

**SCOPE AND CHALLENGES OF 'MAKE IN INDIA' TO INDIA'S NATIONAL  
SECURITY**

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**Sikkim University**



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**By**

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### DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "Scope and Challenges of 'Make in India' to India's National Security" submitted to Sikkim University for the degree of Master of Philosophy, is my original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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### SCOPE AND CHALLENGES OF 'MAKE IN INDIA' TO INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

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Date:

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

AoNs	Acceptance of Necessities
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nation
BARC	Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
BEL	Bharat Electronics Limited
BEML	Bharat Earthmovers Limited
BOP	Balance of Payment
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China and South Africa
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DAC	Defence Acquisition Council
DIB	Defence Industrial Base
DPP	Defence Procurement Procedure
DPSU	Defence Public Sector Undertaking
DRDO	Defence Research and Development Organisation
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and Far East
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEP	Foreign Economic Policy
FGFA	Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft
FICV	Future Infantry Combat System

FII	Foreign Institutional Investors
FIPB	Foreign Investment Promotion Board
FPI	Foreign Portfolio Investors
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSL	Goa Shipyard Limited
HAL	Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
HDR	Human Development Report
HSL	Hindustan Shipyard Limited
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAI	Israel Aircraft Industry
IDSA	Institute of Defence and Studies Analyses
IEA	International Energy Agency
IGMDP	Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
IL	Industrial Licence
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JV	Joint Venture
KLO	Kamtapur Liberation Organisation
LCA	Light Combat Aircraft
LoC	Line of Control
LRSAM	Long Range Surface to Air Missile
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDL	Mazagon Dock Limited

MIGHANI	Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MRSAM	Medium Range Surface to Air Missile
MTA	Multi Role Transport Aircraft
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDFB (S)	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit)
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
PD	Preliminary Design
RBA	Royal Bhutan Army
SBU <sub>s</sub>	Strategic Business Units
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TCS	Tactical Communication System
ToT	Transfer of Technology
UDFD	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Assam
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNO	United Nation Organisation
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
USA	United States of America

USSR                      United Soviet Socialist Republic

WW I                      World War I

WW II                     World War II

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The conventional notion of Power in International Politics is primarily viewed from military security that is mostly termed as National Security. The stronger the State from military point of view the lesser the chance to get attacked by other States. So State was in search of a massive Power to secure its border from outside threat in terms of National Security.

National Security is highly influenced by National Interest, occasionally both words are interchangeably used as synonyms. In course of time, the notion of National Security evolved and broadened to include other things as referent objects such as economy, culture, political stability, environment, human beings etc. At the present scenario, the significance of the military power has changed. With manifestation of the nuclear weapon, ballistic missiles, which are capable to reach any part of the world in a few minutes, and having the large destructive force, the concept of power supremacy has lost its sense. Besides with the development of science, technology and improvement of weapons became more expensive. The race for supremacy could result in the economic exhaustion of the States. Even having nuclear weapons and excellent army, any State could not ensure guaranteed protection against an attack with the same kind of missiles, and could not save advantage, which would guarantee it against the destruction. The deterrence factor would also be seemed as obsolete and useless. So in this backdrop, India's dependency to self-reliant in defence production through National Security perspective would be of great interest to investigate.

Since independence, India have been depended on foreign supplies for its defence requirements and India have suffered due to supplier pressure- denial of spares for political reasons, high costs of spares, delays and lack of transparency in technology as a result our armed forces are left with obsolete and failure prone equipment. In contemporary scenario, the National Security of India consists of reducing its dependency to purchase weapons from other countries as well as to build a self-reliant technology base that creates both local employment and indigenous production of weapons. So the current government has introduced a flagship Programme named 'Make in India'. This study intends to examine the scope and challenges of 'Make in India' Programme from India's National Security perspectives.

‘Make in India’ aims to create a self-reliant and self-sufficient defence sector where India can maintain and repair the equipment’s which are obtained from abroad, and manufacture its own equipment and not relying on foreign supply.

India is growing as a powerful nation in the world and it has second largest armed forces, and 6th in terms of military spending that is 53.6 billion dollars in 2016. The ‘Make in India’ Project aims to provide India a new face in International Politics and International Market. The ‘Make in India’ Project will manufacture its own authentic war heads and ammunition which would be used for self defence as well as for the purpose of exporting, thus making India’s Economy stronger to solve the problem of unemployment and to foster innovation.

Yet the challenge for ‘Make in India’ would be the revival of manufacturing by Indian firms in terms of technological innovation and its ability to sell its defence product to other nations and coming out as an exporter of the product. Manufacturing sector demands highly skilled labour whereas India lacks highly skilled labour force. The biggest challenge of ‘Make in India’ is to renovate the broken trust between industry and government, which was hampered by the policy paralysis.

### **Rationale and Scope**

National security in the contemporary era has been very much linked with all the aspect of security or the elements of National Security where one aspect is linked with another. India is the seventh largest country in the world and accounts for 1.25 billion population where the problem of ethnic conflict, unemployment, terrorism, political unrest has been very much in highlight. While on the positive side, India is growing as one of the biggest markets for world economy and every country wants to do bilateral business with India. The ‘Make in India’ project would provide platform not only to the youth of India for better job opportunity but India would also be recognized as the arm/ammunition producing State. Its supply/ export of arms and ammunition would earn India huge chunk of profit and stockholder in world governance. The ‘Make in India’ project would manufacture indigenous defence produce. The technology and the defence product would be authentic where there would be less change for producing obsolete and outdated materials. India was



cheated many times by Russia and US, Mig-21 which is brought from Russia has a technological default and few tanks with outdated technology.

If the defence products are manufactured in India itself then the technology know-how would remain secret within the country. If any other countries get the technological ideas or blue print of any weapons then it would jeopardize the security of a country. The defence product bought by India from US, Russia, Israel or France, their technology or blue print are with the exporter which can be sold to other nations as-well and the deterrence factors would be useless

### **National Security: A Perspective**

A State is composed of four essential elements which are Sovereignty, Population, Government and Territory. Securing all its element is termed as National Security that is achieved through cordial relation with other States and making stronger National and Foreign Policies which are in favour of own State which is also referred to as National Interest. Morgenthau (2005) in his work "*Politics among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*" states that national interest is survival—the protection of physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-States. National Security is a mean whereas National Interest is an end to meet the security of a State. National Security means an ability of a State to secure its border from foreign invasions and assure the protection of its citizens through the exercise of economic and political power, intelligence agencies and diplomacy.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, world witnessed two world Wars (World War I and World War II) where national *security* was viewed through traditional notion in which military aspect was given preference. Luciani (1989) in his article "*The Economic Content of Security*" argues that National security as an ability to withstand aggression from abroad. The traditional notion of National Security can be better described in words of Stephen Walt where he argues security studies is about the phenomenon of war and it can be defined as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force" (Barry Buzan, 1998). Likewise Walter Lipmann (1943) in his work "*US Foreign Policy: The Shield of the Republic*" states that "A nation has security when it did not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war".

By the end of second World War, the notion of National Security was not only limited to military perspectives. Arnold Wolfers (1952) in his work *“National Security as An Ambiguous Symbol”* mentions that while recognizing the need to segregate the subjectivity of the conceptual idea from the objectivity, talks of threats to “acquired values”. “An ambiguous symbol meaning different things to different people. National Security objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”. Wolfers laid stress on the understanding of security in all its forms.

The liberation movement from the colonial master began to take place on large number where the colonial countries tried to liberate themselves from the foreign administration. Vinod Saighal (1991) in his article *“Remoulding the subcontinent, part II”* states that national security as the “preservation of the unity and integrity of a nation is as essential prerequisite for global equipoise”. India too was trying to liberate itself and unify among its smaller states to fight British administration.

The tradition of relating National Security with only military perspective was gradually diminishing and other elements of National Security such as economic, political, environmental, social, geopolitical, military, individual/ human etc... were also given importance. When security is taken into consideration all the elements constitute National Security to make one Nation stronger. Barry Buzan (1983) in his work *“People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations”* gives importance to the individual security and State too becomes a source of threat to its own individual. Social threats come in a number of forms, but according to Barry Buzan, there are four obvious types of threats that individual perceives. These are: physical threats (pain, injury and death); economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources); threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties); and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation).

The end of the Cold War, combined with rise of globalisation, has opened facets of National Security challenges that not only include military security but also environmental degradation, international terrorism, sustainable development, poverty, unemployment etc. In this context one cannot ignore the statement of Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defense

(1977-1981) in the Carter administration, who engorged the definition of National Security by comprising elements such as economic and environmental security where he stated that “National Security then is the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside and to control its borders”.

In the era of globalisation where the world is treated as one village the notion of National Security is treated as interdependent and interlinked with entire element and if one elements lags behind or if it is not functioning well, then it would hamper the functioning of the State and the National security would be jeopardize. This statement can be justified with the statement and definitions of various authors where the essence of Shekhar Dutt in his work “*Current Trends in India’s National Security*” states that National Security depends collectively and interdependently on country’s economic strength, foreign policy, defence policy, human resources, infrastructure and the strength of its Armed Forces and all other security forces. He also stresses on developing mechanism to maintain balance between security and economic growth since both are complimentary to each other and are at the core of National Security.

National Defence college (1996) in its proceedings of Seminar on “*A Maritime Strategy for India*” adhere the elements of national power and stated that “National Security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military might”.

Arun Prakash (2005) in his work “*Emerging India: Security and Foreign Policy Perspectives*” illustrate that National Security goes well beyond strategic and military considerations, to involve political, economic, social, technological and even environmental factors.

## **India's Security Strategy**

India under the British administration had the national interests of British though it has its own notion of National interest to liberate itself from the British Colonialization. But after the independence, India like in the global sphere had the various trends and sphere in term of national interest. The formulation of its first ever national interest was drawn by the first Prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru.

Srinath Raghavan (2010) in his book *“War and Peace in Modern India”* argues that Nehru was the blend of liberalism and realism. For being a liberal Nehru abhorred war for its inherently illiberal effects and consequences but yet he maintains that, use of force was necessary for any State to defend itself from any unprovoked attack from outside and held conflict as an endemic feature of politics. Nehru was also focused on nation-building, merging princely state and other smaller states into Indian Nation, smaller states like Junagadh 1947, Hyderabad 1947-48 and Kashmir 1947-48 were merged into India.

Priyankar Upadhyaya (2008) in his article titled *“Peace and Conflict: Reflections on Indian Thinking”* highlighted that the Nehru remained consistently focused on the issues of international peace and security. His understanding of history imbued him with a strong opposition to imperialism, which he saw being orchestrated in the Cold War. In addition, Mahatma Gandhi's tall image as the apostle of peace helped him to slip into the role of a peacemaker amid the turbulence of the Cold War. The policy of non-alignment which he enunciated along with other leaders of the nascent Afro-Asia not only entailed anti-colonialism but also an equally strong commitment to international peace and security.

Indira Gandhi was convincingly a realistic leader whose credentials had been seen during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Indira directly intervened in the conflict to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistan, which resulted India to be a power of South Asia after emerging victorious. David Reynolds (2001) in his work *“One World Divisible: A global History Since 1945”* argues that in the Liberation War Pakistan was supported and received assistance from the United States while Indira signed a treaty with USSR which was popularly known as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for twenty years, where there was an understanding of if either was attacked, the two countries would consult to remove such a threat. India's relation with USSR grew closer while it became distant

with the United States. Eventually USSR has become India's largest trading partner and its biggest arms supplier for much of Gandhi's premiership (Racioppi, 1994).

Leslie Derfler (2011) in her book *"The Fall and Rise of Political Leaders: Olof Palme, Olusegun Obasanjo and Indira Gandhi"* illustrates that Nehru's long standing policy of non-alignment was scrapped by Indira Gandhi in favor of a new Indo-Russian alliance. The era of Indira Gandhi also marked for the achievement of the first nuclear test in 1974 in Pokhran which was the result of Indira's authorization for the development of nuclear weapons.

The Times of India's (2015) article *"1987 Siachen hero passes away"* mentions that in terms of national security perspective in Rajiv Gandhi's era, the Operation Rajiv proved to the stage to take-off India into another level of International Politics where India occupied the Quaid Post in the disputed Siachen region of the Indo-Pakistan border. Manas (n.d.) *"Rajiv Gandhi"* highlights that Rajiv Gandhi helped Maldives in 1988 to suppress coup which was requested by the President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. He also sent Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in an endeavor to help the government to eradicate militants agitating for a separate Tamil homeland. Ramamohan Rao (2016) in his article *"Rajiv Gandhi- The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Prime Minister of the 20th Century"* analyses that in terms of Information technology revolution that it was seeded in times of Rajiv Gandhi which has today resulted India being one of the biggest IT sectors in the world.

The Hindu (2004) article *"Narashima Rao and the 'Look East' policy"* mentions that Rao made diplomatic overtures to Western Europe, the United States, and China. He decided in 1992 to bring into the open India's relations with Israel and Rao also launched the Look East foreign policy, which brought India closer to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). P.V Narashima Rao energized the national nuclear security and ballistic missiles program, which ultimately resulted in the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests. He increased military spending, and set the Indian Army on course to fight the emerging threat of terrorism and insurgencies as well as Pakistan and China's nuclear potentials.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the non-congress Prime Minister of India who had an important role for maintaining ties with the People's Republic of China, boosting trade, seeking solution of territorial disputes through dialogue and to fight against the terrorism. David J

Karl (2001) in his article *“Lessons for Proliferation Scholarship in South Asia: The Buddha Smiles Again”* argues that to fight terrorism Vajpayee establishes a strategic and military cooperation with Israel. The nuclear proliferation in 1970 paved way for India to produce its own nuclear head, Buddha smile in 1974 and ‘Shakti’ (Divine Power) in 1998 nuclear tests were conducted by India during the tenure of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Atal Vihari Bhajpai respectively. Sujata K. Dass (2004) in her report *“Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Prime Minister of India”* explains that it was during the tenure of Vajpayee the Defence Intelligence Agency was setup to provide better military intelligence and monitor India’s border with Pakistan.

Even in tenure of Manmohan Singh under UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government, India had a constant threat from Terrorism and other such extremist groups (Naxalism and insurgent in North-East India). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh states that “Naxalism remains the biggest internal security challenge and it is imperative to control Left-wing extremism for the country’s growth (Hindu, May 24 2010). Likewise Kanti V Bhajpai and Harsh V Pant (2014) in their book *“India's National Security: Critical Issue in Indian Politics”* argue that India was constantly posed with the threat of terrorism, naxalism and insurgent movement and all threat should be seen through different dimension and perspectives and dealt accordingly. Happymon Jacob and Kimberly Layton (2009) in their article *“UPA’s Foreign Policy: A Critique”* have criticized UPA government for its failure to respond appropriately to the terrorist threat, to assist Pakistan in its effort to eradicate terrorism and to allies within Pakistan for strategic inroads into Pakistan. UPA government failure has also been highlighted in terms of border dispute with China which other Prime Ministers have called for immediate resolution of the problem, yet Manmohan Singh has chosen a characteristically lackadaisical approach.

Sanjay Ruparelia (2015) in his article *“Minimum Government Maximum Governance: The Restructuring of Power in Modi’s India”* argues that Narendra Modi focused on privatization and liberalization of the economy, based on a neoliberal framework and liberalized India’s foreign direct investment policies, allowing more foreign investment in several industries, including in defence and the railways. Hindustan Times (2014) report *“Look East, Link West, says PM Modi at Make in India launch”* highlights that Modi

introduced the 'Make in India' initiative to encourage foreign companies to manufacture products in India with the goal of turning the country into a global manufacturing hub. Supporters of economic liberalization supported the initiative, while critics argue that it would allow foreign corporations to capture a greater share of the Indian market. Make in India is a part of Indian indigenization of various manufactured product which include defence industries as well.

Laxman Kr. Behera (2016) in his book "*Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for making in India*" argues that Indian defence industrialization isn't a recent initiative it was started immediately after independence and has five major phase which are Phase one: The Quest for self-sufficiency 1948-1960, phase two: Self-sufficiency to Self –Reliance 1960-1980, phase three: Self Reliance through Coproduction 1980-1999, phase four: Self-Reliance through Private Sector Participation 2000-2014 and phase five: Self-Reliance through Make in India initiatives 2014-.

#### **'Make In India': Re-Defined Security.**

'Make in India' is an initiative which was launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on September 25, 2014 which was led by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. The initiative aims to raise the contribution of the manufacturing sector to 25% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the year 2025 from its current 16% and create 100 million additional jobs by 2022. It covers 25 diverse sectors which ranges from automobile to Information Technology and defence manufacturing (India M. i., 2017). Even though the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been operating a formal offset policy as part of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) since 2005 with an objective of strengthening the indigenous arms industry it would not fulfill its objective but it has been a stepping stone for 'Make in India'.

Preeti Kaushal (2016) in her article "*Seizing the indigenous dividend – Make In India*" argues that the objective of 'Make in India' are to change India into international manufacturing center, which will also facilitate job creation which further enhance Economic Growth to support both indigenous and global companies to invest in India and foster innovation.

Amitab Kant (2015) in his article *“Transforming India into Global Manufacturing Hub”* explains that ‘Make in India’ is a timely response to a critical situation by 2013, the much-hyped emerging markets bubble had burst, and India’s growth rate had fallen to its lowest level in a decade.

‘Make in India’ constitute the elements of self-reliant and self-sufficient where self-reliant refers to the capability to maintain and repair the equipment’s which are obtained from abroad while self-sufficient means to manufacture own equipment and not relying on foreign supply. G Raj Narayan (2015) in his article *“Indigenisation-The only way forward”* argues that since independence we have been depended on foreign supplies for our defence requirements and we have suffered due to supplier pressure- denial of spares for political reasons, high costs of spares, delays and lack of transparency in technology as a result our armed forces are left with obsolete and failure prone equipment.

Since 2005, India has the third largest armed forces in the world after United States and China and is one of the largest importers of conventional defence equipment. India spends about 31.1% of its total defence budget on capital acquisitions. India ranked 6<sup>th</sup> in term of military expenditure where India spend 48 billion dollars in 2015 and 53.3 billion dollars in 2016 which accounts for 2.3 percent of GDP. The Report of ASSOCHAM India titled *“Make in India: Achieving Self- Reliance in Defence production”* mentions that India’s Aerospace and Defence market is among the most attractive globally and the Indian government is keen to leverage this advantage to promote investments in the sector but only about 35% of defence equipment is manufactured in India, mainly by PSUs (Public Sector Undertaking).

‘Make in India’ in such circumstance is an answer where the indigenous defence can be manufactured and huge chunk of capital that flow out of the country would be checked and circulated within the country. The technology and the defence product would be authentic, where the cases like Russia selling outdated Tanks and MIG-21 fighter would not be repeated and tolerated. ‘Make in India’ would also flourish economic sectors which will also furnish employment and innovation.

The challenge for ‘Make in India’ would be the revival of manufacturing by Indian firms in terms of technological innovation and its ability to sell its defence product to other



nations and coming out as an exporter of the product. If 'Make in India' would overcome these challenges then the national security would be redefined in a sense that it would secure in all aspects, which includes the economic, military, societal and human as well.

### **Research Objectives**

- To examine changing nature of security discourse from traditional to non-traditional.
- To analyze how India's Security Strategy evolved in Post-Independent era.
- To explain the scope and challenges of 'Make in India' Programme from a security perspectives.

### **Research Questions**

- How does the discourses on Security deepen and broaden from traditional to non-traditional perspectives?
- How India's security strategy evolved through different phrases in the post-independent era?
- What are the scope and challenges of 'Make in India' Programme offer to India's security Strategy?

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study is analytical in nature, and qualitative and quantitative techniques are employed to collect data to substantiate the findings of the study. The study have made use of both secondary and primary sources to collect data. The secondary data has been be collected from available books, articles, and journals etc. Primary data has been collected with help of questionnaires and unstructured interviews from experts and institutions that deal with issue under examination. The study had endeavor to meet various stakeholders and experts in institutions such as Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) etc.

The total respondents were 37. The respondents were selected by going through the profile and whose interest compatible with the study. Most of the respondents were academicians and research scholars- 11 academicians, and 12 research scholars, 10 military personnels, and 4 government employees. The respondents were determined with a notion that they were linked with the related study. All the respondent had a concrete knowledge regarding the topic of the study. All the respondents had some interconnection with the study. In-fact the determination of respondents were based on their experience or their association with 'Make in India'.

## **Chapterization**

This work has been divided into following five chapters dealing with various aspects of the research work.

### **Chapter I: Introduction**

This chapter has outline the nature of the study, rationale and scope, objectives, research questions and methodology and chapterization of the study.

### **Chapter II: National Security: Discourses**

The second chapter explore brief account of doctrine of National Security and its importance. It examines the changing nature of security discourses from traditional to non-traditional. This chapter will also elaborated the various elements of national security that are becoming more significant in contemporary era.

### **Chapter III: Evolution of Indian Security Strategy**

This chapter focuses on the historical analysis of India's Security Strategy and the trends of strategy from post-Independence to till date. The last section of this chapter focuses on the India's Security Strategy with reference to defence and its industrialization.

### **Chapter IV: Scope and Challenges of 'Make in India' Programme**

This chapter would gives account of the contemporary security initiatives in India and its scope and challenges with reference to 'Make in India' Programme. This chapter analyses the data collected through primary source and field visits.

### **Chapter V: Conclusion**

This chapter summarizes the study. Finding, suggestions and recommendation for effective security system have also been highlighted in this chapter. The scope for further research in the concern area will also be advised.

## CHAPTER 2

### NATIONAL SECURITY: DISCOURSES

#### Introduction

The word security stands for the freedom from fear and threats. Human existence and the life of a country are full of threats so the concept of security has a broad view. The scope of security includes only those things that threaten core values. Thus, the security is concerned with preventing, limiting and ending the war.

The discourses or concept on security deepen and broaden from traditional to non-traditional perspectives. Traditionally, the concept of security has been most closely associated with national security, namely, external military threats to the nation-state. Over time, however, the limitations of this definition grew glaringly apparent. By defining threats solely in terms of foreign militaries, one misses out on the vast number of nonmilitary threats of the modern era, such as terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, piracy network, and the like. Further, if the threatened agent is defined simply in terms of nation-state, one ignores the fact that threats and violence can be directed exclusively at certain groups, classes, families, and even individuals within states, and can, in many cases, emanate from the state itself.

Non-traditionally, the concept of security is a broader concept, which not only include military force, but the other aspects of security e.g. Environmental, economic, political, societal etc which is called broadening of security that constitutes a security threat, and an extending or deepening of which can be considered threatened. Non-traditional security aspect includes economic, environmental, political, human, societal, etc.

During the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world witnessed two Great Wars (WW I and WW II), where the security of any state was defined in terms of military capacity and its ability. The perception of the security at that time was, stronger the state from the military point of view lesser the chance to get attacked by other States. The powerfulness of any state was viewed upon on its capabilities to maintain strong military.

After the end of WWII, USSR and the USA emerged as the most powerful nations of the world. These two countries were very powerful but the difference between them was the political ideologies. USSR was inclined and propagated Socialism while USA propagated Capitalism. The ideological difference between these countries led to the emergence of the new war known as cold war. During the era of the cold war, the security was viewed in terms of having relation with the powerful countries- alliance. Conventionally security was only confined to the military aspect where securing military was the prime objective of the state, in fact, military security was the one in all which was given preference over the other forms of security. The other forms of security evolved only after the end of WW II the when world witnessed intrastate war/ civil war, the rise of environmental degradation, poverty, international terrorism, violation of human rights and globalisation. These other forms of security were termed as non-traditional security.

The security was not only confined in making its military stronger but the other aspects were also given preference. The issues of human, economic, political, environmental, societal also elevated. The real question was security for whom and by whom? National security was the real issue because when it comes to the major security issues the national security is the foremost importance than other issues.

So, to understand the discourses on National security, this chapter tries to examine the doctrine of National Security and its importance. It also examines the changing nature of security discourses from traditional to non-traditional. This chapter has also elaborated the various elements of national security that are becoming more significant in the contemporary era.

## **2.1. Conceptualizing Security**

Security is a contested word, the notion of security differs from one person to another and from one country to another. The security issue in the European nation may be the refugee crisis to the threat of terrorist attack, while in case of South Asian Nation could be something else, say for instance human security which includes (poverty, employment, hunger, health and diseases, etc.). The notion of security which is prevalence in this contemporary era isn't the same what it seemed to be in the earlier times. In earlier times

the state was the referent object<sup>1</sup>, or the entity to be made secure, and that its relations with other states are the proper focus of security. While in case of the contemporary times referent object were primarily individual or the people and it gives most importance to those people suffering insecurities inside states.

Traditional notions of security were concerned with the security of territory for external aggression, or as protection of National Interests in foreign policy, or as global security from the threats of nuclear. It has been related more to nation states than to people (Bajpai, 2002:43). Security has always been very crucial to all the countries because it decides the sovereignty of the country from the internal and external threats that directly or indirectly disturb their security primarily the whole notion of security focus on national security or the defense of the state. This traditional view of national security was derived from the realist perspective that developed after the Second World War and cold war period which mostly focus on state defense. But this was very narrow understanding of security (Williams and Krause, 1997:35-37). This view could be considered relevant during the period of the world wars to the end of the cold war where states seemed to be in a constant struggle for power.

Security is an essential precondition of an ordered human existence. Security is related to the ability of the state to safeguard the well-being of its people or protection/ safeguarding the existential threat to core value can be termed as security. Safeguarding the existential threat to core values may be a vague statement of defined security. The term security in general understanding means the situation where the essential factors concerning the individual are secured like employment, shelter, food, health, clothing etc. where the survival is the essential part of it and Ken Booth describes security as the „survival- plus“ where the plus indicates the freedom from all sorts of threats (Williams, 2003:254-256).

Buzan's definition of security is that “security is the pursuit of freedom from threats” (Buzan, 1991:18) Barry Buzan's definition of security mainly point out the security as the freedom from threats/ attacks, where to be secure is to be untroubled by danger or fear. As per se the definition of security by Ken Booth, he related security with emancipation

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<sup>1</sup> Referent object: “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 36)

“Security means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individual and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, and political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security” (Booth, 2013:245).

The notion of security is connected with a sequence of various aspects of human existence and with the processes and activities in society and nature. From the evolutionary viewpoint, security is rooted as a biological mechanism, as the tendency of an organism to survive, as an adaptation of the organism to the menace coming from the environment. Biologically speaking (All living beings are equipped with mechanisms which make above all two things possible: firstly, protection of the integrity of an individual, and secondly, the reproduction of species. Their behavior is to a great extent conditioned by their motivation and emotional state. The former can be illustrated by hunger, thirst or pain. Such states direct living beings either to avoid harmful effects from the environment or to search for food. Emotional states, such as frustration, anger, fear, etc. primarily direct living beings to avoid risks, to act in self-defense or to alleviate the untoward state of distress in which they find themselves), security is the basic precondition for the operation of the basic life functions (eating, human reproduction, etc.). Security is thus a level of development and involves a deliberate, conscious human activity to establish a state of security (as a positive act) (Lowenhard, 1991:19-20).

## **2.2 Changing Nature of Security from Traditional to Non-Traditional Security**

The realist foundation of security was based on a hierarchical understanding of the anarchic international system based on national power. This understanding is weakened by the transformation of the international system from a hierarchical to an interdependent order. This new system is network based, where the network is defined as, ‘a set of informal relationships or alliance between organizations’ (Fukuyama, 1999:199). In this web of international relations, the threat to security is not only from one nation to another but also from various non-state sources of insecurity. This is mainly because the military centered security paradigm does not address the rapidly growing non-military threats to all aspects

of security “like the struggle for resources embedded in the pursuit of energy security, food security,...environmental degradation and resource depletion; forced migration; international terrorism; the ascendancy of non-state actors in drugs, arms, money-laundering and financial crime organizations; and the growing linkages between governance and international security” (Chari, 2000:50).

## **2.2.1 Traditional Notions: External and Internal**

### **2.2.1.1 External**

The traditional notion of security implies national security covering both the external and internal threats. Regarding external threats it has four main components like:

- a. Military threats**
- b. Threat of War**
- c. Balance of Power**
- d. Alliance Building**

**Military Threats:** Military threats can affect all components of the state (Sovereignty, Territory, Government and Population). It can put into question the very basic duty of a state to be able to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the layers of social and individual interest. The level and objectives of military threat can take on different levels of importance, and the fact that they involve the use of force puts them in a special category when it comes to security (Stone, 2001:4-5).

(a) Military threats mean the military action which endangers the core values of a country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

(b) It also endangers the lives of ordinary citizens. Quite often, ordinary men and women are made targets of War.

**Threat of War:** In responding to the threat of War, a government has three basic choices: to surrender, to prevent the opposite side from attacking and to depend on itself which War



actually takes place. In fact, the security policy is concerned with preventing War, which is called deterrence and with limiting or ending War, which is called defence.

**Balance of Power:** Balance of Power means a balance between bigger and smaller countries. In international relation, it is a posture or policy of nation or group of the nation by matching power against the power of the other side. This balance is maintained to countercheck the threat to security. In global arena, the growing power of bigger countries has become a threat to Global security. However, governments are very sensitive to the balance of power. And the best way of maintaining a balance of power is to build up one's military together with economic and technological power.

Kenneth Walt, who established the foundation of structural realism, finds that international structure generates tendency towards competition between security-seeking states. The pressure and incentives created by the international system greatly limit the potential benefits of cooperation. Walt does, however, also argues that states recognize the importance of limiting their pursuit of power. Power is a means to achieve security (Glaser, 2010:18).

**Alliance Building:** An alliance building is a coalition of states that coordinate their actions to defer or defending against military attack. Actually, it deals with the alliance or agreement between states or nations. In this policy, most alliances are formalized in written treaties and are based on the fairly clear identification of who constitutes the threats. Moreover, it signifies that alliances are based on national interests and can change when national interests change. Alliance may sometimes bring risks- "a state's allies might fail to meet their commitment to defend the state, leaving it vulnerable to attack, and state's commitments to the alliance might result in being drawn into wars that it would otherwise have been able to avoid" (Snyder, 1991:54).

#### **2.2.1.2. Internal**

In the traditional notion of security the concept of internal security was not given importance because after WWII it seemed that for the most powerful countries in the globe, Internal Security was more or less assured. While internal security was certainly a part of the concerns of governments historically, after WW II there was a context and situation in

which internal security did not seem to matter as much as it had happened in the past. For instance, after 1945 the US and USSR appeared to be united and could expect peace within their borders, hence, there is no threat to internal security.

In the same way, most of the European countries particularly the powerful ones, faced no serious threats from groups or communities living within those borders. Therefore, these countries focused primarily on threats from outside their borders than the threats from inside. The security challenges faced by the Third world (Asian and African) countries were different from the challenges faced by the First world (European) countries. Third world countries faced the prospect of military conflicts with the neighbouring countries. Third world countries feared more from their neighbours than from the Soviet Union or America. Moreover, these countries also feared due to separatist movements which wanted to be an independent country (Konwer, 2011:129-130).

### **2.2.2. Non-Traditional Security**

Non-traditional security goes beyond military attack or threats. It includes a wide range of threats and dangers affecting the conditions of existence. In the non-traditional concept, the referent object is expanded. In this conception, security is for the state, individual and for the whole community. That is why, sometimes non-traditional views of security have been called human security or global security (Paul, 2012:131).

In 1983, Barry Buzan in his work “People, State and Fear” advocated that it’s not only the military issues, but the people were also affected by threats in the political, economic, societal and environmental areas as well. He argued that in today’s world the national security problem needed to be seen in terms of a general systematic security problem in which individuals, state, and the system all play a part, and in which economic, societal, and environmental factors are as important as political and military ones (Sheehan, 2006:46-47). Non-traditional security emphasis on human security, terrorism, poverty etc.

## **Human Security**

The Human security orientation was initially embraced in a landmark 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) entitled *New Dimensions of Human Security*. This report offered a model that incorporated seven broad categories of security problematique -economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political and food. Although primarily an analysis of development crises facing the post-Cold War world, it also adopted a key postulate that, if applied, would have major implications for security politics: A secure state untroubled by contested territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people (UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994:6).

Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms... It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strength and aspiration. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival (Hampson, 2013:282).

The term human security if defined more narrowly, it would give accrue greater analytical and policy value. This is because it would then represent a distinct class of security problems-separate from those embraced by traditional national security criteria- that has become more urgent in recent years (Tow, 2002:178). The definitional approach to human security has three interlocking features. First, it entails recognizing that transnational threats to international norms arising from inadequate in internal state systems make individual and groups within state more vulnerable. Second, it asserts that states and individuals confronting such vulnerabilities often cannot address them effectively on their own. Thirdly, states and people require some form of international intervention to gain freedom from fear and want. This imposes constraints on state sovereignty through mobilization of international civil society to safeguard international norms and the sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalizing world (Commission on Global Governance, 1995:13).

## **Poverty**

Despite sixty years of official development policies, as well as the commitment made in 2000 by 189 States at the UN to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one billion people continues to live in extreme poverty. Poverty is the cause of far more deaths than armed conflict. This human insecurity occurs against the backdrop of a growth in global military spending (SIPRI, 2011:34), a growth in arms trade, and the significant proliferation in the small arms and light weapons which accounts for the majority of violent deaths and maiming.

Improvement in human security necessarily involve poverty reduction, and likewise, poverty reduction will decrease human insecurity. Such improvements can also be seen as synonymous with improvement in the experience of human beings. Thus, poverty is not simply a relevant area of security studies, rather, it is a central concern for those who believe that security is a priori about human beings and that it is about states, world regions, and the global political system only to the extent that they help or hinder the primary goal of human security (Thomas, 2013:300).

Therefore, in a world where half of humanity lives in a condition of poverty, understanding the national and global structures and policies which sustain this situation is crucial for the articulation of policies supportive of the enhancement of human security. As a consequence, a critique of current development policy, and the articulation of alternative pathways to development should be a key focus for security (Williams and Spear, 2012:72).

## **Terrorism**

Terrorism is integral to many contemporary conflicts and should be studied in the broader context of armed violence. As terrorism isn't a current phenomenon and it is not only the problem of one particular country or region. Terrorism is one of the global issues and has affected every country of the globe. The United States of America which is regarded as the superpower state with sophisticated security system like police, surveillance systems, and social networks was under the attack by the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, so the carnage of 9/11, 2001 in the United States of America proves that no country is safe from the acts of terrorism (Pradhan, 2016:33).

The word terrorism has been a buzz word in this contemporary time, but its history is as old as the human civilization. The word terrorism is derived from the Latin word ‘terrere’, which means “to frighten” (Maras, 2014:18). Like the human civilization has its own pattern and course of development so does the terrorism, in fact, the violence has been an integral part of human civilization. The act of violence with political objective has been the common understanding of terrorism which is rooted in the course of development of human civilization. Terrorism involves the use of naked force and violence in the form of killing of the people, particularly killings of officials and leaders of the state, abductions for ransoms, and hijacking of aeroplanes, narcotic smuggling, and ethnic killings. Terrorism has been the standard weapon of certain fundamentalists, extremist, militant sub-nationalist revolutionary, and jihadi and rebel groups. These use terrorism for securing their narrow goals as well as for projecting their parochial interests. They believe that by creating fear and terror, they can be successful in their missions (Lutz, 2013:36).

Terrorism is isn’t a recent phenomenon and there exists no proper definition of it. But the very commonly accepted definition terrorism “is the use of violence to create fear (i.e., terror; psychic fear) for (1) political, (2) religious, or (3) ideological reasons. (Ideologies are systems of belief derived from worldviews that frame human social and political conditions). The terror is intentionally aimed at noncombatant targets (i.e., civilians or iconic symbols), and the objective is to achieve the greatest attainable publicity for a group, cause, or individual. The meaning of terrorism is socially constructed” (Rush, 2009:54). Terrorism is different from murder, assault, arson, demolition of property, or the threat of the same; the reason is that the impact of terrorist violence and damage reaches more than the immediate target victims (example government or military). It is also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society (example civilians or even society as a whole) (Martin, 2015:66).

There are other examples of non-traditional security which are economic, political, social, environmental, energy etc. The table 2.1 gives the clear picture about the difference between the Traditional and Non-Traditional security.

**Table No 2.1:**

**Difference between Traditional and Non-Traditional Security**

<b>DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY</b>	
<b>TRADITIONAL SECURITY</b>	<b>NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY</b>
Traditional conceptions of security are principally concerned with the use or threat of use of military	Non-Traditional notions of security go beyond military threats and dangers affecting the conditions of human existence
In Traditional security conception the referent is the state within its territory and governing institutions.	In the non-traditional conception, the referent is expanded and covers wide areas of security.
The scope of traditional notions of security is confined to internal and external threats of the state.	On the other hand, the scope of non-traditional notions of security cover not just the state but also individuals or indeed all of human kind.
In the traditional security, 'force' is both the principal threat to security and principal means of achieving security.	While in non-traditional security, cooperation is the principal means of achieving security, i.e., co-operative security to all the humankind. Non-traditional views thus have been called human security or global security.

Source: Paul, K.P. (2012). Contemporary World Politics. New Delhi: Arun Prakashan

### **2.3. Broadening and Deepening of Security**

Broadening refers to a conception of security studies that includes a range of issues beyond military force under the rubric of security while deepening implies a theoretical approach to security that connects our understanding of security to deeply rooted assumptions about the nature of political life more generally (Williams and Peoples, 2015:29).

In 1980, Richard Ullman widen the concept of security and security studies, he argued that the problem with the military security is actually creating insecurities among the nation. Ullman contemplated that it is not only the military security that should be given priority but should also be given to the non-military issues (Ullman, 1983: 133). Barry Buzan challenged the traditional notion of security by widening and deepening the concept of security studies, both horizontally and vertically. Barry Buzan belongs to the widener's school of thought who refers security as not only to be limited within the sphere of military aspect but the other aspect, rather the other element of National security. Having in mind the horizontal dimension, the wideners think that in reality the security concept has expanded from exclusively military onto political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. Vertically, the altered security concept should also be open to referent objects other than the state (individuals, social groups, humanity as a whole). Ontological standpoint of the traditional understanding of security critics is that "social relations and security threats are actually the result of an inter-subjective ideational social construction and that they do not exist objectively, independently" (Ejdus, 2007:67).

Barry Buzan gave importance to the individual security where the state becomes a source of social threat against the individual. The very concept of state providing some security to the individual was only by imposing threats. The aspect of individual security which we need to pursue here relates to what might be called social threats: those arising from the fact that people find themselves embedded in a human environment with unavoidable social, economic and political consequences. Social threats come in a number of forms, but according to Barry Buzan, there are four obvious basic types of threats that individual perceives. . These are: physical threats (pain, injury and death); economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources); threats to rights

(imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties); and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation) (Buzan, 1983:28).

Buzan's five sectors broadening of security agenda are:

- Military security concerns the two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states perceptions of each other's intention.
- Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.
- Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power
- Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for the evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.
- Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planter biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Sheehan, 2006:47).

United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace has identified "new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of the individual..." The 2004 report of the Kofi Annan-appointed High Panel focused on human rights issues and endorsed the controversial concept of "right to protect" in cases of genocide and gross human rights violations in a country"<sup>2</sup>. Hough (2004) in his book "*Understanding Global Security*" explains that today, most consider security from a global perspective rather than only from the perspective of individual nations and the idea of common security. More recently, analysts, following the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1994 Human

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<sup>2</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.csis.org/pacfor/pac](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac) – The date is of 2003/03/26 at 21:19, accessed on 27/08/2017.



Development Report and their notion of security as "freedom from fear and want" (Hough, 2004:12).

#### **2.4. National Security**

Walter Lippmann is one of the first scholars to define national security explicitly. He defined, "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war" (Lippman, 1943:51).

The Realists argue that the main responsibility of the state is to protect its citizens from external and internal threats using the military might and for them military power is the most important tool to secure all kind of security issues. But when it comes to the major security issue the national security is the foremost importance than other issues. Therefore military power is the political weapon to tackle the threats arising out of the different components. National Security as a concept gained momentum during the Second World War.

The classic realistic approach to national security focuses on the nation-state. This perspective emphasizes the concept of national power and the importance that nation-states attach to the acquisition of power as the primary factor determining how much influence one state can wield over rival states in the international system. Hans Morgenthau was the primary advocate of the realist school of international politics in the 1950 and his work, *Politics among Nation*, stressed the accumulation of national power as driving forces of national behavior (Morgenthau, 1985:144).

The scope of national security is exceedingly broad. National security encompasses several disciplines political science, history, economics, and others - and a shifting array of specialized topics - strategy, weapons, policy analysis, arms transfer, budget making etc. National security is a relatively recent field of inquiry. As it is said, "the concept is a product of the post-war international environment, although its components have existed independently for some time" (Harf, 1982:1).

By the end of Second World War, the notion of National Security was not only limited to military perspectives. Arnold Wolfers, mentions that while recognizing the need to segregate the subjectivity of the conceptual idea from the objectivity, talks of threats to

“acquired values”. “An ambiguous symbol meaning different things to different people. National Security objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, 1952:431-450). Wolfers laid stress on the understanding of security in all its forms. In Wolfers, statement there are two inaccessible situations: absence of threat and absence of fear. Both threat and fear are absolute forms of life’s paradox.

Mario Nobile defines national security as "an intricate interaction between political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social and other internal and external social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, the physical survival of its population, political independence and possibilities for a balanced and rapid social development on an equal footing (Nobile, 1988:72-73).

Amin Hewedy, an expert in international relations, defines national security as an activity of nation-states with which the states within the range of their social capacities at present and in future, considering global changes and development, protect their identity, existence and interests (Hewedy, 1989:16). This activity involves:

1. Specific measures (in trade and economy, culture, etc.) to protect and defend themselves against any kind of threat from the environment;
2. Security measures of the society (long-termed and short-termed), which must be in tune with the capacities of the society (otherwise they may lead to the opposite - insecurity), and adjusted to global and regional changes in the world.

Thus national security can be in most general terms defined as a state of security of the nation-state. It involves: security of the national territory, (including air-space and territorial waters), protection of the lives and property of its population, existence and maintenance of its national sovereignty, and exercise of the basic functions of its society (economic, sociopolitical, cultural, ecological, social, etc.) (Grizold, 1994:40).

National Security means to secure the element of the state which are composed of: Government, Population, Sovereignty and Territory. It is achieved through friendly

relation with other States and making stronger National and Foreign Policies which are in favour of own State which is also referred to as National Interest.

According to Lasswell all the measure which are proposed in the name of National Security does not necessarily contribute to the avowed end.... Lasswell states that, “security lies in the best balance of all instrument of foreign policy. It means coordination in the handling of arms, diplomacy, information and economics, and correlation of foreign and domestic policies” (Romm, 1993:3). Laswell view contains the policy of state and related instruments, and also examine the elements of national security as diplomacy, arms, information, and economics as perceived in that period.

Despite the political and economic changes over the years, there exist a threat to the territory of one state posed by the activities of other states. In this, neorealist world, with each state in command of a discrete territory and population, and with each capable of monopolizing the legitimate use of force within that territory, the essential security function remains –the self defence and, if necessary, war. Other threats may exist and be of concern to governments but, according to the traditional line of thinking, they are not security threats (Lipschutz, 1995:5).

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, in her work, “Redefining Security” states, that Global developments suggest the need for national security to include resources, environmental and demographic issues. To secure the state against those objective threats that could undermine its ability and threaten its survival. The threats could be countered by appropriate means, including the development and deployment of new weapons systems shifts in military doctrine, and payoffs to allies. It is evident that most of the threats posited by those who have argued for a redefinition of security have primarily to do with human health and welfare, social problems, internal sources of instability, and the costs imposed upon societies by the disruption of customary ways of doing things. While such threats certainly could affect the safety, cohesion, and stability of individuals, families, communities, societies, and even countries, it was is by no means clear that these constitute security threats or problems of national security in the Cold War or neorealist sense of the term (Mathews, 1989:162).

### **2.4.1. Elements of National Security**

An element is the fundamental part of any concept, National Security is one of such concept. The elements of national security are identified from chosen parameters by examining their fundamental nature and character in support of the vitality of national security governance.

Vojin Dimitrijevic, Professor of international law, identified five distinctive features or the basic elements of national security, which are as follows:

1. Ensuring the existence of the state as a political community, existence of the nation (which is not identical with the existence of a particular state) and the physical survival of its population
2. Protecting territorial integrity as the basic right of the state;
3. Maintaining political independence as an attribute of internationally recognized national status of the state;
4. Ensuring quality of life;
5. Embedding of the vital interests of the state in the national security policy (Dimitrijevic, 1973:11).

The few elements of national security are as follows:

1. Military Security.
2. Economic Security.
3. Cyber Security
4. Energy Security.
5. Border Security.
6. Health Security.
7. Environmental Security.
8. Disaster Security.

9. Food Security. (Paleri, 2008:63)

### **Military Security**

National Security means to protect the sovereignty, territory, population and government of any state from foreign aggression, the protection capabilities lies in the strength of a military might of a state. In the traditional approach, security is a military phenomenon, military capabilities take a priority in budgetary allocation by governments, and the projection and deterrence of military force are central to understanding the workings of international politics.

The military security is about identifying actual and potential threats from other states, and coping with them, either by acquiring sufficient levels of appropriate military capability oneself or by allying with other states that possessed such capability. The ultimate mechanism for maintaining security was the resort to war. Military security is all about the threat and use of force to achieve political objectives (Sheehan, 2006:80).

The requirement for governments to focus their attention on military rather than other forms of security was seen as being a result of the structure of the international system. Say for instance, for realist the key elements of the international system is anarchic where there is no world government. States are obliged to produce to their military security through their own efforts, and these efforts will seem threatening to other states in the system, causing them to respond in kind, and triggering an arms race spiral as a result of this security dilemma. Military power is relative to the situation in which a state tries to use (Snow 1991:1)

The traditional approach to security assumes that the domestic politics is stable and peaceful while there is an arena of necessity, contingency and violence beyond the state. “In the real aspect the boundaries of military security are themselves necessarily somewhat fluid. Since the perception of a threat implies the recognition of vulnerabilities, military security must compass internal elements such as actual or potential insurgencies and terrorism, ideological division, national pressures, in fact, any national weakness that might be exploited by an enemy” (Freedman, 1992:754).

## **Economic Security**

Economic security is state's economic strength. Economic security is necessary for any state to overcome any other insecurities. Economic security is necessary for- any specific industries which contribute to economic welfare by generating jobs and profits, maintaining an adequate military where military strength requires an economic underpinning, and a part of economic security is maintaining, level of general economic output that allows diversion of adequate resources to military use, and foreign investment that may gain significant commercial assets in world through direct investment.

Economy caught the eye of national security by the impact it had on financing defence capacities and ensuring an innovative and efficient war industry, as well as the use of economic sanctions or other non-military instruments. Long-term success of national power is depended on the capacity of the state to create and sustain a performance economy and a sustainable economic growth (Andruseac, 2015:234)

Economic security is the key issue in national security and in maintaining affairs with other states. An economically rich state possession all the required equipment necessary to secure other aspect of security. The economic security is the nexus of all other security, there is a connection between economic and politico-military security. The economics of military security deals allocative, productive, techno-industrial, infrastructural, and cost-price aspects of resourcing military security capabilities.

The pursuit of economic security broadly defines Foreign Economic Policy (FEP) objectives. The conduct of FEP itself can be said to fall into two domains. The first of these can be referred to as technical policy realms, which themselves can be subcategorized into a core element (trade, foreign direct investment, international finance, and foreign aid policies and an associative element (industry policy). Core element possesses a more overt and cognitive international focus while associative element is subordinately allied to the core element in some functionally supportive, often competitiveness enhancing manner. The second domain is economic diplomacy, which broadly concerns the means and parameters within which trade, investment, and other international economic relations are conducted between representative agents of different FEP powers. Economic diplomacy

can generally be viewed from different levels of engagement, modalities, exercise of power, and bargaining processes (Dent, 2010:243-244)

Barry Buzan feels that economic security is located in the intense debates which regard the relations between the anarchical political structure and the economic structure of the market. Various approaches have in view the position of states and societies in relation to the markets', as well as the situation in which individual economic actors have their own demands and their relation with the markets (Buzan, 1998:76).

Economic security is about the safeguarding the structural integrity and prosperity-generating capabilities and interests of a political-economic entity in the context of various externalized risks and threats that confront it in the international economic system (Dent, 2007:253).

Economic security is the vital elements of national security as economic security can secure all the other elements of national security.

### **Cyber Security**


Cyber security is "the protection of computer systems from the theft or damage to their hardware, software or information, as well as from disruption or misdirection of the services they provide" (Gasser, 1998:3). The use of Information and Communications Technologies has become widespread in daily the life of people all around the world. This cyber facility offers un-precedent development in the exchange of information and communications, but at the same time, it involves serious risks and threats which can affect National Security. Terrorist groups recruit, train, and target through the internet, organized criminal enterprises exploit financial data with profit that exceed drug trafficking, and intelligence service steals secrets.

Several features contribute to the propagation of criminal actions in cyberspace: the lucrateness of manipulating it in economic, political or other terms, the ease and low cost of employing the tools used to stage attacks, and the ease with which attackers can hide make it possible to carry out these activities anonymously and from anywhere in the world, with cross-cutting impacts on the public and private sectors and on citizens themselves. The different attacker profiles exploit technological vulnerabilities in order to glean

information, steal highly valuable assets and threaten basic services that are essential to any country's normal functioning (Presidency of Government, 2013:3-5).

Cyber security is also plagued by the problem of attribution. Cyber-attacks can be masked, routed through various countries, and even designed to give the appearances of originating from somewhere other than their true point of origin. For any victim of a cyber-attack, this makes it difficult to attribute a cyber-attack to its true perpetrator, limiting opportunities to apportion blame or formulate a response that might include a retaliatory cyber-attack or even the use of military force. Apportioning blame and formulating an appropriate response to cyber-attack is problematic because attribution can be extremely difficult (Sheldon, 2013:313).

**Figure 2.2: Risks and Threats to Cyber National Security**



Source: Presidency of Government, Government of Spain. (2013), National Cyber Security Strategy. Retrived from [www.enisa.europa.eu](http://www.enisa.europa.eu). The date is 2013, accessed on 23/07/2017

The link between cyber security and national security was developed in Clinton administration in the 1990s. Yet there have been significant differences between traditional



domains such as airspace that make protecting cyberspace difficult. To begin with, no single entity owns the internet; individuals, companies, and governments own it and use it. It is also arguable that there is not just one Internet but many. Governments also do not have a monopoly on operating in cyberspace. In contrast to heavily regulated airspace, anyone with good computer or phone and an internet connection can operate there. And, making it more challenging for governments, most of the cyber expertise resides in information technology companies. Yet, all are affected equally by a disruption in cyberspace; a computer virus disruption that occurs through a commercial website can slow down the internet for government and military users as well as for private citizens (Reveron, 2013:6).

### **Energy Security**

Energy is central to all human endeavors. Even the most primitive humans must consume food in order to obtain the caloric energy to hunt, gather more food and other essential materials, build shelter, and defend against predatory animals and hostile tribes; more complex societies need the energy to procure food and water and to construct cities, fortifications, factories, ships, roads, railways and so on. The more complex and productive a society, the greater its need for energy; without adequate supplies of basic fuels, a complex society cannot maintain a high rate of industrial output, provide a decent standard of living to its citizens, or defend itself against competing powers (Klare, 2013:536)

Energy security exists when there are energy sources large enough to meet the needs of the political community (the energy demands), which include all military, economic and societal activities. Those sources must be able to deliver such quantities of energy in a reliable and stable manner, and for foreseeable future. As soon as these conditions are not met, there exists a problem of energy (in) security (Stokes, 2007:373).

The growing concern over energy security is derived from rapidly increasing global demand for energy, allied to rising fears over the size of key energy stocks and the likelihood of being able to exploit them in the future. The fact that the world's largest domestic reserves of key sources (especially oil) ensures that energy security becomes irretrievably entwined with wider foreign and security policies. An energy-security nexus exists, whereby a central priority for core powers becomes ensuring that friendly and stable

governments exist in the oil-rich South. This objective is a key determinant of foreign policy, and influences the nature of diplomacy and assistance (Stokes and Raphael, 2010:382).

The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. Energy security has many scopes: long-term energy security mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and sustainable environmental needs. Short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance. Lack of energy security is hence, linked to the negative economic and social impacts of either physical inaccessibility of energy, or prices that are not competitive or are overly volatile (IEA, 2016:4).

Looking at energy security from a purely economic view tends to focus on the association between national security and the availability of natural resources for energy consumption. As well, access to cheap energy is a given as being essential to the functioning of modern economies. It is also a given that the uneven distribution of energy supplies among countries can lead to significant vulnerabilities. However, there is also a much wider spectrum of energy security concepts. Various countries employ different strategies to achieve the same basic goal of energy security and ultimately national security (Filho, 2013:12).

The regular shortage of energy has a significant effect on the quality of life for many, with health, education and transport services often severely affected. This scenario-of insufficiency of energy supply is mostly in South where the abundant source of energy lies, whereas in the North, the existence of robust infrastructure ensures that the problem of energy security manifests differently.

### **Border Security**

Border security originates from the territorial instincts of the animal kingdom as signposts, which indicates that territorial sovereignty is non- negotiable. In the case of a nation, the border is its geopolitical boundary that is recognized internationally. Protecting these boundaries, especially from cross border human migration is a serious concern. Nations

are actively engaged in defending their borders in every possible way to uphold their sovereignty and values. People migrate and cross borders in search of opportunities despite the nature of the border-mountainous, deserts, oceans or barren land, nothing failed to deter the determination of migrants. Nation has to protect their border against such odds. Protecting them with its associated disputes and all, at the outer perimeter or within the state at the entry points essential for national security. This requirement endorses border security, as an element of national security from the beginning of nation-state (Paleri, 2008:65).

Border security is very essential for any state to safeguard its national interest and national security as migrants along with themselves also sometimes carries deadly communicable disease like Swine Flu, Bird Flu, HIV, Ebola Virus, etc.. Not only disease sometimes non-state actors like terrorist, militant and other such miscreants enter into the country and carry out dangerous acts which might jeopardise country's national security.

### **Health Security**

Health cannot be treated distinctly and far away from the field of security because it has the long growing tendency to ruin the future of the nation by its dangerous effect on the world. When we talk about security, health is one of the important constituents that should not be let out of the focus from the policies makers and the government. Health security is the most essential part of the individual as well as the nation- health determines the well being of the nation and has an immense potential to create a chaos in the world. If we trace back to the history, health has always been the most prioritized issue in terms of the national security agenda. For instance, during the Peloponnesian War, disease dispirited the Athenian people, demoralized the political leadership, and weakened the army, preventing it from achieving important military objectives. 1918 influenza epidemic killed 25 million people, including 500,000 Americans. The Spanish flu struck 294,000 allied troops in the fall of 1918, alone. Nearly 23,000 died, and the disease caused significant if short-lived problems on both the allied and German sides (Peterson, 2002:45).

Disease not only affects the peace of the nation but it also obstructs the economic stabilities of the country because the presence of diseases interrupts the immunity which reflects on their working capabilities and gradually slows down the working value of the workers and

disturbs the production of the enterprise to they work. Health has the propensity to disturb economic, political, social and military stability. As the pandemic disease creates an extra burden on the state in terms of financial matter and even the in social relation between the states which has a direct effect on the economics of the state. By causing severe economic, political, and social effects, epidemic diseases can produce domestic instability, civil war, or civil-military conflict, or it may lead a state to lash out against another State.

The emergence of health as a national security issue is contributed by three issues: the spread of new and existing infectious diseases; the continued growth of the HIV/AIDS pandemic: and bioterrorism. But two other factror facilitaed this emergency. The first of these was the growing acceptance during the 1990s of a broadened security agenda. The end of Cold War saw security analysts shift their focus away from the threats, especially military threats, to more diffuse risks. This opened the door for a more electic rango of issues to be considered as security concerns. The second factor facilitating factor was a human agency. A number of prominent individuals used their positions of power and influences to place health on foreign and security policy agenda (McInnes, 2013:327).

Former US President Barack Obama and US Senator Richard Lugar argued that:

*“When we think of the major threats to our national security, the first to come to mind are nuclear proliferation, rouge state and global terrorism. But another kind of threats lurks beyond our shores, one from nature, not human-an avian flu pandemic. An outbreak could cause millions of deaths destabilized South Asia (its likely place of origin), and threaten the security of governments around the world”*  
(Lugar, 2005:3)

Links have also been drawn between health and national security. Any Infectious disease say for instance HIV/AIDS, SARS, Ebola, are insructive in that it shows how infectious diseases can simultaneously bear upon human security and national concern. This disease has a detrimental impact on the armed forces of the worst affected countries. Sometimes the pathogen of diseases can be used as weapons and transmitted to other countries in form of mails, packages and parcel which in further can be chaos and destruction (Elbe, 2007:418).

## **Environmental Security**

Environment security emerged as an important concept in security studies due to the growth of environmental consciousness in developed countries. A number of events stimulated and sustained the growth of the environmental movement. The major development leading to emergence of environmental security was also the attempts from the 1970s onwards by a number of scholars to critique orthodox security discourse and practices by highlighting their inability to manage environmental risks to national international security. The major reason for as to why environmental security has become an important concept in security studies is because of the growing recognition that environmental changes do not merely pose risks to the ecosystem; they also pose risks to the human being (Barnett, 2010:220-223).

The Environmental security requires a clear analysis of how human actions are clearly changing all aspects of the biosphere, and in the process making the world we inhabit an increasingly artificial place. According to the scientific literature on earth system science, the change we have already made to the living part of the planet are of such a scale as to require the nomenclature of a a new geological era, the 'Anthropocene (Steffen, Crutzen and O'Neil, 2007:614-621). Not only are we changing the atmosphere, and as a result setting climate change in motion, but humanity is also changing other parts of the planet, building roads, ports and cities, clearing forests to grow crops and fishing numerous parts of oceans to the stage where many species are endangered. These new, increasingly artificial circumstances are the world in which climate changes will render both people and states insecure in the near future (Dably, 2009:112).

Environmental change might cause war. Ullman defined a national security threat as anything that can quickly degrade the quality of life of the inhabitants of a state, or that narrows the choices available to people and organizations within the state. He suggested that environmental degradation is likely to make Third World government more military confrontational in their relations with the advanced, industrialized nation (Ullman, 1983: 142).

When environmental security is narrowly interpreted as being about national security and armed conflict, it has more purchase with the orthodox security-policy community. A

number of environmental scientists have also argued that environmental degradation will induce violent conflict. “ If a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will steadily decline, its social fabric deteriorates, and its political structure become destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether the conflict in the form of disorder and insurrection within the nation, or tensions and hostilities with other” (Myers, 1986: 251).

Environmental degradation or transformation can be both source and result of violent conflict. Environmental degradation, but also poor respect for environmentally attuned resource management, may lead to disputes within countries and between otherwise friendly countries. When environmental degradation is a consequence of intentional acts of warfare, it often escalates the conflict. Environmental degradation may also aggravate a conflict that instigated for other reasons, e.g. ethnic or religious tension or socio-economic inequalities.

Regular non-warfare military activity may also have a negative impact on the environment in terms of pollution and resource mis-use as well as the more severe threats implied by nuclear testing, accidents in nuclear-powered submarines or ice-breakers, dumping of radioactive material in the ocean, and so on. Military preparations represent a potential threat to the environment and to individuals even if they may not represent a threat to state security in the traditional sense of the word. Discussions about the use of military means to protect the rainforest, and to protect fish stocks in the Barents Sea from illegal fishing, possibly through Russian Norwegian cooperation, are examples of positive linkages between the military sector and the environment (Græger, 1996:110).

Environmental change can weaken the economic base that determines military capacity. The natural resources and environment service are important to economic growth and employment in many countries. If the national capital base of an economy erodes, then so does the long-term of its armed forces as it exposes people to health risks and moreover, environmental change can also undermine the human development. If economic development can be ecologically unsustainable, then national security can be similarly unsustainable.

## **Disaster Security**

Disaster is sudden, calamitous event that cause serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing human, material, economic and environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own level of resources. The United nation defines disaster as “the occurrence of a sudden or major misfortune which disrupts the basic fabric and normal functioning of society or community” (UNDP, 2007:7).

No part of the world is free from the disaster of any sort. Disaster induces trauma and anguish. The agony would be reduced if disaster is prevented or the damages after a disaster mitigate. The collateral damages of disaster can be equally serious and cascade in the social system. The victim of disaster can be anyone or anything, economic growth, health, development and resources will be severely affected by the disaster. The disaster like environmental issues can also cross borders. The impact may even affect the geostrategic environment and change the maps of the nation. The loss due to a disaster in socio-economic and generally irreversible.

In today's international system where people feel divided and isolated from violent forces of nature, catastrophic natural disasters have the potential either to reinforce or to shake up the prevailing status quo. The notion of security employed here is "the pursuit of psychological and physical safety ... to prevent direct threats ... from endangering the survival of these regimes, their citizenry, or their ways of life (Mandel, 1994:21).

Natural disasters clearly have the potential to kill people and substantially degrade the way of life, questions arise about the possibility that they may simultaneously increase support for government regimes and promotion of intergovernmental cooperation. Natural disasters tend to strengthen national governmental stability by increasing national unity as everyone bands together in the face of common destruction; and natural disasters tend to strengthen international governmental cooperation by increasing the bonds between donor and recipient countries as recipients feel grateful toward donors and donors feel compassionate toward recipients.

## **Food Security**

Food security is an essential feature of a country's independence and sustenance. Today, the world faces contradiction because of the persistence of food insecurity and the degradation of natural resources. The contradiction is also seen that major portion of the globe is that half of the world is preoccupied with dieting and the other half is struggling for survival since they do not have enough to eat. International meetings have from time to time come up with official documents that would adopt such methods that will provide food security, reduce poverty, and work for sustainable management of natural resources. Food security as a concept originated only in mid- 1970s, in the discussions of international food problems at a time of global food crisis. The initial focus of attention was primarily on food supply problems of assuring the availability and to some degree the price stability of basic foodstuffs at international and national level. That supply-side, international and institutional set of concerns reflected the changing organization of the global food economy that had precipitated the crisis (Shahi, 2015:340-342).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 provides that “everyone has the right to the standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food”. Food security is a flexible concept as reflected in the many attempts at the definition of research policy usage (Smith, 1992:13).

World Food Summit defines Food security as “Availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” (UN, 1975:6). In 1983, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expanded its concept to include securing access by vulnerable people to available supplies, implying that attention should be balanced between the demand and supply side of the food security equation, ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food that they need (FAO, 1983:6).

Food security includes at a minimum: The ready availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods and, an assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially ways (eg., without resorting to emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing or other coping strategies. In contrast, food insecurity is having limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate



and safe foods or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways (World Bank, 1986:7).

The 1996 World Food Summit adopted a still more complex definition: Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels is achieved, when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active healthy life (World Food Summit, 1996:5).

Hunger, poverty and disease are interlinked, with each contributing to the occurrence of the other two. Hunger reduces natural defenses against most diseases and is the main risk factor for illness worldwide. People living in poverty often cannot produce or buy enough food to eat and so are more susceptible to diseases. Sick people are less able to work or produce. The UN Standing Committee on Nutrition concluded that nutrition is an essential foundation for poverty alleviation, and also for meeting MDGs related to improved education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health and disease.

### **Conclusion**

Security means different thing to different people and security is an unsteady concept. The traditional approach to security is very much confined to the military aspect of security. In traditional approach military security was given preference than other forms of security, in fact, military security was supposed to be securing the other aspect of security (non-traditional which was developed after WWII and end of Cold War). The concept of security diminished from traditional to non-traditional concept after the end of WWII when the world witnessed the escalation of globalisation, environmental degradation and international terrorism.

The non-traditional concept of security included all the features which some way or the other affected the human lives. The non-traditional notion of security seemed to the linkage amongst each other, they gave the impression to be a tile of bricks which support the life system. If any of this aspect of security (which includes economic, political, social, environmental, food, disaster etc.) is challenged or is under threat this would jeopardize other as well.

The notion of security has also deepened from individual to societal, regional and global. The deepening of security has been viewed as the common security where the environmental disaster in one region affected the other region as well. The notion of security broadened from military to human, health, food, energy, economic, environmental, political security etc. All the aspect of non-traditional security kept the human security as the center of focus while in case of national security the state is the key focus. State maintained the stronger military to protect itself from the threat of other states. National security in the present era not only deals with building military superiority but also focuses on other elements which are vital to the survival of a state.

Military security remains an absolute crucial dimension of security as the whole. The government continues to invest considerable resources in attempting to acquire it. Military security is extremely expensive to acquire, and the opportunity costs in terms of human security agenda are profound. Efforts to increase military security can have unintended counterproductive consequences in the military or other fields.

The pursuit of economic security broadly determines how a nation or other state-like entity defines their FEP objectives. National power depends on states capacity to create and sustain a performance economy and a sustainable growth. Economic security is necessary for any state to secure the other aspect of security. Economic security determines the well-being of a state or its population.

Energy security involves a complex nexus of geopolitical, economic, and strategic concerns, which link together distant regions of the globe, and disparate security concerns. Rising demand for energy, and the likelihood that this will continue to be met by fossil fuels are matched by increasing uncertainties over the size and stability of remaining stocks. This will, almost inevitably, lead to a rising prominence of concerns over energy security, and an increasing possibility of intensified inter-state competition over energy reserve.

Health security has acquired a greater security salience in the context of human security and national security. Health has the proclivity to disturb economic, political, social and military stability. Health security can cause a severe economic, political, and social effects, epidemic diseases can produce domestic instability, civil war, or civil-military conflict.

Epidemic diseases and its pathogens can also be used as a biological agent and used as a weapon to strike any country. Health security policies hence determine the national security strategy.

Environmental security has been one of the key new security issues that have helped to broaden the meaning of security. It is the product of efforts by the environmental movement to raise the profile of environment issue and contest the practices of national security. The increasing recognition that environmental problems demand common security approaches and the growth in multilateral environmental agreements and the strategic vacuum created by the end of the Cold War.

Border Security involves securing the illegal migration of people across nations in search of various opportunities, which is a big concern for every nation and this is one of the elements of national security. Cyber security concerns the securing/ protection of computer system, so as to avoid misuse, manipulation or damage to the data, software or hardware and reducing the chances of theft of vital information related to a personal identity or national security.

Disaster leads to the disruption of the social functioning leaving both environmental and economic damages to the society/nation. After the occurrence of a disaster the members of the society and the various nations bond by the way of sharing the mutual interest/ cause which leads to greater unity. Food security as a concept in its early years talks about securing fluctuating supply of food and stabilizing the price both at the international as well as national level. But, it has evolved to the availability of nutritionally adequate and safe food which are acquired by the socially acceptable way.

Even in this contemporary era, when the concept of security has been evolving from state to global and comprehensive notion, national security remains the major issue. The national security is the foremost and important than other issues. The national security is the most important than the other security as it is key factor for survival of humankind or security of any kind. National security constitute various elements which are necessary for the state and as well as for the individual. The elements of national security are in fact the ingredient of state which is composed of sovereignty, population, territory and government. These elements are also vital for the survival of individual and states.

## CHAPTER 3

### EVOLUTION OF INDIAN SECURITY STRATEGY

#### Introduction

India has faced traditional and non-traditional threats to its security. India has faced external danger to its security as well as danger from within. After Independence India adopted its own security policy, where various measures were adopted to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the country and other threats such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, terrorism, diseases etc.

The external danger to India's security can be related with its involvement in conflicts with its neighbours-Pakistan and China. With Pakistan, India was in a state of war on four occasions in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. While in case of China the border dispute and Tibet led to war in 1962. The heavy loss in 1962 gave India a bitter experience as of which India realized that strengthening its military power and capabilities was most to formulate a strong national security strategy. Therefore India adopted the policy of making nuclear tests to safeguard its security. India conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and in 1988 successfully.

India's security strategy has been to strengthen International Institutions, organization, International norms, International Law etc., to protect its security interests. India has full faith in the United Nations and India has always supported the activities of the United Nations. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, supported the cause of Asian solidarity, decolonization, disarmament etc. To make more effective, Indian leaders have suggested many reforms in the structure and functioning of U.N. Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan in UN was most proactive proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Instead of joining any Bloc (US-Capitalist or USSR-Socialist) India preferred to follow the policy of Non-Alignment to maintain the status of colonial liberation, peace, cultural, economic and political cooperation. India's security strategy from 1947 to the present day, can be seen as a transition from unified idealism under Nehru, through a period of intermitted realism or realpolitik lasting about the mid-1960s till the mid-1980s, to economically driven pragmatism.

Indian troops have been sent to other countries on U.N Peace Keeping Mission, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (Operation Pawan) was successful to end the Civil war in Sri Lanka in 1987.

Indian security strategy is geared towards meeting security challenges within the country. India adopted firm policy to deal with terrorist, militant groups, separatists etc., of Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir. Separatists have tried to break away from India. They threatened unity and integrity of the country. Indian government adopted a democratic method to deal with separatists but firmly told them that there can be no compromise with nation's unity and security.

India's dependence on foreign countries for the supply of defence goods and the product has been one of the drawbacks in Indian security strategy as India spend a huge chunk of the budget in importing those goods. But, the development are being made to manufacture those products within India which would be very helpful for India to develop its economy in the way that the vast mass of citizens are lifted out of poverty and misery and huge economic inequalities are not allowed to exist. Since defence production would require labour (skilled and unskilled) the employability would be increased. The 'Make in India' is one of such initiative initiated by Modi government in 2014 to produce indigenous defence product for being self-sufficiency and self-reliance.

This chapter, therefore, tries to discuss the historical analysis of India's Security Strategy and the trends of strategy from post-Independence till date. The last section of this chapter has focused on India's Security Strategy with reference to defence and its industrialization

### **3.1. Indian Prime Minister and their marks on Indian Security Strategy**

The national security of any country is determined by the foreign policy adopted by it. This section is necessary to discussed since, India's national security strategy had been determined by the foreign policies adopted by the Indian Government or by the Indian Prime Ministers. On 15 August 1947 India got its freedom from British Raj. The responsibilities of formulating its new affairs fell upon the first Prime Minister of India Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. India was struggling with the huge masses of poverty, illiteracy, and communism, and most importantly with the unification of princely states. This section

looks into the various important agreement, treaty and policies initiated or ratified in the tenure of various Prime Ministers of India.

From independence through the 1950s and 1960s India's foreign policy was framed for international consumption as one of some idealism, while Nehru tackled the tremendous domestic challenges of long-term cohesion and economic revitalization that the British Empire had neglected in the final decades of the Raj. Within India, the dominant Congress Party coalesced around a project of state nationalism (Hasan: 2002:56). The foundation of Indian foreign policy was the policy of Panchsheel or the Five principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The doctrine of Panchsheel found philosophical expression at the hands of Gautam Buddha and its subsequent propagation by Emperor Ashoka through work edicts and scriptures all over Asia (Mohite, 2010:27). It helped Indian leaders to devise Panchsheel as principles of contemporary foreign policy. The Panchsheel principles were jointly adopted by Chinese Premier Chou-Enlai and his Indian counterpart, Nehru on April 29, 1954. The five principles were-

- i. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- ii. Mutual non-aggression,
- iii. Mutual non-interference,
- iv. Equality and mutual benefit, and
- v. Peaceful co-existence (Ministry of External Affairs, 1954:1).

Panchsheel as the framework, was not only for relations between the two countries, but also for their relations with all other countries, so that a solid foundation could be laid for peace and security in the world. Panchsheel, as envisioned by its creators, gave substance to the voice of newly established countries who were seeking the space to consolidate their hard won independence, as it provided an alternative ideology (apart from Capitalist and Socialist) dedicated to peace and development of all as the basis for international interaction.

Nehru also chose the path of Non-Alignment (NAM) in the face of the bipolar order (USA-Capitalist and USSR-Socialist), arguing that India would have to 'plough a lonely furrow' (Appadorai, 1982:10). Indian foreign policy of the time seemed moralistic to outsiders, defining the national interests as congruent with world co-operation and world peace. Non-

alignment has been regarded as the most important feature of India's foreign policy. It was adopted by Nehru to enable and underline India's strategic autonomy (Bajpai, 2002:225). Nehru kept in mind that being a colony of British for 200 years his policy would be based on the dynamic concept, where India would neither support USA-Capitalist or the USSR-Socialist or committing to any military bloc but taking an independent stand on international issues according to the merits of each case. Nehru saw in non-alignment a guarantee of India's independence in the field of foreign policy. According to him joining block would mean only one thing to "give up your view about a particular question and adopt the other party's view on that question, to please it and gain its favour". Nehru took the initiative to summon the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947. Later on a Conference, of 29 countries of Asia and Africa was held in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955.

Indian's cohesion was severely tested not only by the fallout of a murderous partition in 1947, but, following rapidly thereafter, by the resistance of several princely states namely, Junagadh (1947), Hyderabad (1947-1948) and Kashmir (1947-1948) to merge with India.

In August 1970, while paying tribute to her father's ideal of Non-Alignment, Mrs. Gandhi asserted that the problems of developing countries needed to be faced not merely by idealism, not merely by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking and hard-headed analysis of the situation (Appadorai, 1949:43). This judgement reflected a growing realization that India's interests could not be fully protected by its earlier international stance. On the international stage, the realistic turn was evident as India swerved away from Non-Alignment towards alignment with the Socialist Soviet Union, marked by the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 9, 1971, which was signed between the Mrs Gandhi and Premier of Soviet Union Khrushchev. The treaty mainly involved promotion of friendship, peace and security both at bilateral and international levels. Under the leadership Gandhi, India's relations with Russia strengthened substantially. Gandhi had a very clear foreign agenda, only "pro-Indian". However, Indian critics said that she was very stubborn on her stand, leaning toward Moscow to an extent which was quite difficult and also very embarrassing during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (Mishra, 2015:51-52).

The impact of the treaty were:

1. Discourage Pak threat to India's security.

2. Check the possible Sino-Pak collusion against India.
3. Neutralize the growing Washington-Pindi-Beijing entente.
4. Help indirectly to make a decisive contribution towards the formation of Bangladesh.
5. Assure Soviet support during the Bangladesh War, and
6. Prevent the adoption of the US-China sponsored anti-India moves in the U.N. Security Council.<sup>3</sup>

A few months later, military intervention in the Bangladesh war enabled India to shatter Pakistan and halve its size and weight in response to Pakistani atrocities and the influx of Bangladeshi refugees into India (Mukherjee and Malone, 2011:89). Indira Gandhi threw her support behind the Bengali movement to separate East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan, providing refuge for the ten million Pakistani civilians who fled to India in order to escape the marauding Pakistan army and eventually offering troops and arms. India's decisive victory over Pakistan in December led to the creation of Bangladesh.<sup>4</sup>

In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran, a response to that of China in 1964 at Lop Nor (nuclear test site of China) which was commonly known as 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosive' and also sometimes referred as Smiling Buddha. It was developed by the collaborated work of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) team.<sup>5</sup>

In 1984, amid upheavals in India over the Sikhs Free Khalistan movement's campaign for an independent Punjab, Mrs. Gandhi, was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, a shocking events for the country. Her assertive style endured, nevertheless, in Delhi's approach to the Sri Lankan crisis of the mid-1980s under her son Rajiv Gandhi. India got involved in Sri Lanka Civil war when thousands of Tamils from Sri Lanka fled to Tamil Nadu in India in 1983 when Sri Lankan government launched heavy oppression on Jaffna, the base of the

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<sup>3</sup> The information has been accessed from <http://indiancommunities.org> on 20/07/2017

<sup>4</sup> The information is taken from a Documentary Video prepared by History Channel and was televised as an episode of 'Indira Gandhi'. Accessed from [www.history.com/topics/indira-gandhi](http://www.history.com/topics/indira-gandhi) on 03/08/2017.

<sup>5</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.nuclearweaponarchive.org](http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org) on 23/08/2017



Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an organization fighting for greater autonomy for Tamil and later, independence from Sri Lanka. Operation Pawan was initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in October 1987. Operation Pawan was accomplished successfully by taking control of Jaffna from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE had implemented the road of violence to achieve their objective of a separate Tamil state. This operation lasted for a fortnight and resulted in the loss of over 200 soldiers and an unaccounted number of civilians (Chanda, 2014:4).

The factors that were responsible to compel India to intervene in Sri Lanka were firstly, the Geo-political. The involvement of Western powers in Sri Lanka such as USA, Israel, Britain, and anti-India powers such as Pakistan and China, compelled India to make very strategic approach towards Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka had adopted the western tilted foreign policy on account of the Indian probable interventionist panic. Secondly, the Tamil factor. The Tamils of Sri Lanka and the people of Tamil Nadu, State of India had been same ancestry and the common ethnic lineage. Therefore, the people of Tamil Nadu could not ignore the sufferings of Tamils of their lineage in Sri Lanka, which were incurred by the Sri Lankan anti-Tamil society. And therefore to annihilate the sufferings, sorrows, and atrocities of the Sri Lankan Tamils, the people of Tamil Nadu State put pressure on the central government to take the issue of Sri Lankan Tamils into consideration. As a result, India had to intervene in Sri Lanka (Khobragade, 2008:919).

*"India's involvement in Sri Lanka... was unavoidable not only due the ramifications of Colombo's oppressive and discriminating policies against its Tamil citizens, but also in terms of India's (own) national security concerns..."* (Dixit, 2002:327).

Rajiv Gandhi also indicated complete throwback to Nehruvian Non-Alignment posturing by proposing a much-touted "Action Plan" at United Nations for phased elimination of all nuclear weapons. Rajiv Gandhi in June 15, 1988, propose for a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world order in UN General Assembly which is known as Action Plan. Rajiv Gandhi's speech in UN General Assembly in 1988 are as follows:

*"We are approaching the close of the twentieth century. It has been the most blood-stained century in history. Fifty-eight million people perished in two world wars. Forty million more have died in other conflicts. In the last nine decades the ravenous machines of war*

*have devoured nearly 100 million people. The appetite of these monstrous machines grows on what they feed on. Nuclear war will not mean the death of 100 million people, or even 1,000 million people. It will mean the extinction of 4,000 million, the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth. We come to the United Nation to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness”* (UN, General Assembly, 1988:2)<sup>6</sup>.

Action Plan called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2010. Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan continues to hold its relevance in contemporary era as well. It is the only action plan presented by any Head of Government at any forum which is detailed in such a practical manner, how we can eliminate nuclear weapons (Regihe, 2011:23).

The year 1991 marked another turning point in Indian foreign policy. It coincided with the collapse of the post-1945 world order characterized by Cold War confrontation. In India, over four decades of socialist economic policy and poor fiscal management culminated in a severe Balance of Payments (BOP). The uncertainties arising out of the collapse of India's trusted friend and supporter, the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States (US) gave a certain jolt to the hitherto prevailing structure of India's foreign policy. India was forced to explore other options, both regionally and globally, in search of preserving and promoting its economic and strategic interests, and there, the eastern neighbours offered a promising area of engagement. The ASEAN, with Japan, Korea and China put together, constituted economically the most dynamic region, not only in Asia but the whole world. Indian policy could not ignore this region particularly under the new situation when India was in dire need and desperate search for new openings for its, liberalizing economy (Katyal, 1994:8).

India was also looking elsewhere in Asia by the beginning of the 1990s, like towards the newly emerged Central Asian Republics, not only for retaining them as the captive markets of the Soviet period, for its products and services, but also to meet the growing energy needs, as the hitherto prevailing arrangements had been disturbed due to the breakdown of

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<sup>6</sup> Rajiv Gandhi on 15 June 1988, during his keynote address on “Agenda Item 8- General Debate” at UN, General Assembly, where he propose for Action Plan for a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world order. The key note address is available in UN’; General Assembly, 15 Special Sessions. Accessible through the website [www.fissilematerials.org>library>gan98](http://www.fissilematerials.org/library/gan98). For more details of the speech, please refer to APPENDIX I

the Soviet Union in 1991. India shed its Non-alignment ideology in favour of a pragmatic foreign policy. This favored some normalization of traditionally antagonistic relationships with neighbouring countries, a greater commitment to international institutions that might legitimize its emerging power status, a positive approach to relations with the world's remaining superpower (Mukherjee and Malone, 2011:92). The Look East policy, thus, emerged as an important foreign policy initiative of India in the post-Cold War period which was in 1991 by the Narashima Rao government with the aim of developing political relations, increasing economic amalgamation and forging security cooperation with countries of Southeast Asia. The policy marked a shift in India's perspective of the world, with the strategic and economic importance of Southeast Asia to India's national interests being recognized (Bajpai, 2010:523).

The Cold War's end had a profound impact on Indian foreign and security policy. Most importantly, the Soviet dissolution had meant the end of the Indo-Soviet security relationship, as the principal successor state, Russia, was both unable and unwilling to play a similar role. Consequently, India's policymakers were forced to abandon some of the key lodestars of its foreign and security policies. To that end, India's leadership started to abandon its visceral and reflexive anti-American and sought to improve relations with the United States (Blank, 2005:122). It also pursued better relations with states that it shunned as squalid American stooges during much of Cold War. As part of this general transformation of India's foreign and security policies, the country chose to reassess and alter its fraught relationship with Israel (Ganguly, 2003:45).

Apart from the general reorientation of its policies at the end of the Cold War, India's interest in forging a better relationship with Israel stemmed from two specific concerns. At one level, India's policymakers saw improvement in the Indo-Israel relationship as a possible bridge to a better relationship with the United States, given the existence of close US-Israelis ties. At another level, India also wanted to diversify its sources of weaponry, and Israel was more than willing to oblige (Withington, 2001:18-19). Since India's decision to grant Israel full diplomatic status in 1992, the relationship has made considerable progress on a variety of fronts, extending well beyond defence cooperation. However, the bilateral security relationship, which covers the gamut from weapons sales

to counter-terrorism cooperation, forms the kernel of the Indo-Israeli nexus (Kumaraswamy, 2002:194).

The shifts in Indian foreign policy manifested in a various way, the nuclear tests at Pokhran were one of its outcomes. Pokhran-II the nuclear tests were conducted on May 11 and May 13, 1998, not only had demonstrated that India's indigenous talent is second to none but also provided the nation with a nuclear deterrent factor. The 1998 tests in Pokhran signaled a dramatic shift in India's nuclear posture. It brought India's nuclear capability from the realm of a quiet and covert military programme to a publicly known status. The reason behind this shift revolves around the issues of national security which emerged due to two factor- China and Pakistan which played a major role in this direction. India had to formulate its nuclear policy in the context of those nuclear weapon states with China and its 'all weather ally'- Pakistan, as a central factor which undoubtedly pose the biggest strategic challenges (Bhudani, 2009:178-179).

India declared herself a 'Nuclear Weapon Nation' after doing the five nuclear tests on 11th and 13th May, 1998 at Pokhran. At that moment, India's nuclear doctrine/policy<sup>7</sup> was declared systematically. According to it:

1. India will not attack any nation with a nuclear weapon for the first time.
2. India will not go through nuclear tests again in future.
3. India's role will be a responsible nuclear weapon nation.
4. India will not hand over nuclear technology or nuclear weapon to any country.
5. India will support multipolar global structure henceforth.

India in tenure of Prime Minister Vajpayee has broken the monopoly of the Nuclear Five (USA, UK, Russia, France and China). Prime Minister Vajpayee has rightly observed "it is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to

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<sup>7</sup> Indian Nuclear Policy is available in Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Ministry of External Affairs, Accessible through the website [www.mea.gov.in](http://www.mea.gov.in). For more details of Indian Nuclear Doctrine, please refer to APPENDIX III

the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of humankind (Subrahmanyam, 1998:23).

The National Security Council (NSC) was constituted in 1999 by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government with a vital function in the formulation of national security strategies, which provide the basis for the formulation of national military strategies by the military hierarchy. The NSC has another vital task – to evaluate, coordinate and integrate strategic information, advice, expertise and suggestions from the Armed Forces, Govt. agencies and think tanks/institutions (Kapali, 2000:13). NSC was formed with an aim: to facilitate integrated thinking and coordinated application of political, military, diplomatic, scientific and technological resources to safeguard national security. NSC was created as the government felt a need for a wide range of sources, expertise amongst its members in specialized fields and, a coordinating head to harmonize the views to obtain worthwhile options, provided that such agency should be aware of security issue but not be involved in managing them (Raghavan, 1996:46-47).

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was formed after Kargil war in 1999 by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee cabinet with an objective to carry out four function- “to provide single-point military advice, administer strategic forces, enhance planning process through inter and intra service prioritization and to ensure integration in the armed forces (Mukherjee, 2014:439). Both NSC and CDS has been able handle major security challenges in times of crisis and have dealt with the crisis in expedite manner. It was the idea of Vajpayee that led to the formation of NSC and CDS.

The Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement of 2005 and 2008 was also the result of shifts in Indian foreign Policy. The US visit by Manmohan Singh was the most remarkable feature of Singh's foreign policy and national security strategy, where India and U.S agreed on the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement in 2005. India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard and in exchange, the United States agree to work towards full civil nuclear cooperation with India. India would also be given recognition as a de facto nuclear-weapons state; and nuclear-related supplies to and from India would be accepted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). But, the acceptance to put

its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA created a storm in the domestic politics, leading Left to withdraw support from United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. However, the government survived with the support of Samajwadi Party. And finally put the agreement in effect in 2008.<sup>8</sup>

Narendra Modi is the present Prime Minister of India. 'India First' is the fundamental feature of the Modi Doctrine. India's choices and actions are based on the strengths of its national power. Further, India's strategic intent is shaped mainly by realism, co-existence, cooperation and partnership. Moreover, Modi's foreign policy doesn't fit a 'hard nationalist script' based on India's military might and expansionism, rather it is guided by a core value of 'Vaasudhaiva Kutumbakam'<sup>9</sup> (the entire world is our family). Focused on India's development, Modi's foreign policy 'is guided by the constant drive to reform and transform India, for security and prosperity of all Indians (Chaturvedy, 2017:3).

Narendra Modi also took a severe initiative to eradicate terrorism in Kashmir and Northeast India. On 26 December 2014, the Government of India declared the launch of Operation All Out against Bodo militants. The decision to launch the operation was taken during the meeting between Chief of Army Staff General Dalbir Singh Suhag and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh. The meeting was held to review the security situation in Assam after the killing of 69 Adivasis by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit), NDFB(S), in the three districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang and Sonitpur. In May 2014, the government had attributed a similar attack on Muslims to the NDFB(S). The December attacks, described as one of the worst massacres in the history of Northeast India, led to widespread protests by all sections of people. In retaliation, the Adivasis had killed 14 Bodos (Sharma, 2016:1). To counter terrorism in Kashmir, which hound India, surgical strike was conducted across Line of Control (LoC) after Uri attack on 29 September, 2016.

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<sup>8</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.indiandefencereview.com](http://www.indiandefencereview.com). on 12/08/2017

<sup>9</sup> Vaasudhaiva Kutumbakam (Sanskrit: Vaasudhaiva Kutumbakam. From 'vasudha', the earth; "eva"= indeed is; and "Kutumbakam", family) is a Sanskrit phrase that means the whole world is one single family. Everyone has their own worldview which is quite different from person to person. Vaasudhaiva Kutumbakam says animals, birds, plants, trees and other organisms in the ecosystem have Atma they are part of our family (Nath, 2014:17).

Surgical attack was also the showcase of India's power and success in conveying to the world the deleterious effects of terrorism in India

To boost India's economy Modi focused on maintaining regional institutional capacity and regional connectivity development through cooperation with the neighbouring countries and the global powers as well. Modi dreams of a 'thriving well-connected and integrated neighborhood' and hence, the current Indian government under Modi has clearly indicated India's priority for building stronger ties with its neighborhood. At ASEAN summit held in Manila Philippines, Modi calls for joint efforts with ASEAN to mitigate terror. Modi placed ASEAN at the core of its 'Act East Policy.' Modi said "our ties with ASEAN are old and we want to further strengthen cooperation" (PTI, 2017:3).

To promote India as a manufacturing hub Modi initiated 'Make in India' programme. This scheme was launched by Modi in the workshop organized by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. Make in India focus on various aspects such as Job creation and skill enhancement in various sectors of the economy, especially chemicals, IT, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, weaving, bio technology and electronics. About 25 areas are to be taken into creation in order to implement the concept of Make in India. Such initiatives in various sectors aim at increasing the GDP growth and Tax Revenue of the country. From the date of launching of the concept of the Make in India initiative the GDP has an increased along with increase in tax revenue. The statistics exhibit the positive result of this aspect of the GDP growth and tax revenue of the country (Pole, 2016:2-3).

### **3.2. India in Times of War and Indian Defence Policy**

India has been involved in conflict and tensions with its neighbours since its independence, in which the factors vary from the border issue, geo-strategic deterrence, rivalry, etc.. With Pakistan alone we fought four war- 1947-49, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and with China in 1962. War with Pakistan was fought mostly for the Kashmir while in case of China, the origin of the war lay in two issues-the boundary dispute and Tibet.

### **3.2.1. Kashmir War (1947-49)**

The two key factors influenced the making of India's defence policy in the aftermath of its independence from British colonial rule in 1947. The first stemmed from the Gandhian heritage. Gandhi's role in India's freedom struggle was simply inestimable. Consequently, his aversion to using force had profoundly influenced his successors, most notably, Jawaharlal Nehru. Not surprisingly, Nehru had sought to construct a world order that would rely on multilateral institutions and hobble the resort to force in international affairs. Simultaneously, Nehru was acutely concerned about the diversion of scarce resources away from economic development towards defence (Khera, 1968:142).

A second inheritance, also from the colonial era, had a profound impact on Indian defence policymaking. This inheritance was paradoxical. On the one hand, India inherited colonial notions about the scope and extent of its borders. On the other, its leaders had been kept out of the counsels of defence policymaking during the long span of colonial rule. While Indian leaders firmly subscribed to the colonial inherited borders, they lacked an adequate understanding of defence and security issues (Ganguly, 2010:23). Nehru was firmly committed to the defence of India's colonially inherited borders. However, Nehru, because of a profound aversion to the use of force along with his commitment to India's economic development, chose to dramatically limit defence expenditures in the post-Independence era (Thomas, 1996:95).

India's ability to defend its territorial claims in the former princely state of Jammu Kashmir during the 1947-49 war with Pakistan reinforced the belief that it possessed sufficient military wherewithal to defend its border. Interestingly enough, Nehru made it plain that the defence of the Himalayan borders would involve multilateral diplomacy, rather than reliance on India's limited military prowess. Nehru's influence on defence policymaking was so overwhelming that even the Chief of Staff of Indian Army agreed with this assessment (Khera, 1968: 158). Nehru's Defence Minister, V.K Krishna Menon, had also persuaded himself that the principal threat to India's security stemmed from Pakistan and that China, a Communist state, would not attack India. In an attempt to cut defence expenditures, in 1950 the Indian Army was trimmed by 50,000 men to about 500,000 (Barua, 2005: 56).



The 1947-49, Indo-Pak war over Kashmir was fought, after armed tribesmen (Lashkar's) from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (now known as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) invade the disputed territory in October 1947. Kashmir was strategically located between India and Pakistan and though it was controlled by a Hindu Maharaja, the majority of the population were Muslims. Sikhs and Hindus made up the other major ethnicities though they were a minority compared to the Muslim population. Though required to choose between the India and Pakistan the Maharaja was unable to decide which state to join. Pakistan felt that as it was the established state for Muslims in South Asia that Kashmir should accede to it rather than India. Unfortunately, "though Kashmir was majority Muslim, the majority of the population of Kashmir (including a majority within the Muslim population) did not support joining Pakistan and instead wished to join India or for independence from the two states"<sup>10</sup>.

On 24<sup>th</sup> October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir pleaded to India for help. India had to take a swift decision and further rush her troops to save Kashmir. But Nehru feared that direct military action would lead to war with Pakistan. Ultimately he decided to send the troops on 27<sup>th</sup> October. Nehru took four critical days in taking an urgent decision. On the same day, the first Indian battalion was airlifted to Srinagar. It had arrived just in time. "A few minutes later the airfield might well have been in enemy hand" (Nesenko, 1977:40).

The Indian troops resisted the invading forces from Srinagar, pressing it back beyond river Uri and thus ceased the invader's offensive operation. That was the best and the last opportunity in his lifetime to get the Kashmir problem permanently solved. Nehru could have ordered the army to clear the entire territory of Kashmir, but he did not. Britain and USA wanted that India should refer the Kashmir issue to the UNO so that it could pave the way for their interference.

The war officially ends on January 1, 1949, when the United Nations arranges a ceasefire, with an established ceasefire line, a UN peacekeeping force and a recommendation that the referendum on the accession of Kashmir to India is held as agreed earlier. That referendum has yet to be held. Pakistan controls roughly one-third of the state, referring to it as Azad

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
<sup>10</sup> This information has been accessed from [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) on 16/062017.

(free) Jammu and Kashmir. It is semi-autonomous. A larger area, including the former kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar, is controlled directly by the central Pakistani government. The Indian (eastern) side of the ceasefire line is referred to as Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries refer to the other side of the ceasefire line as "occupied" territory (Hasim, 2014:27).

### **3.2.2. Chinese Aggression (1962).**

In 1962, India fought a disastrous border war with China. The origin of Indo-China war lay in two intertwined issues: the boundary dispute and the Tibet. The western sector consists of boundary of the Ladhak with Sinkiang and Tibet. Here both India and China claimed the area of Aksai Chin. The eastern sector comprises the boundary between Tibet and India's North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now known as Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that the boundary ran along the McMahon Line, agreed upon in the 1914 Shimla conference between India, China, and Tibet. On this occasion, the Chinese representative had initialed the map depicting the Shimla conference. When the dispute arose, the Indians argued that the Chinese had rejected the conference owing to differences on the boundary between Tibet and mainland China, and not on account of the McMahon Line. In any case, it did not matter, for Tibet exercised treaty-making powers at that time. The Chinese, however, held that they had never assented to this alignment, and that Tibet had no right to conclude agreements with British India. The dispute in the central sector, along with the boundary between Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, and Tibet was minor a one (Raghavan, 2007:157).

**FIGURE 3.1: All Disputed Areas along Sino-Indian Border**



**Source:** Jagga, Brigider R.K. (2012). China's Growing Power and Implications for India: Will it be a Cooperative/Competitive or Hostile Relationship? *Royal College of Defence Studies*, 38. Wiltshire: Defence Academy of UK.

The origins of the India-China war are difficult to fathom from conventional IR perspectives. Both NEFA and Aksai Chin were resource poor, sparsely populated and located well away from major population centers. While Aksai Chin provided access to Tibet and might, therefore have strategic values for the Chinese, no such argument is adequate in explaining India's claim. While NEFA has been integrated into the Indian Union as the state of Arunachal Pradesh, it did not hold this significance in 1962 and there are clear indications that China was willing to renounce its claim to the region on the basis of a new border agreement (Chacko, 2014:76).

Suffice to say that Indian defence planner had grossly mis-estimated Chinese capabilities, Indian intelligence about Chinese intentions had been fundamentally flawed, and rampant political interference and utterly compromised the Indian military strategy designed to cope with a Chinese attack. Faced with Chinese intransigence along the Himalayan border, India had embarked upon a dubious military strategy known as the forward policy. This had

involved sending in small, lightly armed military units into the Chinese-claimed territories designed to demonstrate India's control thereof. Indian troops lacked both firepower and logistic support. When the Chinese attack in force, the vast majority of the Indian defenses, especially in the eastern sector, collapsed. China imposed a humiliating ceasefire on India after successfully occupying what India deemed to be some 14,000 square miles of its territory. The Indian exercise had been a classic case of compliance failure, the inability to match resolve with capabilities (Schelling, 1968: 123).

It was not until after the military debacle with China in 1962 that the Indian defence Policy underwent a fundamental reorientation. In the wake of the disastrous defeat at the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), Indian defence planners undertook a major reassessment of India's defence needs. They came to the inexorable realization that India could ill-afford to rely on diplomatic platitudes and professions of goodwill to protect its vital national security interests. Nehru and his successor, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, proved unwilling to formally jettison the doctrine of Non-Alignment, which had been a cornerstone of India's foreign policy. Accordingly India did not seek a formal military relationship with the United States or the Soviet Union (Haqqani, 2005:88). Instead, it sought and received modest military assistance from the United States, and attempted to build its defence industrial base. Though India was embarrass defeated, the armed forces embarked on an ambitious military modernization plan that sought to create a 45 squadron air force armed with supersonic aircraft, a million man army with 10 new mountain divisions trained and equipped for mountain warfare, and a more powerful navy with greater reach (Thomas, 1996:113).

### **3.2.3. Indo-Pak War (1965)**

Long before India could recover from the military calamity of 1962, it became embroiled in the second war with Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan's military dictatorship of Mohammed Ayub Khan initiated this war based upon an illusory belief that it enjoyed widespread support amongst the Muslim population of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir (Brines, 1968:67). Pakistani decision makers had further inferred that the Indian leadership lacked political resolve, since an early Pakistani incursion in the trackless wastes of the

Rann of Kutch in the Indian state of Gujarat in 1964 had not encountered stiff Indian Military resistance (Ganguly, 1989: 86).

Within a week of the Pakistani incursions in Kashmir in September 1965, India opened a second front in Punjab and even crossed the international border. This form of horizontal escalation enabled India to relieve pressure in Kashmir. The war lasted a few weeks and was brought to a close with United Nations sponsored ceasefire. Since the United States evinced little interest in resolving the dispute, the Soviet swiftly stepped into the breach. Accordingly, they mediated a post-war settlement in the Central Asian city of Tashkent, USSR (now in Uzbekistan) in 1966 (agreement was signed between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan). Under the terms of the Tashkent Accord, the two sides agreed to return to the status quo ante and to also abjure from the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute (Kasturi, 2007:147).

Even though the 1965 war had not produced a clear-cut victor, the Indian armed forces had acquitted themselves admirably. Nevertheless, the memories of the 1962 military debacle rankled, and Indian fears of further Chinese malfeasance remained. Indeed, following the initial Chinese nuclear test of 1964, a firestorm of controversy broke out in India about the advisability of India acquiring its own nuclear deterrent. In the end, India chose not to embark on a crash nuclear weapons programme. Instead, it set in motion a modest effort to acquire a nuclear weapons option. To this end, in 1966 the government sanctioned the Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP) (Mirchandani, 1968: 101).

### **3.2.4 The Liberation War (1971)**

The third Indo-Pakistani conflict did not take place over Kashmir. Instead, it stemmed from the dynamics of Pakistan's internal politics. The crisis that ultimately culminated in the war had both long-term and more proximate cause. The underlying causes of the crisis could be traced to the structural imbalances that had long characterized the two wings of Pakistan (East and West Pakistan) (Zaheer, 1994:56). The bulk of foreign assistance was disbursed in West Pakistan, most industrial investments were located in the western wing, and East Pakistanis were poorly represented in the civil services and the military. Furthermore, East Pakistanis had long resented the imposition of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan.

The more immediate precipitants of the crisis were the results of Pakistan's first free and fair election, in which the Awami League, an East Pakistani based political party, won an overwhelming victory in December 1970 in East Pakistan. Matters deadlocked over the question of power-sharing between the two wings as both military establishment and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People Party (PPP), which had swept the polls in West Pakistan, proved utterly intransigent. By early March, Awami League supporters had become increasingly restive and on 25 March, the Pakistani Army embarked on a major military crackdown in East Pakistan. The military crackdown resulted in deaths of several hundred thousand Bengalis, and the flight of about 10 million individuals into the border states of India, most notably Tripura and West Bengal (Rao, 1991:157).

The Indian government, under Indira Gandhi's leadership, swiftly decided that it would have to resort to war to ensure a return of the refugees to East Pakistan. To this end, her government drew up extensive politico-military plans for a sharp, swift thrust into East Pakistan. Much of this task was entrusted to General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, the chief of Army Staff. Manekshaw, who was given a free hand with military planning, decided that it was best to wait until he had succeeded in moving sufficient numbers of troops and armour from other fronts, and until winter had closed the Himalayas passes before embarking on a major military offensive. His decision to wait until winter made eminent strategic sense. With the Himalayan passes snowbound, The People's Republic of China (PRC), Pakistan's principal regional ally, would not be able to open a second front (Jacob, 1997:41).

External concern and support for India's plight proved to be merger. The American position was downright unhelpful. The Nixon administration was acutely beholden to the Yahya Khan regime in Pakistan for having served as a conduit for the opening to the PRC, and was consequently quite unsympathetic to India's concern (Smith, 2005:112). To neutralize what she and her advisers perceived to be an emerging US-Pakistan-China nexus, Mrs. Gandhi signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971 (Horn, 1982:98). With political initiatives to resolve the crisis exhausted, with India's Himalayan flank military secured, and with Soviet diplomatic support guaranteed, India responded with considerable vigor to a Pakistani attack on its

western borders on 2 December 1971. Within three weeks Indian troops had successfully marched into Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan. The untrammelled Indian military victory contributed to the breakup of Pakistan and led to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh (Kasturi, 2007:156).

India's military victory in this war put to rest any lingering doubts about its pre-eminent politico-military status in South Asia. It also allayed the military's misgivings about its performance during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. From 1972-1979, the region enjoyed a period of unprecedented peace as the military balance tilted dramatically in India's favour. In large part this was possible the United States lost interest in Pakistan and terminated its military relationship with the country. Simultaneously, India solidified its arms transfer relationship with the Soviet Union and distanced itself from United States (Mansingh, 1984:134).

### **3.2.5. The Kargil War (1999)**

The overt Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons had greatly emboldened Pakistan's decision-makers. They had become convinced that their possession of nuclear weapons had now neutralized India's conventional superiority. Quite correctly, they had assumed that India would be unwilling to expand the scope of a future conflict for fear of escalation to the nuclear level (Kapur, 2003:89). This realization led them to embark on a limited probe in Kargil district in the state of Jammu and Kashmir across the Line of Control (LoC) in April-May 1999.

In the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, in an effort to allay international concerns, Prime Minister Vajpayee had undertaken an effort to improve relations with Pakistan. To this end, in February 1999, he had travelled from the city of Amritsar to Lahore in Pakistan to initiate a new bus service. In Lahore, the two sides had agreed to a series of nuclear confidence-building measures. In the aftermath of the Lahore summit, Indian policymakers had assumed that relations with Pakistan, though far from ideal, were nevertheless on the mend. Accordingly, they had reduced the normal levels of surveillance and monitoring along the LoC in Kashmir. Pakistani decision-makers, however, exploited this gap in Indian intelligence gathering to undertake probe (Mir, 2014:110)

Despite the initial failure to anticipate and stem a Pakistani incursion across LoC, India's armed forces acted with considerable alacrity once the scope and extent of the incursion became evident in early May 1999. By early July, in a series of successful joint operations, the army, in concert with the air force, managed to evict the bulk of the intruders. Faced with imminent defeat, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to Washington D.C, to plead his case to President Clinton. In a significant shift in American Policy, which had frequently equivocated on questions of responsibility in terms of the onset of various Indo-Pakistani crises, the United States forthrightly blamed Pakistan for the incursions. The Kargil war ended with Pakistan failing to secure its objectives and under the US and G-8 countries pressure that were assembled at Cologne (Germany), Pakistan decided to accept the ceasefire declared by India on July 11, 1999. India had set July, 1999 as the deadline before Pakistan for the total withdraw and Pakistan complied with it (Talbot, 2004:85).

### **3.3 Defence Industrialization in India**

India is probably the only country which despite having a vast defence industrial base (DIB)<sup>11</sup> still imports majority of its armaments, including several low-tech items. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is the world's largest importer of major weapons, with a 15 per cent global share during 2010-2014 (SIPRI, 2015:13)

India has the third largest Army, the fourth largest Airforce and the seventh largest Navy in the world. India is among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of military expenditure and world's largest arms importer. India allocates about 1.8% of its GDP towards defence spending, of which 40% is allocated to capital acquisitions and only about 30% of India's equipment is manufactured in India, mainly by public sector undertakings. Even when defence products are manufactured domestically, there is a large import component. All these factors make the Indian defence market one of the most attractive

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<sup>11</sup> DIB: Defence Industrial Base of India, comprises of 52 defence laboratories and establishments under DRDO; and 9 defence public sector undertakings and 39 ordnance factories under the Department of Defence Production of Ministry of Defence (MoD). (Behera, 2016: 112)



globally and provide an immense opportunity for both domestic and foreign players in the defence sector<sup>12</sup>.

The humiliating loss of the war in 1962 against China proved to be vital and realizing that India needs a better equipped defence product. India imports most of its defence requirement from Russia, USA, Israel, France and UK. But, importing defence product wasn't just answer make its defence sector, when a huge chunk of the budget was used to buy the products. At the same time India has been cheated on multiple occasion while buying Russian Mig21 and Tanks.

The defence manufacturing in India has been ongoing process. Since 1948 there has been a realization to make own war head and other essentials defence product. The defence manufacturing process in India can be divided into five phase- the Quest for self-sufficiency 1948-1960, phase two: Self-sufficiency to Self –Reliance 1960-1980, phase three: Self Reliance through Coproduction 1980-1999, phase four: Self-Reliance through Private Sector Participation 2000-2014 and phase five: Self-Reliance through Make in India initiatives 2014-

### **3.3.1. The Quest for Self-Sufficiency 1948-1960**

India's defence industrialisation immediately after independence was influenced by the country's socialistic and centralised planning system reflected in the first Industrial Policy Resolution adopted in 1948. The resolution emphasised the importance to the economy of securing a continuous increase in production and its equitable distribution and pointed out that the State must play an active role in the development of industries. The resolution, which was revised in 1956, reserved the key industries – including arms and ammunition, railways, air transport and atomic energy – in the domain of the public sector and the State assumed the exclusive right for their development. All the 18 ordnance factories that India inherited from British India formed the core of the state-led defence industry. The OFs were supported by a rudimentary R&D setup (which in 1958 became a full-fledged organisation, DRDO) and an aircraft plant, Hindustan Aircraft Factory, which was set up

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<sup>12</sup> This information has been accessed from [www.gita.org.in](http://www.gita.org.in) on 8/8/2017

in Bangalore in 1940 by the visionary industrialist Walchand Hirachand with the objective of promoting aviation industry in India.

.With the self-sufficiency model designed around low-end technology and minimal dependency on state funding, defence production up to the mid-1960s were nonetheless quite remarkable, although certain weaknesses were prevalent. The production of ordnance factories in the 1950s had 'eased dependence on foreign (primarily British) sources, which accounted for no less than 90 per cent of India's military equipment and stores in 1950'. By 1953, 80 per cent of the Army's light equipment was produced indigenously and India was self-sufficient in non-lethal stores and equipment. During this period, the government also undertook initiatives for the production of tanks, trucks, tractors and jeeps in the ordnance factories, for which technical assistance was sought from other countries (Lorne, 1967:129)

Scindia Shipyard Limited which was setup in 1941, later renamed as Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) when Indian Government acquired it. It is a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU) established with an aim to developed in-house designs for tugs, cargo vessels under standard flexible design and concept design for survey vessels etc. Similarly, Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) was established in 1757 to undertake R&D of its product range and new shipbuilding projects based on in-house design. GSL's indigenously developed designs of patrol vessels have saved country considerable foreign exchange by avoiding import of the ship designs (Ministry of Defence, 2015: 74) (MoD, 2015:74).

### **3.3.2. Self-Sufficiency to Self-Reliance 1960-1980.**

The quest for self-sufficiency to Self- Reliance was due to the events of the 1960s, particularly the 1962 war with China and the India-Pakistan war of 1965 brought about a major change in India's defence policy.

Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was incorporated as a DPSU in 1960 and is leading Shipyard amongst all DPSU Shipyards engaged in the construction of warships and submarines. The yard constructs missile destroyers and Scorpene submarines and is thus helping the nation to achieve self-reliance in warship construction for the Indian Navy. MDL has also been shortlisted to build frigates of P17A class which are follow on ships of

Shivalik class ships. MDL has also been earmarked to build future submarines under Project 75-I (MoD, 2014:71).

In 1964, three more DPSU, were established- Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), and Bharat Earthmovers Limited (BEML). HAL is the largest Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), which has so far produced 15 types of aircrafts from in-house R&D and 14 types under license production (MoD, 2015:59). BEL with its nine Strategic Business Units (SBUs), was established to adapt indigenous technologies into its product or jointly develop products for the defence forces (MoD, 2014:69). BEML is engaged in the design, manufacturing, and marketing, and after sales service of defence and aerospace products.

Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) was incorporated in the year 1970 under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). BDL has in-house Design and Engineering division for upgradation of products and development of related test equipment. BDL has been nominated as the Lead Integrator for the Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MR SAM) and Akash Surface to Air Missile (SAM) for the Indian Army and for the Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LR SAM). Missile Integrator of the Indian Navy is being developed jointly by the DRDO and Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI), Israel (Ghosh, 2016:23).

Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) was established in 1973 as a DPSU to achieve self-reliance in the manufacture of a wide range of Super alloys, Titanium alloys, Special Purpose Steels etc. for the critical sectors, with technical knowhow from foreign collaborators. MIDHANI has so far developed, manufactured and supplied more than 105 grades of high performance alloys in different shapes, sizes, forms towards programmes of national importance in the defence, space and atomic sectors In this stage of India's defence industrialisation, the concentration was more on licence production rather than on indigenous production. Apart from MiG21, a number of other programmes were taken up for licence production, including tanks, destroyers, etc. (Gupta, 1997:42).

While the first phase of defence industrialisation suffered from a poor R&D and industrial base, leading to import dependency, in the second phase, the dependency was formalized by way of forging a close relationship with the Soviet Union for licence-manufacturing in India. The painstaking efforts made for indigenous production, particularly in aeronautics,

paved the way for pure licence-based production, a feature of India's aeronautics industry that is continuing even now. The Soviet arms transfer and transfer of technologies for licence production no doubt helped India strengthen its military capability, but did little by way of strengthening its defence industrial and technological capability. As a former DRDO headnotes: "most defence production in India was under licence, which neither led to capacities to design nor develop advanced manufacturing techniques; licenses for assembly of weapon systems simply followed one another in boring succession" (Singh, 1998:65). By the end of the Cold War, India was overwhelmingly dependent on the Soviet Union: 100 per cent for ground air defence, 75 per cent for fighter aircraft defence, 60 per cent for ground attack aircraft, 100 per cent for tracked armored vehicles, 80 per cent for tanks, 100 per cent for guided missile destroyers, 95 per cent for conventional submarines and 70 per cent for frigates (Bristow, 1995:3).

### **3.3.3. Self-Reliance through Coproduction 1980-1990.**

Beginning with the mid-1980s, the government pumped up resources on R&D to enable DRDO to undertake high-profile projects. A major beginning in this respect was made in 1983 when the government sanctioned the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) at the initial cost of Rs 388.83 crore to develop four missile systems – Prithvi (surface-to-surface), Akash (surface-to-air), Trishul (naval version of Prithvi) and Nag (anti-tank) – and a Technology Demonstrator, Agni (Standing Committee on Defence, 2007:14) (SCD,2007:14). In the same year, the government also sanctioned the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) at a cost of Rs 560 crore to develop an indigenous fighter aircraft (SCD, 1997:17). The indigenous efforts were however not adequate to meet the growing requirements of the armed forces. This forced the government to look for alternatives from external sources. However, unlike in the past, the focus was shifted towards co-development and co-production with foreign companies. The beginning was made in 1998 when India and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement to jointly produce a supersonic cruise missile, BrahMos. A joint venture (JV) was set up in India with an authorised capital of \$250 million, shared 50.5 per cent by India and the balance by Russia (the equity structure is designed to enable the JV to operate like a private entity for fast decision-making) (SCD, 2006-07:5).

Since BrahMos, a number of collaborative programmes have been taken up by India, including for combat and transport aircraft and missile systems. Taking the BrahMos model further, India and Russia signed in 2007 two inter-governmental agreements for co-development and co-production of a Multi Role Transport Aircraft (MTA) and a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). India's investment share in both projects would be 50 per cent (Press Information Bureau, 2010:11 (PIB,2010:11)). Pursuant to the agreement, HAL, the designated Indian partner for these aircraft, has signed in 2010 Preliminary Design (PD) contracts with its Russian partners. The PD of FGFA, valued at \$295 million, was planned to be completed in 18 months from February 2011, after which full-scale design work would be taken up. Initially, India planned to acquire as many as 250 FGFA's from 2018 onwards (Press Information Bureau, 2012:18) (PIB, 2012:18).

For the MTA, a JV was formed in 2010 with an initial outlay of \$600.7 million (at 2006 prices), to be funded equally by both sides. Apart from Russia, India has also signed joint developmental programmes with Israel, which has become one of the top suppliers of arms to India. Cementing the growing defence trade between Tel Aviv and New Delhi, DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) are currently undertaking two missile systems: Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) and Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM) (Ministry of Defence, 2010-11:97). The LRSAM was successfully test fired by the Indian Navy on 30 December 2015. (PIB, 2015:12).

#### **3.3.4. Self-Reliance through Private Sector Participation 2000-2014.**

Self-reliance towards defence manufacturing and production took a most important turn in the early 2000s, when the government decided to open defence production and allow 100 per cent Indian private sector participation and permitted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of up to 26 per cent both, however were subject to industrial licensing conditions to be set by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2001:9) (DIPP, 2001:9). However, the liberalization process has been a long-drawn-out process, dating back to the constitution of six task forces in 1998 to explore the question (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2012:2). This did not, however, mean an easy access to defence contracts as MoD's Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) – which stipulates detailed rules and procedures for capital procurement and the source of

procurement– did not have enough provisions to facilitate private companies’ participation in defence contracts. In order to create such provisions, successive DPPs have included a host of enabling provisions that include an offset clause, two new procurement categories – Make and Buy and Make (Indian) – and a host of other measures.

Under the offset clause, which was first announced in 2005, foreign companies winning MoD contracts worth Rs. 300 crore or more are required to plough back 30 per cent of the foreign exchange component of the contractual value to the Indian defence enterprises. To facilitate the private sector to receive offsets, the government gave complete freedom to the foreign companies to choose their Indian partners. It was hoped that given the dynamism and flexibility the private sector would be the preferred partner for the foreign companies for the fulfilment of offset obligations and in the process to get to know the intricacies of defence production.

The Make category, announced in DPP-2006, is a somewhat revolutionary step, designed to provide the Indian industry, including the big private enterprises, an opportunity to indigenously design, develop and produce ‘high technology complex systems’. The category was included in DPP-2006 following the acceptance of the 2005 report of the Kelkar Committee, which recommended a host of policy measures to enhance self-reliance in defence production. For the Make projects, the government makes a commitment to provide 80 per cent of the developmental cost to the industry. Consequent to the articulation of the Make category, two big Army projects – Tactical Communication System (TCS) and Future Infantry Combat System (FICV) – were initially identified with a further plan to award as many as 150-180 projects over a period of time (Shukla, 2012:5).

Complementing the Make category is the Buy and Make (Indian), under which MoD contracts will be given to Indian industry which is in turn required to form technology tie-ups with foreign companies. This is a marked departure from another existing Buy and Make category, which has been historically used by MoD to nominate its own enterprises to undertake licence production (based on technologies supplied by the foreign companies). Apart from these initiatives, the government has also tweaked its DPP to create more opportunity for the private sector. As per DPP-2013, vendors participating in Buy (Global) contracts were given a degree of freedom to provide MToT (Maintenance Transfer of

Technology) to an Indian private entity. Earlier, MoD had retained the power to nominate the Indian partner, which was invariably a public sector enterprise under its control. The biggest change in DPP-2013 however was the preferred order of categorization in the order of: (1) Buy (Indian); (2) Buy & Make (Indian); (3) Make (Indian); (4) Buy & Make; and (5) Buy (Global). The significance of the order of categorization is that while seeking in-principle approval from the government, the armed forces are required to use the higher categories or else give justification for not doing so. The intention was that by putting the onus on the armed forces to look for indigenous-centric categories as a default option, it would reduce large-scale import (through the Buy (Global) route which is now the least preferred option) and in turn promote self-reliance. From the private sector's perspective what is significant is the higher preference accorded to Buy and Make (Indian) over Buy and Make, which has traditionally been used by MoD to negotiate technology transfer agreement with foreign vendors and hand over the negotiated licences for production to public sector units on the nomination. After this crucial change, there has been a favourable impact on the first two prioritised categories. In terms of the Acceptance of Necessities (AoNs) accorded by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the highest decision-making body of MoD, during 2013-14 and 2014-15, the first two prioritised categories accounted for 93 per cent of the value of AoNs accorded. In the previous three years, their combined share was 47 per cent (Behera, 2016:12).

### **3.3.5. Self-Reliance through Make in India Initiative 2014 onwards.**

The Make in India initiative is not restricted to the defence industry; it covers 25 diverse sectors and constitutes a part of the Modi government's larger economic plan to propel the share of manufacturing in GDP to 25 per cent (from 16 per cent at present) and create 100 million additional jobs by 2022 (Government of India, 2015:15). Also, the model is not very different from the previous model: both of them focus on achieving the same broad goal of self-reliance in defence manufacturing through greater participation of the private sector. But where Make in India differs from the previous model is the greater degree of political and bureaucratic will to achieve the objective. The new model reposes a great deal of trust with the private sector. More importantly, to facilitate private sector participation

the government has brought in a host of ‘ease of doing business’ measures, besides bringing in an element of decisiveness in decision making.

In less than two years of coming to power, the Modi government has already taken several broad reform measures pertaining to the defence industry. These pertain to industrial licensing, FDI cap, defence exports and level playing field between private and public sectors (Behera, 2016:175). The reform in licensing which came in the form of a series of government notifications issued between 26 June 2014 and 22 September 2015, is an attempt to codify and simplify the process of granting industrial licence (IL) and remove procedural hurdles and other complexities in the process. It may be noted that from the very beginning when the private sector’s participation was allowed, there was no clarity, at least in the public domain, with regard to the items against which IL would be granted. Also, restrictive conditions were imposed while granting the IL and there was undue delay in the whole process. To streamline the process, the government has brought out a public version of a list of defence items. The list, while identifying the items which are subject to IL, has also made it clear that any item not included in the list is not subject to industrial licensing. It has also extended the validity of IL from the earlier three years to 18 years, removed the annual capacity norm as a condition for grant of IL and permitted sale of defence items to the government and public sector units and companies holding valid IL, without permission from MoD. The human interface involved in filling up the licence application has also been removed by putting it online. More significantly, the government has expedited the IL granting process. In the first year itself, it has granted some 73 ILs in comparison to 56 given in the previous three years (PIB, 2015:15).

The reform in FDI cap was first announced in the Modi government’s first budget presented to Parliament on 10 July 2014. A detailed notification was issued on 26 August 2014, which has further been revised via Press Note 12 (2015 Series) issued on 24 November 2015. As per the November 2015 notification, the FDI cap stands increased from the earlier 26 per cent to a now composite cap of 49 per cent that includes, besides FDI, investments by foreign portfolio investors (FPI), foreign institutional investors (FII) and the like. Under the previous policy, investments from FPI/FII were either banned or capped at an arbitrary level. The new policy also allows all forms of foreign investment up



to 49 per cent under the automatic route, requiring no prior government approval. For FDI beyond 49 per cent, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) is authorized to decide on each proposal 'whenever it is likely to result in access to modern and state-of-the-art technology' (DIIP, 2014:12)

The private sector has also long demanded a level playing field with the public sector defence production units, which were long exempted from paying central excise and customs duties on goods supplied to the defence forces. In response, the government has withdrawn both exemptions on 30 April 2015. These notifications have also encouraged foreign companies such as Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems to actively explore the scope of future investment in India (PIB, 2105:17)

Make in India also emphasises putting the private sector at the heart of the procurement process. The private sector envisages it to be an opportune time to forge tie up's with foreign OEM's to bring in cutting edge technology for the manufacture of various defence systems in India. Such like defence manufacturing could be undertaken either independently or as a JV with foreign partners. Notwithstanding the perceptual differences, it can be safely assumed that in case the Government's aim is to acquire and develop in-house research, design, development and production capabilities to enhance the self-reliance of the existing Indian DITB (Ghosh, 2016:160-161).

All the phrase in the defence manufacturing has some essence in India Security strategy. The Make in India initiative has no doubt created a buzz in India's private sector defence industry. However, the private sector currently constitutes the smallest segment of the Indian defence production and technology sector, which continues to be dominated by the public sector, including DRDO. The reason for this is that there could always be the risk that such a 'Make in India' campaign could finally end up becoming a programme of 'Make in the Private sector through ToT from Foreign OEMs. As a result, what happened in the Indian defence public sector in the last 70 years could very well get replicated in the private sector, with virtually no knowledge creation and technology incubation as was experienced by the public sector earlier (Behera, 2016:176).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter basically dealt with the evolution of Indian security strategy. India's security strategy has been evolving since 1947 and still is. Like the rest of nations, India holds its national integrity and national interest as the heart of its national security strategy and foreign policies. India's journey from 1947 to the present day, in terms of security strategy, can be comprehended as a transition from idealism under Nehru, through a period of hard realism or realpolitik lasting about the mid-1960s till the mid-1980s, to economically driven pragmatism.

Initially, Indian security strategy was based on the principles of opposition, racialism, and imperialism, particularly, till 1962. Therefore, as a natural corollary, India extends support to United Nation and has followed a policy of Non-Alignment throughout the period of Cold War. This has led India to adhere to the principles of Panchsheel.

Nevertheless, the policy of Non-Alignment came under doubt owing to its proximity association with the Soviet Union. The Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 confirmed the international concerns regarding India's attitude towards Non-Alignment. Then, Rajiv Gandhi' Action Plan at United Nations indicated a complete throwback to Nehruvian Non-Alignment posturing by proposing a much-touted "Action Plan" at United Nations for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Cold War's end had a profound impact on Indian security strategy. Importantly, the end of the Indo-Soviet security relationship and a general transformation of India's foreign and security relationship with Israel. With the introduction of economic reforms of 1991 the gap between India and ASEAN got reduced. The shifts in Indian security strategy policy manifested in various way, the nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998 were one of its outcomes. NSC and CDS were formed to handle major security challenges in times of crisis. Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement of 2005 and 2008 was the result of the transformation in Indian security strategy.

India was in a state of war with Pakistan in four occasions and with China in 1962. The time of crisis also paved a way to enhance Indian security strategy and defence policy in terms of military capabilities. India realized that strengthening its military power and capabilities was most to formulate a strong national security strategy.

Defence manufacturing in India is also a way to enhance its security strategy. The defence manufacturing industries are flourishing in India and in near future, it could self-sufficiency in defence product manufacturing and even be an importer of defence goods to other nations. Post-independence, from 1947 and up to the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak wars in the early sixties, the absence of a DIBT in India had compelled large scale import of capital equipment for defence. Such equipment was mostly produced from off the shelf and from militarily advanced countries like the UK, France and Sweden. The trend since has continued, barring a few contracts post-1971 with the erstwhile Soviet Union, which allowed for Indigenous Manufacture under licensed production agreements. Technology transfer then was limited in scope and did not extend to design and development. Thus, the induction and pace of imbibing new technologies by the Indian defence industry remained slow.

Coupled to this were comparatively low levels of investment in defence by both the government and the private sectors, the technology embargos and control regimes of the industrially advanced countries, a minimum Transfer of Technology in licensed production and its poor absorption by the recipients. Moreover, there was neither any incentive for the industry to progress the pace of indigenization in terms of its content nor any mechanism by the government to monitor and verify the same in terms of the timelines, as and when these were stipulated in a few contracts. To make things worse, the government accentuated the problem by keeping the Indian private industry out of the defence sectors manufacturing and production activities for a considerable period of time, as compared to other military advanced countries thereby, further increasing the dependency on foreign sources and imports.

Make in India programme of the Indian government is a perfect solution to produce an indigenous defence product. It also supports private sector participation in defence production. But the challenge seems to be that almost all the Indian prime players involved in defence business have signed MOU's with leading manufacturers abroad for the transfer of technology of specific major defence systems. The defence manufacturing process in India can be divided into five phases- the Quest for self-sufficiency 1948-1960, phase two: Self-sufficiency to Self-Reliance 1960-1980, phase three: Self Reliance

through Coproduction 1980-1999, phase four: Self-Reliance through Private Sector Participation 2000-2014 and phase five: Self-Reliance through Make in India initiatives 2014-.

Regardless of, all the security strategies, many failures which are holding India as a limping power in its own region. The international agenda have fissile out from the hands of India. China has been showing its aggressive posture against India, who can forget the recent border issue of Dokhlam in Sikkim. Pakistan continues to burn the pockets of India. Smaller neighbours of India irritate India on many occasion. The hot seat of UN is still eluding from India's reach. Terrorism haunts and kills thousands of Indians. Multilateral International bodies are not working on the framework of Indian interest. Despite all the hindrance and failures India's security strategy has been proved to be one of the strongest national policies in the world.

## CHAPTER 4

### SCOPE AND CHALLENGES OF 'MAKE IN INDIA' PROGRAMME

#### Introduction

On 25<sup>th</sup> September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi pronounced the concept of 'Make in India' which is supposed to be an international marketing strategy by attracting foreign investments, to make India the manufacturing hub. Ever escalating international competition has provided the manufacturers from around the world the opportunities of inexpensive labour, raw material, capital and of course the booming potential of the markets. The aim is to increase the GDP to 25% as compared to the present stagnant GDP of 16%, to create 100 million job opportunities by 2022 according to national manufacturing policy.

'Make in India' is a deliberate effort to assist investment (both domestic and foreign), nurturing innovation, strengthen skill development, preventing brain drain and making the use of globally standardized technology reasonably priced for Indian citizens. 'Make in India' is the solution to give new life to the Indian economy. It is an effort to pull out our economy from the shackles of recession. It aims to correct the GDP composition of India which presently is tilted towards service sector.

'Make in India' initiative aims to make India an integral part of the global supply chain. It is about making Indian companies excel in a globalized workspace. India has vigorously opened up its economy – Defence, Railways, Construction, Insurance, Pension have all been rapidly opened up for Foreign Direct Investment. India today is one of the most open economies of the world

In order to achieve this, the Government of India has taken up a series of measures to radically improve Ease of Doing Business. Its objective – make the regulatory environment easy and simple for business to flourish. It has effectively used technology to converge and integrate departments. 14 services are integrated with eBiz portal which will function as a single window portal for obtaining clearances from various government agencies.

India has rich natural resources, skilled and abundant labour force and increasing middle class. India is viewed as the upcoming outsourcing and manufacturing hub by the international investors. It's an effort made by the Government of India to harness the international demand for cheap labor and abundant natural resources. An effort by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to promote companies to make India a manufacturing hub by diverting their production units in India.

Since the year 2009, the manufacturing sector of India is showing a reverse trend with its share of GDP falling from 2.2 to 2.0 (Bruce, 2014:289). It is undoubtedly true that, if India aspires to be a powerful nation by 2030, it needs a strong sustainable growth which can only be achieved if India creates a strong manufacturing base (Shah, 2013:1). The existing labour laws are less employment friendly and biased towards the organized labour force; they protect employment and do not encourage employment or employability; they give scope for illegitimate demands of the Trade Unions and are a major cause for greater acceptance of capital-intensive methods in the organized sector (Milly, 2007:2). Employers complain of major skills gaps, and fewer than 25% of graduates are estimated to be employable in manufacturing<sup>13</sup>. India's underdeveloped infrastructure is the top most issue faced by Japanese manufacturers (Make in India, 2015:9). Senior managers of manufacturing companies consistently rank difficulties in acquiring land as one of the top priority areas to be tackled by the government. The share of manufactured goods in total merchandise exports fell from 77 percent in 2003 to 65 percent in 2013 (Joumard, 2015:9). 'Make in India' is a dream campaign launched by the Prime Minister of India to boost this sector so that India can present its candidature for becoming the Global Leader (Chattopadhyay, 2015:11).

This chapters aims to study the scope and challenges of 'Make in India' Programme. This chapter would give an account of the contemporary security initiatives in India and its scope and challenges with reference to 'Make in India' Programme. This chapter has analyses the data collected through the primary source and field visit.

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<sup>13</sup>The information has been accessed from [www.planningcommission.gov.in](http://www.planningcommission.gov.in). Accessed on 10/10/2017

#### **4.1 Made in India V/S ‘Make in India’**

After independence, Indian government wanted to establish and developed industrial sector with our own resources for that purpose to create awareness, to foster industrialization, Government of India start Made in India Abhiyan. To made sound and strong India, government decide Industrial policy and provided financial support, infrastructural facilities, technical support to Indian industrialist and open rural, urban and international market for their product. Since 1950, we are successful through Made in India Abhiyan. In simple words, we can say that Made in India means our investment, our infrastructure, our resources, our market and our customer. Made in India applies to any product that is manufactured by the domestic or foreign corporation. The product is Indian product as long as it is made fully in India. After independence and especially, the introduction of new industrial policy in 1991, featured with inclusive growth of India. The root of Made in India concept bowed with Mahatma Gandhiji’s Swadeshi Movement. Made in India put both together, people and capital<sup>14</sup>.

Made in India involves swadeshi land, labour, capital, entrepreneurship and technology or intellectual property. Made in India refers to India's own Brand Equity in Indian and/or foreign markets. It is an invitation to foreign capital, technology or Intellectual property (innovations) to employ Indian manpower and land to manufacture goods in India for the domestic market and/or export market. Made in India involves capital outflows in the form of dividend, interest and royalty, capital, etc. in the long-run. Unless it is covered by exports, it may amount to the postponement of present bop pressures to future. Made in India may not be able to provide solution to present BOP imbalance unless it leads to the growth of exports, import substitution. But, it will not involve any forex outflow in future (Gupta, 2015:105-106).

‘Make in India’ is different, in this movement we allowed and invite to other countries, industrialist to come in India invest money and produce and manufacture within India. ‘Make in India’ is a project which is inspired by the Chinese project ‘Make in China’, which raised China’s GDP considerably. In this project foreign company can set up their

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<sup>14</sup>The information has been accessed from [www.iaeme.com](http://www.iaeme.com) on 05/10/2017.

factories in India by investing their capital and technology. The government provides subsidies to make them run (Chaudhari, 2015:37).

#### **4.2. Aims and Objectives of ‘Make in India.’**

‘Make in India’ programme was launched by Narendra Modi on 25<sup>th</sup> December to boost the country economy. Make in India was also a strategy to build the Indian security strategy resilient. Make in India covers 25 sectors which vary from automobile production, IT Industries, Pharmaceutical production, defence production etc.

The main objective of ‘Make in India’ are as follows:

1. To create employment
2. To bring foreign investment and technology (through FDI)
3. To increase India’s GDP
4. Indigenization of India product. (Government of India, 2015: 3)

##### **4.2.1. Employment Generation**

The ‘Make in India’ programme covers 25 sectors and there will be a huge demand for skill and unskilled labour. It has targeted the youth of the country. The investments in the targeted sectors, i.e. telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, tourism etc. will encourage the young entrepreneurs to come forth with their innovative ideas without worrying about the source of speculation (Khan, 2017:2-3).

‘Make in India’ have attracted a huge number of foreign investment in India which will be helpful in generating employment. There is a direct and positive relationship between FDI and employment. As firms are operated in India they require skilled and unskilled labour. In India, labour is a cheap source and available in abundant. Therefore, FDI provides employment to all the section of the people. They contribute a good proportionate of the total employment

##### **4.2.2. Foreign Investment and Technology (through FDI) and Increase GDP**

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment made by an organization/entity in one country in an industrial/business activity in another country. FDI can take place in the form of establishing new business operations from scratch or acquiring existing business assets



in the other country. FDI includes mergers and acquisitions, building new facilities, expansion of existing production capacity, etc. FDI usually involves control/participation in management, joint-venture, management expertise and technology transfer. It excludes investment through purchase of securities or portfolio foreign investment, a passive investment in the securities of another country.

Make in India's objective is to bring foreign investment and technology through FDI. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become one significant element in this rising trend of globalization and integration in this world economy, although the question as to how, and to what extent, FDI affects economic growth is relatively conflicted from one study to another. Moreover, in developing countries, FDI is often seen as an important contribution for economic growth, and some development economists have long argued that countries pursuing outward-oriented development strategies are more likely to achieve higher rates of economic growth than those that are internally focused (Suchitra, 2010:23). The vast impact of FDI on economic growth may directly affect the growth by contributing to capital accumulation and the transfer of new technologies to the recipient countries or indirectly by augmenting the stock knowledge of the recipient countries (Mello, 1999:133).

FDI plays a vital role to make a substantial contribution to the economic growth by investing in sectors and bringing along with other indirect positive impacts including the transfer of technology, training, skills, employment, to name just a few, which all contribute to the long term development of the recipient countries. In addition, the outstanding increase in FDI inflows demands the analysis of their relationship because the positive relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth cannot be universally agreed and the certainty whether FDI cause economic growth can be varied, yet the critical importance of FDI inflow to one economy cannot be denied (Moolio, 2013:87-88).

Manufacturing of products in India will help the economic growth of the country, this will not only boost the trade sector but also will increase the GDP of Indian economy. Various sectors such as exportation, architecture, textiles, telecommunications etc. are likely to flourish inevitably, strengthening the Indian economy.

### **4.2.3. Indigenization of India product and innovation in India**

Indigenization has the biggest objective of 'Make in India'. It aims to reverse the current imbalance between the import of goods and indigenous manufacture various products. Indigenization has mainly target defence sector, India has been depended mostly on a foreign country for its defence supply.

There are several aspects of this process, the best case scenario being that we have the ability to design, develop, make i.e. the ability to manufacture and integrate, test, maintain and upgrade the defence systems we require and, if possible, export these on one hand while developing synergy with the civilian sector on the other. Where this is not feasible, we should be able to at least manufacture or integrate the system within the country with the help of full technology transfer. Given the nature of the defence materials, this may not be possible all the time. In such cases we should at least have the ability to provide a life cycle support i.e. repair and maintenance if not mid-life upgrade (Singh, 2015:39).

India is gearing up to upgrade its ease of doing business parameters and addressing necessary policy reforms to attract investments under 'Make in India', it is very important to put the highest priority in strengthening its innovation ecosystem, primarily led by industry and in partnership with government, academic and research institutions, nationally and globally. India's position in global innovation index has been sliding year on year basis.

### **4.3. Challenges of Make in India.**

There are many challenges that hinder the smooth progress of the manufacturing sector which in turn adversely affect the 'Make in India' campaign. They are as follows:

#### **4.3.1. Infrastructure**

The growth of manufacturing sector is highly dependent on its quality of infrastructure. The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (2015-16) has given 81<sup>st</sup> rank to India out of 140 countries for its deficiency in infrastructure. Quality infrastructure is one of the top requirements for the success of "Make in India". India's underdeveloped infrastructure is the top most issue faced by Japanese manufacturers<sup>15</sup>. .Roadways in India

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<sup>15</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.mof.go.jp](http://www.mof.go.jp) on 13/10/2017

pose a big challenge for the growth of the country and successive governments are continuously failing to implement their electoral promises (Chattopadhyaya, 2015:25). The projects of railways department suffer from even longer delays as compared to road sector. Also, rail transport is 70% more expensive in India as compared to the United States which makes it inefficient<sup>16</sup>. There is a nationwide scarcity in terms of power generation. About 48% of firms suffer from power cuts for more than 5 hours in a week and around 60% of firms are ready to pay more for continuous and reliable supply. In order to promote the foreign trade, ports play a very important role. There is a scarcity of modernised ports and those that exist, are using 90% of their capacity as against an average of 70% international usage.

#### **4.3.2. Labour Laws**

India's labour regulations are among the world's most stringent and complex, and over time have limited the growth of the formal manufacturing sector<sup>17</sup>. The present labour laws favour the employees and protect employment and also a big tool in the hands of trade unions to raise their bargaining power giving a way to go for capital intensive methods in the organized sector. This adversely affects the expansion of employment and generating jobs (Milly, 2007:3).

There are more than 200 laws regarding conditions of employment, social security, health, safety, welfare, trade unions, industrial and labour disputes, etc.<sup>18</sup> From the year 2004-05 to 2011-12, the rate of employment growth was just 0.5% with contrast to 2.8% during 1999 to 2005 (Bruce, 2014:289). The Industrial Disputes Act 1947, Section 9A requires (an industry with at least 50 workers), worker's consent to modify job description or move workers from one plant to another. It further requires at least 21 days in the notice before modifying wages, hours of work, rest intervals, and leave and chapter V-B of the same act with employees more than 100 requires industrial firms to obtain prior government permission to lay-off or retrench one or more workers. Another problem is lost relevance of most of the labour regulations in the present day.

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<sup>16</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.dxdoi.org](http://www.dxdoi.org) on 10/10/2017

<sup>17</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.mays.tamu](http://www.mays.tamu) on 5/10/2017

<sup>18</sup> The information has been accessed from [www.nishithdesai.com](http://www.nishithdesai.com) on 28/09/2107

### **4.3.3. Skill Workers**

Education and skill are the key forces for the growth and development of a country. The countries with high skilled labour can do much better than others. But the situation in India is very gloomy with huge skill gaps. Although India has improved a lot in education its competitors are much ahead in this area (Skill Development, 2006: 2). As per the report named “Higher Education in India: Vision 2030” by FICCI and Ernst Young, 75% of IT graduates are deemed ‘unemployable’, 55% in manufacturing, 55% in healthcare and 50% in banking and insurance graduates are deemed unemployable (Bhagowaty, 2016:7). Further, in India, only 3.5 million workers are undergoing skills courses a year, compared with 90 million in China (Nam, 2014:1). The quality of higher education is also low. As per NAAC report “the quality of education in 90% of the Universities and 70% of the colleges is below par” (Joumard, 2015: 21).

### **4.3.4. Ease of Doing Business**

Ease of doing business is the major obstacle to the growth of the manufacturing sector. The World Bank’s “Ease of doing Business 2015” report has ranked India at 142<sup>nd</sup> out of 189 countries for its ease of doing business. The “ease of doing business” covers ease in starting a business, enforcing contracts, registering property, gaining access to electricity, paying taxes, etc. The easier and simple process gives a country a good rank. The more the complex and time consuming process the poorer is the rank given (Ease of Doing Business, 2014: 12).

### **4.3.5. Research and Development**

The expenditure on Research and Development in India is just 0.9 of GDP. Moreover around 3/4th the share comes from the public sector and just 1/4th is invested by private sector showing severe contrast to the trends followed in the US and China (The Manufacturing Plan, 2016:15). The credit of the faded growth of manufacturing goes to the low technological depth of the sector. Indian R&D sector is still under explored as India lags behind her competitors in infrastructural and technological development. Therefore it poses a big challenge to the investors to improve further in skill and standardization of the issues.

#### **4.3.6. Land Acquisition**

Land acquisition is another major issue involving a lengthy and cumbersome process. It is one of the main reasons for delay of the projects. About 70% of the infrastructure projects got delayed due to it (OECD, 2014: 39). It takes 14 months on an average to acquire land (Ease of doing business, 2014: 12). Another difficulty is to establish the land title due to incomplete land records (Joumard, 2015: 29) which becomes a cause of litigation later. Also the owners of the land are often inadequately compensated which again leads to disputes and delays.

#### **4.3.7. Exports**

Exports play a major role in the growth of the manufacturing sector. But the share of India in global merchandise exports has been very low as compared to other countries like it rose from 0.5% in 1990 to 1% in 2006 and 1.8% in 2013. Whereas the developing countries' share in global merchandise exports rose from 24% in 1990 to 38% in 2006 and 45% in 2013 (France, 2015:2). India's export basket, 62% comprises of manufacturing exports (as of 2013) which is the lowest among most Asian economies with China having 94%, Japan 88%, Philippines 77%, Singapore 70% and Thailand having 74% (Government of India, 2015: 5). The major reasons behind the declining manufacturing exports are the slow rate of growth of the sector, the small share of high tech exports, inadequate infrastructure, etc.

#### 4.4. Data, Interpretation and Analysis

The study was conducted in New Delhi where various think tanks, universities and institutions are located. The Institutions like IDSA, CLAWS, JNU, IPCS, IPSC, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence were visited to extract information regarding the study. The total respondents were 37. The respondents were selected by going through the profile and whose interest compatible with the study.

**Table No. 4.1:**

#### **Profile of Respondent**

CATEGORY	GENDER			Male %	Female %	Total %
	M	F	TOTAL			
<b>Academicians</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>63.64</b>	<b>36.36</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Military Personnel</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Research Scholars</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>58.33</b>	<b>41.67</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Government Employee</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Field work<sup>19</sup>, 27 October to 27 November 2017.

The above table shows the profile and category of respondents. The respondents were divided into four categories- Academicians from various universities and institutions, Military personnel (not below the rank of Colonel) and who have association with various institutions like IDSA and CLAWS, Research scholar from universities whose areas were related with the national security issue or whose topics were compatible with the study were

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<sup>19</sup> Fieldwork has been conducted during 27 October to 27 November, 2017. Hereafter it is referred as field work.


determined. Similarly, a government employee from the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance were also taken into consideration.

Most of the respondents were academicians and research scholars- 11 academicians, and 12 research scholars, 10 military personnels, and 4 government employees. The respondents were determined with a notion that they were linked with the related study. All the respondent had a concrete knowledge regarding the topic of the study. All the respondents had some interconnection with the study. In-fact the determination of respondents were based on their experience or their association with 'Make in India'.

Out of 37 respondents, 10 respondents were female while 17 were male. Out of 10 female respondents, 4 respondents were from academics background, 5 were research scholars and 1 government employee. No female respondent were found in the category of military personnel. In terms of the male respondent 7 were academicians, all 10 respondent from military personnel's, 7 research scholars and 3 government employee.

**Figure No. 4.1.**

**Age Group of Respondent**



Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

Age of respondent was considered as the response of the questionnaire varied from one age group to another. Age group was divided into three ranges-25-30 years, 31-50 years and 51+ years. 8 respondent were under 25 -30 years (all the 8 respondent were research scholar), 16 respondent were under 31-50 which consists of 7 academician, 3 military personnel, 4 research scholar and 1 government employee. 13 respondent were under 51+ years which consist of 4 academician, 7 military personnel and 3 government employee. No research scholar was under the age group of 51+ years.

**Table No. 4.2.**

**Security Strategy with Neighbouring Countries**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	4	36.36	7	63.64	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	6	60.00	4	40.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Research Scholar	5	41.67	5	41.67	2	16.66	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	2	50.00	2	50.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.


\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree

Most of the respondents were positive towards the change of Indian Security strategy with our neighbouring countries. 17 respondents strongly agree, while 18 respondents agree to it. India need to rethink it security strategy as there has been an escalation of tension with Pakistan and China. Pakistan and China growing alliance is a worry some for India. China has always been an all-weather friend of Pakistan.



**Figure No. 4.2:**

**FDI and Make in India**



Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

Most of the respondents agreed that there has been an increase in FDI through 'Make in India'. 17 respondents strongly believed there has been an increase in FDI through 'Make in India' and 14 respondents agreed to it. While 3 respondents were uncertain about it. 1 respondent did not agree on it and 2 respondent strongly disagreed on the rise of FDI through Make in India.

Most of the respondent who agrees upon the increase of FDI through make in India since the ease of doing business which Make in India would ensure will increase FDI inflow. Few respondent were uncertain and those who disagree had a view that due to political reason it would be hard to attract FDI through Make in India.

The FDI policies of Government have played a crucial role for foreign companies investing in India. The foreign Defence companies like Israel Airspace Industries, Rafael (Israel)

BAE India System have already invested in India. Furthermore, the FDI 100 percent have attracted other giants like Airbus (France), Raytheon (USA) etc.

**Table No. 4.3**

**Employment Generation through Make in India**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	5	45.45	5	45.45	1	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	0	0.00	10	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Research Scholar	0	0.00	6	50.00	3	25.00	3	25.00	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree

Most of the respondents agreed that ‘Make in India’ will generate employment. 5 academicians strongly agreed that make in India would generate employment. 24 respondents agreed to it which consists of - 5 academics, 10 military personnel, 6 research scholars and 3 government employees. 4 respondents were uncertain about it. 3 research scholars disagreed that ‘Make in India’ would generate employment.

The respondent who agreed that ‘Make in India’ would generate employment believed that ‘Make in India’ means more manufacturing which will lead to more employment opportunities. ‘Make in India’ would also attract huge FDI which implies more employment. Few respondents were of the view that ‘Make in India programme’ would be failure so it won’t generate employment.

With a lot of foreign companies coming and investing, they would require a manpower (skill and un-skill) for the production process. The large population of India would provide

a cheap labour for companies investing in India. There also seems to be a problematic situation of Indian labour. India lacks skilled labour. The labour law in India is most stringent and complex. The present labour law protects employees and employment and also a big tool in the hands of trade unions to raise their bargaining power giving way to go for capital intensive methods in the organized sector. This could adversely affect the expansion of employment and generating jobs.

**Table No. 4.4**

**Defence Manufacturing**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	3	27.27	6	54.55	2	18.18	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	0	0.00	10	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Research Scholar	0	0.00	6	50.00	6	50.00		0.00	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree

There seems to be a positive feedback on the successful promotion of defence manufacturing in India through 'Make in India'. Only 9 respondents were uncertain regarding the promotion of defence manufacturing. 25 respondents agreed upon the promotion of defence manufacturing through Make in India. 3 respondents strongly agreed to it.

Since independence we have been depended on foreign supplies for our defence requirements and have suffered due to supplier pressure, denial of spares for political reasons, high costs, delays and lack of transparency in technology as a result, we were left with obsolete and failure prone equipment. But, with 'Make in India' it is not that similar

case, a large number of companies entering into Joint Venture with foreign companies, the defence manufacturing is likely to take off in a big way. Moreover, the FDI of 100 percent has attracted large number of foreign companies to invest in India for defence manufacturing. The foreign Defence companies like Israel Airspace Industries, Rafael (Israel) BAE India System and Airbus (France), Raytheon (USA) etc. have already invested in India. The joint venture of Indian companies with foreign companies will also allow Indian companies to absorb foreign technology. The objective of Indian Defence Policy for self-reliance and self-sufficiency would also be fulfilled. The aim of indigenization would be achieved through ‘Make in India’.

**Table No. 4.5**

**Transfer of Foreign Technology**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	4	36.36	4	36.36	1	9.09	2	18.18	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	4	40.00	6	60.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100
Research Scholar	0	0.00	6	50.00	2	16.66	4	33.33	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree


Transfer of Technology has been the biggest issue in ‘Make in India’ by foreign companies. 4 academicians and 4 military personnel strongly agreed that ‘Make in India’ would promote Transfer of Technology. 4 academics, 6 military personnel, 6 research scholars and 3 government employees agree that transfer of technology is the main agenda of ‘Make in India’ and it would promote it. India attracting foreign companies as manufacturing hub would be a win-win situation for both India and foreign companies would allow an ease of

transfer of technology. 4 responses were uncertain- 1 academician, 2 research scholars and 1 government employee as they said ToT is dependent on many factors. 6 respondent disagree- 2 academician and 4 research scholar, they said due to political reason foreign companies won't allow. They stated that ToT especially in term of defence industries, the concerned country have to ratify it in their legislature by 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of the members.

Transfers of technology (ToT) have been an important contributing factor to the building of capability in India's defence industrial base through 'Make in India'. The main issue with the ToT would be the transparency of technology. 'Make in India'.

**Figure No. 4.3**

**Respondent's view on capabilities of Indian Industries to absorb Foreign Technology**



Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.


Over 64 percent and 8 percent of the respondents agree and strongly agreed that Indian industries would absorb foreign technology if there would be ToT from the foreign companies. They said Indian Industries and its skilled man power have the ability to absorb the foreign technology. 13 percent respondents were uncertain about it since most of the

joint venture with foreign companies are keeping Indian companies in the back seat. 10 percent disagreed that Indian companies won't absorb the foreign technology as Indian technology lags behind the foreign technology and will take time for Indian companies to adjust to the new technology. The lack of skilled worker is also another issue.

Ability to absorb foreign technology is most to achieve self-sufficient and self-reliance as ToT or licensed manufacture contracts by themselves cannot enable this since they provide only the know-hows of manufacturing specific parts and systems. The know-whys of the design could possibly help, but these are either not provided for political reasons or simply unaffordable. It also requires a wide and deep knowledge as well as skills base, which does not get built up by a narrow focus on frugal engineering based indigenization of foreign parts as propagated by the goal of self-reliance. Raising these levels is, however, possible as we shall see ahead, and if achieved to a sufficiently high level, provides the benefits of not only being able to absorb a larger quantum of higher-level technology but also offer opportunities for exports, thereby bringing in much needed profits. For exports, however, the industry will need to work towards building globally competitive production capability. Such action to develop global competitiveness cannot be inspired by the goal of achieving self-reliance but by that of achieving technological superiority.

**Figure No. 4.4**

**Make in India a measure to strengthen Indian national security**




Source: Field Work, 27 September-7 October 2017.

Make in India is a measure to strengthen Indian national security. National security measure tries to secure not only its border from external threats but also tries to secure itself from internal and non-traditional threats like unemployment, poverty and insecurity dilemma. 23 respondents agreed and 5 strongly agree that Make in India is a measure to strengthen Indian national security by attracting FDI which would generate employment and more importantly they stood firm on the vital essence of Make in India which was to manufacture indigenous goods, which is a better option than to import goods from foreign countries. They were also firm that indigenous of Indian goods would check a huge chunk of money to flow outside India. 5 respondents they remain uncertain with a view that the intention of foreign companies are unknown till date. 4 respondent did not agree that Make in India is a measure to strengthen Indian's national security as foreign companies are more advanced than Indian companies so they will be the one who will be benefiting from this programme.

**Figure No. 4.5**

**Compromise over National Interest**




Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

18 respondents/ 55 percent disagree that India will compromise with its national interest over the transfer of technology in order to attract FDI. National interest are supreme and 'Make and India' programme was initiated to strengthen national security. 18 per cent which is 6 respondents were uncertain while 27 per cent/9 respondents agreed that India will compromise over national interest as in few sector like defence government have given 100 per cent FDI.



**Figure No.: 4.6**

**Relation with present Defence Importing Countries**



Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October, 2017.

If 'Make in India' programme is successful it will emerge out as one of the exporting countries in the world. Its relationship with its current importing countries is a most to watch. As India would be taking over its market. What would their relationship be like? Most of the respondent said that their relationship would be either complementary or supplementary since the defence production process in India is a joint venture with the foreign companies. It is a win-win situation for the both. 10 respondents said India's relationship with other nation would be complimentary while 11 said it would be supplementary. 6 respondents went in favour of India being a rivalry. They said that India would be selling their product to those countries which are already the market for that country. No country wants to share its market with the other country. 8 respondents were of the view that their relationship would be neutral as foreign companies also have a huge stake in India defence companies, so it's a win-win for both the countries. 2 respondents were uncertain as they believed that international system is anarchic in nature and no one can predict the future.

**Table No. 4.6**

**Will Make in India win International Market**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	1	9.09	7	63.64	1	9.09	2	18.18	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	0	0.00	10	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Research Scholar	1	8.33	4	33.33	3	25.00	4	33.33	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.


\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree

One of the objective of ‘Make in India’ in term of defence manufacturing is to export its products. Will India be able to win international market? 2 respondents strongly agreed with it and 24 respondents were affirmative that India will able to win the international market. The bilateral relationship with the Asian countries and Middle East countries were seen as a positive aspect. South Asian countries like Myanmar and Vietnam have been receiving economic aid from India which is a sign that there would be ease for India to win Market. The deal between India and Vietnam on BrahMos missile has already been signed. India has also been exporting its defence product to Afghanistan and Oman. 4 respondents were uncertain and 6 respondents disagreed. They said that Indian defence product would not be a match for foreign products.

There are various challenges which “Make in India’ faces the slow rate of growth of the sector, the small share of high tech exports, inadequate infrastructure, etc.

**Figure No. 4.7**

**Competence of Indian Private Industries with Foreign Industries Technology**




Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October, 2017.

Private sector participation has increased significantly in defence production through Make in India. The query which still is a doubt is whether the Indian private companies would be able to compete with foreign industries. Most of the respondents were affirmative that Indian private companies will be able to compete with foreign industries. 29 respondents agree that private companies have the potential to compete with foreign companies. They said that Indian private companies will always have an edge due to the preference accorded by the MoD in defence procurement. Moreover, DPP provided a MTOT (Maintenance Transfer of Technology) to an Indian private entity. Since the Indian defence procurement is to achieve indigenization, Indian private companies will have a higher preference of MoD.

**Figure No. 4.8**

**Limitation of Indigenization**



Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October, 2017.

With the big foreign companies tying up cooperation with the Indian industries. There seems to be a limitation for indigenization. 9 respondents strongly disagreed that there will be limitation on indigenization. 7 military personnels and 2 research scholars firmly believed that there would be no limitation for indigenization. 14 respondents disagreed with it, out of 14 members 5 were academicians, 3 military personnels, 4 research scholars and 2 government employees. The respondents who disagreed were of the view that 100 per cent indigenization is the ultimate goal of Make in India and DPP, there will be no limitation for indigenization. 5 respondents were uncertain. 7 respondents agree that there will be a limitation since the foreign companies are the sole owner of technology. Two respondent strongly agreed that there will be a limitation for indigenization.

**Table No. 4.7**

**Shift of Policies from NAM and Non-violence towards Realistic and Pragmatism**

	SA	SA%	Agree	Agree%	UN	UN %	DA	DA%	SD	SD%	Total
Academician	0	0.00	6	54.55	0	0.00	5	45.45	0	0.00	100
Military Personnel	0	0.00	3	30.00	0	0	7	70.00	0	0	100
Research Scholar	4	33.33	4	33.33	2	16.67	2	16.67	0	0.00	100
Government Employee	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00	0	0.00	100

Source: Field Work, 27 September-27 October 2017.

\*SA= Strongly Agree, UN= Uncertain, DA=Disagree and SD=Strongly Disagree

‘Make in India’ programme covers 25 manufacturing sectors with an aim to make India a manufacturing hub. India needed a concrete policies to deal with other nation. The foreign policies of India seems to be fading gradually from the Nehruvian concept of NAM and non-toward much realistic policy. The respondent’s response were quite perplexing. 13 respondents agreed that Make in India is a much more realistic policy. 6 academician, 3 military personnel and 4 research scholar agree to it. 4 research also strongly agreed on that Make in India is much more realistic in nature as the concept of NAM and non-violence hardly have any existence in the contemporary era. Moreover, India is in need of such realistic policies to overcome problems like poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, terrorism, and insurgency etc. 5 respondents were uncertain. 15 respondents consider that there has been no shift of India’s early policy of NAM and Non-violence. In NAM, India wasn’t a part of any blocs-capitalistic (USA) and socialist (USSR) similarly Make in India project is not inclined to any nation, it is open to all nation who wants to invest in India.

India has face both traditional threat on five occasions (state of war with Pakistan on four occasion and with China in 1962) and in early the 1990s the country was financially broke and faced severe BOP crisis can relate with the non-traditional threat (economic security).

Since independence to till date there has been a transition in India's security strategy from idealism to hard realism or realpolitik to economically driven pragmatism today. 'Make in India' is also an example of economically driven pragmatism.

### **Conclusion**

'Make in India' programme offers a great scope to for manufacturing sector to boost in India. It aims to correct the GDP composition of India which presently is tilted towards service sector. 'Make in India' has provided a thoughtful effort to assist investment (both domestic and foreign), which would nurturing innovation, strengthen skill development, prevent brain drain and make the use of globally standardized technology reasonably priced for Indian citizens. 'Make in India' is the solution to give new life to the Indian economy. It is an effort to pull out our economy from the shackles of recession.

In order to achieve the objective of 'Make in India', the government had taken up a series of measures to radically improve Ease of Doing Business by providing land and other business procurement through easy means. Indian private firm are also strongly motivated to invest. Foreign companies are also invited to invest in India which is a win-win situation for both India and foreign investor. Foreign companies have huge relaxation on FDI providing 100 per cent FDI in few sectors.

The foreign companies investing in India implies three things- the flow of foreign income, which would boost Indian economy and solve the problem of unemployment. Foster innovation through the transfer of technology- Indian firms will be working as a dual partnership in many sector with foreign companies and they would be able to grasp the knowledge of high technology. They would acquaintance with foreign companies and have the change to explore the high tech information. Thirdly the 'Make in India' would check the outflow of huge the amount of capital which would be better utilized within the country. This measure is also necessary to cope with the present scenario to eradicate unemployment, poverty and malnutrition.

The respondents were composed of four categories- 10 Academicians, 11 Military personnels, 12 research scholars and 4 Government employees. The questionnaire was developed both as open ended and close ended. The objective of preparing the

questionnaire both open ended and close ended was that to obtain information objectively and as well as subjectively. The respondents were all aware regarding the topic of the study. They gave their valuable time and filled the questionnaire and provided their insight thoughts which were very informative and helpful

Academician's response varied but they justified their responses with an informative and proactive suggestion. Many academician's were in favor of make in India and believed that it was a necessary step to deal with India's current situation. The proponent which make in India consist were very appealing for foreign investor to invest in India. They were also firm that 'Make in India' was a measure to strengthen India security strategy. They also assumed that foreign investment in defence sector was a part of India's border FDI policy intended to bring attendant advantages of technology transfer, marketing expertise, and introduction of modern managerial techniques and new possibilities of exports.

They also stated that despite all the efforts, India's defence production has not lived up to the expectations, leading to import of critical systems to maintain defence preparedness.

Military personnel were all affirmative about 'Make in India'. As a matter of fact, there were no negative remarks regarding the 'Make in India'. They said 'Make in India' will make India's economy and military stronger which is an essential component for the existence of any country. They also consider that India need to rethink their security strategy towards their neighbouring countries especially SAARC countries, and Vietnam, Philippines and Afghanistan. In case of SAARC countries the regional bound need to be made much stronger and India should help them to develop their economies as well or else China might come as their allies. Pakistan and China growing relationship have been a great concern for India's security. In case of 'Make in India' and defence production, it was India who would be benefitting. This step will help generate employment and the process of self-reliant and indigenous goods will also be successful. 'Make in India' through FDI will be helpful in bring ToT.

Research scholar opinion and response were quite perplexing, some were in favor that Make in India will generate jobs, foster innovation, and it will check out-flow of money. They also consider that Make in India will strengthen India security and India need such policy to survive in the present scenario of global politics. Few had a negative connotation

regarding Make in India. They said whatever component that made Make in India was a rhetoric. And it was just an ambitious vision of one political party. Political affiliation of research scholar played a major role in their responses.

Government employees were also taken into consideration who were working in Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance and simultaneously writing regarding the issue of Make in India. All the government employee had a positive attitude towards Make in India. They consider Make in India a major policy which would leave India footprint in world politics.



## CHAPTER 5

### Conclusion

The discourses on security deepen and broaden from traditional to non-traditional perspectives. Security has always been very crucial to all the countries because it decides the sovereignty of the country from the internal and external threats that directly or indirectly disturb their security primarily the whole notion of security focus on national security or the defense of the state. The national security is the most important than the other security as it is key factors for survival of humankind or security of any kind.

The central objective of the study has been to analyze the scope and challenges of 'Make in India' to India's national security. This study also examined the changing nature of security discourse from traditional to non-traditional and analyze how India's security strategy evolved in Post-Independent era. The analyses of the literature on the security reveals that definition of security mean varies from person to person and security is an unsteady concept. The conventional or traditional understanding of security has been confined to military aspect. In traditional understanding military security was the one in all, it was given preference over the other form of security. In fact, the other form of security evolved only after the end of WW II when the world witnessed intra state war/ civil war, the rise of environmental degradation, poverty, international terrorism, human rights and globalisation. These other forms of security were termed as non-traditional security.

The difference between the traditional and non-traditional security was that former conceptualize security with the use or threat of military and latter goes beyond military threat and dangers affecting the conditions of human existence. In traditional security, the conception of the referent is the state within its territory and governing institutions and the scope of traditional notions of security is confined to internal and external threats of the state. While in the non-traditional security conception, the referent is expanded and covers wide areas of security (like the human, environmental, political, societal, health, etc.). The scope of non-traditional security not only cover state but also individual or indeed all of humankind.

The notion of security has also deepened from individual to societal, regional and global. The deepening of security has been viewed as the common security where the environmental disaster in one region affected the other region as well. The notion of security broadened from military to human, health, food, energy, economic, environmental, political security etc. All the aspect of non-traditional security kept the human security as the center of focus while in case of national security the state is the key focus. State maintained a stronger military to protect itself from the threat of other states. National security in the present era not only deals with building military superiority but also focuses on other elements which are vital to the survival of a state.

Even though the concept of security has been evolving from state to global and comprehensive notion, national security remains the major issue as it is key factor for survival of human kind or security of any kind. In fact, the state ensures protection of the individual or human being form any threats.

Chapter III examines the evolution of Indian security strategy. It deals with the historical analysis of India's Security Strategy and the trends of strategy from post-Independence till date. It also focuses on India's security strategy with reference to defence and its industrialization. India's security strategy have been evolving since 1947 and still is. India like the rest of nations holds its national integrity and national interest at the heart of its national security strategy and foreign policies. Terrorism, insurgency and Naxalism has always been a hindrance to Indian security strategy. Its strategy had been based to overcome challenges from terror from any kind and to mitigate terror with the cooperation among the regional groups and the powerful nations.

India's security strategy has many success and failures. Liberation of Bangladesh, Kashmir war, Kargil war, Nuclear Test, Strategic ties with US, successful operations against terrorism, Naxalism and insurgency other could be regarded as a mark of achievements. India fought four war against Pakistan and remained victorious. In 1962 India went on a war with China due to the border dispute. India lost the war, but the failure of India army in 1962 paved a way to enhance military capabilities. India realized that strengthening its military power and capabilities was most to formulate a strong national security strategy. The humiliating loss of the war in 1962 against China proved to be vital and realizing that

India needs a better equipped defence product. India imports most of its defence requirements from Russia, USA, Israel, France and UK. But, importing defence product wasn't just answer when its defence sector spends the huge chunk of the budget to buy the products.

The quest for self-sufficiency in defence production was a result of 1962 war. The defence manufacturing in India has been an ongoing process. Since 1948 there has been a realization to make own war head and other essentials defence product. The defence manufacturing process in India can be divided into five phase- the Quest for self-sufficiency 1948-1960, phase two: Self-sufficiency to Self –Reliance 1960-1980, phase three: Self Reliance through Coproduction 1980-1999, phase four: Self-Reliance through Private Sector Participation 2000-2014 and phase five: Self-Reliance through 'Make in India' initiatives 2014-.

There are other many failures, which are holding India as a limping power in its own region. The international agenda have fissile out from the hands of India. China has been showing its aggressive posture against India, who can forget the recent border issue of Dokhlam in Sikkim. Pakistan continues to burn the pockets of India. Smaller neighbours of India irritate India on many occasion. The hot seat of UN is still eluding from India's reach. Terrorism haunts and kills thousands of Indians. Multilateral International bodies are not working on the frame work of Indian interest.

Despite all the hindrance and failure, India's security strategy has been proved to be one of the strongest national policies in the world. India places national security at the front and is very much capable to deal with other security issues. In fact, India's national security strategy has been very expedite to address other securities issues aswell.

Chapter IV, deals with the scope and challenges of 'Make in India', and the field analysis and interpretation. The objectives of make in India are to create employment, to bring foreign investment and technology (through FDI), to increase India's GDP and Indigenization of India product.

The challenges of 'Make in India; are infrastructure, labour laws, skill, ease of doing business, research and development, land acquisition and exports. Despite all the

challenges Make in India has been able to fulfill few of its objective. To conduct this study various stakeholders and experts in institutions such as Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance was visited and interviewed.

The respondents were divided into four categories- Academicians from various universities and institutions, Military personnel, and Research scholars from various universities whose research area were related to the national security issues. Similarly, the government employee from the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance were also taken into consideration.

The respondents consider that 'Make in India' is a policy that India carve for. It will be helpful in solving problems like unemployment, foster innovation, create more efficient research and development facilities. The 'Make in India' programme seems to be a pragmatic policies compared to the idealism and preacher policies of Nehru.

### **Findings of the Study**

- The nature of security discourse has been changing been from traditional to non-traditional. Security is not only viewed from military perspectives but the other aspects of security like environment, health, economic, energy etc. have greater concern nowadays. Moreover famine, disease and environmental disastrous kill more people than the war.
- National Security/ National interests is/are the center of all the foreign policies. No nation wants to jeopardize it government, population, territory and sovereignty. National interests ensure the existence of the state as a political community and physical survival of its people. National interests protect the territorial integrity as the basic right of the state.

- India's security strategy has been evolved considerably since Indo-Sino war. The humiliating loss of 1962 war paved the way to enhance Indian defence policies and the quest for self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the defence production.
- There has been a shift of paradigm from Non-alignment towards realistic and finally an economically pragmatic policy. This has favored some normalization of traditionally antagonistic relationships, a greater commitment to international institutions that might legitimize its emerging power status, a positive approach to relations with world's remaining superpower. BRICS is one such institution where India is a member country. 'Make in India' is also one of such economic pragmatic programme.
- The 'Make in India' will be able to fulfill its objectives. The FDI policy of India have attracted great number of foreign companies to invest in India. Even in defence sector many foreign companies are willing to transfer the technology as well. There may be the issue of capabilities to absorb foreign technology but India will overcome this challenge as well
- Transfer of Technology is the biggest issue. Indian technology lags behind the foreign technology and it would need some time for Indian workers and companies to adjust with the new technology.
- The 'Make in India' is a measure to strengthen Indian security strategy. Make in India' covers 25 sectors which compass every aspect of security, from strengthening military through indigenous defence production to generating jobs which will be helpful to eradicate poverty and unemployment.
- Indian defence manufacturing sector will be able to indigenized defence products but it will take some considerable time. Lack of skilled worker is the biggest challenges. The ability to absorb foreign technology is most to achieve self – sufficient and self-reliance as ToT or licensed manufacture contracts by themselves cannot enable this since they provide only the know-hows of manufacturing specific parts and systems. The know-whys of the design could possibly help, but these are either not provided for political reasons.

- A better and austere mechanism to check and control the functioning of Indian Private Companies and Foreign companies should be prepared. Since, the intention of most of the industries would be just profit maximization, the quality of the products could be compromised.

The study reveals that India's national security strategy has been viewed conventionally with a threat from China and Pakistan. India need to change its security strategic not only in regards with China and Pakistan, but other smaller nation like Nepal, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar and Philippines as these countries are closer to China and could be China's allies which is threat to India security. 'Make in India' programme has agglomerate its various mechanism to help these countries which is a positive side of Indian's pragmatic policies.

The study also reveals that 'Make in India' programme should also allow its neighbouring countries to take advantage of the programme which will help them to resolve the issue of unemployment, poverty and political instability in the region. But, the bigger challenge of 'Make in India' programme would be that it will attract a huge influx of migrants from adjoining countries. India should check such infiltration so that the Indian population would get the first priority of the job opportunities.

The study reveals that the issue of national security and 'Make in India' is a vast issue and it is very much interdependent with various factors and sectors of 'Make in India'. There is a further scope in the study since the elements of national security are evolving every day. The 'Make in India' Programme is also in its initial stage and its progress is yet be seen. The limitation of time barred the study for bringing out supplementary findings.

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## **APPENDIX I**

General Assembly: Fifteenth Special Session. Held at Headquarters, New York,

Thursday, 9 June 1988, at 10:a.m

### **AGENDA ITEM 8**

#### **GENERAL DEBATE**

Address By His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

The President: The Assembly will first hear an address by the Prime Minister of the Republic of India.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, was escorted to the rostrum.

The PRESIDENT: I have great pleasure in welcoming the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. I invite him to address the General Assembly.

Mr. Gandhi (India): Mr. President, may I begin by extending to you our warmest felicitations on your election as President of this vitally important special session of the General Assembly. Our deliberations will benefit greatly from the wealth of your experience and your deep understanding of the issues before us. We are approaching the close of the twentieth century. It has been the most blood-stained century in history. Fifty-eight million people perished in two world wars. Forty million more have died in other conflicts. In the last nine decades the ravenous machines of war have devoured nearly 100 million people. The appetite of these monstrous machines grows on what they feed on. Nuclear war will not mean the death of 100 million people, or even 1,000 million people. It will mean the extinction of 4,000 million, the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness.

Humanity is at a crossroads. One road will take us like lemmings to our own suicide. That is the path indicated by doctrines of nuclear deterrence, deriving from traditional concepts of the balance of power. The other road will give us another chance. That is the path signposted by the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, deriving from the imperative values of

non-violence, tolerance and compassion. In consequence of doctrines of deterrence, international relations have been gravely militarized. Astronomical sums are being invested in ways of dealing death. Ever new means of destruction continue to be invented. The best of our scientific talent and the bulk of our technological resources are devoted to maintaining and upgrading this awesome ability to obliterate ourselves. A culture of armaments and threats and violence has become pervasive. For a hundred years after the Congress of Vienna, Europe knew an uncertain peace based on a balance of power. When that balance was tilted - or, more accurately, when that balance was perceived to have tilted - Europe was plunged into an orgy of destruction, the like of which had never been known before and which spread to engulf much of the world. The unsettled disputes of the First World War led to the Second.

Humankind survived because, by today's standards, the power to destroy which was then available was a limited power. We now have what we did not then have the power to ensure the genocide of the human race. Technology has now rendered obsolete the calculations of war and peace on which were constructed the always dubious theories of the balance of power.

It is a dangerous delusion to believe that nuclear weapons have brought us peace. It is true that, in the past four decades, parts of the world have experienced an absence of war. But the mere absence of war is not a durable peace.

The balance of nuclear terror rests on the retention and augmentation of nuclear armouries. There can be no ironclad guarantee against the use of weapons of mass destruction. They have been used in the past. They could be used in the future. And, in this nuclear age, the insane logic of mutually assured destruction will ensure that nothing survives, that nothing lives to tell the tale, that there is no one left to understand what went wrong and why. Peace which rests on the search for a parity of power is a precarious peace. If we understand what went wrong with such attempts in the past, we may yet be able to escape the catastrophe presaged by doctrines of nuclear deterrence.

There is a further problem with deterrence. The doctrine is based on the assumption that international relations are frozen on a permanently hostile basis. Deterrence needs an enemy, even if one has to be invented. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate expression of the

philosophy of terrorism~ holding humanity hostage to the presumed security needs of a few.

There are those who argue that since the consequences of nuclear war are widely known and well understood, nuclear war just cannot happen. Neither experience nor logic can sustain such dangerous complacency. History is full of miscalculations. Perceptions are often totally at variance with reality. A madman's fantasy could unleash the end. An accident could trigger a chain reaction which inexorably leads to doom. Indeed, the advance of technology has so reduced the time for decisions that, once activated, computers programmed for Armageddon, pre-emptive human intervention and all hope of survival. There is, therefore, no comfort in the claim of the proponents of nuclear deterrence that everyone can be saved by ensuring that in the event of conflict, everyone will surely die.

The champions of nuclear deterrence argue that nuclear weapons have been invented and, therefore, cannot be eliminated. We do not agree. We have an international convention eliminating biological weapons by prohibiting their use in war. We are working on similarly eliminating chemical weapons. There is no reason in principle why nuclear weapons too cannot be so eliminated. All it requires is the affirmation of certain basic moral values and the assertion of the required political will, underpinned by treaties and institutions which ensure against nuclear delinquency.

The past few years have seen the emergence of a new danger: the extension of the nuclear arms race into outer space. The ambition of creating impenetrable defences against nuclear weapons has merely escalated the arms race and complicated the process of disarmament. This has happened in spite of the grave doubts expressed by leading scientists about its very feasibility. Even the attempt to build a partial shield against nuclear missiles increases the risk of nuclear war. History shows that there is no shield that has not been penetrated by a superior weapon, nor any weapon for which a superior shield has not been found. Societies get caught in a multiple helix of escalation in chasing this chimera, expending vast resources for an illusory security while increasing the risk of certain extinction.

The new weapons being developed for defence against nuclear weapons are part of a much wider qualitative arms race. The development of the so-called "third generation nuclear weapons" has opened up ominous prospects of their being used for selective and

discriminate military operations. There is nothing more dangerous than the illusion of limited nuclear war. It desensitizes inhibitions about the use of nuclear weapons. That could lead, in next to no time, to the outbreak of full-fledged nuclear war.

There are no technological solutions to the problems of world security. Security can only come from our asserting effective political control over this self-propelled technological arms race. We cannot accept the logic that a few nations have the right to pursue their security by threatening the survival of humankind. It is not only those who live by the nuclear sword who, by design or default, shall one day perish by it. All humanity will perish.

Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws~ that men are superior to women; that white races are superior to the coloured; that colonialism is a civilizing mission; that those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible Powers and those who do not are not. Alas, nuclear weapons are not the only weapons of mass destruction. New knowledge is being generated in the life sciences. Military applications of these developments could rapidly undermine the existing convention against the military use of biological weapons. The ambit of our concern must extend to all means of mass annihilation.

New technologies have also dramatically expanded the scope and intensity of conventional warfare. The physical destruction which can be carried out by full-scale conventional war would be enormous, far exceeding anything known in the past. Even if humankind is spared the agony of a nuclear winter, civilization and civic life as we know it would be irretrievably disrupted. The range, precision and lethality of conventional weapons are being vastly increased. Some of these weapons are moving from being "smart" to becoming "intelligent". Such diabolical technologies generate their own pressures for early use, thus increasing the risk of the outbreak of war. Most of these technologies are at the command of the military blocs. This immensely increases their capacity for interference, intervention and coercive diplomacy.

Those of us who do not belong to the military blocs would much rather stay out of the race. We do not want to accumulate arms. We do not want to augment our capacity to kill. But



the system, like a whirlpool, sucks us into its vortex. We are compelled to divert resources from development to defence to respond to the arsenals which are constructed as a sideshow to great power rivalries. As the nature and sophistication of threats to our security increase, we are forced to incur huge expenditure on raising the threshold of our defences.

There is another danger that is even worse. left to ourselves, we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when, in the passing play of great power rivalries, tactical considerations are allowed to take precedence over the imperatives of nuclear non-proliferation, with what leeway are we left?

Even the mightiest military Powers realize that they cannot continue the present arms race without inviting economic calamity. The continuing arms race has imposed a great burden on national economies and the global economy. It is no longer only the developing countries that are urging disarmament to channel resources to development. Even the richest are beginning to realize that they cannot afford the current levels of the military burden they have imposed upon themselves. A genuine process of disarmament, leading to a substantial reduction in military expenditure, is bound to promote the prosperity of all nations of the globe. Disarmament accompanied by coexistence will open up opportunities for all countries, whatever their socio-economic systems, whatever their levels of development.

The technological revolutions of our century have created unparalleled wealth. They have endowed the fortunate with high levels of mass consumption and widespread social welfare. In fact, there is plenty for everyone, provided distribution is made more equitable. Yet, the possibility of fulfilling the basic needs of nutrition and shelter, education and health remains beyond the reach of vast millions of people in the developing world because resources which could give fulfilment in life are pre-empted for death. The root causes of global insecurity reach far below the calculus of military parity. They are related to the instability spawned by widespread poverty, squalor, hunger, disease and illiteracy. They are connected to the degradation of the environment. They are enmeshed in the inequity and injustice of the present world order. The effort to promote security for all must be underpinned by the effort to promote opportunity for all and equitable access to

achievement. Comprehensive global security must rest on a new, more just, more honorable world order.

When the General Assembly met here last in special session to consider questions of disarmament, the outlook was grim. The new cold war had been revived with full force. A new programme of nuclear armament had been set in motion. As a result, during the years that followed, fear and suspicion cast a long shadow over all disarmament negotiations. Humankind was approaching the precipice of nuclear disaster.

Today, there is new hope for survival and for peace. There is a perceptible movement away from the precipice. Dialogue has been resumed. Trust is in the air.

How has this transformation occurred? We pay a tribute to the sagacity of the American and Soviet leaderships. They have seen the folly of nuclear escalation. They have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. At the same time, we must recognize the role of countless enlightened men and women all over the world, citizens of the non-nuclear-weapon States as much as of the nuclear weapon States. With courage, dedication and perseverance they have kept the candle burning in the enveloping darkness. The Six-Nation Initiative voiced the hopes and aspirations of these many millions. At a time when relations between the two major nuclear-weapon States dip to their nadir, the six nations - Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania - refocused world attention on the imperative of nuclear disarmament. The Appeal of May 1984, issued by Indira Gandhi, Olof Palme and their colleagues, struck a responsive chord. Negotiations stalled for years began inching forward. The process begun in Geneva has led to Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow.

We have all welcomed the ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - concluded between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. It is an important step in the right direction. Its great value lies in its bold departure from nuclear arms limitation to nuclear disarmament. We hope there will be agreement soon to reduce nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. The process should be carried forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Only then will we be able to look back and say that the INF Treaty was a truly historic beginning.

India believes it is possible for the human race to survive the second millenium. India believes it is also possible to ensure peace, security and survival into the third millenium and beyond. The way lies through concerted action. We urge the international community immediately to undertake negotiations with a view to adopting a time-bound Action Plan to usher in a world order free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence

We have submitted such an Action Plan to this special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. Our plan calls upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament. This commitment must be total. It must be without reservation.

The heart of our Action Plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages, over the next 22 years, beginning now. We put this Plan to the United Nations as a programme to be launched at once. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the center piece of each stage of the Plan, this is buttressed by collateral and other measures to further the process of disarmament. We have made proposals for banning other weapons of mass destruction. We have suggested steps for precluding the development of new weapons systems based on emerging technologies. We have addressed ourselves to the task of reducing conventional arms and forces to the minimum levels required for defensive purposes. We have outlined ideas for the conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons.

The essential features of the Action Plan are;

**First**, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons, in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest.

**Secondly**, all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process.

**Thirdly**, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal.

**Fourthly**, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the United Nations.

We propose simultaneous negotiations on a series of integrally related measures. But we do recognize the need for flexibility in the staging of some of the measures.

The President: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister of the Republic of India for the important statement he has just made.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, was escorted from the rostrum.

## APPENDIX II

### Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine

August 17, 1999

1. Preamble	2. Objectives
3. Nuclear Forces	4. Credibility and Survivability
5. Command and Control	6. Security and Safety
7. Research and Development	8. Disarmament and Arms Control

#### Preamble

1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimized through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context. These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.
2. India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires an environment of durable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It will be India's endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a

constructive role in advancing the international system toward a just, peaceful and equitable order.

3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people. India will strenuously guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and frequency in the use of force for political purposes.
4. India's security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.
5. However, the very existence of offensive doctrine pertaining to the first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of states.
6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.

## **Objectives**

1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.
2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security.

3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that : (a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.
6. Deterrence requires that India maintain:
  - (a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
  - (b) A robust command and control system,
  - (c) Effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and
  - (d) Comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy,and
  - (e) The will to employ nuclear forces and weapons
7. Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

## **Nuclear Forces**

1. India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.
2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.

## **Credibility and Survivability**

The following principles are central to India's nuclear deterrent:

1. **Credibility:** Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.
2. **Effectiveness:** The efficacy of India's nuclear deterrent be maximized through synergy among all elements involving reliability, timeliness, accuracy and weight of the attack.
3. **Survivability:**
  - (a) India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organized for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.



- (b) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons.

### **Command and Control**

1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).
2. An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated on strategic objectives and a targetting policy shall form part of the system.
3. For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.
4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control, communications, computing, intelligence and information (C412) systems shall be assured.
5. The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation.
6. Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.

### **Security and Safety**

1. **Security:** Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or use.
2. **Safety** is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and systems shall be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place and risks of accident are avoided.
3. **Disaster control:** India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system capable of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials.

## **Research and Development**

1. India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field.
2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.

## **Disarmament and Arms Control**

1. Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.
2. Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every effort shall be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning first use.
3. Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding unconditional negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.
4. Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness.
5. In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.

### APPENDIX III

#### Questionnaire

Dear Mam/Sir

This Questionnaire schedule is prepared to collect the data for the M.Phil Dissertation on “The Scope and Challenges of ‘Make in India’ to India’s National Security”. The study will be an attempt to understand the role of ‘Make in India’ programme offers to India’s Security strategy. The study will try to explore the role of ‘Make in India’ and its initiative for defense manufacturing within India. The study focus on the importance of building Indian product or indigenization of defense product to boost export and cut import of foreign defense goods. The study also focuses on the transfer of technology by foreign industries to India.

The survey is conducted for the partial fulfillment of M.Phil Dissertation which is for the purpose of academic research. I would request you to kindly fill in the questionnaire below . The response here will be kept confidential. Also the result will be analyzed at the group level, not individually. Please be honest while giving the response as it will help the study to be more effective and appropriate.

Thanking You  
Subarna                      Moni

Pradhan

Profile of the Respondent:

Name:.....Sex:..... Age.....
Designation:.....Area of Interest:.....
Affiliated Institution:.....

Q. 1. What are the objectives of 'Make in India' Programme?

- To make India a manufacturing hub
- Create jobs
- Cut Imports and Boost Exports
- Enhance R&D in India (mostly Defense and other Hi tech areas )
- Increase India's global economic footprint
- All of the above

If any other please  
specify \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q.2. How 'Make in India' will bring FDI and Contribute to GDP?

- low corporate tax and individual income tax rates
- Cheaper labour
- infrastructure subsidies
- free land or land subsidies
- All of the above

If any other please  
specify \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q.3. Foreign Investments increases through Make in India?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly   
Disagree

Please  
specify \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

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Q.4. Will 'Make in India' policy help in curving the problem of unemployment in India?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.5. Will 'Make in India' be successful in promoting Defence Manufacturing in India?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.6. The Indian Security Strategy with respect to our neighboring countries, do we need to rethink/ restructure the policy?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.7. Do you think 'Make in India' will promote Technology transfer to India?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.8. Will the Indian Industries absorb the foreign technology provided by the foreign Industries, if there would be a Transfer of technology from foreign industries?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.9. Can 'Make in India', be considered as measure to strengthen Indian's national Security measures?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

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Q.10. Will India compromise with its national interest over transfer of technology in order to attract FDI?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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Q.11. How will the 'Make in India' programme (especially defense manufacturing/India as exporting country) would affect the relationship with its present defense importing nations?

- Complimentary to each other
- Supplementary to each other
- Rivalry to each other
- Neutral
- Uncertain

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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Q.12. Do you agree that we will win International Market through 'Make in India' (In terms of emerging out as the exporter of Defense merchandises)?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree Please

specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q.13. Will the private industries of India able to compete with Foreign Industries, since industries like Reliance and Adani have been recently engaged in Defense Production?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify, \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q.14. The defense production in India has been mostly been the duo work of Indian industries and foreign industries. Will there be limitation for indigenization?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



Q.15. Do you think 'Make in India' Programme is a shift from India's early policy of NAM and Non-Violence toward much realistic policy?

Strongly agree  Agree  Uncertain  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_