


HISTORY OF SIKKIM (1817-1904)

DR. P. K. JHA



ANALYSIS OF BRITISH POLICY AND ACTIVITIES



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
PREFACE	vii—viii
INTRODUCTION	ix—xiii
ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
CHAPTER I Establishment of British Suzerainty over Sikkim	1—29
CHAPTER II Change in Superstructure	30—50
CHAPTER III Change in Equilibrium of Population	51—66
CHAPTER IV Reorganisation of Revenue System	67—95
CHAPTER V British Trade Activities through Sikkim	96—118
CONCLUSIONS	119—123
GLOSSARY	124—126
APPENDICES	127—157
BIBLIOGRAPHY	158—168
INDEX	169—173

M A P

Map showing approximate race distribution in Sikkim, 1892

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH SUZERAINTY OVER SIKKIM

The English were aware of some commercial possibilities with Tibet since setting foot on India. They came to know of the traditional trade between Nepal under the Newars and Tibet which had its terminus at Patna. The desire to secure Tibetan gold was the reason of Kinlock's expedition of 1767 in response to an appeal by the Newar chiefs to the British power in India for help.¹ But with Kinlock's failure to penetrate into the hills, hope of trade with Tibet through Nepal came to an end for some time.

Warren Hastings made the first serious attempt to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Tibet, and, in 1772, when war broke out between Bhutan and Cooch Behar, he sent troops to help Cooch Behar who sought British help. Bhutan being Tibet's vassal, Tashi Lama communicated Hastings and Hastings, in response to Tashi Lama's letter to him to treat the Bhutanese leniently, decided to send a friendly mission to Tashi Lama.² In May 1774 a mission under George Bogle was sent to "open a mutual and equal

1 Sarkar, S. C., Some Notes on the Intercourse of Bengal with the Northern Countries in the Second half of the Eighteenth Century, in proceedings of the Indian History Records Commission, Vol. XIII, 1930, P. 99.

2 Frontier and Overseas Expedition from India, compiled by the Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Army H. Q. India, Vol. IV, P. 128.

communication of trade".³ But this mission did little to open up the trade route through Bhutan. In 1783 the second mission was sent under Samuel Turner.⁴ But the little promise which was secured by Turner's diplomacy could not be utilized due to departure of Hastings for England and Lord Cornwallis's policy of non-involvement in the trans-Himalayan trade.

Thus Bhutan being closed to Indian merchants, attention was again directed towards Nepal. But, in spite of placing resident at Katmandu in 1800,⁵ no trade was opened and the relations between the Company and the Gurkhas had become so strained that in 1814 Lord Moira, the Governor-General of India, went to war with Nepal. This war gave the English an excellent opportunity to contact with Sikkim which was under Gurkhas since 1775 and with whom Bhutan's relation also was not cordial.⁶ The rumour of the Gurkhas and the Bhutanese intriguing together against the British made the opening of relations with Sikkim a political and military necessity. In the spring of 1815 Captain Barre Latter induced Raja Tsugphud Namgyal to help the British and promised to help the Raja to recover his territories lost to Nepal.⁷ After the end of the Gurkha War, to establish friendly relations between British India and Sikkim, the Treaty of Titalya was signed on 10 October 1817.

*Treaty of Titalya and the Cession of the
Morung-Company's relation with Sikkim opened.*

The East India Company ceded, transferred and handed over "in full sovereignty to the Sikkimputte Rajah, his heirs and successors, all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the eastward of the Mechi River and to the westward of the Teesta River, formerly

3 Markham, C. D., Narratives of Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa, P. 202.

4 Turner, S., An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet, Pp. 419-33.

5 Northley, W. B., The Land of the Gurkhas, Pp. 43-44.

6 History of Sikkim, Pp. 86-87.

7 Lamb, Op. Cit., P 41 ; Rao, P. R., India and Sikkim, Pp. 1-2.

possessed and occupied by the Rajah of Nepaul, but ceded to the Honourable East India Company by the peace signed at Segoulee" (in December, 1815 by the Company and Nepal) (Art. I) and guaranteed the possession (Art. IX) under certain conditions that the Sikkim Raja and his successors would not commit any act of aggression on the Gurkhas or any other state and would refer to the arbitration of the Company any disputes arising with Nepal or any other neighbouring state (Art. II & III). Sikkim would render military assistance to the Company in case of war in the hills (Art. IV); would not permit any European or American to reside in Sikkim Raja's territory without the Company's permission; would deliver up any dacoits or criminals from British India taking refuge in Sikkim and would afford no protection to the revenue defaulters or other delinquents from British India (Art. VI & VII). Sikkim authorities would afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company's provinces and would levy no transit duties on their merchandise (Art. VIII).⁸

This treaty gave a blow to the Nepalese ambition towards east and the possibilities of Nepal and Bhutan intriguing together against the British came to an end. But Sikkim Raja's freedom of action was drastically curtailed. The Company got right to trade upto the Tibetan frontier under the protection of the Sikkim authorities with whom Tibet had political, commercial and ecclesiastical relations and whose princes were closely connected with Tibet by matrimonial relations. But the treaty was completely silent regarding criminals from Sikkim taking shelter in the Company's territory and this gave rise to problems in future.)

On 7, April 1817, the Governor-General Lord Moira by a Sunud granted to the Sikkim Raja "all that portions of lowland situated Eastward of the Meitchie River, and Westward of the Mahanudee, formerly possessed by the Rajah of Nepaul, but ceded to the Honourable East India Company by the Treaty of Segoulee, to be held by the Sikkimputtee Rajah as a feudatory, or as acknowledging the

⁸ Aitchison, C. U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring countries, Vol. XII, Pp. 58-59.

supremacy of the British Government over the said lands'.⁹ The object behind giving these lands was to make Sikkim stronger as a buffer state and to enable the Sikkim Raja to "subsist the garrisons he must maintain for the protection of the passes", between Sikkim and Nepal.¹⁰ The condition of granting this land known as Morung was that the provisions of the Treaty of Tilalya would be in force in the Morung also with the addition that the Company's police would be allowed to arrest the criminals and all public defaulters even inside the Morung; and that, if required, the Governor-General in Council might transmit to the local authorities in the Morung and this should be immediately obeyed and carried into execution in the same manner as was done in case of that coming from the Sikkim Raja.¹¹ Thus the Company's grip in Sikkim was further strengthened and the Raja of Sikkim who was feeling unsafe being sandwiched between Nepal and Bhutan had his territories restored; but under the British control and protection.

The cession of Darjeeling and compensation for the cession

Between 1817 and 1826 no important transaction took place between Sikkim and the Company. In 1826, a quarrel between the Raja Tsugphud Namgyal and his Lepcha Dewan Buljeet Karjee resulted in latter's assassination. Buljeet's cousin with his eight hundred followers took shelter in Nepal and the Sikkim Raja, in spite of efforts even by Tibet and China, failed to get their return.¹² Both the parties applied for the Company's help. In 1828 Captain G. W. Llyod and G. W. Grant were deputed to investigate and settle the dispute. During their visit to Sikkim they noted the importance of Darjeeling as a place of health resort and in 1829 they again visited Sikkim accompanied by a surveyor, Captain J. D.

9 Ibid.

10 Melville Memo, No. 4 (Rao's op. cit., P. 5).

11 Aitchison, op. cit., P. 60.

12 History of Sikkim, Pp. 114-115.

Herbert. They emphasised on Darjeeling's importance as health resort as well as on her importance from political and commercial point of view. In a letter of 18th June 1829 Llyod said: "As to the resources none can be depended on at first, but should a sanatorium established it must become a resort of people from all parts of the hills and even from Tartary, and I have no doubt be a place of great trade".¹³ Grant also expressed similar views.¹⁴

Thus Darjeeling came to the notice of the Governor-General. But the Company had to wait till 1833 when the Lepcha refugees from Nepal made incursion in Sikkim. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General proposed to his Council to send Llyod to open negotiation with the Sikkim Maharaja for transfer of Darjeeling to the British Government "in return for the equivalent in land or money".¹⁵ Bentinck also wrote to the Raja that the object of possessing Darjeeling was not pecuniary, but "solely on account of the climate".¹⁶ But the Raja annexed two conditions to the proposal for cession of Darjeeling: (1) grant of Debgong to Sikkim in exchange for Darjeeling and (2) arrest of one Kummoo Pradhan against whom the Raja advanced claim for the revenues of the Morung for three years. But the claims appeared to Bentinck to be impracticable.¹⁷ In fact, Debgong, though settled in perpetuity with the Raja of Jalpaiguri in 1828, belonged to Sikkim before being ceded to the Company by Nepal in 1815¹⁸ and Kummoo Pradhan, though an agent of the Sikkim Raja in the Morung, was appointed on the recommendation of D. Scott, the Magistrate of Rangpur.¹⁹

Though the Raja was intimated that the climate was the only factor for wanting the transfer of Darjeeling, Llyod wrote to W. H.

13 Bayley, H. V., Dorje-ling, P. 40.

14 Ibid., Pp, Appendix. AA i-iv ;

History of Sikkim, P. 121. ;

Bengal District Gazetteers, Darjeeling (1947) P. 37.

15 F. P. C., 23 January 1835, No. 1.

16 Ibid., 11 February 1835, No. 111.

17 Ibid., 6 April 1835, No. 104.

18 Ibid., 14 August 1834, No. 5.

19 Ibid., 6 April 1835, No. 100.

Machaughton, Secretary to the Government of India that the cession of Darjeeling should not consist of the spot alone, but should also include part of the mountains over which the road to Darjeeling must be made. Llyod thought that with the cultivation of tea Darjeeling would be a better place than Assam and wanted the settlement of Indian merchants from plains to maintain a native bazar there.²⁰ However, on 3rd October 1835, Llyod wrote to Machaughton that in August last the grant of Darjeeling had been made by the Sikkim Raja²¹ and again on 5th January 1836 Llyod further wrote that the Raja had made the grant freely and without any condition whatever.²²

Darjeeling was ceded to the Company ; but the Sikkim Raja did not consider the cession to be unconditional. In November 1839, he wrote a letter to Dr. A. Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling : "Llyod promised that whatever money I should desire in return should be granted, that my territory should be extended west to the Tambar River ; that Kummoo Pradhan and his brother should be deliverad over to me ; and that the deficit in my revenue in their hands should be made good".²³ But Campbell replied : "I did not know that you desired more in return for it than the satisfaction of having not the wishes of my Government".²⁴ Campbell expressed that the Raja had mistaken because Llyod was not authorized to offer any land. Campbell further brought to the notice of the Governor-General that the Raja had resisted his people from visiting the British territory for the purpose of service and trade. Campbell, however, proposed to express the gratitude of the British to the Raja for being allowed to use Darjeeling as a sanatarium.²⁵ The Raja wrote to the Governor-General also mentioning of Llyod's promise.²⁶ Government of India instructed

20 Ibid., No. 103.

21 Ibid., 9 November 1835, No. 55.

22 Ibid., 8 February 1836, No. 85.

23 Ibid., 12 February 1840, No. 102.

24 Ibid., No 104.

25 Ibid., 7 September 1840, No 98

26 Ibid., 12 February 1840, No. 103.

Campbell to inform the Raja that he would be compensated by Rs. 1,000/- annually if he did agree to "free intercourse between Darjeeling and interior of Sikkim".²⁷ The Raja was suspicious of the British promise.²⁸ Ultimately in September 1841 the Sikkim Raja accepted Rs. 3,000/- per annum as compensation for Darjeeling.²⁹ though the Raja had to wait till June 1847 to get the arrears of compensation since 1835.³⁰ 1841

Increased ill-feeling between the Sikkim authorities and the British and annexation of the Morung.

In spite of the Darjeeling settlement, the relations between Sikkim and the Company were not friendly. Problems cropped up on the question of surrender of slaves from Sikkim who took refuge in Darjeeling as well as the criminals taking refuge to Sikkim from British India. Both the sides refused to co-operate each other in apprehending the slaves or criminals.³¹ The Sikkim Raja was also annoyed with the British because of the loss of Ontoo Hill in 1839 to Nepal by the arbitration of Campbell centering which a dispute continued between Sikkim and Nepal since 1827.³² Campbell charged the Raja of (1) causing "vexations, delays and regular money exactions from people of Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim trading with Darjeeling"; (2) failing to comply with demand for surrendering criminals from India; (3) objecting to accept new road from Besar Batti to Siliguri as boundary on ground that by ceding Darjeeling the Raja had given no lands other than the mountain lands; (4) preventing his people from coming to Darjeeling for labour and trade; (5) prohibiting the people of Bhutan from coming and settling at Darjeeling; (6) refusing to sell Sikkim's lime deposits to

27 Ibid., 2 March 1840, No. 101.

28 Ibid., 26 October 1840, No. 121.

29 Ibid., 27 September 1831, No. 100.

30 Ibid., 26 June 1847, No. 102.

31 Bengal District Gazetteers, Darjeeling (1947), P. 39; History of Sikkim, P. 129.

32 F. P. C., 30 March 1847, No. 87.

✓ the British ; (7) applying frequently for surrender of slaves settling in Darjeeling and Campbell threatened the Raja of depriving of his possession in the Morung for his "unfriendly course".³³ Campbell's bullying tactics paid dividends, and in August 1846 the Raja sent his *Dewan* Illam Sing to Darjeeling to settle the disputes. Campbell was informed that duties were levied on the Tibetan traders "according to their means and after due enquiry" ; but Illam Sing denied all the other charges.³⁴ The Raja also granted the use of the lime deposits at Singmare in Sikkim.³⁵ Government of India decided to increase the Raja's allowance from Rs. 3000/- to Rs. 6,000/-³⁶

P Dewan
 The Sikkim Raja was not happy with Campbell for the latter's overlording him. But the Government of India refused to comply with the Raja's request for the replacement of Campbell.³⁷ This ill-feeling deepened further with the death of Illam Sing in 1847 when internal disorder broke out due to rivalry between Tokhang Donyar Namgyal, better known as *Fagla Dewan* who succeeded Illam and who led the Bhotia factions of Sikkim and the Lepcha factions led by Chebu Lama who was pro-British. This disorder was further aggravated due to the Raja's retirement to the religious life resulting in rivalry on the question of succession to throne.³⁸ The ill feeling increased in 1848 when the Sikkim authorities flatly refused the Governor-General's expectation that Dr. Joseph Hooker, an English naturalist, would be allowed to prosecute his researches in Sikkim on the plea that no foreigner could be allowed to travel in Sikkim. Campbell presumed that the refusal was due to influence

33 Ibid., 22 August 1846, No. 21.

34 Ibid., 21 November 1846, No. 320.

35 Ibid.

With the increase of population in Darjeeling, lime, an important material for house construction, was very much required there. As it was brought from plains it was very costly and time consuming. Sikkim had good lime deposits. But the British had no access to it which they resented. Ultimately the problem was solved in November 1846.

36 F. P. C., 23 October 1847, No. 24.

37 Ibid., 20 March 1847, No. 93.

38 F. P. C., 15 December 1849, No. 140.

of Pagla *Dewan* who had monopoly of Sikkim's trade with Tibet.³⁹ After a prolonged wrangle Hooker was allowed to visit Sikkim. Raja's discontent against the British culminated in 1849, during the second visit of Hooker accompanied by Campbell, when they reached the Tibetan border to investigate the possible trade routes, in spite of protests from the Sikkim officials and appeals from the Tibetan border guards to return back. On their way back they were arrested and escorted back to Tumlong, the then Capital of Sikkim and were eventually released unconditionally. The Raja was so offended with Campbell that he wanted the Governor-General to replace him and till this was done and his slaves were restored to him, the Raja was wanting to detain Hooker and Campbell.⁴⁰ Besides, the Sikkim Maharaja feared that the Chinese would be annoyed at the Europeans visiting the frontiers. The *Vakeel* of Sikkim wrote to Captain Byng, officiating Superintendent of Darjeeling that the Chinese were angry due to "the *Sahibs* crossing the frontiers".⁴¹

The Government of India under Lord Dalhousie took serious offence at the Raja's activities and in 1850 sent up a force under Campbell and attached all the Terai and all the lands lying below the Raman in the north, and the Ranjeet and Teesta in the east, and the Nepal-Sikkim frontier in the west, and stopped the annual allowance of Rs. 6,000/- for Darjeeling. This meant, besides the loss of allowance for Darjeeling, a loss of Rs. 46,000/- approximately in cash and in kind which constituted almost the Sikkim Raja's entire income.⁴²

*The British Expedition to Sikkim and the Treaty of 1861—
Establishment of Protectorate over Sikkim*

Thus the Morung was lost and Sikkim became a hill-locked kingdom. The Maharaja had no alternative but to beg for mercy of

39 Ibid., No. 133.

40 Ibid., 29 December 1849, No. 197.

41 F. P. C., 29 November 1849, Nos. 267-09.

42 Jackson, W. B., Report on Darjeeling (Selection from the records of the Bengal Government, No XVII, 1854), P. 3.

the Company. The Raja who was then at Choombi, the Raja's summer residence in Tibet, informed through Chebu Lama, his *Vakeel* that he had dismissed *Dewan* Namguay or Pagla *Dewan* and prayed to meet Campbell at Darjeeling.⁴³ But as his request was turned down he again made similar request.⁴⁴ In the meantime Campbell came to know of *Dewan* Namguay's return to the Sikkim *Durbar* with normal power.⁴⁵ In March 1859 the *Dewan* Namguay sent a deputation to the authorities in Bengal for receiving Rs. 12,000/- which they said to have been promised by Campbell to be paid to the Sikkim Raja annually for "throwing open the whole country of Sikkim and making it completely available for trading and travelling, if the Government would give a gratuity of Rupees 12,000/- per annum"; and in case of non-compliance they demanded the restoration of the territory confiscated in 1850. Campbell informed the Government of Bengal that they got up the report that Campbell and Chebu Lama had regularly appropriated the gratuity which had long ago been granted by the Government to the Raja.⁴⁶ Situation worsened further due to some incidents of kidnapping of British subjects from Darjeeling in May 1860 and in spite of writing to the Sikkim Raja, then at Choombi, Campbell failed to restore them. So Campbell wanted to apply force and the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal solicited the orders of the Governor-General regarding the course of action to be pursued.⁴⁷ The Governor-General approved Campbell's proposal to apply force and instructed the Lieutenant Governor to demand: "(1) the restoration of the kidnapped British subjects. (2) Compensation to those who have been plundered. (3) the surrender of the plunderers. (4) payment of the cost of occupation. (5) security against future aggression from Sikkim". The Governor-General thought that the best security would be the residence of a *Vakeel* from Sikkim at Darjeeling and wanted to fix

43 F. P. C., 13 December 1850, No. 140.

44 Ibid., 21 February 1851, No. 282.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 27 May 1859, No 51.

47 L. G. P. P (G). A., July 1860, No. 47

certain time for the compliance of the British demands.⁴⁸ Campbell accordingly made the demands to the Raja on 1 October 1860 and, in case of non-compliance within one month from the date, threatened to occupy the Raja's territory lying to the west of the Great Rungeet and to the north Raman river with the Singalelah range as its western boundary and the snowy range as the northern boundary.⁴⁹ But as the Raja failed to comply with, Campbell decided to occupy the above said territory.⁵⁰ After making successful inroad upto Rinchinpong, due to sudden attack at night by the Sikkim forces under *Dewan* Namguay, Campbell had to retreat back to Darjeeling.⁵¹ Sikkim *Amlas* wrote a letter to the Governor-General on December 1860, that due to adoption of forcible measures by Campbell against the Raja, Sikkim's relation with Tibet had been disturbed and the Raja wanted the restoration of the lands and *ryots* which had been forcibly possessed by Campbell and the withdrawal of the British from Sikkim to avoid fight with Sikkim.⁵² Campbell had an idea that the Sikkim ruler was "unpopular and aggressive" and that the Sikkim people would cooperate with the British everywhere in Sikkim and the Lieutenant Governor rebuked him for his scanty knowledge regarding the people of Sikkim.⁵³

The Governor-General lost confidence on Campbell. He also did not recommend the occupation of whole Sikkim but only the southwestern portion of the country. He desired Ashley Eden, Joint Secretary to the Board of Revenue, to be entrusted with the responsibility of negotiation in place of Campbell.⁵⁴ Eden was accordingly selected as Envoy and Special Commissioner in Sikkim. It was made clear to Eden that the Government of India did not want to annex any portion of Sikkim because the existence of an

48 Ibid., September 1860, No 11.

49 Ibid., October 1860, No 20.

50 Ibid., November 1860, No. 21.

51 History of Sikkim, P, 133.

52 L. G. P, P(G). A., December 1860, No. 100.

53 Ibid., January 1861, No. 37,

54 Ibid., No. 44.

independent state between India and the Chinese territory was desirable and asked Eden to be careful to create no such feeling in the mind of the Sikkim people that the British rule would be planted permanently in any part of Sikkim.⁵⁵ Besides, annexation of Sikkim, the British might have feared, would antagonize China and hamper the prospect of trade with Tibet via Sikkim.

Eden observed that there was a second *Dewan* in Sikkim and he was opponent of *Dewan* Namguay. Eden wanted to contact the Raja through him and planned to play the Lepcha faction against the Bhotias to catch the *Dewan* Namguay.⁵⁶ Eden demanded from the Raja : (1) Compliance with all the demands made time to time by Campbell ; (2) pecuniary compensation to the British subjects injured by the Raja's subjects ; (3) surrender of *Dewan* Namguay to Eden and appointment of new *Dewan* to be approved by Eden ; (4) immediate return to Eden's camp of all prisoners, stores, arms and ammunitions taken during attack on Campbell's camp at Rinchinpong ; (5) apology from Raja for his past misconduct. Eden wanted the Raja or his authorized officers to meet Eden to enter into engagement with him for the future good conduct of the Raja and to settle future condition of relations between the Sikkim State and the British Government.⁵⁷

British force left for Sikkim on 1st February 1861 and proceeded almost unopposed. *Dewan* Namguay escaped to Tibet. Lieutenant Governor wanted Eden to insist on having free permission for the British subjects to travel and live in Sikkim and to make roads through Sikkim "especially on the track into Thibet". But the Government of India was opposed to the second proposal because it would be of little value if not given with the good will of the Sikkim Government and the people ; and it could not be claimed without placing Sikkim into subjection to or dependence upon the British Government, to which the Governor-General-in-Council was

55 Ibid., No. 45.

56 Ibid., No 167.

57 Ibid., February 1861, No. 5.

58 Ibid., No. 11.

opposed.⁵⁹ A Treaty was signed on 28 March 1861 at Tumlong by Eden and Sidkeong Namgyal, the Raja's son, as the Raja desired his son to be treated as the Maharaja due to his old age.⁶⁰ Eden hoped the treaty to place relations with Sikkim on a satisfactory footing and to promote trade with Tibet.⁶¹ Eden claimed that by making no territorial possession in Sikkim the British had done the wise thing as Sikkim and Bhutan were tributary to Tibet which was again tributary to China and they would have opposed any annexation.⁶² But the Tibetan Government was not happy with British action due to *Dewan* Namguay's representation to the Tibetan authorities.⁶³ The British were also happy to secure the appointment of Chebu Lama, pro-British leader of the Lepcha faction, as the *Dewan* of Sikkim.⁶⁴

By this Treaty of 1861 was cancelled all the former treaties between the British Government and Sikkim. The Sikkim Raja regained all the territories of Sikkim possessed by the Government of India and undertook to restore all the properties abandoned during Campbell's retreat and to pay indemnity. The Complications regarding delivery of wanted British subjects and freedom of movement of Sikkim's subjects were removed. *Dewan* Namguay or his blood relations were debarred from coming to Sikkim or holding any office under the Maharaja. The British secured valuable rights relating to trade (discussed in Chapter V) and the rights to conduct geographical or topographical survey in Sikkim. The relations of Sikkim with her neighbours became the subject of the British control. The Maharaja, by this treaty, was not permitted to live in Tibet for more than three months in a year and a *Vakeel* was to be accredited by the Government of Sikkim to reside permanently at Darjeeling.⁶⁵ Thus Sikkim became a defacto protectorate of British

59 Ibid., March 1861, No. 53.

60 Ibid., Nos. 88 & 111.

61 Ibid., April 1861, No 30.

62 Ibid., No 48.

63 Ibid., 58.

64 History of Sikkim, P. 134.

65 Aitchison, op. cit., Pp, 61-65

India, though the de jure status of Sikkim remained undefined to create future complications. Expulsion of *Dewan Namguay* and his blood relations was the early step of wiping out Tibetan influence in Sikkim and this policy was pursued very vigorously in due course.

*Succession of Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal, 1862
and increase of allowance.*

In 1862 Maharaja Tsugphud Namgyal abdicated the throne in favour of his eldest son Sidkeong Namgyal, whose succession was supported by the pro-British faction of Sikkim led by Chebu Lama and the annual allowance of Rs. 6,000/- which was stopped in 1850 was restored. In March 1863 the Maharaja informed the Government of Bengal of his distressed financial condition and of debt of Rs. 35,000/- incurred since the confiscation of the Morung. The Government of Bengal solicited to the Government of India for the sanction of Rs. 20,000/- to the Maharaja to enable him to give assistance to his officers who might be engaged in making roads to Tibet⁶⁶ and the Government of India sanctioned Rs. 20,000/- to the Maharaja.⁶⁷

In June 1873 the Maharaja, during his meeting with the Lieutenant Governor at Darjeeling, applied for the increase of his allowance to Rs. 12,000/- which had already been increased to Rs. 9,000/- in 1869 and discussed the questions of Chinese opposition to British trade with Tibet via Sikkim as well as the problems of Nepalese immigration to Sikkim.⁶⁸ The Government of Bengal recommended to the Government of India to increase the allowance to Rs. 12,000/- considering the prospect of making Sikkim the "thoroughfare of a great trade" with Tibet and an active ally⁶⁹

66 L. G. P. P. (G). A., April 1863, No. 29

67 Ibid., August 1863, No 15.

68 L. G. P. P. (J). A., July 1873, No 45.

69 Ibid., No 46

and in September 1873 approved the increase in allowance on condition that the Sikkim *Durbar* would render assistance to open and expand the trade with Tibet.⁷⁰

The Mission of J. Ware Edger.

Though Eden gave a very promising view regarding prospect of trade with Tibet through Sikkim, the attempts of Captain E. Smyth of Bengal Army in 1863 and of T. T. Cooper, an Englishman, in 1867 and 1869, to enter Tibet and the attempt of the Government of India to communicate the Lhasa authorities through the Sikkim Maharaja failed. In April 1873 the Mercantile Community of England under the name "Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce" placed a Memorandum to the Duke of Argyu, Secretary of state for India, for improving trade through the Sikkim route.⁷¹ Besides, the trade was often stopped by the Tibetan officials on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and there was lack of good roads. So it was decided to depute J. W. Edger, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to visit Sikkim to be acquainted with the state of affairs in Sikkim and opening and development of trade with Tibet as well as the opening out of the best line of road to Tibet and "in short all matters connected with the development of friendly and commercial intercourse with Sikkim and the countries beyond".⁷² Edger failed to cross the Sikkim-Tibet boundary and to meet the Sikkim Maharaja who was then at Choombi, his summer residence in Tibet, due to the opposition of the Chinese *Amban* or viceroy at Lhasa who held the Maharaja responsible for the British making roads through Sikkim and threatened him of bad consequence.⁷³

Edgar, however, had discussion, regarding opening of Tibet, with the *Phari Jongpen* and the ex-Dewan Namguay and he was told that

70 Ibid., October 1873, No 1.

71 F. P. A., October 1873, No. 134.

72 Edgar, J. W., Report on a visit to the Sikkim and Thibetan Frontier. Pp. 6-8.

73 Ibid., Pp. 16-17.

to witness any change in Tibetan policy of isolation the best way would be to move to Peking.⁷⁴

On return to Darjeeling in December 1873, Edgar, to improve relations with Tibet, proposed : (1) to obtain a declaration from the Chinese authorities that the exclusion of the British subjects in Tibet were not authorized by the Chinese Government ; (2) to cultivate friendly relations with the Tibetan frontier officers by meeting between the Indian and the Tibetan officials on the Sikkim side of the boundary without creating suspicion in their mind that the British might annex any part of their country ; (3) to establish frontier mart which would depend on its site and the way of its starting and to establish an annual or half-yearly trade fair at Gnatong or some other place to attract Indian as well as Tibetan traders. Edgar preferred Dumsong to Gangtok as site, though the Sikkimese had suggested it in place of Gnatong in the uplands of Sikkim for mart due to easy access to it. Edgar also proposed the construction of a road to Tibet through Sikkim because the mart would be of little significance without it.⁷⁵

Sir Richard Temple, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal endorsed Edgar's proposal for the construction of a road to Tibet and wanted its completion within three or four years.⁷⁶ But the Government of India disagreed because it felt that the road should not be constructed until the Chinese and Tibetan obstacles were removed.⁷⁷

In spite of non-acceptance by the Government of India, Edgar's mission was not a failure. Edgar was deputed to survey the prospect of India's trade with Tibet and the Government of India wanted the Sikkim Maharaja to be instrumental in it.⁷⁸ The Maharaja supported Edgar's proposal regarding establishment of mart and construction of road and agreed to co-operate in the latter work. Maharaja's allowance was increased.

74 Ibid., Pp. 18-23.

75 Ibid., Pp. 76-79.

76 F. P. A., January 1875, No. 31.

77 Ibid., February 1875, No. 24-37.

78 L. G. P. P. (J). A., October 1874, No. 10.

In April 1874, Maharaja Sidkeong Namgyal died. His half-brother Thutob Namgyal succeeded him with the patronage of the British,⁷⁹ though he received presents and letters during the installation ceremonies from Tibetan authorities as well as from the Chinese *Amban*.⁸⁰

In October 1874, during an interview, the Lieutenant Governor pointed out to the Maharaja the advantage that would accrue to Sikkim in case of establishment of friendly relations between the British Government and Tibet and expressed the intention to improve the existing tract between Pheydong and the Darjeeling district; and the Lieutenant Governor was assured of Sikkim's co-operation.⁸¹

In 1881, the Government of Bengal rejected the Sikkim Maharaja's request for increase of his allowance on the grounds that Maharaja violated the Treaty of 1861 by (1) residing at Choombi for more than three months in a year; (2) not appointing any officer to work on his behalf during his absence from Sikkim; and (3) failing to "attend to the injunctions of Government regarding the admission into Sikkim and the settlement there of Nepalese ryots".⁸²

Mission of Colman Macaulay.

Some secret explorations by Sarat Chandra Das, Headmaster of Bhotia School at Darjeeling, who was deputed by the Government of India, in 1879 and again in 1881 made the Tibetan authorities very suspicious and trade on Sikkim-Tibet frontier was stopped. So the Government of Bengal, according to the advice of the Government of India, deputed its Finance Secretary, Colman Macaulay to visit Sikkim and the Tibetan frontier in 1884 to (i) discuss with the Maharaja questions regarding the administration of Sikkim and his relations to the British Government; (ii) to visit the Lachen valley to examine its potentiality as trade route towards

79 Risley, H. H., ed., *The Gazetteer of Sikkim* (1894), P. VI.

80 *History of Sikkim*, Pp. 139-141.

81 L. G. P. P. (J). A., November 1875, No. 32.

82 *Ibid.*, July 1882, No. 27.

the province of Tsang in Tibet ; and (iii) to endeavour to establish friendly relations with the Tibetan authorities of the districts adjacent to Sikkim on the north.⁸³

Phodang Lama and Khangsa Dewan, to Pro-British officials of Sikkim, advised Macaulay to persuade the Maharaja to reside in Sikkim permanently and not to go to Choombi as they hoped that this would promote the British views regarding development of trade and friendly relations with Tibet. They wanted Macaulay to make assistance to construction of Raja's new house and increase of allowance conditional on his agreeing not to leave Sikkim.⁸⁴ The Maharaja was asked by Macaulay to stay at Tumlong, to carry on administration from there and, if cooler place was required, the Maharaja was advised to go to some place like Lachen and Lachung. He was also asked to supply porters for the road work.⁸⁵ The Raja promised to do his utmost to secure the withdrawal of stoppage of trade by the Tibetan authorities and pointed out that the trade was continuing in spite of efforts of the Tibetan authorities to stop it. He agreed to keep up the Lachen route under the treaty, and to continue to keep up the Jelap road. The Raja's increase of allowance was made conditional to his measure to improve Sikkim's administration, promote trade and friendly relations with Tibet.⁸⁶ About this time trouble broke out between Tibet and Bhutan and the Maharaja was allowed to go to Choombi to find out the reason behind the trouble and to use his influence to open the trade, by entrusting a responsible officer to look after the affairs in Sikkim.⁸⁷

Macaulay came to know from the *Jongpen* of Khamba that the monks of the monasteries at Lhasa-Sera, Depung, Gaden Mulu were rigorously maintaining the policy of isolation towards the British because they fear to lose their trade monopoly and that the construction of road would be of no use while the present policy of

⁸³ Macaulay, Colman, Report of a Mission to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier, with a Memorandum on Relations with Tibet., P. i.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, P. 11.

⁸⁵ History of Sikkim, Pp. 168-169.

⁸⁶ Macaulay's Report, Pp. 14-15.

⁸⁷ History of Sikkim, P. 170.

isolation was maintained by Tibet. The *Jongpen* advised Macaulay to secure the consent of China on their side to open Tibet for trade free from all restrictions.⁸⁸

Macaulay attached too much importance to the opinion of the *Jongpen* and advocated for the despatch of a mission to China to plead the British case for a mission to Tibet to the Chinese Government to confer with the *Amban* and the Government officials of Tibet for free admission of Indian traders to Tibet without any obstruction through Sikkim-Darjeeling route.⁸⁹ Macaulay's proposals, though made the Bengal Government very enthusiastic, was received by the Government of India with coolness. However, Macaulay could convince Lord Randolph Churchill the Secretary of State for India, the need of the mission and Macaulay was permitted to go to China to arrange for the passports to go to Tibet. By this time, by the Chefoo Convention of September 1876, the British got the right to send a mission to Lhasa.⁹⁰ After some opposition passports were granted to Macaulay in November 1885. The mission was organized and assembled under Macaulay at Darjeeling in early 1886. The Tibetans were alarmed at the news of the mission and they warned that it would be resisted.

The Lieutenant Governor who wanted to utilize the service of the Sikkim Maharaja who was then at Choombi asked the Maharaja to stay there until arrival of Macaulay. Macaulay sent letters to the Tibetan frontier officer through the Maharaja expressing the peaceful intention of the projected mission. But the Sikkim frontier officer wrote to the Maharaja of the Tibetan authorities' resolution to permit no Englishman to cross the boundary and asked the Maharaja to resist the British mission from crossing the frontier even by force,

⁸⁸ Macaulay's Report, Pp. 43-45.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Pp. 104-105.

⁹⁰ The Chefoo Convention was signed between Britain and China on 13 September 1876 and ratified in its entirety in 1886. Taking advantage of the murder of a British Official, A. R. Margary, in Yunnan this convention was imposed upon the Chinese. This convention allowed the British to enter Tibet from China as well as from India. (Lamb., *op. cit.*, Pp. 145-147).

if required.⁹¹ Thus the Tibetan opposition was determined and the Macaulay Mission had to withdraw.

The Macaulay Mission might not have failed if the Indian Government supported the Mission whole-heartedly. The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, wanted to avoid any complications with China because his hands were full with the affairs in Afghanistan and Burma. The relation with the Afghans were still critical in 1886 and the British army was still lying down in Burma and any application of force by the British would have alarming result. In 1884 the Government of India campaigned against the king Thibaw of Ava in upper Burma and annexed it to the British empire in 1885. Burma had traditional relationship to the Chinese Empire and the Burmese had been accustomed to send presents to Peking at regular intervals. It was therefore decided to ignore the Tibetan question for the time being in exchange of the Chinese recognition of the British position in Burma.⁹²

The Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 and Trade Regulations of 1893.

Immediately after the withdrawal of the Macaulay's Mission Tibetans advanced thirteen miles inside northern Sikkim across Jelap pass and occupied Lingtu. Disputes arose regarding the jurisdiction on the lands above and below the Jelap pass. The Tibetan authorities disagreed to accept the British allegation that the Tibetans had no right on the lands below the Jelap. They took the Sikkimese to task for failing to defend their own territories and their officers acting as guide to the British and working as *Coolies* in opening roads upto the frontier. Tibetans even threatened to take back the disputed lands which they had transferred to Sikkim. The Maharaja could not deny the truthfulness of Tibetan complains and admitted that Sikkim land had been considered as included within Chinese territory since the days of the first Sikkim Maharaja Phuntsog

91 History of Sikkim, Pp. 171-175.

92 Lamb. op. cit. Pp. 170-173.

Namgyal.⁹³ In fact, the Maharaja had entered into a secret treaty with Tibet in 1886 promising to prevent persons from crossing the Sikkim-Tibet boundary and agreeing that Sikkim was subject only to Tibet and China.⁹⁴ This was a violation of the Treaty of 1861 and the Maharaja was asked to return to Sikkim or his allowance would be stopped. But the Maharaja declined to return due to the opposition of the Tibetan authorities and informed that the Tibetans had constructed a fort at Lingtu and stopped trade.⁹⁵

The Government of Bengal suggested to expel the Tibetans from Lingtu by force, a proposal which was opposed by the Government of India.⁹⁶ So the Government of Bengal made some further suggestions that (i) the Maharaja should be invited to Darjeeling and the weakness of the Treaty of 1861 should be corrected; (ii) the Tibetan authorities should be intimated through the Sikkim Maharaja to leave Lingtu by 15 October 1887 and (iii) be asked to send representatives to demarcate the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet.⁹⁷ The Government of India accepted the first two suggestions, but disagreed to the third one.⁹⁸ The Government of Bengal several times invited the Maharaja to visit Darjeeling and even threatened to pass over the responsibilities of Sikkim's administration to Khangsa Dewan and Phodang Lama. The Maharaja informed the Government of Bengal of his inability to return due to his treaty obligation to China and Tibet and demanded the restoration of his annual allowance which was suspended since 1886.⁹⁹

Thus fearing the decline of British influence in Sikkim, Stuart Bayley, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, wanted to adopt some steady measures.¹⁰⁰ The inactivity of the Government of India was also

93 *Ibid.*, Pp. 177-180.

94 Risley., *op. cit.*, P. VIII.

95 *History of Sikkim*, P. 184.

96 *F. S. E.*, February 1887, No. 297.

97 *Ibid.*, June 1887, No. 280.

98 *Ibid.*, No. 289.

99 *Ibid.*, January 1888, No. 2.

100 *Ibid.*, No. 1.

subject to criticism in England by the Chambers of Commerce and by the tea planters in Darjeeling and Dooars.¹⁰¹

So in October 1887, Lord Dufferin made up his mind to expel the Tibetans from Lingtu without further delay. The British expelled the Tibetans from Lingtu and reached Choombi in September 1888.¹⁰² The Maharaja was arrested at Choombi and on his return was instructed never to go to Choombi in future. He was further asked to act according to the council of Phodang Lama and Khangsa Dewan, leaders of the pro-British faction in Sikkim and the Maharaja's close associates were ill-treated.¹⁰³

The defeat of the Tibetans alarmed the Chinese and fearing to lose influence over Tibet, they began negotiation with the British. After a prolonged exchange of views, an Anglo-Chinese Convention was signed at Calcutta on 17 March 1890.¹⁰⁴

This convention defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet at the watershed of the Tista river under the joint Anglo-Chinese guarantee, admitted the British Government's direct and exclusive control over the internal and external affairs of Sikkim and denied to Sikkim authorities any right to have relations with the ruler or officers of any other country without the permission of the British Government.¹⁰⁵

By this convention three matters remained unsettled—pasturage, communications and trade, of which the matter relating to trade was very complicated due to problems regarding the location of mart and the importation of Indian tea into Tibet. However, after prolonged negotiations, Yatung was selected as trade mart temporarily and it was agreed that after five years of the signing of the trade agreement Indian tea might be imported into Tibet at the same rate of duty which was imposed on the Chinese tea into England.¹⁰⁶

101 Lamb., op. cit., P. 182 ; Risley, op. cit., Pp. XV-XVI.

102 Frontier and Overseas Expedition from India, op. cit., P. 55.

103 History of Sikkim, P. 199.

104 Frontier and Overseas Expedition from India, op. cit., P. 61.

105 Aitchison, op. cit., Pp. 66-67.

106 G. B. P. P. (H. C.) 1904 (CMD 1920), Vol. 67, Pp. 804-805.

Thus on 5 December 1893 the Regulations regarding trade, communications and pasturage was signed between India and China.¹⁰⁷

Sikkim placed under British Administration.

While negotiations were going on with the Chinese *Amban* regarding the Anglo-Chinese Convention, *Amban* initially was found to disagree to change the official relation between Tibet and Sikkim. So Edger suggested to the Government of Bengal for the arrangements for the future administration of Sikkim and proposed Sikkim to be administered by a British officer.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly J. C. White was appointed as Political Officer of Sikkim to look after her administration with the help of a Council consisting of important pro-British faction leaders like Phodang Lama, Khangsa Dewan and Shew Dewan and others.¹⁰⁹ But the Raja and Rani, due to their pro-Tibetan sympathies, declined to take part in this administration.¹¹⁰

The Maharaja was asked by A. W. Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, and White to bring from Tibet his eldest son, Tchoda Namgyal who was at Tibet for education. He was also asked to stop sending customary gifts and presents to the Dalai Lama or the Chinese *Amban* at Lhasa. Maharaja was allowed to return to Gangtok on condition that he would send for the *Kumar* as soon as the roads became safe. In 1889, Sir Stuart Bayley forbade him to visit Choombi or to communicate with the Tibetan officials. As to the second instruction the Maharaja wanted to be favoured by a joint order from the Government of India, China and Tibet. Maharaja's appeal for increase of his allowance and permission to be allowed to go to Lachen or Lachung in place of Choombi was made conditional by the Lieutenant Governor to the return of his eldest son from Tibet and final settlement of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations.¹¹¹

107 Ibid., Pp. 806-807.

108 C. P. F. 8 of 1889 (Notes and orders) P. 1.

109 History of Sikkim, P. 206.

110 C. P. F. 8 of 1889, (Notes and orders) Pp. 3-5.

111 History of Sikkim, Pp. 210-217.

After repeated request the Maharaja was allowed to go and stay at Rabdenche near Pemionchi temporarily while the Maharani, who was expecting, was allowed to go to Choombi.¹¹² The Raja secluded himself at Pemionchi and refused to come to Gangtok or bring over his eldest son to Sikkim. The Maharaja was feared to be under the influence of Yangtang Kazi and the Pemionchi *Lamas* whose influence was prejudicial to the British interest.¹¹³

Though due to pressure from White the Maharaja returned to Gangtok but disagreed to bring his son from Tibet. So White suggested to the Government of India to stop the allowance to the Maharaja and to educate his second son Sidkeong Namgyal, the incarnated *Lama* of the Phodang Monastery, for serving the British interest.¹¹⁴

The disgusted Maharaja with his family members, a group of *Lamas* and attendants, tried to escape to Tibet. He failed and was interned in a Monastery at Darjeeling. The second prince was brought to Darjeeling for education and Maharaja's allowance was drastically reduced to Rs. 150/6/6 per month and Rs. 95/- for eleven servants per month. His followers were humiliated and punished. Every efforts were made to make the Raja agree to bring his eldest son from Tibet and the Raja was even lured that he would be allowed to retire to Choombi if he agreed.¹¹⁵ But all efforts having failed, P. Nolan, Commissioner of the Rajshahi Division, proposed to depose the Raja temporarily and to keep him under house arrest. The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal accepted the proposal and suggested to depose the Raja for three years and after three years to instal him or his second son in the throne.¹¹⁶ Government of India, accordingly deposed the Maharaja for three years effecting from July 1892 without making any formal announcement to avoid "excitement".¹¹⁷

112 C. P. F. 9 of 1890, No. 2.

113 C. P. F. 7 of 1891, No. 4.

114 F. S. E., June 1892, No. 149.

115 History of Sikkim, Pp. 227-231.

116 F. S. E., August 1892, No. 64.

117 Ibid., No. 70.

The Maharaja with his family was shifted to Karseong. The helpless Maharaja, in an interview with Nolan in January 1894, requested to be allowed to return to Sikkim and, being advised by Nolan, made up his mind to submit an apology to the Government of India through Nolan.¹¹⁸ The Sikkim Council under the influence of White opposed the restoration of Thutob Namgyal to the throne, but failed.¹¹⁹ Sir Charles Elliot, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, proposed to restore the Maharaja on condition that he would write to his eldest son to come back to Sikkim and would accept the new constitution provided for Sikkim. Raja agreed to both the conditions. On 17 October 1895 Maharaja was asked by Nolan to return to Gangtok and to preside over the Council meetings and to carry on state's administration with some limitations and after 2 or 3 years he might be restored to full power if he succeeded in getting friendly interchange of commerce between the British and the Tibetans. Thus in November 1895 the Maharaja was restored to his throne as a titular head of Sikkim, the actual power being vested on the Political Officer.¹²⁰ Repeated efforts to bring the eldest prince from Tibet having failed, the Governor-General-in-Council decided to recognise the second prince Sidkeong Namgyal as successor designate,¹²¹ in spite of Maharaja's disapproval to it¹²² (discussed in chapter II).

Meanwhile, Yatung did not appear to the British a properly chosen trade mart.¹²³ With it was added the question of demarcation of boundary, as per Convention of 1890. White found that some places inside the Sikkim territory, as per Convention of 1890, had been occupied by the Tibetans. Government of Bengal recommended that White alone should proceed to demarcate the boundary, if the Chinese and the Tibetans did fail to join him. But

118 History of Sikkim. Pp. 234-236.

119 F. S. E., October 1895, No. 462.

120 History of Sikkim. Pp. 241-243.

121 C. P. F. 23 of 1899, No. 1.

122 Ibid, 31 of 1899, No. 3.

123 G. B. P. P. (H. C.) 1904 (CMD 1920), op. cit., Pp. 814-815.

Government of India opposed the move as the demarcation was not provided for in the Treaty of 1893 and it was creating no "serious practical inconvenience".¹²⁴ However, after some correspondence with the Chinese *Amban* by Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India, White was asked to arrange for erection of demarcation pillars at the passes approachable from Sikkim side, with the Chinese and Tibetan officials.¹²⁵ In May and June 1895 White erected some pillars at the Jelap pass and Donchuk which the Tibetans destroyed within a few days of the erection. But Lieutenant Governor's suggestion for stern action against the Tibetans was disapproved by Lord Elgin.¹²⁶ The Chinese *Amban*, as the Tibetan Monasteries were insisting to retain the ancient boundary, suggested to postpone the demarcation for five years when the treaty was to be revised.¹²⁷ So the Lieutenant Governor wanted the Government of India to warn the Tibetans that, in case of their failure to co-operate in the demarcation, Choombi would be held by the British "in pawn either temporarily or permanently."¹²⁸ But Government of India refused to accept the suggestion.¹²⁹ In November 1895, while visiting Yatung, Nolan observed that Tibetans did not think themselves bound by the Anglo-Chinese Convention as Tibet was not a party to it and the Tibetan monks feared that if the British entered Tibet their influence would reduce in Tibet.¹³⁰ So he suggested to drive the Tibetans back from the boundary which they claimed as well as Giaogong of Sikkim. The Government of Bengal supported Nolan's view,¹³¹ but the Viceroy turned it down because Government of India attached more importance to the development of trade than to the demarcation of boundary and thought that "the Tibetans probably possess claims" to territory near Giaogong.¹³² He proposed to

124 Ibid., Pp. 810-811.

125 Ibid., P. 820.

126 Ibid., P. 826.

127 Ibid., P. 834.

128 Ibid., P. Pp. 830-31.

129 Ibid., Pp. 828-29.

130 Ibid., Pp. 840-42.

131 Ibid., P. 843.

132 Ibid., P. 844.

Amban for a joint local enquiry for actual demarcation of the boundary.¹³³ Nothing fruitful happened.

As the Tibetans were attaching so much importance to *Giaogong*, so White wanted the Government of India to insist on the trade mart from *Yatung* to be shifted at *Phari*, which White thought would be a better mart.¹³⁴ Sir Alexander Mackenzie, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, supported White's proposal,¹³⁵ though Nolan was doubtful of its benefit due to Tibet's policy of isolation.¹³⁶

Younghusband Mission—British suzerainty over Sikkim accepted.

With the arrival of Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India in January 1899 Elgin's policy of peaceful persuasion took a sharp change. Curzon was in favour of strong and vigorous policy towards Tibet. He preferred direct Communication with Lhasa, because, he observed, China was nothing more than a *de jure* suzerain in Tibet. He also got information that a party of Russians had visited Lhasa in January, 1899.¹³⁷ This news alarmed Curzon very much and he wrote to the Secretary of State for India in England of his desire to open direct communication with Lhasa.¹³⁸ In June 1899 the Home Government approved his policy.¹³⁹

To open direct communication with Tibet was a very difficult task. The Government of Bengal came to know from *Ugyen Kazi* that the Tibetans would never agree to open *Phari* to Indian traders except under compulsion.¹⁴⁰ *Ugyen Kazi's* letters to *Dalai Lama*, in this respect, failed to receive favourable response. Then Curzon

133 Ibid., Pp. 844-846.

134 Ibid., Pp. 881-883.

135 C. P. F., 24 of 1899, No. 4.

136 Ibid., No. 7.

137 Ibid., 39 of 1899, No. 1.

138 Ibid., No. 4.

139 Ibid..

140 Ibid., No. 8.

made two abortive attempts to communicate Dalai Lama personally.¹⁴¹ So as next step White suggested to occupy Choombi Valley or to stop all Tibetan trade with India. But the second suggestion meant hardship to the British India's traders also and the Tibetan trade was likely to be diversified to Nepal.¹⁴² The policy of isolation pursued by the Tibetans spoke on the imperialistic ego of the British and they were no more ready to tolerate it. Lord Curzon wrote to Lord Hamilton : "...It is, indeed, the most extraordinary anachronism of the 20th century that there should exist within less than 300 miles of the borders of British India a state and a Government, with whom political relations do not so much as exist, and with whom it is impossible even to exchange a written communication. Such a situation cannot in any case be last..."¹⁴³ on 11 April 1902 Hamilton permitted the expulsion of Tibetans from Giaogong without crossing the border¹⁴⁴ and the Tibetans were expelled accordingly.

In the meantime there came the news of a reported existence of a secret treaty among Russia, China and Tibet. Curzon became very restive to take direct action in Tibet without taking China into account because he felt that the *Amban* was nothing more than a Chinese ambassador in Tibet in reality. So on 8 January 1903, Curzon suggested to Hamilton for negotiating with Tibet alone and if a new treaty was concluded the Tibetan representatives also should be signatory to it. The negotiations should cover the questions of Sikkim-Tibet frontier as well as the future relations with Tibet and should culminate in appointing permanent British representative to reside at Lhasa. Curzon proposed that a mission should be despatched to Lhasa with an armed escort and the Tibetan and Chinese Governments should be assured that the mission would be exclusively of commercial character without any political design.¹⁴⁵

141 G. B. P. P. (H. C.) 1904 (CMD) 1920), op. cit., P. 916.

142 Ibid., Pp. 911-913.

143 Ibid.,

144 Ibid., P. 916.

145 Ibid., Pp. 936-942.

Colonel Younghusband was placed as the head of the Mission. The Mission crossed Jelap pass on 3rd December 1903 and after some skirmish and remarkable casualties on the Tibetan side, it entered Lhasa on 4 August 1904. The Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia. A Convention between the Great Britain and Tibet, known as Lhasa Convention, was signed on 7 September 1904. By the Article one of this convention, the Government of Tibet engaged to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet as defined in the said convention and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.¹⁴⁶ Thus the authority which the British secured in Sikkim in 1890 became final with the recognition of it from Tibet. Once the British suzerainty over Sikkim being finally settled, the affairs of Sikkim became affairs of India.

From 1817 to 1889 the British Government in India did not interfere in the affairs of Sikkim directly, though Sikkim became a protectorate in 1861. The British tried to achieve their goal by keeping the internal affairs of Sikkim undisturbed. They thought that this policy would keep the Tibetan authorities in humour and their purpose would be served. But after receiving the news of the Secret Treaty of 1886 and the *Amban* not agreeing to change official relations between Tibet and Sikkim, it was decided to arrange the administration of Sikkim according to the need of the British. White was accordingly appointed as the Political Officer of Sikkim to look after and rearrange the administration of Sikkim. To rearrange the political set up and to consolidate the British position there the following measures were taken :—(a) change in superstructure in Sikkim ; (b) change in equilibrium of population ; (c) reorientation of land revenue system ; (d) actions relating to promotion of trade through Sikkim.