

The Geo-Politics of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

A Dissertation Submitted

To

Sikkim University



In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the

Degree of Master of Philosophy

By

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February, 2018



सिक्किम विश्वविद्यालय

(भारतीय संसद के अधिनियमद्वारा स्थापित केन्द्रीय विश्वविद्यालय)
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled “**The Geo-Politics of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**” submitted to **Sikkim University** for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** is my original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree or diploma of this University or any other university.

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Certificate

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled “**The Geopolitics of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**” submitted to the **SIKKIM UNIVERSITY** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Philosophy in International Relations** department, the results of bonafied research work carried out by **Khargeswar Brahma** under my guidance and supervision. No part of the dissertation submitted for any other degree, diploma, associate-ship and fellowship. All the assistance and help received during the course of the investigation have been duly acknowledged by him.

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“The Geopolitics of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”

Submitted by **Khargeswar Brahma** under the supervision of **Dr. Manish** of the Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Sikkim University, Gangtok-737101, India

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all I am really very thankful to our department-International Relations of Sikkim University, for giving such a valuable opportunity and courage to do the M.Phil course and research work. Also I thank all the faculty members of the department for their support and help during my work.

I specially thank my supervisor Dr. Manish who is a former Associate Professor & Head of the Department ,International Relations, Sikkim University and at present a Professor at School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat , for his valuable guidance, suggestion, comments and support which have contributed immensely to my understanding, knowledge and information in the broader sense about the topic.

I would also like to thank my classmates and friends for their support and encouragement through thick and thin. I would also like to thank our seniors specially Shraddha Rai, Anuradha Bhutia and Pema Tseten for valuable help and support to finish my chapters at time, I am really very thankful, and I would also thank our juniors, and all the students of our department for the friendly and co-operative environment.

I would also like to give my special thanks to the Sikkim University's, Teesta Indus Central Library and staff for their friendly gesture .They have given me an access to the basic needs, important links and the books during the research work which proved to be very fruitful.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my mom and dad who have always supported me with my academic endeavours. And I also express my love for my elder sister and brother who have always believed in me. Thank you.

- Khargeswar Brahma

Abbreviations

CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
BRI	Belt Road Initiative
SREB	Silk Road Economic Belt
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
CPLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
IDSA	Institutes of Defence and Study and Analyses
IPCS	Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
NER	North-East Region
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
TAR	Tibetan Autonomous Region
UN	United Nation
WDS	Western Development Strategy
ASEAN	Association South East Asian Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
PBOC	Peoples Bank of China
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
US	United States
EU	European Union

UK	United Kingdom
BCIM-EC	Bangladesh China India Myanmar-Economic Corridor
POK	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
PSA	Port of Singapore Authority
NDRC	China's National Development and Reforms Committee
FATA	Federally Administrative Tribal Area
NSRF	New Silk Road Forum
NDB	New Development Bank
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
ETIM	East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement
IDE	Institute of Developing Economies
CPC	Communist Party of China
ESCAP	UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
SDPI	Sustainable Development Policy Institute
MFN	Most Favour Nation
ML	Main Line
KKH	Karakoram Highway

JCC	Joint Cooperation Committee
PTI	Press Trust of India
LOC	Line of Control
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
INSTC	International North South Transport Corridor
IDSA	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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Chapter-1

Introduction

The China and Pakistan recently have become closer in economic and strategic cooperation than ever before. Although the relations between two countries is not a new phenomena, but this entire venture recently become more active on ground level after China's initiated of One Belt and One Road. The OBOR project is a China's policy that upgrade old Silk route by building larger regional infrastructure and promotes modern connectivity as vast geographical area i.e. Asia, Europe, Africa as 'New Silk Route' (Eurasian time, 2014).

However, One Belt, One Road is the initiative of China to make of profit oriented and sharing their interest along the route. Further through the initiative China is trying to expand the economic and political interest across the globe. This initiative takes for huge production of goods and finish product to larger market across the region. The idea of OBOR is the basically geopolitical strategy of China by bringing entire part of Rimland under their influence by economic as well political. Chinese president Xi Jinping was announced OBOR officially in a speech in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev University in September 7, 2013 (Yamei, 2017). The plan is to construction an economic belt along the Silk Road as wider a Trans Eurasian project and spanning from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. In his speech, further he claimed that the belt consists of large three billion populations in the region that represents the biggest market in the world (Dawn, 2016).


Broadly, there are five sphere of cooperation were formulated in the project:

1. First involved strengthening policy communications
2. The second was to improve the road networks
3. Third was to promote trade facilitation
4. The fourth aimed at enhancing monetary circulation and the last
5. Sought to strengthen people to people exchange (Aoyama, 2016).

Further, on October 3, 2013 president Jinping attend on the 21st century APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Indonesia and delivered a speech at the Indonesian parliament. In this speech he states and proposed the creation of a 21st century

maritime silk road in order to promote maritime cooperation with ASEAN countries, and to realize a common development and prosperity (Huileng Tan, 2017). In the same platform he further states and propose to the establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as funding institution for the project.

Hence, apart from infrastructural and multi-cooperation some basic importance subject also includes under the project. These some alternate visions are- economic, cultural, educational and health care sector cooperation and includes energy sources. One Belt, One Road is the new Chinese strategy that it combined of the new Silk Road and the 21st century maritime Silk Road that together created Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) (Xinhua, 2017). The aim of project is to facilitate trade along an overland route which connects road and sea transportation. OBOR is a new economic platform and is to be use for a strategic geopolitical gain at the same time. The initiative would also provide a new financial integration and expand trade liberalization and bringing people to people contact. Scholar Francois Godement states that, the primary strategy of OBOR is based on geopolitics and export of its huge infrastructure building capacity, and that would connects with ports. The construction of routes starts from Indian Ocean, Suez Canal and to over Mediterranean Sea and that connects with more than 60 countries and will also gain benefit for 4.4 billion people from Asia, Europe, Middle East and African states. In security point of view OBOR is the Chinese strategy to challenge dominated US hegemony and retreat status quo in the world (Willy Lam Wo-lap, 2016).



Merics great map showing the AIIB member states.

Aftermath, proposed OBOR Silk road framework in 2013, China designed six economic corridors under One Belt One Road to based on geographical location. These Six Economic Corridors are-

- 1) China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor
- 2) New Eurasian Land Bridge
- 3) Corridor from China to Central Asia and Western Asia
- 4) China-Indo-China Peninsula Corridor
- 5) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and
- 6) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Blanchard, 2017).

Amongst all of these, China is considered China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a most important project for them. Because the project is located one of strategic important place where China can extends its interest throughout the project. Therefore China heavily invested of this project and started working first ever than any of project.

Therefore, in this study will attempt to find why China giving most preference on CPEC of any other project in One Belt, One Road (OBOR). It shall also examine the strategic concerns of project from regional actors and its implications of peace and security for broader prospects.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) constitutes one of the largest foreign investments that China has made in the framework of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative as mentioned earlier. The expenditures planned of first allocation is amounted to approximately \$46 billion which will further intensify relation between China and Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan will assume more prominent role in China’s foreign policy. But, CPEC also affects relation between India and Pakistan. The transport corridor between Pakistan and China traverses Jammu and Kashmir, the status of which has been a subject of contention between India and Pakistan since 1947. This constellation would seem to suggest a negative scenario whereby CPEC could place additional strain on India-Pakistan relations. The study attempts to examine the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to, what is possibility of political, economic and strategic consequences of CPEC for South Asia, particularly Pakistan and India? This study also attempts to understand the aforementioned question. While doing so, it shall also attempt to locate the CPEC within the broader China’s strategy of the “One Belt, One Road”.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is a collection of infrastructure projects currently under construction throughout Pakistan. Originally valued at \$46 billion and further increased to \$62 billion. The CPEC is around 3,218 km from Kashgar to Gwadar port in Pakistan (Dawn, 2016). The route proposed broadly two main different directions, this are-

- 1). Gwadar to Kashgar via Balochistan, Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) and Gilgit to Kashgar,
- 2). Another is Gwadar to Karachi port of Sindh via Punjab-Lahore, Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to Kashgar, both the route crosses POK which is a disputed area.

The CPEC is intended to rapidly modernize Pakistani infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic zones. On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for an onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia. A vast network of highways and railways are to build under the aegis of CPEC which span the length and breadth of Pakistan (Dawn, 2016). Modern transportation networks by building under CPEC links seaports in Gwadar and Karachi with northern Pakistan, as well as points further north in western China and Central Asia. A 1,100 kilometer long motorway is building between the cities of Karachi and Lahore as part of CPEC, while the Karakoram Highway between Rawalpindi and the Chinese border completely reconstructed (Steemit, 2017). The Karachi–Peshawar main railway line also upgraded to allow for train travel at up to 160 km per hour by December 2019. Pakistan’s railway network will also extend to eventually connect to China’s Southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar. Recently 43 km long Karachi circular railway worth 27.6 billion projects is approved by CPEC (The Nation, 2016). The estimated \$11 billion worth required to modernise transportation networks and this expenditure financed by subsidized concessionary loans.

Over \$33 billion worth of energy infrastructure are to constructed by private company to help alleviate Pakistan chronic energy shortages, which regularly amounts to over 4,500MW, and have shed an estimated 2–2.5% off Pakistan annual gross domestic product (Deloitte). Over 10,400MW of energy generating capacity is to be brought online by the end of 2018 with the majority developed as part of CPEC’s as fast-tracked “Early Harvest” projects (Linkedin, 2017). According to *China Daily*, the project would provide up to 16,400MW energy altogether once the completed. According to the official report of CPEC, worth of 33.8 billion will be use for energy requirement and fulfillment. A network of pipelines to transport liquefied natural gas and oil is also part of project, including a \$2.5 billion pipeline between Gwadar and Nawabshah to eventually transport from Iran. Electricity from these projects will primarily be generated from fossil fuels, though hydroelectric and wind-power projects are also included in the project and constructed of one of the world’s largest solar farms in Pakistan (Dawn, 2016).

CPEC's potential impact on Pakistan and has been linked to that of the Marshall Plan undertaken by the United States in post-war Europe. As we know, China's interest for a corridor stretching from the Chinese border to Pakistan's deep water ports on the Arabian Sea date back to the 1950s, and motivated construction of the Karakoram Highway beginning in 1959 and more closed after Indo-China war. In 1978 with the linking Karakoram Highway (Revolvy) Gilgit and China become more active cooperation between two country in terms of economic and military. More recently, Chinese interest in Pakistan's deep-water harbor at Gwadar had been rekindled by 1998 and in 2002 China began construction at Gwadar port which was completed in 2006. In February 2014, Pakistan's President Mamnoon Hussain visited China to discuss the plans for an economic corridor in Pakistan. Two months later, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Premier Li Keqiang in China to discuss further plans, resulting in the full scope of the project and devise under Sharif tenure. In November 2014, Chinese government announced its intention to finance Chinese companies as part of its \$45.6 billion energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of CPEC (Reuters, 2014).

However, the project is further help to China to access its strategic interest at Gulf region. Currently China depend long route the Straits of Malacca which provides maritime access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Approximately 80% of oil import from Gulf region passes through this route. As the world's biggest oil importer, energy security is a key concern for China while current sea routes used to import Middle Eastern oil are frequently patrolled by the United States Navy (Business Insider, 2017). In the event that China were to face hostile actions from a state or non-state actor, energy imports through the Straits of Malacca could be halted, which in turn would paralyze the Chinese economy in a scenario that is frequently referred to as the "Malacca Dilemma". In addition to vulnerabilities faced in the Straits of Malacca region, China is heavily dependent upon sea-routes that pass through the South China Sea, near the disputed Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, which are currently a source of tension between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, and the United States.

The CPEC will allow Chinese energy imports to circumvent these contentious areas and find a new artery in the west, and thereby decreases the possibility of confrontation

between the United States and China. In addition to potential weaknesses with regards to the United States Navy and Indian Navy has recently increased maritime surveillance in the Straits of Malacca region from its base on Great Nicobar Island. India has expressed fears of a Chinese “String of Pearls” encircling policy (Reheman, 2010). Indian maritime surveillance in the Andaman Sea could possibly enhance Chinese interest in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – the Kyaukpyu Port, which is currently being developed in Myanmar by the Chinese government as another alternate route around the Straits of Malacca which will likely be vulnerable to similar advances by the Indian Navy. The proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM) would also be vulnerable to Indian advances against China in the event of conflict, thereby potentially limiting the BCIM Corridor’s usefulness to China’s energy security, and thereby increasing Chinese interest in CPEC (Sajjanhar, 2017).

Following the same line India also proposed North-South Transport Corridor between three countries India, Iran and Russia and later many neighboring state also joined the project, today INSTC is an 11 member country including observer. The project is a multi transport capability by ship, rail and road. The initial purpose of project was to connect trade route of South Asia, Middle East, through Chabahar port to land Central Asia, Russia and Europe (The Diplomat, 2017). The project was signed in 2000 long before CPEC and OBOR and entered into force 2002. But the INSTC initially slow down in 2005 to 2012 due to sanction against Iran. After lifting sanction 2016 signing of India-Iran-Afghanistan agreement for enhancing trade and transit and development of Chabahar port for further fulfill to INSTC (Bhatia, 2016). Although the project was signed long before OBOR and its project, but many scholars believe that the project is basically to counter Chinese Belt and Road initiative. Therefore within this study also try to explore the India’s option INSTC and its strategic importance as counter initiative regard the Chinese BRI project.

1.04. Survey of Literature

The survey of literature provides valuable ground to understand and help get more knowledge and information related to the proposed research. So, the literature review is divided into three different parts accordingly i.e. Geopolitics in international Relations,

second is about the One Belt One Road initiative and the third on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. First I will try to understand the Geopolitics in International Relations, and then will try to explore the One Belt One Road initiative and the last part on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Adhikari Sudeepta, *Modern Geopolitics versus Post-Modern Geopolitics a Critical Review*, The review focuses on conceptual view of geopolitics, in this article author stated that, the geopolitics and its importance used basically Euro-Centric on balance of power, the concept of world politics that dominated much of the twentieth century. Geopolitics had promised a privileged scientific perspective on the world affairs and conceptualizes politics a territorial practice in which state and nations naturally struggled for power. Otto Maull the disciple of Karl Haushofer define Geopolitik as one that concerns itself with the state, not as a static concept, but as a living being...it investigate the state primarily in relation to its environment...its space...and attempts to solve all problems resulting from spatial relationship. Geopolitik is concerned with the spatial requirements of a state while political geography examines only its space conditions. The end of modern geopolitics and with rising new super power China, Russia and India problematize modern geopolitics and that emerging new power is declined American Hegemony in Post Modern Geopolitics era.

Basil Germand (2015), *The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security*, The book discuss about importance of maritime security. Maritime security can be understood as concept referring to the security of the maritime domain or as a set of policies regulations, measures and operations to secure the maritime domain. The increase on academic literature maritime security can be explained by the conjunction of the three following factors: a). the impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (notably the launch of counter-terrorist operations at sea), b). the occurrence of three high visibility terrorist acts against ship, and c). the rise of practical attacks in the strait of Malacca. At the beginning of the century then surge of piracy at Horn of Africa between 2007 and 2012 largely contributed to generating academic debates beyond strategic and security studies with scholars from various disciplines discusses the legal, criminal, cultural, economic, military, environmental and energy dimensions of piracy in particular and maritime

security in general. The author also said geographical permanence such as the length of a country's coastline or the absence of direct access to the high seas constrains sea power in general.

“China and India: A Rivalry Takes Shape-Analysis” (2011), *Published by Foreign Policy Research Institute*. The report is a yearly book were clearly stated, India is no more 20th century's India, it is totally changed the book mentioned. The aggressive Chinese policy against Japan, South East and South Asia surprisingly New Delhi has been making policy against Chinese rise. China always tries to discommodate whether NSG membership or bringing terror Mumbai attack mastermind they always pokey against India. That's why India changes the concept and become closed friend with US. Recently Indo-US agreed military logistic mutual cooperation which is headache for China. According the report in Gilgit Baltistan of PoK, the Chinese troops were presence which more concern for India. Former Indian Naval and Air Chief warned that, India is not capable to prevent Chinese aggressive and it is the most threaten than Pakistan. Chinese military officers openly challenges military and displacing US global hegemony by means of war if need to be. The report also claimed Chinese crucially increases presence of Indian Ocean not only economic interest but also strategic regional presence and it has built bases across Indian Ocean. According to report Director General Logistic Department of PLA was expressed and cited in a secret memorandum issued: “we can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an Ocean of the Indians...we are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” Both the China and India's naval is capable to operate long distance maritime and they are expanded foot print also which can change regional status quo in future.

Gearoid O. Tuathail and Gerard Toal (1994), “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statedmanship and Strategy”. The article mentioned about the emerging geopolitics in world politics, Geopolitics originally coined in Swedish by Rudolf Kjellen in the article on ‘Boundaries of Sweden’ in 1899, later the word Geopolitik was first introduced into German in a review of Kjellen himself in 1905 and popularized most famously by Karl Haushofer. The author also mentioned geopolitics is basically came from geographical

studies. Geography is a practice that gained its identity from the western imperializing project of surveying, mapping and cataloguing the earth.

Ilias Iliopoulos (2009), *Strategy and Geopolitics of Sea Power throughout History*, The book discuss about the sea power, the great master of Naval Strategy's and geopolitics Rear-Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's. He famously stated, that 'Control of the Sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world...and is the chief among the merely material elements in the power prosperity of nations.' Before Mahan, Sir Walter Raleigh stated that "He that commands the sea, commands the trade, and that is lord of the trade of the world." accordingly the final collapse of the essentially unmaritime and land bound soviet empire at the end of the long 20th century was simply the latest illustration of the strategic advantages of sea power. Most Realist strategists believed that international politics was mainly a struggle over who gets what, when and how. The struggle could be about territory, resources, political influence, economic advantage or normative interest (values). The contestants were the leaders of traditional nation-states- military and naval forces were their chief instrument of policy. Author also mentioned Mahan's idea of Sea power which is about naval forces and coastguards marine or civil maritime industries and relevant the contribution of land and air force. Sir Julian Corbett said, the real point of sea power is not so much what happens at sea, but how that influences the outcome of events on land.

Jason Dittmer and Nicholas Gray (2010), "Popular Geopolitics towards new Methodologies of the Everyday", in the article simply analyses theory of geopolitics, and mentioned a critical geopolitics as originally formulate in the early 1990s, the text emphasized and speeches associated with elite's specializations of international politics. The elite discourses were generally understood to be divided between formal discourses (theorist) and practical discourse (those performed by politicians and military leaders), for example foundational critical geopolitics by Gearoid O Tuathail (1996), critically unpacked the work of early 20th century theorist of Halford Mackinder's. Practical geopolitics was interrogated through Dalby's (1993) analysis of the escalation of confrontation in American strategic discourse of the late 1970s.

Margaret Scott and Westeny Alcenat (2008), “Revisiting the Pivot: The Influence of Heartland Theory in Great Power Politics”. Today’s Heartland consists of Russia, the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and marked by the Caspian Basin. The paper rests on the research question, to what extent the Heartland theory influential in the current foreign policy of the four great powers- US, EU, Russia and China, as well India. Chinese recently focus on Central Asia to connect Xinjiang province by cultural integrity with Silk Road economic cooperation, the Chinese interest of the Central Asia is basically to protect energy supply according to their needs.

Nick Megoran (2011), “War and Peace? An Agenda for Peace Research and Practice in Geography”, the author clearly mentioned in the first paragraph of the article geography is better at studying war than peace. The contribution proposes an agenda for how geographical study in general and political can bring more about peace. Spykman said there will be peace after war (second world war) but, it will negative reflect because, the United States know to how peace would to be maintain, for that purpose peace will be temporary and fragile which did not involve justice between the states, because of the absence of a supreme government in international society and remains a dynamic system in states and engage in a struggle for power unrestrained by higher authority (classical realism).

Singh Pankaj (2015), “Conceptual Understanding of Geopolitics with Special Reference to Indian Ocean”. The article mentioned the Mackinder’s doctrine of geopolitics of the Heartland theory hypothesized, the possibility of a huge empire being brought into existence in the Heartland which not to be use coastal or transoceanic transport to remain coherent, because they had already self sufficient resources. Spykman could be considered as a disciple and critic of both geostrategists of Alfred T. Mahan and Halford Mackinder, He argued “The unity of world politics and the unity of the world sea.” He extends the include unity of the air and it will affect the alignment of nations throughout the world’s regions. Maritime mobility opened up the possibility of a new geopolitical structure in the overseas empire. Rimland’s defining the characteristic of intermediate region lying is between the Heartland and the marginal sea. Author specially said the

Rimland has great importance coming from its demographic weight, natural resources and industrial development. Rimland consists of Indian Ocean littoral countries therefore, we can say that one who controls the Indian Ocean, will control the world. Indian Ocean has become very relevant in the 21st century world order which Spykman assume already in his work. Therefore, most of worlds powers trying to control the Indian Ocean region. The emerging India and China's economic power, the importance of Indian Ocean also increased in trade activities.

Small Andrew (2016), "The China Pakistan Axis: Asia's new Geopolitics", Here author clearly said the China-Pak relationship was primarily enmity towards India. According to his interactions Chinese and Pakistani officials, he found volumes illuminate some hidden aspects of the Islamabad and Beijing against India. He said like the China-Pak axis not only important evaluation of partnership but, also important their interactions play of wider regional geopolitics.

Bal Kishan Sharma and Nivedita Das Kundu, "China's One Belt One Road Initiative Challenges and Prospects", According the article OBOR is the economic approach, cultural aspects along with the educational and health care cooperation. The article focuses the OBOR is the connectivity both on land and sea route that proposal to connect the Nations by Road, Rail and Sea. It is an ambitious project aimed at speed up the growth of Chinese economy. However, the argument clearly indicates that there is a need to act strategic related to OBOR both on the land and sea road.

"China and South Asia: Towards an uncharted Order –Analysis", *Published the Institute of South Asian Studies (2016)*. The article reported India seems to have no means of moderating the interactions of its neighbors but, CPEC has a military dimension and Gwadar Port not so far from India's western coast, China potentially strategic access to a southern Sri Lankan port were serious concern for India. In the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean the Chinese and India's competitive different stage interms of economic development and regional power but, the Arabian Sea China success in construction of Gwadar port. To counter the Chinese strategy Chabahar port of Iran designed by India but, has no authoritative indication of India being able to gain strategic access to Chabahar over time. Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Yi Xianliang recently catalogued

Chinese investment commitment in South Asia under OBOR initiative as follows US\$ 46 billion in Pakistan, 22 billion in India, 20 billion in Bangladesh and 17 billion in Sri Lanka but, as a leading power India has not fought the initiative.

Dargnant Christian (2016), “China’s Shifting Geo-Economic Strategy”, in the work author trying to observed how Chinese authority continue to maintain stability of market forces to self-regulatory or manage a moderate and regular depreciation of the RMB (Yuan convertor). The author said One Belt One Road is driven by a three pronged ambition- economic, domestic and geopolitical. The main motive of One Belt One Road (OBOR) is to providing access to new markets for Chinese industries and easy access to oil import. The author never neglected the OBOR is equally a strategic dimension. The Chinese navy is emerging power, they develop the ports for benefit the commercial as well military purposes around the Indian and Asian coastline following Middle East Africa and Europe.

Seesaghur Hans (2016), “Corridors of Opportunities and Tensions One Belt One Road”, the article mentioned One Belt One Road is the new financial and economic initiative of China while playing a strategic geopolitical role at the same time. The aimed of OBOR is to established and building infrastructure and connectivity amongst the silk route countries. It has also created tensions among neighboring countries in terms of domestic security as well. And he also said the project is ultimately challenging the notion of super power such US, Russia, India and Japan in international as well regional level.

“One Belt One Road: A role for UK Companies in Developing China’s New Initiative, New Opportunities in China and Beyond”, *Published, China Britain Business Council*, The book published in 2014, it is a briefly discussed about the One Belt, One Road. The book also mentioned the aims of the OBOR initiative including developing prosperity for underdeveloped parts of China. The China developmental Bank has reported that reserved more than US\$ 890 billion for their OBOR developmental project. The book claimed the new Eurasian Land Bridge can be faster than Sea and cheaper than air. The route involves high speed rail and road links and is divided into two lines. In May 2015 President Xi Jinping signed a series of infrastructure agreements worth US\$ 25 billion with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan on high speed rail, energy infrastructure and

aerospace, as well as industrial park providing financial service such as RMB settlement. According to report the China Central Asia West Asia Corridor will be an important gateway for Oil and Gas. As funding stream in 2014 China lunches new financial institutions, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank for all regional and the Silk Road fund.

Alvin Cheng and Him Lim (2015), "Iron Brothers: Sino-Pakistani Relations and CPEC Analysis". The article analyse why Baloch people against any governmental project. The author clarified here, although China is the one of largest trading partner for Pakistan and it also increasing trade well around 10 billion in 2014. At the same time Baloch people won't any developmental project at the region whether China or Pakistan own company. Baluchistan is the rich of natural resources like gold, natural gas, uranium and silver. The Chinese interest most of those resources but, the exploitation and unequal distribution is created problems. The profit sharing the Chinese owner's received 50 percent, Pakistani government gets 48 percent and least only 2 percent of profit get the Baloch local people. This hugs gap of inequality is created uprising against the government. For this reasons Baloch people demanding provincial autonomy for protect their rights, land and natural resources. The other reason is the CPEC, according the article the majority estimated one million workers who would be hired to work on the construction project would be outsider, for this purpose Baloch people not accept any developmental project on their land.

Daniel S. Markey and T.C.A Raghavan (2016), "the China Pakistan Economic Corridor", the article argues that the primary aim of CPEC is the economic principles and it is also driven by broader strategic and security based on rationale and Pakistan massive need for such investment. The article clearly mentioned Washington welcome commercial link Central Asia and hope the economic development which will turn help and promote Pakistan as stability and security. However, strategic rationale of the CPEC and Beijing growing strategic weight in the pivotal region of South West Asia and Gulf and generated considerable political concern to Washington. CPEC is the benefit as a regional if the Pakistan economic growth and generate employment can be brought stability and peace.

Markey also said Gwadar Port developed by China and it will help to Chinese strategic position in the Arabian Sea and it is the big concern for India.

Dwivedi Sangit Sarita (2013), "Exploring Strategies and Implication of an Opportunistic Alliance base study China-Pakistan", the work justified that Pakistan well knows India is the superiority of any sphere. Three wars already lost, the present increasing Indian naval strengths created tension for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan wanted Chinese support to maintain balance of any threat, because of that Pakistan invited Chinese to build Gwadar port and counter Indian naval power. The author clearly mentioned here the China and India not common enemy, now Beijing more believes peaceful negotiation. Beijing also more concern about Indo-US strategic partnership so Chinese won't any problem of their interest. China used national power, political, economic, military, nuclear cooperation to Pakistan that making a strong strategic partnership and to divert Indian intention to Pakistan. Since, there is nothing to threat that, the Pakistan policies based on Indian threat and the Indian policies based on Pakistan threat, but the Chinese maintaining as a good friend with both the countries filling according to their needs and interest.

Javaid Umbreen (2016), "Strengthening Geo-Strategic Bond of Pakistan and China through Geo-Economic Configuration", Today's CPEC was started small trade relations in 1951 and 1963 with the border agreement, and after 1978 the road of Karakoram China-Pak relations changes geo-economics to geo-politics. The article clearly mentioned the CPEC is not only economic connectivity; it is the backbone of strategic of geopolitics between the two countries.

Roy Rameshwar (2015), "China Pakistan Economy Corridor", The article said 'if only money can buy everything, even national interest, to what extent will the 'free falling' economy of China stay on course in terms of time lines and investment commitments along with a very fragile and weak of Pakistan, only time will tell. He also confidently stated we are in for a major gravitational shift of the ever changing global order in near future.

Rajan Alok (2014), “the China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Options before India”, in the article mentioned, China’s plan of One Belt One Road is the combined New Silk Road and 21st century Maritime Silk Road. With this policy China tried to open up western landlocked regions in the line with its ‘Marching Westwards Policy.’ With the proposed of CPEC China negotiate at the same time BCIM-EC (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar- Economic Corridor) to divert Indian attention from CPEC. The author also trying to mention that within the Pakistan many of the regions like Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa opposed the project. Almost all loan of the developmental project of Pakistan given by different Banks of China. As the China is the largest trading partner of Pakistan so, China is the most dependable sources of any developmental project for Pakistan.

Sukumar Mohan Arun (2017), “What Marshall Plan Can Teach India about CPEC-Analysis”, Here author worried that, what the China going to do with Pakistan in near future. Pakistan borrowed from Chinese banks to pay for Chinese project of CPEC, the Beijing well know the returned of loan is not easy for Pakistan. For that purpose India worried if China play like US during Second World War as the Marshall Plan Policy. Through this policy US involved European Economic foundation and interfered the European domestic interest, in the same line Beijing also going to influence Islamabad decision making and economic system in near future, if Pakistan unable to returned of the Chinese loan.

Siegfried O.Wolf, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor, Civil Military Relations and Democracy in Pakistan”, As we know Pakistan has spent several decades under military rule, at the present also the decision making influence by military interest, and CPEC is the implemented does not only limited decision making power of the civil government but, also hamper civilian control of the armed forces. Pakistan is the defective democracy, the military and intelligence service always influence over the civilian government, this in fact allows them to maneuver develop and implement its own strategies to gain control over the CPEC. The book also mentioned CPEC is the unique opportunity to change the country economic outlook and push Pakistan political and geo-strategic standing in the region.

Talwar Shreya (2015), “China Pakistan Economic Corridor and its Geopolitical Implication”, The article looking about the Chinese strategic and importance of CPEC, the Gwadar Port lies on the three most commercial important regions for the West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. The operating the port gives the Chinese strategic and geopolitical advantages. First the port of Gwadar strategically located near of Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, this will allow China to monitor sea line communication crude oil supply to entire world. second China focuses and strategic challenges from the US presence in the Asia, the Gwadar Port will provide standing post to keep a tap on the US and Indian Naval activities in the South Asian region. Nevertheless the port of Gwadar currently being developed for commercial purpose but, to seeing the China-Pakistan relations in the future it can be convert into Naval Military base.

Tim Willasey-Wilsey (2016), *Baluchistan: All Sides Stand to Lose in This New Chapter of the Great Game*. The book mentioned India’s new focus on Baluchistan and has more to do with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) than Kashmir. There are early indications that China understands that CPEC may not be achievable. But there are real dangers in reviving Pakistan’s fears of secessionism and in broadening the field of Indo-Pakistan conflicts and beyond the confines of Kashmir.

Tim was surprised when Prime Minister Modi mentioned on Baluchistan issue during his 15th August Independence Day speech from the Red Fort in Delhi 2015. It was only a fleeting reference but the implications may be considerable. Why has India decided to play the Baluchistan card now? Officials have pointed to the continuing unrest in Kashmir since the death of the militant Burhan Wani in July and frustration in New Delhi and perceived lack of cooperation from Islamabad over recent terrorist attacks.

The author mentioned here A little background for better helpful. Baluchistan comprises 44% of Pakistan’s territory but only 6% of its population. It is a vast area of harsh and arid terrain stretching from the Afghan and Iranian borders down to the Arabian Sea, Apart from the Sui gas installation and the Chinese-run copper and gold mine at Saindak, much of the mineral wealth of Baluchistan remains undiscovered yet. The Ras Koh in the

Chagai Hills is the home to Pakistan's nuclear test site, therefore all sides Baluchistan is a great contributes of Pakistan's nation developmental program and play a great role, so it is the most important that Pakistan should protect their interest .

Following the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 Pakistan's military hardened its views towards ethnic dissent. During a period of Baloch unrest in the 1970s the Pakistan's government deployed such harsh repressive tactics that Balochi to nationalist feeling increased. A further sense of outrage was fostered by the killing of Akbar Khan Bugti by Pakistani aircraft in 2006. Baloch people continually victims, It was inevitable that the announcement in April 2015 of the \$46 billion CPEC from Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea would stir Balochi resentment. There was little effort to persuade the Balochis that they would benefit from the deal and it was evident from the outset that the huge project would be vulnerable to disruption along its enormous length. After Pakistan under pressure from Beijing, announced the deployment of a Special Security unit of nearly 15, 000 troops to defend the project.

For all of this India too has good reason to oppose CPEC. Not only does it suspect that China intends Gwadar to become a naval (as well as commercial) port but part of the route crosses disputed Kashmir territory. India had political contact with Balochi dissidents and has evidently decided that now is the moment to turn up the heat on Pakistan and China. Modi's speech on 15th August and the referral of Balochi Human Rights to the United Nations represented a significant escalation, the author said.

Yousaf Farooq (2013), *Chinese Acquisition, Indian Concerns and its Future Prospects*, The book mentioned, the Chinese policy makers look set to use Gwadar as an integral part of their Geo-West Policy (Malik,2012). Keeping future threats of piracy or geostrategic politics in prospect China may consider Gwadar as an alternate to Strait of Malacca. The book clearly mentioned if Gwadar acts Chinese Naval Base in future, or even a Pakistan-China Cooperative Base, it would be enough for China to check Indian's progress in the Indian Ocean (Malik, 2012).

1.05. Rationale and scope of the study

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of project were China initiated in One Belt, One Road (OBOR). The project is located one of important area which is South Asian Region and connects Sea and Land from Xinjiang of China to Gwadar port in Pakistan. The project is one of most disputed between India and Pakistan because it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) of Gilgit-Baltistan region. Another hand it is nearby strategic important place where located at Strait of Hormuz. In this backdrop, the study would try to explore the importance of project and its possibility of political-economic implications in the region. The studies also try to examine strategic of China and its role in the larger context through the project.

However, we already know the Chinese foreign policy and its role is one of most aggressive nature therefore, most of economic cooperation's between the China and other states slowly changing to the purpose of military access for their regional interest. In terms of economic purpose the CPEC is a platform that can change regional infrastructure and would be create a mutual benefit for future but, the strategic and Chinese interest over Gwadar and CPEC is beyond economic purposes. Therefore, this study will try to understand and explore the aims, objectives and regional implications from the project, and will try to fill the knowledge gap about the CPEC and its larger area.

1.06. Objectives of the study

1. To discuss CPEC within the Belt & the Road framework.
2. To examine the strategy of China through the CPEC in South Asian region.
3. To analyse political and economic implication of CPEC
4. To redefine CPEC and its implication for India

1.07. Research Questions

1. What is the nature of CPEC?
2. What is Chinese strategy vis-à-vis CPEC?
3. What are political and economic implications of the CPEC?

4. What are the implications of CPEC for India?

1.08. Methodology

In this study used qualitative study and adopts both descriptive and analytical methods. Both primary and secondary sources will be used for the study. The primary sources like official documents from CPEC official site, Chinese officials, Indian officials and Pakistan government official is referred. Secondary sources from different journals articles, books, news, visual documentary and reviews are also used in the study. Most of the data and information are used on secondary sources in the study.

Chapterisations

There are five chapters in this study including introduction and conclusion. Three chapters is core which is chapter-2, 3 and 4. These three chapters are mainly deals the main issue of dissertation i.e. related research questions and objectives and the last is the conclusion part. These chapters are-

Chapter 1: **Introduction:** This chapter introduces to the overall topic, brief history of China-Pak relations. The chapter also discusses the concepts of OBOR and touch a bit of CPEC. In the chapter also includes rationale and scope of the study, objectives, research questions and methodology.

Chapter 2: **Describing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor:** This chapter is dealing about the evolutions of CPEC, its aims and objectives, and larger view about the project, regards regional benefit and its future importance.

Chapter 3: **Geo-economic and Geo-strategic perspective of CPEC:** This chapter is basically deals the importance of project and its strategic location, another hand it also deals importance of economic and regional benefit and implications. The chapter also deals China-Pakistan mutual cooperation and its long term benefit from the project as political and economic field.

Chapter 4: **CPEC and India: Implications and Counter-measures:** In this chapter is dealing basically India's and its objection regards the project. The chapter also deals

regional implications from India's point of view and some counter measures from India. The chapter is discussing wider India's initiative to prevent Chinese aggressive policy in South Asia as well Indian Ocean Regions.

Conclusion: The conclusion part is discussing about over whole findings and some alternative suggestion, comments and future possibility implications from the project. Therefore, this part basically talks about cooperative way of solutions rather to competitive source regards CPEC and its implications.

Chapter 2

Describing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The chapter that follows mentions in brief the evolution, objective and challenges of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It starts with the general background and then delves deeper into the historical background of the evolution of the project. The subsequent section of the chapter focuses on the vision of the project followed by different and contending views of not just China and Pakistan but also India and other countries. Further, an attempt has been made to end the chapter with not just the internal issues related with the project but with hope that the project will be able to deliver what it intends to promise.

2.01. Introduction

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an infrastructural development project which includes development of multi transportation facilities, pipelines, energy project and several economic zones. It aims to connect different part of South Asia which will not only help the region to develop but also give china a direct access to Indian Ocean. Currently China travels approximately 12000¹ km route from Arabian Sea through the Indian Ocean via Strait of Malacca for its energy import from the Middle-East to its economic capital in Shanghai. This project if materialized can not only help shorten the existing trade and commercial route but also time consumed and cost of transportation. This it hopes to do by building not just the strategic economic corridor throughout Pakistan including area of POK but also infrastructure and communication development within the country. The CPEC as development project aims to connect not just the sea port of Gwadar in Pakistan to China but also link Western part of China through the Karakoram Highway.

The above mentioned project is a part of China's "One Belt, One Road Policy", which includes apart from CPEC five other corridors, these are:

¹ https://www.google.co.in/search?q=cpec+map+route&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi-7Z7Bp6DYAhWHOI8KHfbOBZMQ_AUICygC&biw=1366&bih=613#imgrc=0NDxyPafE1jF3M:

- 1) China-Mongolia-Russia-Corridor
- 2) New Eurasian Land Bridge
- 3) Corridor from China to Central Asia and Western Asia
- 4) China-Indo-China Peninsula Corridor and
- 5) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (FICCI, 2016:2).

However, CPEC according to China is the most important among the mentioned six economic corridors and is taken as a platform of “win-win cooperation”² for both the countries. CPECs development is part of a grand Chinese agenda of regional economic connectivity under the OBOR initiative, which was outlined in March 2015 by China’s National Development and Reform committee (NDRC) (Simon and Miner, 2016). Under this initiative, China aims to construct a new silk route called “21st Century Silk Road”³ (Chanturvedy, 2017). China proposed to revive the old “Silk route of the Sea” into a 21st century Maritime Silk Road for grand strategy of its long term foreign and security policy goals, which according to the plan would connect parts of Asia, Europe, Middle-East and Africa. CPEC further aims to enhance China’s strategic advantages, with Pakistan getting highest advantages to transform their economic and infrastructure development. From a strategic point of view this initiative will be provide a strategic benefit in the region which would go a long way in benefitting Pakistan. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor according to the plan will not just connect the region but also create economic opportunity in a defined geographical space. Therefore, as stated by Ali ‘CPEC will serve as a driver for connectivity between South Asia and East Asia and will play a crucial role in regional integration of the Grater South Asia which includes China, Iran, Afghanistan, and stretches all the way to Myanmar (Ali, 2016).

² Equal benefit from trade facilitation

³ 21st century maritime silk route is a route that China propose for its own interest of a grand strategy and search of natural resources and developing overland transport networks in pursuit of its national interest.

2.02. Historical Background

China-Pakistan economic relation dates back to the time when Pakistan supported the formation of Peoples Republic of China in the United Nation. That the notion of China is a sovereign independent states in 1950, immediately established the China-Pakistan trade relation (Jamal and Jayshree, 2010). In 1963, the China-Pakistan relations took a strategic turn after the signing of border agreement (Pande, 2015). In 1964, China offered Pakistan US\$60 million interest free loan for infrastructure development, and also provided arms and ammunitions during the Indo-Pak war in 1965. In 1978 Chinese president Deng Xiaoping liberalized Chinese economy and initiated the ‘Open Door Policy’ (Wang and Liu: 37). Through this policy China upgraded not just its ports, roads and border infrastructures but also improved political and economic relations with neighboring countries. This policy further helped China to invest on Agriculture, Industries, Science & Technology and national defence. China to enhance its economic capacity further build five economic zone in the southern part i.e. Xiamen, Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Hainan. These five special economic zones ever since has been not just an attraction for foreign capital and investor, but also home to high-tech industries and a major manufacturing hub (Wu and Sui, 2010).

Further, the Sino-Pak economic and trade relation strengthened when in 1978 Sino-Pak tied up for a road program for the construction of Karakoram National Highway across border through the Gilgit to China’s Xinjiang province. After that China started investing more in Pakistan in areas of new investments and partnership. A joint declaration came to concrete outcome after a meeting between President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and President Hu Jintao in 2003 at Beijing (Shakeel Ahmad, 2016). This declaration highlighted that the areas of cooperation for future between the two countries would be centered on economic and military collaboration. A joint statement in 2006 further strengthened the cooperation when Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed during the visit of President Hu Jintao to Islamabad, to expand and promote the trade cooperation and improve the unequal trade deficit between two countries in Beijing (Ahmad Shakeel, 2016). Considering the above development China-Pak relations continued to expand so

much that their relation came to be termed as ‘all weather friendship’⁴. The trade volume between the two expanded from meager amount of \$1 billion in 1998 to \$15.15 billion in 2015 (Dawn, 2016). We can therefore assume that this enhanced cooperation played a very important role in the foundation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. During the state visit of president of China Xi Jinping to Pakistan in April 2015, he wrote in an open editorial that “this will be my first trip to Pakistan, but I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own brother.” During his visit, Islamabad was dotted with slogans and signboards such as Pakistan-China friendship is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey and stronger than steel (Ankit Panda, 2015).

CPEC constitutes one of the largest foreign investments that China has made in the framework of “One Belt, One Road” initiatives with US\$46 billion for its first allocation, officially announced in May 2013, during Chinese Premier Visit to Pakistan. In February 2014, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain visited China to discuss the plans for an economic corridor in Pakistan. Two months later, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with Premier Li Keqiang in China to discuss further plans, resulting in the full scope of the project to be devised under Sharif’s tenure (CLAWS, 2016). In November 2014, Chinese government announced its intention to finance Chinese companies as part of its \$46 billion energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan, as part of CPEC and the further worth value increased about more than \$51.5 billion in 2016. China and Pakistan formalized plans for the CPEC in April 2015 when they signed fifty-one agreements and memorandums of understanding on Chinese investment (Markey and James, 2016).

The project as mentioned incorporates various infrastructure and connectivity projects to be implemented in Pakistan. CPEC is a long route of approx 3,218 km⁵ from Kashgar to Gwadar port of Pakistan (Dawn, 2016). This route includes two components:


1. First route starts from Gwadar to Kashgar via Balochistan-Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) and Gilgit to Kashgar, and

⁴ Both the party will cooperate and support each and every moment as a family of any situation.

⁵ According to the map-
[https://www.google.co.in/search?q=CPEC+is+a+long+route+of+approx+3,218+km+\(Map\)&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFzILjyaDYAhVJu48KHQRGAZYQ_AUIDCgD&biw=774&bih=602#imgrc=p-ZX8piFBntv6M](https://www.google.co.in/search?q=CPEC+is+a+long+route+of+approx+3,218+km+(Map)&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFzILjyaDYAhVJu48KHQRGAZYQ_AUIDCgD&biw=774&bih=602#imgrc=p-ZX8piFBntv6M):

2. Second route is from Gwadar to Karachi port of Sindh via Punjab-Lahore-Islamabad-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to Kashgar. Both the routes converge in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) which is a disputed area between India-Pakistan.

CPEC, apart from China's strategic interest intendeds to rapidly modernize Pakistan's infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic zones. The project broadly following 1 + 4 cooperation and developmental programs, which includes: 1) the improvement of the economic corridor at the Centre and the Gwadar Port, 2) the development of energy requirement, 3) building of infrastructure and connectivity and 4) the industrial cooperation (Shannon Tiezzi, 2016).



Source: <http://www.cpecinfo.com/cpec-news.php?page33>

The funding for CPEC is mainly backed by China and its newly created financial institution like NDB and AIIB (Panda, 2017), which is integrated to One Belt and One Road strategy. From the literatures available it is evident that CPEC is mostly loaned by different banks in China for instance; Commercial Loan, China Development Bank, The Export-Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited. The loan rates around 6 to 7 percent interest from the private financial institution, and around 2 to 2.4 percent interest rate from the Chinese government owned Banks (Djankov and Miner 2016).

Another source of funding for CEPC is the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Out of US\$51.5 billion \$8 billion has been borrowed from ADB for up gradation of the railway line from Karachi to Peshawar. In addition ADB has further extended loan of \$2.5 billion for the Lahore-Peshawar railway track (Kiani, 2016). Further Beijing has also agreed to provide Pakistan with \$5.5 billion concessional loan to upgrade and modernized the Karachi-Lahore main railway line called ML-1. Both the loans will be provided with less than 2 percent interest rate confirmed the Development and Planning Minister of Pakistan. He further stated that Economic Affairs Division is still busy finalizing the terms and conditions of interest rate which according to him can be brought down (Haider, 2017). However, he was confident of the fact that the three phases and four major areas mentioned will be completed soon according to the short term, medium term and long term project of 2020, 2025 and 2030 respectively.

In terms of connectivity with its western part of the country which owing to its distance is still under developed what the CPEC aims to do is connect the south Asian states with its western land lock region. If this project is materialized than China's backward province will not only be transformed into new development hub but will also lead to creation of new opportunities and sources of employment for the local people which can be in line with Chinas 'Marching Westwards Policy'⁶ (Zhao, 2012). According to the IMF growth forecast, The CPEC is anticipated to boost Pakistan's economy, wherein its GDP is expected to grow by more than five percent by 2020. It further predicted that Pakistan's

⁶ It is a strategy move has its domestic motivation and campaign aiming to addressing the development disparity between the coastal areas and the vast inner lands, and by providing financial support, co-developing large scale business projects and transferring advance human resources.

GDP will reach \$4.2 trillion by 2050 from the current \$988 billion (The *Hindustan*, 2016).

2.03 Vision of the Project

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a project initiated to improve the livelihood of people of Pakistan as well China's western provinces by building an economic corridor, promoting bilateral connectivity, exploring potential bilateral investment, economic & trade, logistics and people to people contact throughout the region (cpecplatform.com). A vast network of highways and railways are to be built under the aegis of CPEC which will span the length and breadth of Pakistan. There are five main areas under this project such as- Energy, Infrastructures, Gwadar port, Rail based mass transit project and Proposed special economic zones (*CPEC.PK*) to be implemented across Pakistan as well Western province of China. Apart from these, this project is expected to enhance and facilitate people and organizations to engage more in making CPEC a successful project. Multiple business opportunities according to this project are to be set up in both the region which will lead to the enhancement of business and companies working and planning to work for the project. The proposed project will therefore provide a platform to promote and facilitate collaboration between business of China and Pakistan. However, there are many views when it comes to CPEC provided by different actors shaped by its interest and intend. While supporters of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor authority terms it as an economic and regional integrity, the same for the other actors is the abusement of their right and their livelihood which will be dealt in brief in subsequent section. Therefore we can say that there is a differing view when it comes to the actors involved in the project.

2.04 Hope and doubts

CPEC apart from its strategic interest is a hope for the expansion of business and to provide opportunities to local traders to export their products to another country. A businessman by profession, Milad Salman of Gilgit-Baltistan who exports fresh fruits such as cherries, apricots and apples, is of the hope that CPEC will be a game-changer for


the region⁷. Till date they carefully pack truckload of fruits and run it down Karakoram Highway to reach the capital Islamabad from where they are flown to Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. In 2016 Salman sold 30 tons of cherries and 100 tons of apples, and this was done via air cargo. He hopes that the export of such produce will be much cheaper and less time consuming if it could be sent by road to China via Xinjiang (Dawn, 2016).

Many policy makers from Pakistan believes that CPEC will also boost tourism in the region which already hosts the world's second highest peak Mt K2 (8000 feet) and Nanga Parbat. The Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, Muhammad Barjees Tahir stated that 'CPEC would be a good platform for enhancing tourism sector in the country. He further stated that it would not just develop the region as tourist destination but also help locals to earn a source of income' (*the express tribune, 2017*). According to some scholars from Pakistan, the region has been blessed with infinite water resources. By building hydro power projects, Pakistan can achieve not just self sufficiency when it comes to its electricity usage but also sell clean energy to China and its neighboring countries. Pakistani scholars in this take example of Bhutan who despite being small in territory has been selling electricity to India. So they make a stand that if Bhutan can do that than even Pakistan can achieve such stand (Dawn, 2016).

Pakistan in addition to this also expects that CPEC will open vistas of great opportunities and will greatly help it in overcoming poverty, unemployment problem and inequalities of smaller province. The huge investment by China is expected to boost Pakistan's \$274 billion GDP by over 15%. It is also expected that CPEC will improve military assistance from China which will help Pakistan a great deal in narrowing its ever widening gap in economic-military-nuclear fields (Onlinemaq, Oct 2016). Most importantly it also expects that through this project, economic stand of Pakistan in the coming age will make it an attractive destination for foreign investments which will help greatly in removing socio-economic inequalities of smaller provinces and in eliminating the space for anti-Pakistan elements.

⁷ According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Gilgi-Baltistan region produces over 100,000 metric tons of fresh apricots annually, 4000 tons of cherries and up to 20,000 tons of apples and exported to Middle East. According to sources fruits grown in the Gilgit-Baltistan region are organic with high value in the market (*DAWN*).

It is important for us to understand that the success of Sino-Pakistan partnership is critically linked to the success of stabilization of the Afghan situation. The realization that threat to CPEC and its completion emanates more from the terrorist groups operating in the Afghanistan's has led these two countries to come together and work for its early completion (the nation, 2016).



<https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/genuine-map-of-cpec.372891/>

2.05 China's View

China as evident has strategic as well as economic interest in the completion and materialization of CPEC and there are number of reason for it. To begin with, most of China's energy requirement is fulfilled by Middle-East countries via Indian Ocean and Strait of Malacca. Apart from the risk involved in the strait with regard to piracy what is

more important is growing Indian navy and its capabilities in the ocean which creates a zone of tension for China, as any hostility between the two countries can lead to serious disruption of energy requirement of China. Further, taking history as a reference, it is evident that the relationship between the two countries has not sailed on the smooth wave. The recent standoff of Doklam (2017) which was resolved diplomatically after 70 days is but one example. It is for this reason China has been relentlessly pushing this project so as to search an alternative route to fulfill its energy requirements without any power to challenge or disrupt its position.

Another reason is the threat in the ocean from non state actors like smugglers, pirate etc which is increasingly becoming a security concern for the nations to conduct trade and business. This is where CPEC and its development are crucial as most of the trade after the completion will be done via road networks. This network will allow free movement of goods to inland China without having crossed the Strait of Malacca. It according to the reports published and plan will be the shortest route for China to export its finished products to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. A report on Asian Development Bank stated that CPEC will connect economic agents along a defined geography and will provide reliable alternative trading revenue for China (Dawn, 2016).

Another important point to consider is increasing haste of China to develop its western part of the region which till date remains underdeveloped. This it claims to do by investing heavily on the development of infrastructure and its road network. In January 2000 China officially commenced the execution of its “Western Development Strategy” (WDS) which covers six provinces and five autonomous regions including Xinjiang and Tibet (Aditi Malotra, 2015). Considering Xinjiang’s distance from China’s coastal cities, it seemed prudent to offer the province benefits from economic linkage in Pakistan and speedy access to the Middle East and other regions. Further, Xinjiang’s geographical location makes it ideal for China’s “Look West” strategy. China shares its borders with fourteen countries out of which Xinjiang province shares eight international borders i.e. Afghanistan, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. This makes the province strategically critical for Beijing. However, Xinjiang is plagued by various problem of which secessionist movement of Muslim Uighurs and its link with the terrorist organization. Therefore it is also for this reason that China has started

focusing on its western regions as it views that the only solution to neutralize the secessionist group is through the development of the region by providing better opportunities to the people in terms of jobs and decent standard of living (xinuah, 2015). In addition what China aims for is a long term economic cooperation including the option of instituting a “trans-regional economic zone” comprising China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and central Asia for vibrant economic development. These is where it highlights the importance of CPEC, which according to China will not only help both countries to develop and grow but transform the domestic structure of Pakistan in both economic and political sphere. However, to counter this stand an article by Chinas news agency *China Daily* stated that “the project may bring power to the state as well as create jobs for the people but in the long run would enslave the country”.

Despite this many countries such as Russia, Iran, France, UK and Afghanistan are keen in joining CPEC and confirm its viability for regional economic cooperation (*Value Walk, 2016*). Russia further, expressed its interest in using Gwadar port for international trade, but owing to strong resistance from India it could not precede with this idea.

UK has also shown interest in CPEC. After Brexit, UK has started to move beyond its borders and has been searching for alternatives for new areas of investment outside European Union (EU) and CPEC according to them can be use as a good platform for new business and investment. To this Beijing and Islamabad confirmed that the project is not for only two countries but for entire South Asian region. To substantiate this ground news agencies such as *Global Times* maintains the stand that “to broaden the scope of investment, China is expected to have an open mind inviting third parties to join the CPEC”. Therefore there is no doubt that if the project is successful it could benefit not just the two countries involved but also countries such Afghanistan, Iran and India as well as other major economics like Russia who according to may be an ideal partner to take part in the CPEC(*the economics times, 2016*).

2.06 India’s View

India strongly objects the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, not the entire project but the route included for the project which passes through the disputed territory of Jammu

and Kashmir⁸. India is concerned with increasing Chinese activity in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and its neighboring states. It is estimated that several thousand Chinese workers are stationed in PoK under the protection provided by the Pakistani government. Many Chinese military are working on disputed areas as per the project but this has not been done with the consent of India. India has been voicing these concerns since the announcement of the CPEC. In April 2015 beginning with a visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China to express these issues in front of China's ministry. However Chinese President Xi Jinping dismissed these concerns describing CPEC as only a commercial project. After a year of the above mentioned episode External Affairs Minister Ms Sushma Swaraj again raised this issue at the United Nations General Assembly. There she made a statement that China has not only been insensitive to its sovereignty, but has never fully explained its plan for the Belt and Road initiative (Aloke Tikku, 2017). Further, addressing India's concerns regarding the CPEC passing Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), a UN report stated that the project might further ignite tensions between India and Pakistan. The dispute over Kashmir is also of concern, since the crossing of the CPEC in the region might create geo-political tension with India and ignite further political instability (Times of India, 2016).

India true to its stand boycotted the Belt and Road summit which was held in Beijing 14-15 May 2017. According to the report, officials of 130 countries participated in the summit, of which 68 had already signed the Belt and Road project (The Hindu, 2017). Just ten days before the forum China ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui gave a speech at a military think-tank (The United Service Institution of India) with a 'four point initiative' to improve ties between India-China, including a suggestion that China was open to renaming the CPEC if that would resolve India's Belt & Road initiative problem⁹. But India did not change its stand and sent no one, not even a local embassy official to take

⁸ This includes Gilgit-Baltistan region, including the Diamer Basha Dam which is a 180 MW hydro power projects. Further there are also statements in the official reports of the project for the creation of some expressway and economic zones along the Karakoram Highway.

⁹ These apart from the above mentioned points were that, i) China-India-Pakistan should work together for settlement of border dispute of 1963, ii) settlement of Kashmir dispute by peaceful negotiation between India and Pakistan and iii) appointment of Indian as a co-founder of AIIB which will support the BRI projects (Haidar, 2017)

notes. Directive were also issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) that any personal from think-tanks, business chambers and other ministers would have to take clearance if they were travelling for the Belt & Road initiative forum. Just an hours before the initiation of summit in Beijing the MEA again issued a comprehensive statement on its objections to the Belt & Road initiative which were three fold in its nature, these were: i) that the corridor includes projects in land belonging to India; ii) that the project could push smaller countries on the road and destroy the ecology of the region. iii) and that Chinas agenda was unclear, which implied the fact that that this was more about enhancing its political influence, not just its physical networks but also mental threats (*MEA, 2017*).

Indian analysts further question the implications of Chinese investment and worried about Beijing's ambitions in South Asia. If Gwadar port became a vibrant economic hub than the Chinese are bound to station its navy and safeguard its interest with expanded fleet and operations throughout the Indian Ocean which again will become a security concern for India. The Gwadar port and its up gradation if materialized according to the project will be one of the busiest shipping lanes in the Arabian Sea for Beijing. And New Delhi fears that the port might become a Chinese naval outpost, thereby threatening India's energy and economic security, from where almost two thirds of India's petroleum imports pass through (*Ghoshal, 2013*).

However, it is important to understand in this context that although the relationship between India and China has been situational, India did not sign One Belt, One Road forum and has not been part of any of its projects. On the contrary it proposed its own 'Spice Route' and countered Chinas Maritime Silk Road (MSR) with SAGAR project further strengthening its relations with ASEAN, Japan, Mongolia, Iran and Central Asian countries. However, despite the above mentioned aspects India owing to its interest joined the new financial institutions such as NDB and the AIIB as it sees these banks as potential sources for a long term infrastructure finance which would benefit India in a long run.

2.07 Pakistan's Internal Issue

The objection to CPEC is not just from Indian side but also from the side of Pakistan as many internal issues such as exploitation and displacement has surfaced in the form of protest from the local inhabitants (Baluch and Pakhtuns). In February 2017, representative from 12 Sindhi village affected by the Gorano dam, a reservoir intended to collect the waste water from coal and gas exploration held a patriotic protest calling for the construction of dam to be rebuked as the lives of the local people as well as the livestock were being threatened (Dawn, 2017). However, according to one of the protestor, no one listened to them and that "their basic rights are being snatched and violated." He stated that almost 15000 people, 2000 animals dependent on the land and almost 200,000 trees are now designated for destruction. The same can also be said for fresh water wells and ancestors graveyard. If Pakistan's government and CPEC developers continue to ignore these incidents then these might fuel the common citizens to go against the government and take a separatist stand (Baloch, 2017).

Apart from this most people from Baluchistan are against the project, so much so that there has been frequent case of extremist groups killing and kidnapping the workers and engineers of the project. Sanaullah Baloch stated that 'since the people of Baluchistan are treated as enemies they do not want to support Pakistan, and that is the reason they resort to disturbance of the developmental project'. Although the Sindhi's, Baloch and Pakhtuns are stakeholder in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor they are concerned about transparency, inclusivity, benefits, management and even the security aspect when it comes to the project (Dawn, 2017). Further, the media houses are also under the clutch of the government and are instructed to report only the good aspects of the project ignoring the protests, demands and ideas of locals around the issue. Such policy of blackout will neither help Pakistan nor Chinese to address the risk and also mitigation strategies according to local needs. Sanaullah Baloch an activists from Baloch claimed that the project will destroy all of Baluchistan's natural resources but the benefits will be go to favored Punjab Province with nothing left for them (Baloch, 2014). He further advised that Pakistan's military leadership should use its soft power to encourage opposition, marginalized and exploited masses and groups to come forward openly and raise their

concerns through a peaceful and democratic way, rather than resorting to violent methods.

In United Nations Human Rights Council, Abdul Nawz Bugti, Baloch Republican Party Representative criticized the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor stating that the project is not of any development, but a threat to the people of Baloch. He stated that after signing the CPEC agreement there has been increasing case of Pakistani militaries extrajudicial killing in the name of safeguarding the project. Baloch populations are forced to migrate from the areas along CPEC through military operations. More than 200 thousand Baloch have been forcibly displaced along the CPEC route till date (Anil Kumar, 2016)

The internal security dilemma is not just prominent in Pakistan but also western part of China wherein the ethnic minority like Uighur community has been increasingly met with political violence with expanded security presence for the push and completion of the project. These efforts implicate Pakistan; Uighur militant groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) have sought refuge in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, where they have established links with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Efr, 2014). China perceives the ETIM as a persistent threat committed to targeting China and attacking Chinese interest inside Pakistan. There is no doubt that the Pakistani government has been forth-coming in helping China to the best of its abilities and China has limited doubts about the intentions of its “All-Weather Friends.” However, Norihiro Sasaki of the *Institute of Developing Economies* (IDE) in Japan stated that apart from strategic reasons the motivations behind the Western Development Strategy (WDS) includes the need to contain the regional government in the western sector. She further claimed that frequent instances of separatist movements of the ethnic minorities in the western region cannot be ignored for long.

From the economic points of view the project will help to transform of Pakistan and western part of China. With huge investment in infrastructure building it will not just help in economic growth and employment capacity but also generate huge taxes from the project. But within Pakistan many are suspicion of Chinese policy. The Pakistani economist Akbar Zaidi alleged that Pakistan will become a colony of China once the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is operationalized. He further states that exploitation

of Pakistan's economy is evident once the project is completed and states that it is hard to understand how some infrastructure projects could threaten a country's sovereignty (Venkatachalam, 2017).

According to experts the completion of Gwadar would make it the economic hub of Baluchistan and create a strategic nexus between Pakistan, China and Central Asia, generating billions of revenue and providing shorter land routes. The US wary of Chinese strategic access to the Arabian Sea and its presence in the region, has reportedly tried to peruse Pakistan against involving China in the development. Despite the warning Pakistan's Prime Minister and Army Chief accompanied by the China's ambassador Sun Weidony inaugurated the Gwadar port to operationalize the trade activities on 13 November 2016 (*Dawn*, 2016). The cargo handling activities at Gwadar port shows that it has become a reality much faster than imagined. Operationalization of Gwadar port further showed Pakistan's commitment to the Belt & Road initiative. Expert considers that Belt and Road project integrates Pakistan into a hub of trade and commerce harnessing its geo-strategic location into its geo-economic advantages. A high level delegation of interim government of Pakistan visited to Beijing in August 2017 and demonstrated the Chinese government its continued commitment towards CPEC. The government inaugurated many major power projects in the month of September, 2017, including Balloki power project 4,320 MW, Port Quasim LNG project 1,320 MW and Chasma-IV nuclear power plant (*The News*, 2017)

Therefore there is no doubt that Pakistan is very important player in this project. Apart from this Pakistan is further trying to include other countries likes Iran to expand its maritime zone to South Asia and Central Asia for greater economic opportunities. Pakistan and six Gulf countries are located in the West intersection zone of the Belt and Road, which makes them important partners of China (Shahbazov, 2017). The importance of Pakistan for China was further evident when in July 2017 in the event of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif being expelled from power, Lu Kang Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated "we believe that the China-Pakistan strategic cooperative partnership will not be affected by the change of the situation inside Pakistan. China stands ready to work with Pakistan to continue jointly build the One Belt, One Road," and that the All

Weather Friendship between China and Pakistan has withstood the test of times (Dawn, 2017).

Thus, it can be said the CPEC is a grand scheme which will transform China into a global power and Pakistan into a regional economic hub. According to a report by price water house Coopers, by 2050 China will be the largest economy in the world. The current Chinese project of One Belt, One Road silk routes and CPEC will be greatest contributors for China's dreams. The Pakistani media and government associate states that the project is a "game and fate changer" for the region. According to the news agency *The Guardian*, the Chinese are not just offering to build much needed infrastructure but also making Pakistan a key partner in its grand economic and strategic ambitions. The project will also open trade routes for western China and provide a direct access to the resource rich Middle-East region bypassing longer logistical route of the Strait of Malacca. The CPEC if successful has the potential to radically alter the regional dynamics of trade, development and politics. CPEC would be a game changer for the Pakistan, and would help to uplift the lives of about 3 billion people across China, Central Asia, South Asia and Middle East.

Conclusion

CPEC is a multi infrastructure project which incorporates development of various infrastructure, communication and transport networks. Apart from the strategic interest that China has from this it is also about development of Pakistan and other nearby region with better connectivity and economic promises. The project if materialised will be a game changer for all the parties included but at the same time will increase threat for other countries such as India wherein there is high chances for both inter and intra state conflicts. Further it can also be assumed that the intensity of conflict between the two countries is likely to increase. The project as stated is for the advantages of both countries, however if it is to succeed it has to take into consideration not just the viewpoints of elite and political class but also the locals for whom the projects are being initiated in the first place. Therefore what we need to look forward from the project is the development of the marginalised and disadvantaged class first and then the region as a whole.

Chapter 3

Geo-economic and Geo-strategic perspective of CPEC

03.01. Geo-economics

The economic and geographical factors of a country are important elements that the country can represent or use to influence the International Relations. In economic terms, Pakistan is weak.¹⁰ The infrastructure and communication system is also poor and corrupted¹¹. The governance from grass root level to top (is also very weak), which made Pakistan's developmental programs very slow. Therefore China is trying to 'Make in Pakistan'¹², so they can emerge as a regional power.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the multilateral trade cooperation between two countries. The project has gained strategic importance over the years in South Asia. The project transforms Pakistan's economic, transportation and living standard (cpec.pk). The project is basically China's interest as on South Asian region and to connect it with Middle East through a short route. Currently China depends on Middle East for its 80% of energy requirement, and hence importing oil energy through a long route of 12900 km¹³ (*map*), which takes 45-60 days. This particular exercise is cost and time consuming. However, the new project takes less time and is beneficial as it takes 10-20 days to reach China's economic capital i.e. Shanghai. It is for this purpose China had declared (April 2016) to increase value of invests worth \$62 billion (current worth value \$51.5 bn) in Pakistan for its energy dependent and transportation from the Middle East (Fair, 2017).

The CPEC will not only benefit China's economic interest but will also help in improving Pakistan's infrastructural development. With this multibillion projects like several power plants, highway networks, pipelines and Gwadar port project it will help Pakistan's prospect of economic development as well. Most of these projects are under

¹⁰ The statement is taken in reference to the Human Development Index 2017, which shows that Pakistan falls under the category of most poor countries (147 ranks) of the world.

¹¹ The statement is taken in reference of Transparency International (TI), 2017.

¹² The idea of Make in Pakistan has been derived from Prime Minister Narendra Modi who has visualized of making India a smart country and his recent developmental policy has been accordingly.

¹³ The statement of energy requirement of China is derived-

(https://www.google.co.in/search?q=cpec+map+route&source=lnms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi-7Z7Bp6DYAhWHOI8KHfbOBZMQ_AUICygC&biw=1366&bih=613#imgrc=0NDxyPafE1jF3M).

construction and this will eventually benefit the people of Pakistan at large. According to the report more than 10,000 new jobs have been created for local people and Baloch youths through the project (Xinhua, 2016). However, Pakistan's official (Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation) have predicted the number to rise till 700,000 (direct jobs) by 2030. The project will add 2 to 2.5 percent to the country's annual economic growth which means the increase will be three to four times from the present (Sarma, 2016). At the present Pakistan is facing huge shortage of energy and power cuts, according to the report¹⁴ six to eight hours of load-shedding in major urban centers and up to 18 hours power cut in the rural area, which made the economy and industrial development in Pakistan stagnant (*Dawn, 2017*). However, through the project Pakistan will transform completely and will emerge as industrialized based economy and fulfills the demand of energy.

03.02. Structure of project

The project is a multi infrastructural and multi communicational, including vast network of highways and railways. The project will be built under the aegis of CPEC which will span the length and breadth of Pakistan. According to the needs and importance of both the countries, there are five main areas the project has focused on. These are- Energy, Infrastructures, Gwadar port, Rail based mass transit project and Proposed special economic zones (cpec.pk).

A). Energy:

Energy is the main sources of any country's economic and financial well being in the modern world. Shortage of energy is the main reason of paralyses for economic growth of the country. Pakistan has enough energy resources, but due to the lack of technical and financial assistance they are not able to gain enough energy according to their needs. According to the report¹⁵ of national geography, in summer season electricity short fall around 500 million KW in Pakistan. As per the CPEC at least 25 energy stations will be

¹⁴ National Geography, cpec documentary 2015.

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=China+Pakistan+Economic+Corridor+CPEC+Documentary+National+Geographic++YouTube360p.

¹⁵National geography.

building to fulfill the shortage of energy (nationalgeography.com). Apart from more than 10 projects completed and some other under construction (*cpec.pk*), which will generate more than 16,695 MW with worth of US\$33,728 million cost.

Over 10,400MW of energy generating capacity is to be brought online by the end of 2018 as part of CPEC's fast-tracked "Early Harvest" projects, and those 21 projects Pakistan expects fourteen early harvest project will operate by 2018¹⁶. According to *China Daily*, the project would provide up to 16,400MW energy altogether. According to the official information *cpec.pk* along 33.8 billion will be used for energy requirement and after filling shortage energy of Pakistan it will generate US\$400 million electric revenue in a year (*cpec.pk*).

¹⁶ Pakistan Stories. <https://pakistanstoriestrue.wordpress.com/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-cpec/>.

Table No.:02:01**Power plant project**

Sl. No.	Project Name	MW	Estimated coast (US\$ M)
1	Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal- fired Power Plant, Punjab	1320	1,600
2	Engrothar 4x330MW Coal- fired, Thar, Sindh	1320	2,000
3	Surface mine in Block II of Thar Coal field, 6.5 metric ton per annum (mtpa), Thar Sindh		1,470
4	Gwadar Coal /LNG / Oil Power Project, Gwadar	300	600
5	HUBCO coal power plant 1X660 MW, Hub Balochistan	660	970
6	Rahimyar Khan Coal Power Project, Punjab	1320	1,600
7	SSRL Thar Coal Block 1 - 6.5 metric ton per Annum (mtpa) Thar, Sindh		1,300
8	SSRL 2x660 MW Mine Mouth Power Plant,Sindh	1320	2,000
9	Quaid-e-Azam 1000MW Solar Park, Bahawalpur, Punjab	1000	1,350
10	Dawood 50MW wind Farm, Bhambore, Sindh	50	125
11	UEP 100MW wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh	100	250
12	Sachal 50MW Wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh	50	134
13	SukiKinari Hydro power Station, KPK	870	1,802
14	Karot Hydropower Station, AJK & Punjab	720	1,420
15	Matiari to Lahore Transmission line		1,500
16	Matiari to Faisalabad Transmission line		1,500
17	Gaddani power park project (2*660MW)	1320	3,960
18	Gaddani power park project (jetty+infrastructure)		1,200
19	HUBCO coal power plant 1X660 MW, Hub Balochistan	660	970
20	KohalaHydel Project, AJK	1100	2,397

21	Pakistan Wind Farm II 2X50 MW (Jhampir, Thatta, Sindh)	100	150
22	Thar mine mouth oracle, Thar Sindh	1320	1,300
23	Muzaffargarh Coal Power Project, Punjab	1320	1,600
24	Gas Power Plant 525 MW	525	550
25	Port Qasim Electric Company Coal Fired, 2x660, Sindh	1320	1,980

<http://cpec.gov.pk/energy> 2016

Ashan Iqbal, Pakistan's Federal Minister for Planning and Development 2016 stated that Pakistan's energy crisis will soon be over (Dawn, 2016). He announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is an investment of US\$44 billion which will focus on infrastructural development for 20 years. At the ground breaking ceremony for two 660 megawatt coal fired power plants in Pakistan's Baluchistan province; he welcomed China's initial \$2 billion investment and mentioned that these power plants would be equipped with the latest technology to generate electricity at low costs. The plants will burn 3.8 million tons of coal per year, and would generate 9 billion KW of electricity per year (Dawn, 2017).

B). Infrastructure projects

Infrastructures & road connectivity is the important element and gear of nation building¹⁷. Pakistan is one of the least developed countries on road connectivity in the world¹⁸. It is one of the reasons that CPEC focuses more on the improvement of road connectivity and transportation. Therefore one of CPEC's main visions is to construct new roads and smooth transportation. There are three main routes planned in the project. The project will be to upgrade the existing road and some other would be to construct new roads, these three main routes are—

1. The Gwadar to D.I Khan through Quetta (phase-1),
2. The Karachi-Hydrabad-Sukkur and,

¹⁷ As it is one of the taken fact that infrastructural development is the core for any developed nation, hence the statement also tries to make use of the statement and link it with nation building process.

¹⁸ International Logistic Performance Index (LPI) Global Ranking, 2016 Pakistan rank 68.


3. The Multan-Lahore-Islamabad to Peshawar (Peshawar-Karachi motorway). The Route 2 and 3 also called Karachi-Peshawar motorway which is around 392 km (cpec.pk, 2016). Gwadar to Karachi is a new project which under the CPEC, the Khuzdar via DG Khan-Islamabad road is the one of long term CPEC alignment route.

In simple terms the roads are basically divided into four main distinctions i.e. – i) Karakoram Highway, ii) Eastern Alignment, iii) Western Alignments and, iv) Central Alignment (cpec.pk, 2016).

i). The Karakoram Highway will Upgrade to 487 kilometer long section between Burhan and Raikot. The Karakoram Highway is officially referred in Pakistan as the Karakoram Highway Phase 2 project. Burhan to Havelian N-35 is a 59 kilometer road and will be upgraded for the 4 lane highway. North of Shinkhari to Raikot near Chilas will be constructed as a 2-lane highway in the project, and the Havelian to Shinkhari is the 4-lane dual carriageway road which is located further south (Wiki, 2012).

ii). The Eastern Alignment is a 1,152 km long motorway which will connect Pakistan's two largest cities i.e. Karachi and the Lahore. The road is a 4 to 6 lane and is designed for travel for the speeds up to 120 kilometers per hour (Mughal 2016). The entire Eastern Alignment motorway project is divided into four sections:

- a) A 136 kilometer long section between Karachi and Hyderabad which is also known as the M9 motorway,
- b) A 296 kilometer long section Hyderabad to Sukkur,
- c) A 387 kilometer long section Sukkur to Multan and
- d) The 333 kilometer section between Multan and Lahore via the town of Abdul Hakeem (Dawn, 2016).



iii). The Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and western Punjab Province are the parts of Western Alignment road. The Budgetary/allocation of the government focused more on Western Alignment route and preferences are given on the basis of land, population and production factors, which connect the Gwadar port directly. The government of Pakistan allocated Rs. 28 billion for the Western route (*cpec.pk, 2017*). The road is several hundred kilometers divided into 2 and 4 lane highways and is expected to complete by mid-2018. Further it is expected to expand for 6-lane motorways. The project of CPEC envisages re-construction of 870 kilometers long road apart from 620 kilometers road (which have already been rebuild in January 2016) in Baluchistan province as a part of the Western Alignment (Fcbalochistan.gov.pk).

iv). The last one is, future Central Alignment route, it is a long term plan which consists of a network of roads that will commence in Gwadar and connects both eastern and western alignments. The routes also connect cities of Basima-Khuzdar-Rajanpur-Layyah-Muzaffargarh and terminating in Dera Ismail Khan, with onward connections to Karakoram Highways via the Brahma Bahtar-Yarik Motorway. The new 285-kilometre-long controlled-access Brahma Bahtar-Yarik Motorway will be build for commerce. The estimated amount for central alignment route under CPEC is \$11 billion (Meena, 2017).

Table No.:02:02

Road Project

Sl. No.	Project Name	Length (KM)	Estimated Cost(US\$ M)
1	KKH Phase II (Thakot -Havelian Section)	118	1,305
2	Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur Section)	392	2,846
3	Khuzdar-Basima Road N-30 (110 km)	110	
4	Upgradation of D.I.Khan - Zhob, N-50 Phase-I (210 km)	210	
5	KKH Thakot-Raikot N35 remaining portion (136 Km)	136	
#	Current estimated Total-	966	4151


<http://cpec.gov.pk/infrastructure> 2017

C). Rail Sector Project

Rail is the lifeline for National transportation of any country¹⁹; most of the nation's development of 21st century depends on rail transport. Hence, CPEC too focuses more on railways and upgrade its existing routes in Pakistan. Pakistan's railway is a not well developed infrastructure. Pakistan's railway network will also have to extend eventually to connect it with China's Southern Xinjiang province under the project of CPEC (Dawn, 2016).

There are two main projects that are focused on railway routes, i) one is Expansion and reconstruction of existing Line ML-1 and ii) another is Havelian Dry port railway connectivity. I) The ML-1 is basically for up-gradation & rehabilitation of existing track from the Karachi-Lahore-Peshawar via Hyderabad-Rawalpindi. It is around 1,872 kms long route and cost estimated for this project is of US\$8,712 million (Dawn 2016). This project also envisions to upgrade upto 140 km/h route ii) the another project of Havelian Dry port, is a 450 MI (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) to meet the demand of containerized future freight traffic in connection with Pak-China Economic Corridor (Revolvy, 2017). The dry port will be established at Havelian by utilizing the railway land, railhead facilities, and high speed capacity stock. This project also has the potential of well established off-dock terminal for handling bonded import-export containers. The Pakistan Railway network will be upto Havelian Railway Station and will be situated at more than 680 kms distance from Khunjab (China border) (fcbalochistan.gov.pk). Initially the Dry Port will act as the container terminal for goods traffic coming from China through KKH. The transshipment arrangement will be provided at Havelian for loading-unloading on railway wagons which is under construction with the estimated cost US\$40 million (<http://cpec.gov.pk/infrastructure, 2017>).

¹⁹ As with development of railways the connection of any region in a country is easily done. And it is through railways that goods and services can be carried from one part of the region to another.



<http://cpec.gov.pk/>

Table No.:02:03**Railway projects**

Sl. No.	Project Name	KM	Estimated cost US\$
1	ML-1 Karachi-Peshawar railway line up gradation(via Hyderabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi)	1,872	8,172 million
2	ML-2 Kotri–Attock Railway Line up gradation (between Kotri in Sindh province and Attock in northern Punjab province via the cities of Larkana and Dera Ghazi Khan)	1,254	
3	ML-3 Rohri–Chaman Railway Line (between Bostan near Quetta to Kotla Jam in Bhakkar District near the city of Dera Ismail Khan)	560	
4	Orange Line (Lahore Metro) a commercial project	27.1	1.6 billion
5	Khunjerab Railway (line between the city of Havelian to the Khunjerab Pass on the Chinese border)	262	300 million

<http://cpec.gov.pk/mass-transit-projects.2017>

In January 2017 Pakistan’s Railway Minister Khawaja Saad Rafique while addressing a press conference- mentioned about the recent sixth Pak-China Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). He stated that three new railway projects including Karachi Circular, Peshawar Mass Transit and Quetta Mass Transit projects have also been included in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He further stated that approximately three million people will benefit from the Quetta mass Transit train services (App, 2017). About Peshawar Mass Transit, he stated this project possess great importance as it will connect Peshawar with Charssada, Nowshera and Mardan. Adding to which he states, “Our first priority is to connect Gwadar with the National Railways tracks and Pak-China join working group which has been constituted for the connection of Gwadar with the railway network.” He said that ML-1 is an important component of multi-billion dollars CPEC projects and China has agreed to provide a long term loan on most favorable terms for the up-gradation of ML-1 from Karachi to Peshawar (*the nation,*

2016). The first phase ML-1 is expected to be completed by December 2017 which is Karachi to Peshawar, and second phase of ML-1 (which is over whole project of railways) is expected to be completed by 2021. The entire project and Work surveillance will be carried out by financing possibly through the Chinese Government Concessional Loan (GCL) (the nation, 2016).

The other project under CPEC for railway route is ML-2. This particular railway route connects the Kotri in Sindh province to Attock in northern Punjab province. The route towards northern Pakistan roughly parallels the Indus River as opposed to the ML-1 which takes a more eastward course towards Lahore (Asad, 2017:45). The project also includes a plan to connect Gwadar to the town of Jacobabad in Sindh. Similarly, ML-3 railway line will also include construction of a 560 kilometer long railway line between Bostan near Quetta to Kotla Jam in Bhakkar District near the city of Dera Ismail Khan²⁰. The route is also called Rohri-Chaman railway line. The railway route will pass through the city of Quetta and Zhob before terminating in Kotla Jam, and the project is expected to be completed by 2025²¹ (Asad, 2017).

The US\$1.6 billion budget of Orange Line of the Lahore Metro is under construction and is regarded as a commercial project under CPEC. Construction on the line has already begun, with the target completion by last month of 2017. The line will be 27.1-kilometre (16.8 MI) long, of which 25.4 kilometers (15.8 MI) will be elevated, with the remaining portion to be underground between Jain Mandir and Lakshmi Chowk (Asad, 2017:45). Pakistan Minister of Planning (Ranjan, 2015), Development and Reforms Asan Iqbal said, Karachi-Peshawar railway line processed 75 percent of the passenger and cargo traffic, but its efficiency has dropped to 60-80 kilometers per hour. He further said, the refurbishment and up gradation of main line will cost \$8 billion and take five to six years to complete. This will revive its efficiency to 120-160 kilometers per hour. It will be upgraded in a manner that it will accommodate fast moving trains, reduce the cost of production and increase the competitiveness of Pakistan product (Kiani, 2016).

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ ibid

The Pakistan's national railway will provide direct access for China to East Asia by 2030 for goods transportation. Pakistan's railways currently account for 4% of freight traffic in the country, and upon completion of these projects under CPEC Pakistan's railways are expected to transport 20% of the country's freight traffic by 2025 (Pakistan stories, 2016). The expected increase of Pakistan's Railways' annual revenue is approximately \$480 million after the completion of all the rail projects (Ranjan, 2015).

D). Gwadar Developmental Project

Gwadar is the main centre for trade and commerce and until and unless Gwadar is developed or modernized the rest of trade communication will be affected²².

Table No.:02:04

Gwadar Developmental Project

Sl. No.	Name of Project	Estimated cost (US\$M)
1	Gwadar East-Bay Expressway (Linking Gwadar Port with the main artery of national highway network)	140.60
2	New Gwadar International Airport	230.00
3	Construction of Breakwaters	123.00
4	Dredging of berthing areas & channels	27.00
5	Development of Free Zone	32.00
6	Necessary facilities of fresh water treatment, water supply and distribution	130.00
7	Pak China Friendship Hospital	100.00
8	Technical and Vocational Institute at Gwadar	100.00
9	Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan	
10	Bao Steel Park, petrochemicals, stainless steel and other industries in Gwadar	Not updated
11	Development of Gwadar University (Social Sector Development)	
12	Upgradation and development of fishing, boat making and maintenance services to protect and promote livelihoods of local population	

²² The entire project is mainly based on Gwadar port and hence trade, transportation and infrastructural aspect is one of the important factor in CPEC. Thus the development of Gwadar is very important to make CPEC successful.

<http://cpec.gov.pk/gwader>. 2017

The entire CPEC is based on developing high capacity Gwadar transportation and communication. As the region is strategically and economically important for CPEC therefore huge infrastructural development and communication at Gwadar port city becomes necessary at the moment and hence both China and Pakistan focuses on the development of Gwadar. At present, Gwadar Deep-Sea Port is connected through a narrow 16 feet wide thoroughfare of Gwadar town at the West-Bay. All the trawlers/trucks loaded with imported shipments pass through this strip causing and disruption of normal traffic. The port does not have a dedicated wide highway to cater the transporting requirements. The port is under operation even with the 3 multi-purpose berths which necessitates the construction of the planned East-Bay expressway²³. This 6-lane expressway along with a provision of 30 meters wide railway corridor shall connect the port with the Mekran Coastal Highway (N-20) through the 2300 acres Free Trade Zone of Gwadar Port (Mimran, 2017). In the same vein China-Pakistan joint venture also have a prospect for new Gwadar International Airport, Hospital, Technical and Vocational Training Institution. This further expansion of developmental project is expected to be completed by 2030. Simultaneously, there are 12 projects which are proposed around the Gwadar for the betterment of public (Ahmed and Fatima, 2015:134). However, some of these projects are still under construction and some have already been completed. Projects planned for the Gwadar Port City is to aim at capacitating Baluchistan to its full economic, social, technical, and energy potential, and closely integrating it within the economic framework of Pakistan and China. For China Gwadar is a new Shenzhen²⁴ and it aims to make Gwadar as a positive commercial hub as well²⁵.

²³ East Bay Express way is a planned highway for 6 lane under the project of CPEC which is going to be located on the eastern side of Gwadar.

²⁴ Shenzhen is a coastal city of China. In 1979 population was 314,000 and seen an urban metropolis from fish town of population 10 million and has \$300 billion GDP in 2016. It is the more of Shenzhen that made China to think Gwadar in the same vein.

²⁵ Today Shenzhen become one of busiest port with billion of GDP contributor for the country after fascinating special economic zone that China made, in the same line China looks Gwadar will contribute more on Shenzhen for trade and commercial after successful of project.

E). Special Economic Zones (SEZs)

Special Economic Zones²⁶ is the high modern facilities areas attracting foreign investors. It is expected that it will trigger a large flow of foreign and domestic investment at the same time focuses on infrastructure and productive capacity as well (Guruprasad 2015). It further embraces in generating additional high economic activity and creation of employment opportunities. A Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is a specific area of the land which promotes industrial growth in a country by providing more lenient economic and tax policies. According to the World Bank annual report in 2008, “by some estimates, there are approximately 3,000 economic zones in 135 countries today, accounting for over 68 million direct jobs and over \$500 billion of direct trade-related value added within zones” (“SEZs and CPEC: Background, Challenges and Strategies”, by Dr. Khan and Anwar)

CPEC and Special Economic Zone:

Pakistan’s industrial development facing lack of facilities that’s the growth rate of industries and trade was declined²⁷ from several years. Therefore under the CPEC both party focus more on industrial building and to improve trade growth. In joint cooperation both party agreed to built some economic zones around Pakistan for better opportunity for local business and attract foreign investor as well (Khan and Anwar).

The Government of Pakistan has promoted five industrial estates such as Multan Industrial Estate Phase-II, Bhawal Industrial Estate and Mainwali, Rahim Yar Industrial Estate, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rawalpindi Industrial Estate special economic Zone under the CPEC project with expectation of 150,000 jobs will create (*DAWN, Feb, 2017*). In later provisions the project approved for more SEZs in Pakistan and hence have identified few provinces which are- Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Sindh and

²⁶ Specifically, Annex D and the accompanying guidelines provide standards and recommendations on the treatment of imports to and exports from free zones including territorial limits, minimal documentation requirements; and issues to be covered by national legislation. Free zones typically allow for duty- and tax-free imports of raw and intermediate materials and, in many cases, capital equipment (World Bank, 2008). <http://documents.worldbank.org>.

²⁷ the Pakistan’s industrial growth rate decline at 2% in 1970s from around 11.9% in 1960s

Islamabad. Under these provisions the government has devised a comprehensive plan to set up 37 special economic zones (SEZs) to boost industrial production. The SEZ Act 2012 provides the governing structure for these zones and allows both federal and provincial governments to set them up under various administrative frameworks²⁸. The list of the proposed sites for establishing SEZs was shared by Pakistan in the last Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), to Chinese authorities (*Dawn, Feb, 2017*). However the Planning Commission of Pakistan is expecting out of 37 SEZs, 27 SEZs to be setup across country under CPEC. The first model of SEZs that are based at Gwadar port under CPEC covers 3000 acres of areas on special discretion of China²⁹. These are-

I) Khyber Pukhtunkhwa:

1. Hattar Industrial Estate
2. Mansehra Marble and Granite Industrial Estate (80 acres)
3. Nowshera Industrial Estate (manufacturing), (1,000 acres)
4. Chitral Industrial Estate (food processing), (80 acres)
5. Ghazi Industrial Estate (manufacturing), (90 acres)
6. D. I. Khan Industrial Estate (manufacturing), (188 acres)
7. Bannu Industrial Estate
8. Karak Oil Refinery (100,000 barrel oil per day)

II) Punjab:

1. Pind Daden Khan Industrial City largest SEZ (10,000 acres)
2. Multan Industrial Estate-II (80 acres)
3. Rahim yar Khan Industrial Estate (450 acres)
4. Bhawal Industrial Estate (400 acres)
5. DG Khan Industrial Estate (3,815 acres)
6. Mainwali Industrial Estate (600 acres)
7. Rawalpindi Industrial Estate (200 acres)

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

III). Baluchistan:

1. Gawadar Industrial Estate (3,000 acres)
2. Lasbela Industrial Estate (1,290 acres)
3. Turbat Industrial Estate (1,000 acres)
4. Dera Murad Jamali Industrial Estate (50 acres)
5. Winder Industrial and Trading Estate (50 acres)
6. Mini Industrial Estate Khusdar (50 acres)
7. Bostan Industrial Estate (1,000 acres)

IV). Sindh:


1. Chinese Industrial Zone near Karachi (2,000 acres)
2. Textile City near Port Qasim (1.250 acres)
3. Marble City Karachi (300 acres)

V). Gilgit-Baltistan:

1. Moqpondass Industrial Estate (Mining & food processing), (250 acres)

(Sources: <http://cpec.gov.pk/special-economic-zones-projects2017>, “SEZs and CPEC: Background, Challenges and Strategies”, by Dr. Khan and Anwar)

On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for an onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia.



<http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/07/pak-army-builds-over-half-of-cpec.html>

As per the report of (Department of Commerce Pakistan³⁰) \$1.8 billion Sahiwal Coal Power Project which is now part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, employees more than 3,000 Pakistani personnel and around 1,000 Chinese. The Chinese construction firm deputed at the new Islamabad International Airport has around 200 Pakistani and 100 Chinese, these ratios are indicative of the mix human resources pool that CPEC is now generating (Ghumman, 02 Jan 2016).

³⁰ Report on CPEC. <https://www.scribd.com/document/353129922/Report-on-Cpec>.

03.03. Geo-Strategy

The geographical location of a country determines its role in International Relations³¹. Pakistan is located at a very strategically important location in the globe³². It is situated at the juncture of energy proficient to energy deficient countries. The geo-strategic importance of Pakistan is also evident from the fact that it is surrounded by world's emerging economic giants i.e. India and China. Pakistan is strategically a very important destination for China as it links to three regions, i.e., the South Asian region, the Middle East and Central Asia (Dawn, 2017). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor planned to develop economic and strategic cooperation between two countries.

From the strategic point of view Gwadar is the central place in the utility of China-Pakistan Economic corridor. As Gwadar has access to both land and water therefore China is keen on developing Gwadar port. Simultaneously, the development of Gwadar port would enable China to have access in Pakistan economically and geographically. Located near the Strait of Hormuz which channels about one third of the world's oil trade, Gwadar could play a key role in ensuring China's energy security as it provides a much shorter route than the current³³ which is more than 12000 km. The current route starts from the Persian Gulf, through the Strait of Malacca to China's eastern seaboard (Chowdhury, 2014). As Gwadar is located near Strait of Hormuz, which covers only 400 kilometers and thus links the Persian Gulf with the rest of the world (the Eurasian times, 2017). It is through the geo-strategic location of Gwadar that China is able to have access to Strait of Hormuz. Thus the project of CPEC in developing Gwadar port influences East Asian countries and challenges the hegemony of United States in the region. China believes that through this project it can expand its strategic space by heading towards West. Thus the CPEC trade route would not only be the substitute to the Strait of Malacca, but also enable China with an entry point to the Persian Gulf (Eurasian times, 2017).

³¹ The following understanding has been derived from the mainframe the understanding of International Relations. The understanding basically assumes or highlights the importance of geographical features of any given state and location.

³² Pakistan is located near Strait of Hormuz, which is very important strait for transportation for oil energy. It is through this strait the world's 2/3rd of oil are transported to rest of the world.

³³ China Currently depends on Strait of Malacca route which is more than 12000 km for oil and energy transportation from Middle-East, which is more time and cost consummated

The projects of CPEC not only have ventures on the access of Strait of Hormuz through Gwadar it has further prospects as well. It is on the ground of maritime security that both China and Pakistan have joint naval patrols in the Indian Ocean from Gwadar port. This particular venture further accumulates the naval outreach of China and Pakistan in the region. Gwadar port will escalate the countries naval movements and further expand defence cooperation, especially in the naval and maritime security field (Khan T., 2016). CPEC will be converted into a commercial hub in South and Central Asia, and will also be transformed into naval axis of the region.

Geo strategically the CPEC route is a very important for China, as far as energy requirements are concerned. China mostly depended on the Middle East for its energy supply that passes through the Strait of Malacca. However, the concern for China in Malacca Strait was that it is controlled by the United States and Indian Navy. In addition to these vulnerabilities, the other source on which China heavily dependent was the South China Sea route. However, this particular sea route is near the disputed Spratly Island and Paracel Islands. Along with this the South China Sea route is also the main source of tension between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines and United States (Dawn, 2016). In this factor that the projects under CPEC will allow China's energy imports to circumvent and it will also help in decrease the confrontation with United States as well. The region where the projects of CPEC could help China is with the relation with India in Indian Ocean. India has strongly upgraded its naval force³⁴, and increased maritime surveillance of the Strait of Malacca region from the base in Nicobar Island. If the conflict to erupt India could potentially impede Chinese imports from the Island (The Hindu, 2017). Indian maritime surveillance in the Andaman Sea³⁵ is one of the reasons for China to make CPEC a successful endeavor.

³⁴ According to Global Firepower India upgraded and or modernizing military and its nuclear capabilities keeping on eye on China, recently India also provide P8 air anti submarine plane in Andaman Island.

³⁵ It was the dominance of India's naval force in Strait of Malacca that Chinese government strategizes for another alternate route in the Strait of Malacca (Chaudhury Rahul, 'maritime surveillance of the Indian EEZ', *IDS*).

If China and Pakistan are jointly moving ahead with CPEC but country like India sees CPEC with different understanding³⁶. Thus, New Delhi sees the Gwadar deep sea port located in Baluchistan province as part of China's "String of Pearls" surrounding India. The string extends from eastern coast to the Arabian Sea. China on the other hand is also developing ports in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh that are considered a potential military challenges to India. It is in this regard that, in May 2016 India's Prime Minister Modi travelled to Iran and announced a deal to develop Chabahar port which is 75 kilometer away from the Gwadar port. He further announced an investment of US\$ 500 million in developing Chabahar port (BBC, 2016). The port will provide India to have an access to Afghanistan and connect it with Central Asia and Europe without depending on Pakistan (*the guardian*, 2016). Eventually many analysts have pointed out that Chabahar port is one of India's policies to counter Chinese initiative of Gwadar port.

However, CPEC on the other hand has made both China-Pakistans to emerge as regional power in economically. It further influences the other region geo-politically and deters other powers from encroaching upon their zones of regional interest.

03.04. Challenges

The primary obstacle to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is full implementation of its security. To address Chinese concerns and ensure the safety of these projects, Pakistan announced in early 2016 the creation of a dedicated CPEC force of ten thousand security personnel, but even a force of that size will be stressed by the task at hand (Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2016). In ongoing military operations targeting Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistani military has placed a special emphasis on the ETIM due to Chinese pressure and is concerned that attacks could delay or derail the CPEC (Hindustan times, 2016). In October 2015 the military claimed to have eradicated the ETIM from Pakistan, but the threat of other groups remains. Islamist militant groups have already attacked by the Chinese workers including kidnapping construction personnel,

³⁶ Geographically, India is surrounded by Pakistan from western side and China from North by land and South side maritime encircling policy by China. Now China and India both have a tussle for the supply of oil energy from the Middle East. It is therefore a joint cooperation between China-Pakistan could be threatening surrounding India and its interest in the region which is New Delhi concern of it.

and hinted their campaigns could expand to include more targeting of Chinese interests (Markey, 2017).

The number of insurgency attacked in Baluchistan province, hampered the development of CPEC projects which were under process. Baloch insurgents have attacked Chinese projects and workers and created abnormal situation. On October 24, 2016 at least 61 people and fresh police recruits were killed and more than 117 injured in a terror attack on a police training cottage in Quetta the capital of Baluchistan in Pakistan (*CNN, 25 Oct 2016*). The place that attacked was not so far from the location of future coal-fired power plant under CPEC. The attacked were suspected to the Afghan Uzbeks affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement group (ETIM). ETIM has several outfits Jihad groups and linked such ISIS and Taliban, and these group activists from the Uighur community in China's Xinjiang province, where the CPEC originated. Every year more than 600,000 Chinese workers enter Pakistan, and they are targeted group of ETIM (Toor, 2017). Another problem for Pakistan is its population growth and at same time the increasing unemployed youth populated who is influenced by networks of extremism and militancy in the country. However Pakistan in response to militant insurgent groups have proposed on creating a Special Security Division (SSD) with 15,000 police, army and paramilitary troops and charged to the Security of Chinese CPEC and non-CPEC workers and this security is going to cost \$155 million (Xenakis, 2017). In order to raise this money Pakistan plans to add these costs to people's utility bills, were people of Pakistan facing their earning worth (the guardian, 2017).

The CPEC also faces domestic political opposition in Pakistan, with infighting between provinces and the central government over the allocation of investment (Markey and James, 2016). The lack of transparency surrounding negotiated deals has heightened concerns and skepticism, that only a few selected will benefit from the investment. Pakistan Federal government works with provincial and local authorities to convince communities that these projects are success to their best interest (Dawn, 2016). But yet Pakistan is unable to provide sufficient security or address the concerns of domestic opponents, therefore most of projects are under trouble. However, China's investment in

energy infrastructure is especially welcomed by the people of Pakistan in hope of employment opportunities. National Pakistan demand outstrips or energy supply by an average of 4,500 megawatts. But the shortage supply and distribution problems lead to frequent blackouts and cost as much, and effect the economic growth which contribute only 2 percent of GDP growth per year³⁷ (Dawn, 2016).

Analysis of facts and figures shows that the CPEC is critically important for both the countries. Pakistan needs it to overcome its economic, development, social and energy problems. China on the other hand needs it to expand its periphery of influence, consolidate its global presence and secure its future supply routes of energy, trade & goods. However the important point is the concept was developed by China as part of its policy “Go Global 2001”³⁸, and simultaneously Pakistan too is benefiting from this policy of “Go Global 2001” of China (IDSA, 2015). Therefore it would be for Pakistan to remain focused on development of the country and find ways to overcome its internal matters.

Conclusion

In geo economic perspective both China-Pakistan have to profit from the CPEC. However it can be understood from the projects under CPEC that Pakistan will be gaining much. As most of the economic and infrastructural development projects are concerned in Pakistan. The project thus will help Pakistan in improving its trade and transportation within and outside the region. These projects would make profit orientation to the local people of Pakistan. However, energy shortages and many hours power cut is the main problem in Pakistan might be solved after the completion of CPEC energy projects. Several energy stations, multiple economic zones will create opportunity for Pakistan’s youths for better future. Through project China will also gain more profit for larger market for its finish goods. Further, Western part of China will also transform and better connectivity with Pakistan. The railway projects under CPEC to connect Xinjiang and

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Go Global 2001 is China’s foreign policy that more focus on transformation ‘Made in China’ to ‘Made for China’ and capital importing country to a capital exporting country. In this policy China planning to create new opportunities to its Western backward provinces to link with neighboring countries by global cross border merger.

Rawalphindi which would improve local traders and business for goods transportations. Therefore project has to plan to improve railways sector for better transportation goods and services for Pakistan as well for China's transportation for trade & services. The entire project of CPEC will make Pakistan's economic transform. The project will establish long run relation between Pakistan and China.

In strategic perspective both countries have will benefit equally from CPEC. For China the project will help as alternate and shorter route from Malacca Strait. As Gwadar port will help China to play a crucial role in Strait of Hormuz and thus giving an alternate for its oil energy supply. The project will also help China to have direct access to Indian Ocean via Pakistan's land for maritime interest and expand. Gwadar will help China's PL Naval outreach at Arabian Sea were they can easily counter balance India's maritime security and trade route. China at present will help Gwadar to develop infrastructurally and economically.

Chapter 4

CPEC and India: Implications and Counter-measures

The chapter tries to study the impact of the CPEC in the region and more particularly to India. The proposed economic corridor constituting a collection of infrastructural projects brings a big security threats to India particularly in the larger geo-economic and geo-strategic environment of the region. As the corridor constitutes a framework of China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative India feels that it would set the stage for China to wield pre-eminent economic, military and diplomatic influence in the region. More so, the question of territorial sovereignty and Beijing's String of Pearls³⁹ doctrine also gives New Delhi a question of concern over the construction of the CPEC. The chapter also tries to look into the counter-measures that India can or have taken to increase its relations in the region vis-à-vis CPEC.

4.1. Introduction

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a collection of infrastructure and energy projects spanning the length and breadth of Pakistan and currently under construction intends to increase Pakistan's building capacity in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), technology, research & development and cultural linkages. The projects are a part of larger Beijing's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative to deepen China's economic cooperation with a number of Asian and European nations. The project in the word of Muhammad Barjees will benefit Pakistan with \$70 billion annual revenue and will rapidly modernize Pakistan's infrastructure and strengthen its economy with new networks, energy projects and special economic zone (Arif 2014). In fact, the projects will helps in stimulating Pakistan's economic development and increase its energy production. It will open windows of great opportunities for Pakistan and will greatly help in overcoming poverty, unemployment, inequities of smaller provinces and helps in keeping Pakistan in par with other nations. Furthermore, the projects will intensify

³⁹ String of pearls is a China's geopolitical influence, to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernize military forces, and foster stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners around the Indian Ocean Region. India believes the String of Pearls is a ambition against India encircle surrounding its territory.

Pakistan relations with China giving it a real stakeholder role in Pakistan's stability and security. On the other hand, the project also gives Beijing's an added advantage of using the project as a development mean to transport its energy supplies and also to develop its western landlocked areas (Ali 2016: 1)

Despite the fact that CPEC provides Pakistan and China huge economic and development potential, there are apprehension and criticism regarding the multi-billion project from most of the nations including India. In India's context, the \$51.5 billion project is a serious concern and a big security threat for many reasons. Some of these include:

a) **Issue of territorial Sovereignty**

Barely two months after China had announced its plan to invest in the CPEC Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that it was unacceptable to India. This is for the simple reason that the CPEC which comprises series of projects including roads, railways, pipelines, hydropower plants and other developmental projects passes through the Gilgit-Balistan area in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) - a territory claimed by India. New Delhi is of the view that Corridor project which passes through a piece of land is a part of Indian Territory. They further emphasized that as per the history of the POK is concern, Pakistan illegally captured the area despite the king of Jammu & Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh joined the Indian Union by signing the Instrument of Accession⁴⁰ October, 1947 (Ali, 2015).

⁴⁰ The Instrument of Accession is a Legal document/letter of declaration which was executed by Maharaja of of then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir ,, Hari Singh in 1947 to accede the princely state of J&K to the dominion of India without any objection.



Source: <https://www.google.co.in/search?q=pok+map&oq=pok+map&aqs=chrome>


As both nations claim a full sovereignty over the disputed area but controls part of it, the construction of the connectivity corridor through the POK brings a greater apprehension within the Indian security analyst. New Delhi remains uneasy about it for the fact that construction of the corridor project through the POK will consolidate the perception of the region as internationally recognized Pakistan territory, diminishing India's claim (Talat 2017). In this regard, India has continuously opposed the CPEC. In addition, the Karakoram Highway, which runs along the POK presents a more security threat for India. The route has played a significant part in the past, particularly during the India- Pakistan wars by acting as a safe transit route for arms and ammunition and contributes to low intensity conflict along the Line of Control (LOC) (Serung 2012). According to Tass and Pravda in their report in Press Trust of India, China uses the Karakoram Highway as a secret corridor for arms smuggling, military strength enhancement along the Indian border and keep a close eye on the developments on the Indian side and J&K in particular⁴¹.

⁴¹ ibid

In addition, New Delhi also feels that the widening of the Karakoram Highway will increase the load capacity, movement of heavy equipment and improves the mobility in switching forces at the time of emergency. In the word of Sering, the Karakoram Highway road has largely been used in transporting troops so as to convert the Gilgit-Baltistan into a military garrison, support war and to establish static check posts (Sering, 2012). It may be recalled that in 2004 China had reportedly moved silkworm missiles to Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway.

b) Gwadar Port

Another issue that makes New Delhi uneasy about the CPEC is the Gwadar Port- a deep sea port situated on the Arabian Sea at Gwadar in Balochistan province of Pakistan. The port constitutes an important part of the CPEC plan and is considered to be a link between China's One Belt, One Road and Maritime Silk Route projects. India's concern stems from the fact that as more than 60 percent of its oil supplies are transported through the Strait of Hormuz, which is just 350 miles from the Gwadar port, China can easily threaten the trade route in the near future (Talat 2017). Apart from it, the strategic location of the Gwadar at the confluence of the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea and because of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz gives a some cause for worry for India as the close proximity of Gwadar to the Strait gives a strategic depth to Pakistan Navy into the Arabian Sea and a greater security concern.




Source: <https://www.thethirdpole.net/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2017/05/Routes.png?x22>

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More than this, the major worry comes from China's involvement in the project when they signed an agreement with Pakistan in 2009 for a major energy project which included the construction of a 7,000MW hydroelectric dam (Aziz and Ahmad 2015). Gwadar deal gives China an important role and rights in Gwadar and aims to link Gwadar to landlocked western China, including its Muslim-majority Xinjiang region giving it access to a shorter and secure route through Pakistan to global trade. However, New Delhi is uneasy about the real motive behind this deal. Many analysts are of the view that the China's involvement in the Gwadar is to threaten India's energy need in any hostile situation since half of India's energy needs are imported from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, more worry also emerges from the China's using the Gwadar as a medium to monitor India's naval activity and even to exploit, expand and improve its naval bases in Indian Ocean region.

c) String of Pearls

The Chinese doctrine of ‘String of Pearls’ refers to the geo-political strategy network of China’s intention to encircle India both from the lands and the maritime footprint (Dabas 2017). The strategy includes the concerted efforts of the Chinese to increase its access to ports and airfields, expand and modernize military forces by fostering a strong diplomatic relations with its partners extending from China’s mainland to Port of Sudan.



Source: http://securityobserver.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Chinese_string_of_pearls.jpg

As China has an increasing presence in the Indian Ocean with already existing ports including the Chittagong port in Bangladesh, the Hambantota port (Sri Lanka), the Port of Sudan (Sudan), Maldives, Somalia and Seychelles, the CPEC in the form of Gwadar Port becomes another strategic part of it. The inclusion of the CPEC will serve as a part of larger China’s military ambition in encircling India. Indeed the incorporation of Gwadar port as a part of CPEC will add to another Chinese naval base in the near future and helps in dominating the Indian Ocean region⁴².

⁴² Ibid

4.2. India's counter measures of CPEC

CPEC which forms a significant part of China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative assumes a pivotal role in the foreign policy of Pakistan and China. Under the aegis of CPEC, a vast network of highways and railways is on the roll spanning the length and breadth of Pakistan, which intends to rapidly develop Pakistan economy and Beijing's options of stretching its OBOR framework helps in increasing their economic and regional ties over the South Asian region. However, this initiative remains criticized from many channels including India. India has raised a series of concerns over the CPEC particularly over the territorial sovereignty of the disputed POK region. In most of the cases, Beijing tries to assuage New Delhi's concern by asserting that the CPEC will not have any impact or interference on the Kashmir issue (Deccan Chronicle, 2017). Beijing further states that the matter should be rather settled through a proper dialogue channels between New Delhi and Islamabad. In his interview with Aljazeera, China's foreign ministry, Hua Chunying claims that Beijing is committed in developing friendly and cooperative relations with its neighbors and that the CPEC would not affect China's position on Kashmir⁴³.

In the build up to the criticism and greater apprehension of the CPEC for itself and also for the region, India is seen making some alternative diplomatic initiative to counter balance the CPEC and Chinese ambitions. To counter OBOR and its CPEC strategy, many initiative such as SAGARMALA project for developing and modernizing old and new ports, connectivity enhancement, port linked industrialization across the South Asian nations are being taken up by India. Furthermore, India is also improving ties with small island nations of Pacific and Indian Ocean by developing their ports and providing economic aid for development of infrastructure and communications.

In recent years, to counter balance the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor India has succeeded in opening the Afghanistan-India Air Corridor and the Chabahar port in Iran. This is seen as a strategic counter balancing force to the CPEC and in June 2017, the first cargo flight carrying US \$5million in plants with medicinal uses was dispatched along

⁴³ Ibid

the Afghanistan-India Air Corridor (Dawn 2017). These initiatives, including some mentioned below are looked upon as a counter balancing force taken by India against CPEC and China's aggressive strategy against India.

a) Chabahar port

On the occasion of signing the Chabahar port deal, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi stated that 'we want to link to the world, connectivity among ourselves is also a priority' (Dawn, June 2017). This statement provides a thrust to the importance of Chabahar port- only Iranian port with direct access to Indian Ocean located in the south of Baluchistan and Sistan Province in providing alternative to CPEC. As Gwadar port constitutes an important feature in the CPEC, India made a deal with Iran in 2015 to develop the Chabahar port. The deal was made in the sense that the strategic location of Chabahar port on the mouth of Hormuz Strait serves as an important transit route to the movement oil and energy flows from the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE (Mauldin, 2017).




Source: *Daily Mail*

Furthermore, as the Chabahar port is on the Gulf of Oman and is well connected to the national highways networks of Iran it will facilitate India's access to the oil and gas rich Persian Gulf and Central Asia. More so, developing a port in Iran will give New Delhi an alternative access route to Afghanistan via Iran thereby increasing trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. In this regard, initiatives are seen from India's side in providing economic aids to Afghanistan in this matter. In the recent years, India's provided an aid of worth US \$2 billion to Afghanistan for development, reforms, close military cooperation and training (Mujaddidi, 2017).

b) International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

India's another strategic counter measure to CPEC is the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project- initiated by Russia, India and Iran in September 2000 and is under progress for close to one and half decade. The project is a significant interest to India as it enables to expand its economic and energy cooperation with Russia and Central Asia. The project received an impetus with signing of the Tripartite Agreement on Transit and Trade between India, Iran, and Afghanistan in May 2016 that included the development of Chabahar port in South Iran as the gateway of the project (Bhatia, 2016). As of 2017, the member countries signatory to the INSTC includes India, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Russia, Oman, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Turkey. The INSTC covers two best routes with optimal transit and cost for its member states. These routes are:

- 1) Nhava Sheva- India –Baku-Azerbaijan Route which connects Nhava Sheva to Bandar Abbas by Sea and from Bandar Abbas to Baku by road.
- 2) Nhava Sheva-India-Astrakhan-Russia which connects Nhava Sheva to Bandar Abbas by Sea and from Bandar Abbas to Amirabad by rail and road and from Amirabad to Astrakhan by Caspian Sea (Ministry of Commerce & Industries, 2014:6)



Source:

[https://www.google.co.in/search?q=b\)+International+North+South+Transport+Corridor+\(INSTC\)&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwim-7GQmKzYAhUHq48KHT0PAyYQ_AUICigB&biw=1366&bih=662#imgrc=gOnLl8HLxJxPKM](https://www.google.co.in/search?q=b)+International+North+South+Transport+Corridor+(INSTC)&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwim-7GQmKzYAhUHq48KHT0PAyYQ_AUICigB&biw=1366&bih=662#imgrc=gOnLl8HLxJxPKM)

The member states of the project pledge to:

- a) Recognize the potential of the INSTC within the framework of economic globalization and the ever increasing trade within the Euro Asia area,
- b) Note the continuous growth of containerized transport between North and South where railways, land transport and seaports are called upon to take a significant role,
- c) make assistance of international organizations, cooperate and commit in setting a common objectives, legal principles and operational rules to INSTC,

- d) Welcome the progress made through the joint activities of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Transport Corridor Europe – Caucasus – Asia (TRACECA) and other inter-Governmental organizations (Ministry of Commerce & Industries, 2014:6-7)


The positive aspect of the INSTC lies in the fact that a large number of countries of Central Asia, Middle-East and African states, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Oman and Syria have recognized the potential of the project and have joined to participate in development of the corridor and gain benefit from its economic potential. In the initial phase of the INSTC project, the progress was slow due to various geo-political reasons including the economic sanctions against Iran. However, in the present context, the project has received an increasing pace with the development of many alternate routes adding to its expansion and potential.

As far as India is concern, the INSTC project will reduce the delivery time of cargo from 45 to 25 days at 30 percent cheaper rates from Mumbai to St Petersburg in Russia (Ministry of Commerce & Industries, 2014). This will alleviate the demand mechanism and helps in connecting with the Central Asian nations by developing different connectivity route. Furthermore, the project will boost the potential for growth of trade relations of India with Russia, North Europe, Central Asia and South Asia.

c) Sagarmala project

India recently implemented Sagarmala project to development ports and its connectivity across coastal region of the country. The project initiated under the Ministry of Shipping (MoS) aims to further utilize the potential of India's vast coastline to boost trade and industrial growth in the coastal region and beyond. The project was launched in 2015 by Ministry of Shipping in Karnataka with an estimated cost of USD 123 Billion for the first ten years (2015-2025) (Make in India, 2017). The project identifies 415 Sagarmala Development Company (SDC) to improve ports, connectivity and local residents and aims to further to link it with industrialization across the South Asian countries. The project specially focuses on four main pillars:

- i) Coastal community development,
- ii) Port modernization,
- iii) Port connectivity enhancement and
- iv) Port linked industrialization (MakeinIndia.com, 2017).



Source:

https://www.google.co.in/search?q=sagarmala+project&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjfhobelqzYAhVIOI8KHRF2ABkQ_AUICyGC&biw=1366&bih=662#imgrc=vGjaK52KjnB0uM:

These projects will reduce costs and delivery efficiency and helps to boost trade competitiveness within the country and also in the region Furthermore, the initiative of Sagarmala project also helps in developing infrastructural and connectivity route which could connect India with other littoral sub-continent thereby implying greater Indian influence in the Indian Ocean Region and helps deter China's Belt and Road in region (Singh, 2015).

d) Act East Policy

Under the rapidly changing geo-political realities, defined by the increasingly assertive role of China, India imparted greater vigor to engage with the Southeast Asian nations through its rechristened dynamic and action oriented 'Act East' policy. India's conceivably felt that its initiative of economic engagement with the ASEAN members has become a multi-faceted encompassing security, strategic, political, counter-terrorism and defense collaboration. Therefore under 'Act East' India aims to extend its relations with its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region to the Far East, thereby significantly expanding its geographical coverage beyond ASEAN alone, to include other countries like Japan, Australia, Pacific Island nations, South Korea, and Mongolia. (MEA 2015) The policy was formally enunciated in 2014 at the 12th ASEAN- India Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. India's top leaders, including Prime Minister, President, and Vice-President has constantly made a visit to most of the ASEAN nations reinvigorating the importance of their relations under this new policy.

In the recent years, under the purview of 'Act East' Policy, India has improved its relations with its ASEAN counterpart. For example to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, India has recently extended and announced grant gratis (no-cost) visa to all citizens of Myanmar (Time Hindu, 2017). In the recent years, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh as a part of its neighborhood first policy and made a commitment to develop a deep sea military infrastructure in Sonadia. In addition, India is also a major maritime security provider with other powers such as the United States (US), Australia and Japan in the Indian Ocean Region.

e) Indo-US alignment

The United States and India signed a defense agreement- the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 which allowed both the nations to use each other's military facilities for supplies, spare parts, services and refueling (Singh, 2016). In effect, the agreement encourages the US armed forces to operate out of Indian bases, and India can use US bases across the globe vice versa. In the larger picture, the agreement helps in monitoring China's growing influence in Asia and in the fight against

the security threats. In his four day visit to the United States in 2016, Indian ex defense minister Manohar Parrikar acquired jet engine technology and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (Roche 2015). The visit also witnessed the US and India finalizing two foundational agreements- the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA). Many observers noted that these signing of agreement are made to counter Chinese influence in Asia-Pacific region, as the US would like to use the LEMOA to China's growing military in the South China Sea, use each other facilities against common enemy.

f) Malabar Exercise

The Malabar exercise initiated in 1992 between India and the US is a joint annual naval exercise particularly in the Bay of Bengal to test different naval strategies. The exercise which includes the basic training, submarine hunting and maritime cooperation posits India's maritime security influence and capabilities with its ally (Verma, 2017). This annual exercise received a further boost with Japan making it as a tri-nation exercise in 2017. The involvement of Japan is projected by many Chinese media as a security concern since Beijing considers Indian Ocean Region as economically important for its growing economy and the strategic closeness between three countries also gives a series of security concerns to Beijing (Hindustan Times, 2017).

Conclusion

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or the CPEC which constitutes one of the largest investment projects that China has invested in Pakistan signifies the towering plan of Beijing in connecting South Asia with Central Asia via Pakistan and encourage in making trade and travel management short and cheap. This benefit would be equally available to all South Asian nations including India in drawing related major economic advantage from the projects provided that it join the CPEC.

However, India significantly opposes the construction of the projects for varied reasons, including the losing of the territorial sovereignty of the POK and the fear of greater Beijing's encircling strategy vis-à-vis India's position in Asia-Pacific region. In retaliation to the project, New Delhi is itself busy in making counter-balancing approach with nations that justifies the need in checking the growing hegemony of China in Asia including South and Southeast Asia. Having said this, the discussion can be concluded that behind the New Delhi's pessimistic view of the project lies its multiple objectives including the maintenance of its hegemony in South Asia by limiting Pakistan's economic development options, undermining China's economic development and advancements in whole of Asia region and making Beijing's to stress maximum focus on the India potential demands which includes the acceptance of India as a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group, designating Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed as a terrorist in the United Nations etc to meet its outcome.

Having said this, it looks beyond doubt that India will ultimately fail and left behind in its negative politics in region particularly when most of the countries from the region are willing to join or be a part of the CPEC. As such it is right time for India to leave its anti-politics of the CPEC and join it in the greater benefits of its development and economic integration with China and the region.

Conclusion

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) - a collection of infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan gives Pakistan and China a significant economic dimension, converging strategic interests in the region and a fostering new alliances in South Asian geo politics. As South Asia which constitutes a gravity of fast changing geopolitical dynamics, the construction of CPEC will break the long isolation nature of Pakistan bringing huge developmental projects and also allowing China to circumvent the potential weaknesses from the shadow of the United States by maintaining and expanding its power of influence. In all, the construction of the CPEC is looked as a game changer in the whole South Asia region and more particularly to Pakistan and China.

- As far as economic dimension of the CPEC is concern, the corridor is seen as a platform for Pakistan to change its internal political instability by establishing new developmental & infrastructure projects with new opportunity for unemployed youths. Furthermore, the CPEC will also helps in boosting Pakistan economic and foreign trade relations. On the other hand, China looks upon CPEC as a part of its OBOR initiative with a special interest in harnessing the energy and strategic importance of the corridor for its oil trade route and also in maximizing its power influence.
- For Pakistan, the CPEC project is looked upon as an opportunity for Pakistan to develop and transform its economic & political juggernaut. Many analysts are of the view that with the completion of the corridor, it could bring regional peace and stability in the region and more precisely a stable structure government in Pakistan in the near future. As far as China is concern, with the completion of the corridor projects Beijing will get a permanent naval base in the Indian Ocean region that can help in keeping surveillance over its counterparts.
- In terms of benefit from the project, it is not limited to energy and military purposes for Pakistan but other sustainable and important purpose like information & communication, manufacturing and agriculture are also seen to benefit from the project. Indeed Pakistan has no proper manufacturing capacity or system and most of the goods and services are hugely depended on China.

However, within the prospects of CPEC for Pakistan and China, there are emerging challenges and apprehension as far as the implementation and the larger strategic moves of the projects is concerned. The concern particularly emerges from India which shares a significant part in this project. First, New Delhi is of the view that the major route plan of the CPEC significantly violates the territorial sovereignty of another nation since the project route passes through the POK region which India significantly claims as a part of Indian Union. Second, the presence of the China in the POK region will significantly create a more chaos to the Kashmir issue as New Delhi feels that the presence of China in POK will give a notion of legitimacy to Pakistan over POK region. Third, the increasing dominance of China particularly in the South Asia and Southeast Asia gives a concern of security threats to India. The presence of Chinese naval bases in most part of India's neighbors, the construction of many ports in the Indian Ocean Region including Beijing's economic assistance would allow China to expand its influence in the region. India feels that this would change the regional balance of power in China's favor and would automatically narrow down India's role in Asia.

As such from the above points, it looks clear that the CPEC is viewed as a part of developmental prospects in the eye of Pakistan and China. Both the nations feel that the construction of the CPEC could create a platform that could engage unemployment, bring peace and stability and development prospects in both the nations. However, in this optimistic claim, India is worried about the real motive behind the CPEC. Although being a significant economic dimension, the corridor is looked as an area of concern as far as India position in the South Asia is concerned particularly over the larger expansionist role of Beijing in the region. Although India have initiated many counter- balancing role against the CPEC including the development of Chabahar port, INSTC and many such in the long run this counter- balance activity will prove to be futile unless a study is conducted about the CPEC and the greater implication in the region.

In this regard, a clear goal of the CPEC has to be discussed within the three nations. Unless it is done, the success of the project is very limited as time and again New Delhi will try to counter the objective of the project in the lieu of its national interest. More so, Beijing should also look for an alternative transit of the corridor in conforming its respect

over the territorial sovereignty of the POK. Having said this, it is not a easy task to proceed with this suggestion knowing the fact that India and China- the two dominating power in Asia will always try to subdue the other in achieving its absolute gains.

The project with this venture would redefine the relations in South Asia. In a news media⁴⁴ Chinese premier stated ‘the world peace and regional stability cannot be a reality without strategic mutual trust between China and India, and likewise the development and prosperity of the world cannot be a reality without the cooperation and simultaneous development of China and India’.

⁴⁴ Reuters [May 2013], <https://uk.reuters.com/article/india-china/china-offers-india-a-handshake-across-the-himalayas-idINDEE94J01620130520>

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APPENDIX-I

Welcome to CPEC.Pk

Assalam-O-Alikum

Welcome to CPEC.Pk

I am sure that you are aware of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor - The economic hub for the revival of the Pakistan's Economy. This is the Allah's gifted opportunity for the Pakistanis through which, hopefully Pakistan would jolt back towards the economic stability.

Creation of CPEC.PK is a step towards recognition of the sincere efforts of the Chinese governments and its Pakistani counterparts. The website CPEC.PK is launched to create awareness amongst every individual whether he /she are living in Pakistan or abroad. Through this website we will bring all the latest information and news about the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and about the development of trade, industry that will mushroom due to the development of this corridor.

Through CPEC.PK we are offering / requesting all those who are knowledgeable to participate with us by contributing their time giving CPEC.Pk more information. By becoming the part and team of the content contributors for CPEC.PK you will be acknowledging that Pakistan is on the right path of growth and stability through CPEC.

We would be obliged if you could share your thoughts and ideas with us and help improving CPEC.PK

cpec.pk/2015/10/welcome-to-cpec-pk/

info@cpec.pk

APPENDIX-II

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

VISION

To make Pakistan an attractive Investment Destination by ensuring business friendly environment, provision of state of the art modern facilities, appealing incentives, legal protection and sizeable returns. To make Pakistan an attractive Investment Destination by ensuring business

MISSION

To build investors' confidence by promotion, facilitation, coordination, liberalization, protection and simplification of policies and procedures to boost local and foreign investment so as to contribute in social and economic development of Pakistan.

Pak-China

Investment & Business Project

This document established under observation of Pakistan President Honourable Mr. Mamnoon Hussain, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Chairman Board of Investment Dr. Miftah Ismail and Secretary Azher Ali Choudhry in 2016.

APPENDIX-III

Official Message of CPEC

Friendship between China and Pakistan is based on trust and mutual support, and we have been devoted friends through both good and hard times. Our friendship is a pacesetter for amicable relations between countries.

President Hussain, Prime Minister Sharif and I have agreed to elevate China-Pakistan relations to an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership. This description of China-Pakistan partnership is a most appropriate one, as it aptly defines the all-weather friendship and all-round cooperation between China and Pakistan.

First, we should strengthen mutual assistance and deepen strategic cooperation. We should keep the good tradition of frequent high-level visits and meetings, work together on major strategic issues, and support each other on issues involving our respective core interests and major concerns.

Second, we should advance our shared interests and achieve common development. We should use China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to drive our practical cooperation with focus on Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure development and industrial cooperation so that the fruits of its development will reach both all the people in Pakistan and the people of other countries in our region.

Third, we should enhance close exchanges to build lasting friendship. This year is the Year of China-Pakistan Friendly Exchanges. We should conduct diverse and colorful events of celebration and encourage more contacts and exchanges between young Chinese and Pakistanis. In the next five years, China will

provide 2,000 training opportunities for Pakistan and train 1,000 Chinese language teachers for Pakistan.

Fourth, we should stick together in face of difficulty and jointly meet security challenges. China will work with Pakistan to tackle non-traditional security threats so as to provide a reliable security guarantee for bilateral economic cooperation and common development. The Chinese nation loves peace. China will continue to pursue win-win cooperation and enhance friendship and cooperation with other countries. It will stay committed to the policy of affinity, sincerity, mutual-benefit and inclusiveness. It will deepen win-win cooperation with its neighbors so as to deliver more benefits to them through its own development. China will continue to pursue a win-win strategy for opening-up to build an open economy. This will create new development opportunities and space to both Asia and the world. We will strengthen cooperation with countries along the land and maritime Silk Roads, so as to jointly build an open platform for cooperation and create new impetus to achieve sustainable development in the related regions.

To build a China-Pakistan community of shared destiny is a strategic decision made by our two governments and peoples. Let us work together to create an even brighter future for China and Pakistan

Mr. Xi Jinping

President of China

<http://cpec.gov.pk/messages/2>

“Pak-China bilateral ties are time tested; our relationship has attained new heights after the China Pakistan Economic Corridor that is a game changer for the region and beyond”.

Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi

Prime Minister of Pakistan