadists on Twitter, watch ISIS's murderous propaganda on YouTube, view jihadist selfies on Instagram, or read religious justifications for the killing of civilians on Just Paste It (Schori Liang, 2016).

It is known that, ISIS's use of social media is believed to be resonating with vulnerable populations, particularly Muslim converts and susceptible alienated youth (Gilsinan, Feb 23, 2015). However, radicalization of Americans cannot be narrowed to any single social or demographic profile. Instead, the Americans who are being radicalized to support and fight for Islamic extremists come from all walks of life (US Govt, 2015). Those Americans who travel overseas to support terrorist groups can also incite others back home and abroad by their actions to conduct attacks and can themselves return back to the U.S. with training to complete terrorist attacks(Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015; Kderner, 2016).

Insightfully, these foreign fighters have been trained in combat, have strong ties to terrorist groups, and recruit others to join the fight. The U.S. Government has the ability under the law to revoke passports on several grounds, including reasons of national security (US Govt, 2015). The administration has not indicated they plan to utilize immigration controls as other countries have in order to stop foreign fighters. Nor is the danger posed to the United States by foreign fighters limited to those terrorists and adherents to terrorists groups who are U.S. citizens (Schori Liang, 2016).

 In order to enter the United States, citizens of most countries must obtain visas issued at overseas embassies and consulates by the State Department. In 2014, the State Department issued almost 10 million visas to foreigners seeking temporary entry into America and nearly 500,000 immigrant visas for permanent residence (US Govt, 2015). This process plays a crucial role in detecting individuals with terrorist ties and stopping them from entering the United States (Brooking, December 11, 2015). Despite these safeguards, many of the subjects would have been convinced on terrorist charges in the United States since 9/11 are aliens who travel to America on visas, including student visas, tourist visas, and green cards. This danger is compounded by the large number of foreign fighters from visa-waiver countries who do not even need a visa to enter our country.

Federal and State governments as well as communities have begun to take action to mitigate the threat of terrorist propaganda on social media. However, they have experienced multiple challenges in combating this threat. The unprecedented speeds with which people

are being radicalized by violent Islamic supremacists are difficult to keep up with and is straining the ability of government to monitor and intercept suspects. Jihadists using increasingly secure Web sites and applications, and communicating in code with Americans and westerners in the United States present even further challenges for law enforcement in tracking, identifying, and apprehending those who seek to engage in terrorist attacks. In order to combat this trend, the US government must ensure that law enforcement has the necessary tools to do its job. Efforts to counter and deter unconventional information warfare must be joined with other government agencies' efforts to deal with the problem of terror on social media.

As noted by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, in their recent book, "ISIS: the State of Terror", the Islamic State, also known as ISIL, has been prolific in its ability to exploit a variety of social media platforms. According to the authors, jihadists have been making slick propaganda for decades (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). But for a long time these production scattered to an exclusive audience of potential recruits, never making the evening news or creeping into the collective consciousness of the West. However, in stark contrast, ISIS and its online supporters, continue to use Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and other social networking services to broadcast their terrorist messages to a global audience in real time and significantly extend their recruitment, mobilization, and financing efforts beyond the battle fields in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

On September 11, 2015 CEP or the Counter Extremism Project, released profiles of 66 Americans who have joined or allegedly attempted to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, as well as other Americans accused of planning attacks on U.S. soil, providing financial assistance to extremist entities, or propagandizing on their behalf. These individuals have very different background sand experiences (Smith, 2017). But the one characteristic that they seem to share was an active participation on social media. Through #CEP Digital Distruption, the US officials have identified and reported hundreds of extremists to Twitter. And in June, the group has expanded its campaign to include monitoring of Twitter accounts in French, Italian, German, and Turkish.

The strategies that the US department adopted for countering terrorists radicalization method through internet was first, one of the problems that have been encountered is that many social media companies place accounts that have been reported into a rolling queue. It believe that by giving CEP as well as others like the State Department trusted reporting status and opening a direct line of communication, it can more easily and swiftly identify and remove the most notorious extremists online (Cronin, 2015).

Second, the campaign relies in part on our stakeholder audience also reporting accounts. But the reporting process on Twitter and other social media sites is long and cumbersome. Twitter recently started its streamlined reporting process for women to report harassment or stalking which is great. But reporting of violent extremists stills fall into a catchall category (Berger, Jun 16, 2014). Third, while every organization is different, we believe it's critical that America's most important tech companies show a united front when it comes to fighting violent extremism. This would include a clear public policy statement that extremist activities will not be tolerated.

Fourth, shine the bright spotlight of transparency in the most extremist, most egregious extremist accounts. This past year, one of the most influential social media jihadist Shami Witness, was exposed and immediately shut down his accounts and stopped operating. It can collectively agree that the most egregious of cyber jihadist do not deserve anonymity or the right of free hate and incitement of terror speech through the use of Twitter or any other social media platform. Fifth, companies should more proactively monitor content. While no social media company has been able to resolve the problem completely, companies like Google and Facebook are at least willing to have a conversation and take steps to address the issue.

Some of the practical measures that the US government have recently adopted were the need to realize that military victory is the best way to weaken ISIS propaganda appeal. There is a connection between the real world and the propaganda. The propaganda gets weakened when the reality on the ground changes. Second, there needs to be much better policing of social media.. It's overdue for Congress and for others to have a serious exchange of views, a serious conversation with social media companies on the terrorist presence on the Internet and how these companies violate terms of services, let alone the question of legality. Better policing of the Internet will decrease the number of ISIS propagandists and help those who are fighting it be increased. There is value in making it inconvenient for them.

Third, people are radicalized in clusters as part of a personal relationship either directly or in person online. We know that recent converts, 40 percent of ISIS, people who want to join ISIS have been recent converts in the United States. And second generation immigrants are particularly at risk. We need to empower domestic and international civil society by both consistent funding and training to be on all the time, to be intervening and engaging with these lost and questing souls, enlist people who have a talent for engagement. Fourth, Syria is important. ISIS seeks to present Syria as a mobilizing factor to mobilize people, to radicalize them, to get them to do something. They present a false image of the

reality in Syria. And there is power in helping the Syrian people, victims of ISIS, survivors of ISIS violence, being able to communicate the reality on the ground that is often not known by a teenager in Mississippi or in California.

Lastly, the issue of volume and volume has value. We all know in our personal lives how you may see an obscure idea or strange idea be amplified by social media because a lot of people are pushing to it. The United States and friendly countries in the West and in the Middle East are lessened by the Islamic State supporter's on-line. And there is a need of volume to make the message more powerful and there is a need of network to fight a network.

Coalition responses of regional players against ISIS

The US has decided to build a regional coalition force that would act to counter spread the ISIS approach in the region. However in the present context, the key to this coalition is Turkey as it has become a substantial regional power and has the largest economy with powerful military defence in the region (Friedman, 2014). Turkey is also the most vulnerable to events in Syria and Iraq, which run along its southern border. Turkey's strategy has been to avoid conflicts with its neighbours, which it has been able to do successfully so far (Fisher, 2015). The US now wants Turkey to provide forces, particularly ground troops to resist the Islamic State (ISIS) and it has an interest in doing so, since Iraqi oil would help diversify its sources of energy and because it wants to keep the conflict from spilling into Turkey (Friedman, 2014). The Turkish government has worked hard to keep the Syrian conflict outside its borders and to limit its own direct involvement in the civil war (Byman & Miles, 2012).

Turkey is in a difficult situation because if it intervenes against the Islamic State alongside the United States, its army will be tested in a way that it has not been tested since the Korean War, and the quality of its performance is uncertain (Friedman, 2014). The real risks are real, and victory is far from guaranteed. Turkey would be resuming the role it played in the Arab world during the Ottoman Empire, attempting to shape Arab to politics in a ways that it finds satisfactory (Martin, 2013). The United States did not this well in Iraq, and there is no guarantee that Turkey would succeed either, in fact, Turkey could be drawn into a conflict with the Arab states from which it would not be able to withdraw as neatly as the US did. At the same time, instability to Turkey's south and the emergence of a new territorial power in Syria and Iraq represent fundamental threats to Turkey (Friedman, 2014). There are

claims that the Turks secretly support the Islamic State, but it very difficult to accept such claims. The Turks may be favourably inclined toward other Islamist or jihadists groups, but the Islamic State is both dangerous and likely to draw pressure from the United States against any of its supporters. Still, the Turks will not simply do American's bidding as Turkey has interests in Syria that do not match with those of the U.S (Friedman, 2014).

Turkey want to see the Assad regime toppled, but the United States is reluctant to do so for fear of opening the door to a Sunni jihadist regime (or at the very least, jihadist anarchy) that, with the Islamic State operational, would be impossible to shape (Cockburn P. , 2015). To some extent, the Turks are keeping the Assad issue aside as an excuse not to engage in the conflict. But Turkey wants Assad gone and a pro-Turkey Sunni regime in his place. If the United States refuses to cede to this demand, Turkey has a basis for refusing to intervene; if the United States has become the focal point of US-Turkish ties, replacing prior issues such as turkey's relationship with Israel (Friedman, 2014).

The emergence of the Islamic State has similarly redefined Iran's posture in the region. Iran sees a pro-Iranian, Shiite-dominated regime in Iraq as critical to its interests, just as it sees its domination of southern Iraq as crucial (Al-Shishani, 2005). Iran fought a war with a Sunni-dominated Iraq in the 1980s, with devastating casualties; avoiding another such war is fundamental to Iranian national security policy (Mockaitis, 2007). From Iran's point of view, the Islamic State has the ability to cripple the government in Iraq and potentially unravel Iran's position over there. Though this is not the most likely outcome, it is a potential threat that Iran must counter (Friedman, 2014).

Small Iranian military formations have already formed in eastern Kurdistan, and Iranian personnel have piloted Iraqi aircraft in attacks on Islamic State positions (Cockburn P. , 2015). The mere possibility of the Islamic State dominating even parts of Iraq is unacceptable to Iran, which aligns its interests with those of the United States. Both countries want the Islamic State broken and both want the government in Iraq to function. The Americans have no problem with Iran guaranteeing security in the south, and the Iranians have no objection to a pro-American Kurdistan so long as they continue to dominate southern oil flows (Friedman, 2014). Because of the Islamic state as well as greater long term trends, the United States and Iran have been drawn together by their common interests.

There have been a numerous reports of US-Iranian military cooperation against the Islamic state, while the major issue dividing them (Iran's nuclear program) has been marginalised (Cockburn P. , 2015). The announcement that no settlement had been reached in nuclear talks was followed by a calm extension of the deadline for agreement, and neither

side threatened the other or gave any indication that the failure changed the general accommodation that has been reached (Friedman, 2014). The view of achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon is far more difficult than enriching uranium and Iran is not an imminent nuclear power and that appears to have become the American position. Neither the US nor Iran wants to strain relations over the nuclear issue, which has been put on the back burner for now because of the rise of Islamic state (Friedman, 2014).

This new entente between the United States and Iran naturally alarms Saudi Arabia, the third major power in the region if only for its wealth and ability to finance political movements (AMIN, 2012). It sees Iran as a rival in the Persian Gulf that could potentially de-stabilize Saudi Arabia via its Shiite population (Martin, 2013). The Saudi Arabia also sees the US as the ultimate guarantor of their national security, even though they have been acting without the United State's assist since the Arab Spring (Fisher, 2015). Frightened by Iran's warming relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia is also becoming increasingly concerned by American's growing self-sufficiency in energy, which has dramatically reduced its political importance to the United States (Friedman, 2014).

There has been speculation that the Islamic State is being funded by Arabian powers, but it would be irrational for Saudi Arabia to be funding ISIS. The stronger the Islamic State is, the firmer the ties between the US and Iran becomes. The United States cannot live with a transnational caliphate that might become regionally powerful someday. The more of a threat the Islamic State becomes, the more Iran and the United States need each other, which runs completely counter to the Saudis' security interests and Saudi Arabia needs the tension between the United States and Iran (Friedman, 2014). Regardless of religious or ideological impulse, Saudi Arabia alliance with the US forms an overwhelming force that threatens the Saudi regime's survival and the Islamic State has no love for the Saudi royal family (Bunzel, March 2015). The caliphate can expand in Saudi Arabia's direction, too, and that has been already seen grassroots activity relates to the Islamic State taking place inside the kingdom (Fisher, 2015). Saudi Arabia has been engaged in Iraq, and it must now try to strengthen Sunni forces other than the Islamic State quickly, so that the forces pushing the United States and Saudi Arabia together subside (Friedman, 2014).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In modern world, terrorism is being dominated by a form, which is popularly referred to as "religious terrorism". The religious fanatics are spreading propaganda via social media. In other words, terrorists are using religion in justifying their means and ends to use violence and terrorising its opponents. The point of terror is to terrorize—a role historically assumed by organized force, be it state or army, at least when it comes to instigate fear among peoples mind that apocalypse begins. In other contexts, in times of war, terror may be legitimized, even when deployed against civilians, but in the modern era, the bombing of Coventry, Dresden, and Tokyo, and the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes to mind. However, modern terrorism has been dominated by the religious ideology.

Terrorism scholar such as James D. Kiras says that terrorism differs from criminal violence in its degree of political legitimacy because those sympathetic to terrorist causes suggest that violence is the only remaining option that can draw attention to the plight of the aggrieved (Kiras, 2008). The causes here have been included in the form of ideology, ethnic, and religious exclusion or persecution (Baudrillard, 2003). Some terrorism scholars like Audrey K. Cronin holds the view that terrorism is the threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends by a non-state actor (Cronin, 2007). But at the same time holds a view that ISIS is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army (Cronin, 2015). ISIS had its view similar to the core Al-Qaeda group attracted followers with religious arguments and a pseudo-scholarly message of altruism for the sake of the ummah, the global Muslim community (Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015)

Terrorism is a concept of dynamics in the historical phase which has taken its shape to define in present era of globalization. Modern terrorism has changed its course with the changing advancement of technological communication and free flow of ideas. Modern terrorist group has learned the better way to use the facilities which globalization provides. The easy access to internet have created an opportunity for terrorists group to radicalise younger generation who are most users of social media and also spreading the terror with home grown terrorism.

The other means of spreading chaos is through cyber jihad in which hacking division of terrorist group might crash down computer, hack into personal account or send kill messages or videos of beheading and mass killing by gun shots. Thus, social networking on-line becomes more private and confined to one's acquaintances that it will be increasingly

difficult to detect for counter-measures. For legal and technological reasons, it is harder to get access to information on corporate-owned sites like Facebook compared to ISIS-owned forums and emphasizing that the first priority should be monitoring and not taking down content. Focus more on following issue of radicalization and looking for the fires of criminal activity and focus less on removing incendiary materials since most people are already fireproof.

However, the propaganda is playing a role in promoting terrorist attacks in the U.S. where many home grown cases of jihadist terrorism involve the use of social media. Several sources indicate that there are 90,000 pro-ISIS tweets on a daily basis(Smith, 2017; Schori Liang, 2016). While others suggest that there may be as many as 200,000 such tweets. Accounts belonging to other foreign terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda's branch in Syria, have a total of over 200,000 followers and are thriving(Nance, 2016; Schori Liang, 2016). Official Twitter accounts belonging to Jabhat al-Nusra operate much like those belonging to ISIS, tweeting similar extremist content (Smith, 2017).

For the United States, the Islamic State has shown that the idea of the US simply leaving the region is unrealistic, and at the same time, the US will not engage in multi-divisional warfare in Iraq (Smith, 2017). The United States failed to achieve a pro-American stability out there previously and neither has it any chance to achieve this time. The US-led air campaign applied significant force against the Islamic State and is a token of American's power and presence, but is as well as its limits (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). The US strategy of forming an alliance against the Islamic State is extremely complex, since the Turks do not want to be pulled into the fight without major concessions, the Iranians want reduced pressure on their nuclear programs in exchange for their help, and the Saudis are aware of the dangers posed by Iran (Friedman, 2014).

What is noteworthy is the effect that the Islamic State has had on relationships in the region. The group's emergence has once again placed the United States at the centre of the regional system, and it has forced the three major Middle Eastern powers to redefine their relations with the US in various ways (Schori Liang, 2016; Smith, 2017). It has also revived the deepest fears of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Turkey wants to avoid being drawn back into the late Ottoman nightmare of controlling Arabs, while Iran has been forced to realign itself with the US to resist the rise of a Sunni Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as the Shah once had to do (Hamed, 2015; Nance, 2016).

The Islamic State (ISIS) has established its base in South Asia and is gaining momentum in India (Tecimer, 2017; Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Singh, 2015). By taking a

greater role in the global fight against ISIS, India can prevent the extremist group from taking a stronger hold over its Muslim population, and make it more difficult for radicalized Bangladeshis to carry out attacks. Combating ISIS also provides India with the strongest basis for continued progress on U.S.-India security cooperation under the Trump administration (Tecimer, 2017; Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). India faces an increasing domestic threat from virtual recruitment and self-radicalization, which has resulted in some Indians officially joining ISIS and fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Also of concern is the external threat from Bangladesh's rising extremist population and radicalized individuals from Bangladesh that might plan and execute attacks in India if ISIS were to grow larger in the region(Singh, 2015; Varfolomeev, Nov 23, 2015).Though there may be natural limits on the Islamic State's success in India (such as Indian jihadists being preoccupied by the Kashmir conflict), ISIS's unique online media exploitation has allowed individuals and small groups to garner significant attention(Singh, 2015). Furthermore, there aren't similar natural limits on the growth of ISIS in Bangladesh. The porous borders between Bangladesh and India and the rising tensions in refugee camps related to the Rohingya refugee crisis are particularly concerning. Although India's Ministry of Home Affairs estimates that only 75 Indians have joined ISIS, the Islamic State is growing faster in India than many realize (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). Starting in 2014, cases surfaced of young adults trying to join ISIS online, without ever having face-to-face contact with a recruiter (Tecimer, 2017).

India banned ISIS in December 2014, almost six months after UN Security Council Resolution 2170, which officially condemned the group and called member-states to take action against it (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Tecimer, 2017; Singh, 2015). Although then-Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said that India would fight ISIS under a UN resolution and a UN flag, the national government was quick to downplay his comments and maintained that this hypothetical situation would invite an evaluation of the situation, not necessarily action (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). Indian government officials participated in a number of U.S.-led summits on extremism and ISIS during the Obama administration, though there was not high-level participation at the first meeting of President Donald Trump's "Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS." Former Indian security officials cite the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) Operation Chukravyuh as India's main response to Islamic State's growing online threat (Tecimer, 2017). Starting in late 2014, IB officers reportedly posed as Islamic State recruiters on Twitter, communicating with hundreds of Indian youth who intended to join the Islamic State (Singh, 2015).

According to the NIA charge sheet, ISIS has established a strong presence in the cyber world and has found most of its recruits/sympathizers through social media websites. The arrest of ISIS operative Mehdi MasroorBiswas on December 13, 2014, from his residence in Jalahalli in north Bengaluru (Karnataka), and subsequent revelations underscored the potential of such activities (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). Using his Twitter handle @ShamiWitness, Biswas had made 124,000 tweets. Of these, 15,000 tweets were directly in connection with the IS — defending their actions; praising their work (including the appalling mass beheadings); inspiring youth to spread IS ideology and join the war in West Asian as voluntary jihadists (Tecimer, 2017). Prior to this, he had tweeted on behalf of IS under a different handle @ElSaltador. At the time of his arrest, Mehdi had 17,800+ Twitter followers of which 15,000+ were from foreign countries (Tecimer, 2017; Jaishankar, May 8, 2017).

As India has not been involved in the fight against ISIS on a global scale, there have been few opportunities for U.S.-India joint counter-ISIS operations (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Tecimer, 2017). The CIA-NIA joint counterterrorism operation in January 2016, where the CIA reportedly alerted the NIA to a north Indian ISIS cell (Tecimer, 2017), was successful in capturing members of the cell, but it underscored a perception in the U.S. government that the critical information-sharing is a one-way street. India can widen its information sharing network to include its complete, updated terrorist watch lists with the United States regularly. Although the 2014 Joint Statement mentioned identifying areas where terrorist watch lists could be exchanged, there has been no indication that this exchange has officially taken place and how frequently the watch lists would be updated (Singh, 2015; Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Tecimer, 2017).

In many cases of self-radicalization, ISIS often tends to graft onto pre-existing organizations. About one-third of the reported Indian ISIS sympathizers have affiliations with other groups, including the Indian Mujahidin (IM), Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), or ISIS-inspired groups such as Junoodul Khalifafil Hind (JKH) (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Tecimer, 2017). ISIS radicalization also tends to spread through family, school or neighborhood ties, often coalescing into cells, such as Ansarul Khilafa Kerala (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Tecimer, 2017). The on-line influence of ISIS in drawing the attention of the youths and radicalized for violent offenses has been a new kind of challenge for India and the world. Without unnecessarily exaggerating the threat, details available in public about ISIS recruitment and propaganda can be a valuable way of anticipating its future challenge to India's national security.

Another potential point of contention between the United States and India is over Bangladesh. India supports Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government, but, until recently, Bangladesh has been slow to act against ISIS (Viswanathan, 2016). India's strong support of Hasina's government must be tempered by strong condemnation of its response to ISIS terrorism (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). India's support of the Bangladesh government could open the door for coordinated ISIS attacks in the future, and for Bangladeshi ISIS fighters to make their way into India (Viswanathan, 2016). India should align its approach to the Bangladeshi government with that of the United States and coordinate intelligence and information sharing appropriately (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017 ; Viswanathan, 2016).

India must grapple with the risk that if it plays a larger role in the global fight against ISIS it might become a target of increased attacks. Increased counter-ISIS measures both in India and on the global scale may add more cause for radicalizing individuals. In the May 2016 ISIS propaganda video, Fahad Tanvir Sheikh vowed to avenge the violence against Muslims in India and gave a formidable warning to India (Tecimer, 2017; Jaishankar, May 8, 2017). The Islamic State is growing in India and the train bombing in Madhya Pradesh in March and the detainments in Uttar Pradesh in April are signals that a policy change may be warranted (Jaishankar, May 8, 2017).

The anti-ISIS effort is one of Trump's key foreign policy priorities, and the Trump administration will presumably be more willing to engage with other countries who have similarly made countering ISIS a priority (Tecimer, 2017). The Trump administration will likely criticize countries that are not supporting the U.S. coalition against the Islamic State; this could impact trade deals and other future negotiations (Tecimer, 2017). South Asia is critical in the fight against ISIS and India has the potential to play a large role in the United States' regional strategy. To better collaborate with the United States on countering ISIS, India should consider conducting joint counterterrorism operations with the United States; sharing more inclusive intelligence, including updated terrorists watch lists; and taking a firm stance against Bangladesh's weak response to terrorism.

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